HISTORY

MEDIAEVAL PERIOD

The early Deccan Musalmans seem to have had little control over Kolaba. According to Ferishta [Briggs' Ferishta, II, 338.] as late as 1377 many parts of the konkan were in the hands of the Vijayanagar or Anegundi kings [The site of Vijayanagar is the modern village of Hampi, thirty-six miles north-west of Bellari. The Vijayanagar dynasty included about twelve Kings whose power lasted from about 1336 to 1587. Coldwell's History of Tinnevelly, 45-50; Ind. Ant., II, 177]. Of these Bukka I died in 1377 and was succeeded by Harihara II. During his reign there were insurrections in Konkan and the region came to be held by Turuskas on behalf of the Bahamani kingdom. In the next year Mujahid Shah, the Bahamani Sultan, was assassinated at Adoni. This presented a great opportunity for Harihara II for retaliation and he invaded Konkan and Northern Karnataka at the head of a large army. Though the details of the campaign are not definitely known, two or three incidents stand out clearly. Madhavamantrin who was in charge of Banavasi on behalf of Vijayanagar, defeated the Turuskas and captured Goa and reduced the seven Konkans to subjection (A. D. 1380). It must have been during this campaign against the Sapta-Konkans that the important ports of Ceul and Dabhol on the coast of Northern Konkan were acquired by Harihara and the possession of these ports besides Goa must have made him master of the entire West Coast of the Deccan [Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, VI, 282.]'. On the evidence of Nuniz it can be said that Harihara II "was always at war with the Moors and he took Goa and Ceul and Dabull and Ceillao and all the country of Caramandell". [Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, VI, 324.]

Soon after the introduction of British administration into Ratnagiri, inquiries brought to light a general tradition, that before Musalman times the south Konkan which included the present Kolaba, had been under a dynasty of Lingayats called the Kanara kings, whose headquarters were at Anegundi. They were believed to have established the village organisation of which traces remained though the original system was defaced by the later institution of Khots. Their power was said to have gradually decayed, merging into a time of disorder, when the country was overrun by Kolis and nearly unpeopled. One of the leading local chiefs had his headquarters at Kurdu near the Devasthali pass about twenty-two miles south-east of Nagothana [Rev. Rec. 121 of 1825, 2-4.]. Jervis refers to this same tradition and notices that one of the centres of Vijayanagar power in the Konkan was at Rayagad [Konkan, 89.] which was held by Maratha polygars as tributary.

The Bahamanis,1347-1489.

From the beginning of their rule in 1318, the Deccan Musalmans seem to have held ports in Kolaba of which Ceul was one [Briggs Ferishta, II, 295]. Under the Bahamanis (1347-1489) the change of capital from Daulatabad south to Gulbarga caused the chief traffic to pass to the Ratnagiri ports of Dabhol, Ciplun and Rajapur Still Ceul remained a place of importance, as in 1357 when Hasan Gangu distributed his territory into four provinces, the northwest province is described as comprehending Ceul, Junnar, Daulatabad, Bid and Paithan [Briggs Ferishta, II, 295]. Muhammad II who ruled from 1378 to 1397 was an enlightened rider. When his kingdom was ravaged by famine he made prompt and efficient arrangement for the transport of grain from Gujarat and Malva and its distribution among Muslims only at cheap rates. He established orphanages in various centres in the kingdom two of which were at the Konkan ports of Ceul and Dabhol [Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan Vol. VI, p. 254.].

In 1429, a force was marched to the sea and is said to have reduced the whole Konkan to obedience. In 1436, a second army was sent and the chief of Redi or Rayagad was made tributary [Briggs' Ferishta, II, 424.] and in 1451 by the establishment of Junnar as a leading Musalman centre the connection with the Konkan was strengthened [Briggs' Ferishta, II, 484.]. But these steps did not succeed in establishing a complete hold of the Bahamanis over Konkan; for, the Bahamani kingdom was ever a hot-bed of rivalry between the Deccani and paradesi groups. Indeed the signs of this rivalry were noted as early as the Konkan campaign of 1429 referred to above. The Bahamani general Khalaf Hasan Basri planned to capture Sasti which was then held by the Sultans of Gujarat. The army of Khalaf Hasan encamped on the Mahim creek but his attempt to occupy Sasti proved futile because the Deccani officers under Khalaf Hasan treacherously quitted his camp, with the result that the Gujaratis were able to gain an easy victory over Khalaf Hasan [Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Vol. VI, p. 359.]. During 1430-31, the Bahamani army was defeated on three successive occasions by Gujaratis. Khalaf Hasan, the paradesi minister attributed these reverses to the treachery and cowardice of the Deccanis. But the latter seem to have convinced the king of the incompetence of his paradesi adviser. The result was that the Deccanis were raised to power. Now they openly manifested their desire to suppress the foreigners and in 1446, treacherously massacred a large number of them. In that year an army of the Deccanis and paradesis was sent against Raja Sankarrav Sirke, a chieftain with his headquarters at Khelna (Visalgad) in South Konkan. The Raja of Sangamesvar who earlier had professed submission to the Bahamani Sultan made common cause with the Sirke. These two stalwarts once again showed that the spirit of the Konkan was yet unsubdued. The invaders, who were lured by them into the fastnesses of the hilly tracts of this region, suffered a crushing defeat with the result that the survivors retreated to the fort of Cakan. Taking advantage of this, the Deccanis misrepresented this affair to the Sultan and ascribed the defeat to the treacherous and inefficient conduct of the Konkan campaign by Khalaf Hasan and his paradesi colleagues. The Sultan concurred with the Deccani's view and brought about a severe massacre of the foreigners. After the incident a few surviving foreigners represented to the Sultan the deception practised on him and gave him the correct version of what had taken place. The duplicity of the Deccanis was exposed with the result that they were degraded in the court and the foreigners regained their ascendancy. [Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, VI, 265-266.] The feud between the two parties, howeyer, never actually died out.

The reign of Muhammad Shah III (1463-1482) was a period of gradual rise and ascendancy of one of the ablest ministers of the Bahamani kingdom, Mahmud Gavan, who was Persian by birth. Anxious to establish his hold over Konkan he marched (1469) against refractory Konkan chiefs with a powerful army including the troops of Junnar, Cakan, Kolhad, Dabhol, Ceul, Wai and Man. In this campaign Mahmud Gavan invaded Jakhurai, i.e., probably Sankarrav of Sangamesvar by way of Kolhapur. Mahmud had a great difficulty in capturing Khelna or Visalgad which barred his progress to Sangamesvar. He was, however, assisted by Karansingh of Mudhol, who held a band of Maratha soldiers under his control: Bhim, the son of Karansingh scaled the walls of Visalgad with the help of a wild lizard [ An animal holding its nails fixed into the rock.] and captured the fortress. The subsequent capitulation of Sangamesvar was an easy affair which Mahmud accomplished. This was followed by the conquest of Goa. As he was very anxious to hit at Vijayanagar, he was very keen on carrying out this enterprise successfully, for there was a brisk sea-borne trade carried on by Vijayanagar through Goa, on which the prosperity of Vijayanagar depended to a considerable extent. The loss of the port thus cut off not only a lucrative source of income to Vijayanagar but also the traffic in horses which was essential for keeping up its military strength [Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan VI, 298.]. Mahmud's campaign of Konkan ended in 1472 [H. K. Shervani; Bahamanis of Deccan p. 298.]. Bahamani kingdom ever remained a hot-bed of fighting nobes. Sultan Mahmud Shah (1482-1518) took no interest in the kingdom and the provincial governors became powerful. Bahadur Gilani a noble of the Bahamani Empire seized the whole of Konkan and committed various acts of piracy off the Gujarat coast for several years (1491-94). He further carried on depredations as far as Cambay and seized the island of Mahim. Mahmud Begada the Sultan of Gujarat (1458-1511) first attempted to send an army against Gilani, but he soon found that for a dash against Gilani, the Gujarat army would have to invade the Deccan. Mahmud, therefore, wrote to the Bahamani king pointing out the need of suppressing the rebel. The Bahamani king in response to this sent an army against Gilani, but 'it was not till 1494 that Gilani was defeated and slain and full reparations were made to Gujarat, which ever afterwards maintained an uneasy control over the northern part of Konkan, leaving the southern part to be ruled by the Ahmadnagar rulers who succeeded the Bahamanis.

Gujarat Kings,1509.

Towards the close of the fifteenth century (1489) the inland parts of Kolaba passed from the Bahamani to the Ahmadnagar kings. The seacoast, including at least Nagothana and Ceul, remained in the hands of the Gujarat kings, [In 1502 the Italian traveller Varthema (Badger, 114) placed Chaul in Gujarat; and in 1508 according to Mirat-i-Ahmadi (Bird, 214) Mahmud Begada established a garrison at Nagothana and sent an army to Chaul.] till, in 1509, the overlordship of Ceul passed from Gujarat to the Portuguese [Faria in Kerr, VI, 120.]. After this, though the coast boundary of Gujarat shrank from Ceul to Bombay, [Stanley's Barbosa, 68-69.] the Gujarat kings continued to hold the fort of Sangaza or Sahksi in Pen till 1540 when it was made over to Ahmadnagar [Faria in Kerr, VI, 368.].

Portuguese on the scene.

The arrival of Portuguese on the scene at this time, was destined to affect the fortunes of Konkan in a remarkable way. In order to understand the circumstances in which they came to dominate the Konkan scene it is necessary to make a few preliminary observations about the maritime trade of India. From very early times, Indian ships on the west coast carried on trade with Hormuz in the Persian Gulf. The main centre of this trade was Gujarat but Malabar and Konkan had also a share in it in the fourteenth century. The Arabs exercised a strict monopoly in this trade from Malabar to the Red Sea. Towards the end of the century the Portuguese arrived on the scene and planned to oust the Arabs from this lucrative trade and succeeded in establishing themselves firmly at Cochin and Calicut. Their policy in the beginning was only to send annual expeditions from Portugal but by 1505 they adopted a new policy of settling in India permanently and with that view they appointed Almeida as the first residential viceroy, at Cochin. This policy of the Portuguese of settling in India, keeping a standing fleet as well as the construction of forts alarmed the Muslim rulers of Bijapur, Gujarat and other smaller states. Their supremacy on the Arabian sea had also seriously affected the interests of Arabia and Egypt by depriving them of the duties levied, on Indian goods. So when the Muslim rulers appealed to the Sultan of Egypt for aid he readily agreed and sent a fleet under Amir Hussain, who in January 1508 severely defeated a Portuguese fleet off Ceul in Konkan and the son of the Portuguese commander lost his life. Next year the Portuguese viceroy Almeida avenged the death of his son by inflicting a crushing defeat on the Muslim fleet off Diu on the Gujarat coast. [Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan VI p. 424.] In 1516 the Portuguese succeeded in establishing a factory at Ceul and Revdanda. [Da Cunha's Chaul and Bassein, 39.] It should be noted that Ceul was a very important port through which brisk maritime trade used to be conducted in the 15th century. Even Dabhol and Rajpuri could stand no comparison to it. Silk, spice articles, nutmegs, and coconuts used to be exported largely to Europe. Ceul was equipped with suitable piers to facilitate the landing of boats in those days. What is called Revdanda to-day was in fact a part of Ceul. However, with the occupation of Goa by the Portuguese and their increasing supremacy, the trade of Ceul was diverted to the south. When the Sidis established their hold over Janjira and Danda-Rajpuri and as the English established themselves at Surat, the prosperity of Ceul came to be on the decline [The port of Chaul had lost its importance during the 13th and 14th centuries but regained it in the 15th century; it became "a place of considerable note in the 15th century, during the prosperity of the Bahamani dynasty and its Ahmadnagar branch" (J. Da Cunha: History of Chaul and Bassein, published in 1876, pp. 17-18). However, J. Da Cunha wrote in 1876; "Chaul long before Bassein rose to be the capital of the North, was the Principal entrepot of trade of the Portuguese in this part of India, as well as their chief naval station and arsenal." (J. Da Cunha: History of Chaul and Bassein, p. 82).]. The growing rivalry between the Adilshahi and Nizamshahi kingdoms and their constant lighting caused the decline of the commercial prosperity of Ceul still further. Even nature conspired as it were to destroy the prosperity of Ceul. With the gradual accumulation of silt the sea became shallow and the port no longer remained convenient for landing of ships and carrying on sea-borne trade [Mr. S. V. Avalaskar: Shiva-Charitra Sahitya, Vol. IX, Introduction, pp. 4 and 5.].

But to turn to the main incidents of history, in 1521, on the promise that he would be allowed to import horses through Ceul, Burhan Nizam Shah (1508-1553), the Ahmadnagar king allowed the Portuguese to build a fort at Revdanda about two miles below the Musalman town. In 1524 the fort was completed. In 1528 a Gujarat fleet of eighty barks appeared at the mouth of the Ceul river and did much damage to Ahmadnagar territory and to Portuguese trade. Thereupon a Portuguese fleet was sent to act against the Gujarat fleet, which took several Gujarat vessels, and passing up the Nagothana or Amba river burnt about six Gujarat towns. On his way back to his boats the Portuguese General was attacked by the commandant of Nagothana, but beat him off with loss. In 1533 and again in 1538 the Gujarat kings made treaties with the Portuguese. In 1540 Burhan Nizam Shah of Ahmadnagar took the fort of Sahksi in Pen from its Gujarat commandant. The Gujarat commandant asked for help from the Portuguese who re-took the fort, and kept it for a time, but finding it costly handed it to Ahmadnagar [Faria in Kerr, VI. 368.]. So formidable had the power of the Portuguese grown that in 1570 the kings of Ahmadnagar, Bijapur, Calicut, and Achin in Sumatra formed a league against them. Murtaza Nizam Shah of Ahmadnagar, who was stirred to great exertions by the hope of securing Ceul and Bassein, led an army against Ceul, hut without effect [Faria in Kerr, VI. 423.]. The Portuguese in their turn invaded the Ahmadnagar territory, attacking Kalyan and hunting its suhurhs. In 1594 the Ahmadnagar king again attacked Ceul and detached a body of horses to ravage Bassein. [Briggs' Ferishta, III 284.]

Sidis of Janjira.

At this stage, it is necessary to take note of another power that materially affected the fortunes of Konkan, the power of the Sidis of Janjira, who originally came from Abyssinia. About the middle of the fifteenth century (1437), when the Bahamani dynasty became independent of Delhi and intercourse with "North India ceased, the fashion arose of bringing to Western India large numbers of Abyssinians and other East Africans.  [The trade in slaves from the African coast to Egypt, Arabia and India had been going on from prehistoric times. During the time of the author of the Periplus (A.D. 70 and 80), Abyssinian slaves were exported from Opone from the Egyptian market where they were, in demand on account of their docility, courage and intelligence (Vincent's Commerce of the Ancients, II. 157). Under the Shilahara rulers of the Konkan (A.D. 810-1260), slaves are mentioned as sent from Sofala in Africa to the Thana ports [Ibn Aluradv (950) Reinaud's Abulfida, cccvii ]. Towards the end of the fifteenth centurv Abyssinian slaves were in high estimation in Turkey, Arabia and India. They were docile, tractable, intelligent and endowed with talents and courage which always raised them to favour and often to command. [Vincent's Commerce, II. 122 note 3, and Nikitin: (1470). India in Fifteenth Century 9, 10, 12 ]. In India these slaves were employed by Musalmans as soldiers' and sailors. In the beginning of the sixteenth century (1514) Barbosa notices the high value attached by Moors to Abyssinian slaves, who were Christians, taken, in war. These Christian slaves were sharp, well-built, and faithful, and when they became Musalmans they were better than the original Moors (Stanley, 18). During the period of Portuguese power in the Konkan (1530-1739) the import of African slaves into India continued brisk. Great numbers of house-slaves were brought by Portuguese ships from Africa and spread all over the Portuguese territories. The number of slaves varied from six to ten in a small establishment and from thirty to forty in a large establishment. Besides working as farm-servants they carried umbrellas and palanquins and did other menial work. They cost little to buy, and scarcely anything to keep, only a dish of rice once a day. Some of these blacks were sold in war, some by their parents, and others, in despair, barbarously sold themselves [Gemelli Careri in Churchill, IV. 203; Terrv (1618) in Kerr's Voyages. IX. 392; Badger's Varthema 114, 151: Nairne's Konkan. 50 ]|. Hamilton (1680-1720) notices that a good store of Mozambique negroes was brought to India. They were held in high esteem by the Indian Portuguese who made them Christians and raised them to be their priests (New Account. I. 10). Hamilton also notices (Ditto, I 24) the import of slaves from Aethiopia. In driving off the Maskat Arab's from Diu in 1670. African slaves are noted (Ditto, I. 40) us behaving ' with great gallantry. After the fall of Bassein (1739) negroes are mentioned in the stipulations regarding the release of prisoners (Jervis' Konkan, 130) Under the Maratha supremacy in the Konkan (1670-1800) the pandarpeshas or Maratha landlords of Thana had to obtain a special leave of the Peshva for the employment of slaves. In 1750 Grose (I. 159) notes the fondness of the Moors for Abyssinian slaves known as Habshi Kafirs. These slaves were black, woolly, and not thicklipped; they were brave, faithful and shrewd . they were well treated. Traces of African blood may be seen among some of the Salsette Christians and Konkani Musalmans, and among Hindus the Katakan have a sub-division named Sidi; some Thakurs have frizzled and curly hair and Talheri Kunbis are occasionally met, whose deep blackness suggests a part African origin.] These men from the Arab El Habish, the people of north-east Africa, were known as Habshis, or more often as Sidis, which was originally a term of respect, a corrupt form of Sayyad. Though most Habshis came to India as slaves, their faithfulness, courage, and energy often raised them to positions of high trust in the Bahamani court. According to Orme the successful Abyssinians gathered round them, all of their countrymen whom they could procure either by purchase or invitation, including negroes from other parts of Africa, as well as Abyssinians. From their marriages, first with natives of India and afterwards among their own families, there arose a separate community, distinct from other Musalmans in figure, colour and character. As soon as they were strong enough they formed themselves into an aristocratic republic, the skill and utility of the lowest orders giving them influence, and influence fostering a pride in their name which made them among the most skilful and daring sailors and soldiers in Western India [Orme's Historical Fragments, 56-57. Waring (Marathas, 71) describes these Abyssinians as brave and active and staunch Muslims, hostile by religion and by interest to the rise of a Hindu power.].

Towards the end of the fifteenth century Sidi Yakut is mentioned as admiral of Bahadur Gilani, the son of the Bahamani governor of Goa, who, establishing himself at Goa and Dabhol, attempted, in the decline of Bahamani power, to make himself ruler of the Konkan. In 1493 Bahadur sent Yakut with a fleet of twenty sail against the Gujarat fort of Mahim near Bombay. Yakut took the fort, and Bahadur refusing to submit or to restore the place, was attacked, defeated, and slain by Mahmud Bahamani [Briggs' Ferishta, II, 539, 543; IV, 72.], as mentioned above.

There is no evidence that this Yakut Khan was connected with Janjira [Janjira is the Marathi corruption of the Arabic Jazirah meaning an island.]. Since the establishment of Musalman power in the Deccan, Janjira, the fort and Danda-Rajpuri, the port rose to great importance under the Ahmadnagar king. According to a Musalman history of Ahmadnagar it was Malik Ahmad (1490-1508), the founder of the Ahmadnagar dynasty who first established Abyssinians as the captains of the island fort of Janjira. During the period of the highest prosperity of the Musalman kings of Ahmadabad (1450-1530), Danda-Rajpuri is said to have been one of the twenty-five districts or sarkars into which their possessions were divided [Bird's Mirat-i-Ahmadi, II.]. But the reference is doubtful; at most, it only implies that the ruler of Rajpuri acknowledged the Gujarat king as his suzerain [Compare the entry of Mulhar or Baglan as one of the twenty-five 'districts' of Gujarat. The Baglan chief's dependence went no further than the furnishing of a body of troops in time of war.]. About 1490 Ahmad Shah, the founder of the Ahmadnagar dynasty, took Danda-Rajpuri after a long siege [Briggs' Ferishta, III, 198; Wiring's Marathas, 44.]. At this siege, according to an Ahmadnagar Musalman history, after vainly attacking the island fort of Janjira for six months, Ahmad's troops grew disheartened. Besides his want of success Ahmad's position was very uncertain. He had only lately thrown off his allegiance to Mahmud Bahamani (1482-1518) who was doing his utmost to bribe Ahmad's troops to give up his cause. The fortunate capture of Sivneri, the fort of Junnar in Poona, with five years' revenue of Mahiirastra and the Konkan, enabled Ahmad to secure the allegiance of his men by gifts and high pay [This find of treasure appears in the Ahmednagar history as the gift to Ahmad by a Janjira hermit of a piece of the philosopher's stone.]. The siege of Janjira was pressed, the fort taken, and the Koli garrison tied to chains and thrown into the sea. Ahmad rebuilt and strengthened the fort and gave the command to his Abyssinian slave Yakut [Sahabi's Ahmadnagar History (3-7) gives the following account of the way in which Sidi Yakut obtained the command of Janjira fort. During the seize, Ahmad looking down from the rocky shore across the half a mile of sea to the fort lost heart and turning to his general Salabat Khan and his slave Yakut said; 'Who can take a fort whose moat is the sea? Salabat Khan was silent. But Yakut dashed down the rocks, and, throwing himself into the sea, swore that he would not return without the head of the captain of the fort. Ahmad sent a boat after him. But Yakut raised himself in the water and struck at the boat with his sword declaring that he would not come back unless the king commanded him and sent his ring in token of his command. Ahmad sent his ring and Yakut binding it in his turban swam ashore. Pleased with his courage Ahmad promised that, if Janjira fell, Yakut should commandit.]. According to another account the Sidis got possession of the island by fraud [Clunes' Itinerary, 24.]. A certain Perim Khan, and one or two other Abyssinians, dressing as merchants, brought from Surat a shipload of great boxes said to contain wine and silk. They asked Ram Paul, the Koli captain of the island, if they might land their goods. He gave them leave, and, in return, they regaled the garrison with wine. The Kolis drank to excess, and the merchants, opening some of the boxes in which armed men were hid, attacked and took the fort. According to local information gathered in the second half of the nineteenth century by F. B. O'Shea, Inspector of Post Offices, Konkan Division, Ram Patil embraced Islam and was made governor of the island under the name of Ithbai Rav. According to another source, tapped by Larcom, during the same period Burhan Nizam Shah (1508-1553) granted Janjira and Danda-Rajpuri to his famous Shia Minister Shah Tahir [Shah Tahir was a Persian, very highly respected for his learning and holiness. Ferishta (Briggs, III. 223) has an excellent account of Shah Tahir's tact in bringing about a friendly meeting between his master and Bahadur Shah (1526-1536) of Gujarat.], who in 1537 induced Burhan to establish the Shia faith as the state religion of Ahmadnagar. This in Mr. Larcom's opinion, explains the Shia shrine of Pancaytan Pir in the fortress of Janjira [According to another account this shrine originally belonged to the old Koli guardians of the island.].

Gujarat Claims 1450-1530.

The chief town of Habsan appears in Barbosa (1514), as Danda [Stanley's Edition, 71.]. and, about the same time, Danda is entered in the Mirat-i-Ahmadi among the ports that yielded revenue to Gujarat [Bird's Mirat-i-Ahmadi, 129. It is difficult to understand what control or rights the Gujarat king had over Danda-Rajpuri. The right may have been nominal, or the revenue may have been recovered from Gujarat merchants trading with Janjira.]. The mention of the Malabar coast and the Maladiv islands in the same list shows that the fact of getting revenue from Danda did not imply the possession of any political power in the port. Whatever power there may have been was lost between 1530 and 1535 when the greater part of the Thana coast passed from Gujarat to the Portuguese. Still the Ahmadabad kings seem to have cherished some claims over Janjira, as in 1578 when the Emperor Akbar conquered Gujarat he is said to have arranged that Danda-Rajpuri should be considered part of Ahmadnagar. [Bird's Mirat-i-Ahmadi, 134.] In 1584 Salabat Khan, the Ahmadnagar minister, was for a time imprisoned in Danda-Rajpuri. [Briggs' Ferishta, III, 265; Ferishta, I, 388. Salabat Khan seems to have been moved to Kherla in Berar. Briggs' Ferishta, III, 278.]

First Sidi Governor, 1618.

In 1600 Ahmadnagar was taken by the Moghals, and though the great Malik Ambar soon after recovered most of the territory for his king, [ Briggs' Ferishta, III, 315.] local records seem to show that till 1618 the governors of Danda Rajpuri were Moghal officers, [The appointment of one Allah Khan is noted in 1612 and of Ibrahim Khan in 1618.] though the Portuguese still continued to have their hold on Revdanda. In 1618, an abyssinian of the name of Sidi Surul Khan was appointed governor. In 1620 Sidi Surul was succeeded by Sidi Yakut, and he, in the following year, by Sidi Ambar who was known as Sanak or the Little, to distinguish him from the great Sidi or Malik Ambar who restored and remained in power at Ahmadnagar till his death in 1626. [Mr. Larcom's MS.] Danda-Rajpuri along with the whole district of Kolaba continued to remain under Ahmadnagar till 1630, when, on the final overthrow of the kingdom by Shah Jahan (1628-1658), it passed to the Moghals. [Elphinstone's History, 509.] But the Moghals exercised so little control that, within two years, almost the whole of the district except the territory round Danda, where the Sidis then had firmly rooted themselves fell into the hands of Sahaji Bhosle, Sivaji's father.[ According to Jervis (Konkan, 89) in 1632 Shahaji was offered the whole of the Nagar Konkan if he would agree to hold it from the Moghal Emperor and would give up all claims to lands in the Decran.] In February 1636 a strong Moghal force was sent to recover the Konkan from Sahaji who retreated to the hill fort of Mahuli in Thana and was there forced to surrender.[Jadunath Sarkar; Shivaji, p. 17.] In 1636, as Adil Khan of Bijapur agreed to pay tribute, Shah Jahan made over the Kohkan to him. The places especially noticed as ceded to Bijapur were Jival or Ceul, Cakan in West Poona, and Bahal or Pabal, perhaps Panvel in Thana [Elliot and Dowson, VII, 256.] and Danda-Rajpuri also.

Janjira made over to Bijapur, 1636.

In1636 Sahail entered the service of Bijapur. [Jadunath Sarkar: Shivaji, pp. 17-18.] Under the Bijapur kings the Kohkan between the Savitri and Bassein was divided into two commands, one between Bhivandi and Nagothana whose headquarters were at Kalyan, and the other from Nagothana to the Savitri under the Sidls of Janjira whose headquarters were at Danda-Rajpuri and who held the Government on condition of protecting trade against pirates and of carrying pilgrims to Mecca. [Grant Duff, Vol. I, IIO.] The Sidi now became the leading Abyssinian officer of the Bijapur fleet,[ Jervis' Konkan, 90; Grant Duff, Vol. I, IIO.] and was raised to the rank of Vazir. In accordance with the aristocratic constitution of the Sidi community it was arranged that on the death of a Vazir, the first officer of the fleet, not the son of the late governor, was to succeed. Among Bijapur Vazirs the local records mention Sidi Ambar, who died in 1642, Sidi Yusuf who died in 1655, and Fath Khan who according to Grant Duff was an Abyssinian, [ Grant Duff, Vol. I, III.] and, according to Khafi Khan, an Afghan. [Khafi Khan in Elliot and Dowson, VII, 289.] The submission of the Sidis to Bijapur was not smooth; for, we find that Sidi Ambar, Captain of Danda rebelled against Adil Shah and was defeated in November 1640. A Bijapuri army under Asad Khan was sent in February 1642 to wrest Danda from the rebels and in March 1642 Fath Khan in retaliation proclaimed a puppet Nizam Shah as the lawful heir of an ancient dynasty and was tyrannically seizing territories in Balaghat under his pretended authority. Eventually, Bijapur Government made peace with Fath Khan, recognising him as its vassal and the lord of Danda[ Sarkar: Shivaji, p. 256.]

Shivaji.

Sivaji's contact with the present Kolaba district can be traced to the year 1656 when he marched to invest Rairi (Rayagad) in the course of his campaign against the Mores of Tavli. Krsnaji and Baji, the two sons of the late Candra Rav More who had met his death at the hands of Sivaji's officer, together with many women of the family had taken refuge in the fort. Rairi was then a very lofty and almost inaccessible plateau without the fortifications which Sivaji later strengthened and named it as Rayagad in 1656 [ Shivacharitra pradipa p. 50.]. The siege was a short one; want of a leader and exhaustion of provisions forced the young Mores to agree to a surrender through the mediation of the two of Sivaji's Mavle followers (April 1656). Sivaji was now free to invade South Konkan with ease and extend his dominion in that region [ Sarkar: Shivaji, p. 43.]. Next year on 31st July, he despatched Raghunath Ballal Korde to attack the Sidls [Maratha chroniclers describe the Sidi as an enemy like a mouse in a house (Vide Sabhasad Bakhar para. 80).] of Janjira, and in October following, himself burst into Konkan. The northern part, largely comprising the present Thana district, including Kalyan, Bhivandi and Mahuli were captured from the Bijapur officer Mulla Ahmad by January 1658. Sivaji's progress towards the south into the Kolaba district seems to have been assisted by the petty local chiefs in that region who were eager to throw off Muslim yoke and had written to him for help. Surgad, Birvadi, Tala, Ghosalgad, Bhorap or Sudhagad (15 miles east of Roha), Kangori (12 miles east of Mahad), all passed into his hands and thus the Sidls of Janjira lost the eastern half of the Kolaba district to him [ Sarkar: Shivaji, p. 55.]. With a view to press the Sidi still further, Sivaji again sent in 1659, a strong force under the Pesva Samrajpant but the Marathas were met by Fath Khan and defeated with great slaughter [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, p. 130. In this connection Sir Jadunath Sarkar writes " Fath Khan was a brave, active and able leader. In 1659, when Afzal Khan was advancing against Shivaji from the east, Fath Khan seized the opportunity of trying to recover his own. But, on hearing of the destruction of the Bijapur army (November), he retired in haste." (Jadunath Sarkar: Shivaji, Sixth Edition, p. 127).]. Sivaji made every effort to repair this disaster and sent a fresh body of troops under Raghunath Pant. But Fath Khan maintained his ground and in the following year (1660) gained some important advantages [ Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, p. 131.]. In this campaign Kay Savant a loyal vassal of Bijapur cooperated with the Sidi. Sivaji's General Baji Pasalkar met him when both of them fell in a single combat [ Sabhasad para. 78.]. During the rains of 1661 Sivajl turned his whole strength against Fath Khan, and, in spite of bad weather, drove back Fath Khan's troops in a great land battle and captured Danda-Rajpuri before the season was open enough to allow the Bijapur government to relieve it [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, pp. I44-I45. Grant Duff's details seem to show that there is no truth in Orme's story (Historical Fragments, 8-9) that, on escaping from Panhala fort, where he had been closely ' besieged by the Bijapur general Sidi Johar or Salabat Khan, Shivaji appeared before Danda-Rajpuri, and, on showing a forged order from Sidi Johar, induced the commandant to give up the fort. Orme was perhaps misled by Shivaji's capture of Rajapur in Ratnagiri which followed shortly after his escape from Panhala fort. See Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, p. 143.]. Sivaji further totally excluded the Sidi from the mainland by fortifying a hill that commanded the island fort and building a chain of fortresses, such as Birvadi and Linganagad (5 miles, east of Rayagad) [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, p. 112.], which effectively prevented the Sidi depredations in that quarter. He opened batteries against the island fort of Janjira, but for want of guns and artillerymen, failed to make any impression on it. Every season during the next nine years (1661-1670) Sivaji battered Janjira but with little success. Fath Khan was hard pressed and applied for help to his new neighbours, the English. And so great a name for strength had the Janjira rock gained, that the English factors in Bombay wrote to Surat, advising the council to give up Bombay and take Janjira instead [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, p. 174.]. Maratha gains on the Kolaba coast were organised into a province, which was placed under the Viceroy, Vyankoji Datto, with a permanent contingent of 5 to 7 thousand men (Jadunath Sarkar, Shivaji, p. 58).

Finding his supplies from the mainland totally cut off and thus reduced to starvation, the Sidi started piracy against the villages and ports in the south, on the sea coast of Sivaji's dominion. Sivaji's inability to control the piracy convinced him of the need to build up a strong navy to ensure the protection of his sea-side districts.

But even before this, his attention was forcefully directed to a greater danger of an attack coming from the Moghals. For, as soon as Aurangzeb found himself fairly secure on the throne he pursued his incomplete task of obtaining control over the Deccan. Late in 1660 he sent against Sivaji his own uncle Siiyasta Khan who having occupied a few places like Cakan near Poona and thus obtained initial success, planned to complete the Moghal conquest of Sivaji's dominions by attacking Konkan. The general chosen for this purpose was Kar Talab Khan, an Uzbeq who had attained a car-hazari rank in the Moghal army. With him Sayasta Khan sent many of his own Rajput and Muslim subordinates and local allies (such as Rai Baghini, the heroic widow of Udaji Ram). Marching from Poona by way of Lohgad. Kar Talab Khan descended into Konkan by a pass a little to the south of Bhorghat and through dense jungles, steep rocks and narrow broken roads reached Umarkhind (about 15 miles, east of Pen). Sivaji, by secret and rapid marches, came up with them and cut off their lines of advance and retreat alike: Kar Talab had TO surrender and was forced to buy a safe retreat for His army, from the Maratha hero.[ Sarkar : Shivaji, p. 83.] But these and other successes of Sivaji further south in the Ratnagiri district were chequered by a subsequent great defeat. In May 1661 Moghals first conquered Kalyan and then Mahad the capital city of that region, which they held for nine years. The fort of Deiri, in the Pen subdivision was besieged by a Muslim general named Bulaqi but a Maratha relieving force under Kavji Kodhalkar drove him away after slaying 400 of his men (21st August 1661). In 1662 Sivaji led an attack on Pen but the Moghal defence was obstinate and SivajI's forces suffered a heavy loss, in killed and wounded. We find that even upper Ceul and Rahamatpur were properly garrisoned by Moghal forces at this time. The net result of these combats was that although Sivaji remained master of Ratnagiri and only a very small part of Southern Kolaba, the rest of the region including Northern Konkan came to be occupied by the Moghals. [Sarkar : Shivaji, p.  87.]

We may not here pause to describe Sivaji's surprise night attack on Sayasta Khan and his immediate recall from the Deccan. At this time Sivaji started building up his navy in right earnest. He first strengthened Rayagad, and fitted out a fleet in imitation of the Janjira Sidis. He rebuilt or strengthened Kolaba fort of Alibag, repaired Suvarnadurg and Vijayadurg, and collected war vessels. His chief centre at this time was the harbour of Kolaba. [Grant Duff, Vol. I, p. 147.] His power was so formidable that the Bijapur government, through his father Sahaji's mediation, was forced to enter into a truce with him, and give him the whole territory south of Kalyan.

As soon as Sivaji found himself free from the risk of war with Bijapur he turned his arms against the Moghals [Jervis' Konkan, p. 92.]. In the latter part of 1663, he assembled an army near Kalyan and another near Danda-Rajpuri and gave out that he meant either to attack the Portuguese at Bassein and Ceul, or to reduce the Sidis. His real design was on Surat which he surprised and plundered from the 6th to 10th January 1664 [Sarkar: Shivaji p. 92.]. Sivaji enriched Rayagad with the spoils of Surat, and made it the seat of his government. In the same year (1664), death of his father, Sivaji assumed the title of Raja and struck coins.

It appears that during this period Sivaji's ships sailed far off into the Arahian sea. For, from the English at Surat writing in March 1665 we are able to learn that from each of the eight or nine "most considerable ports in the Deccan" he used to "set out 2 or 3 or more trading vessels yearly to Persia, Basra, Mocha (in Arabia), etc." The rise of Marathas as a commercial and naval power caused anxiety to the English merchants, the Sidi and the Moghal Emperor alike. Of these the English did not make any active move but the Moghals did for early in 1665 when Jay Singh opened his campaign against Sivaji he wrote to the Sidi to enter into an alliance with the Moghals. Later when he was about to begin his invasion of Bijapur he invited the Abyssinians to join the Moghal force promising them mansabs [ Sarkar: Shivaji, p. 260-61.]. Sidi Sambal fought on the Moghal side during the invasion of Bijapur in 1666. The informal connection between the Emperor and the Sidis that came to be thus established was, as we shall see later, "strengthened subsequently.

Unable to withstand the Moghal advance Sivaji agreed to hold his lands from the Emperor and to attend at Agra to be invested. Enraged at the low position which was given to him at the Moghal court, he fled from Agra in 1666 and spent the greater part of the following two or three years at Rayagad in the management of his territory.

The Sidi appointed Moghal Admiral, 1671.

In 1669 Sivaji's attack upon Janjira was renewed with great vigour. In October, Sidi was so hard pressed and Janjira was in such danger of being starved into surrender that he wrote to the English merchants of his resolve to hold out to the last and then deliver it up to the Moghals. At this time Aurangzeb is reported to have written to Sivaji [Sarkar: Shivaji, 261 note.] commanding him to withdraw from the attempt. It is not certain whether Sivaji obeyed or not, but the real crisis came next year (1670) when Sivaji staked all his sources on the capture of Janjira. Fath Khan, worn out by the incessant struggle resolved to accept Sivaji's offer of a large sum and a rich jahagir as the price of giving up Janjira. But his three Abyssinian slaves Sambal, Kasim [So in the local accounts. Khafi Khan's Yakut instead of Kasim (Elliot and Dowson, VII, 289; Grant Duff's Vol. I, 191) seems to be due to a confusion of his name with the title he afterwards gained. ] and Khairiyat roused their clansmen on the island against this surrender to an infidel and imprisoned Fath Khan and seized the Government. [Sarkar: Shivaji 261.] Kasim and Khairiyat, who were brothers, waived their claims in favour of Sidi Sambal, who was accordingly appointed governor. Sidi Sambal wrote for help to his master Adil Shah of Bijapur and to Khan Jahan, the Moghal governor of the Deccan. Adil Shah was little able to help; but the Moghal general, readily sent  messages of friendship and promises of assistance. Finding that their only chance of support was from the Moghals, the Sidi agreed to transfer their fleet from Bijapur to the Emperor. Aurangzeb changed Sambal's title from Vazir to Yakut Khan, and gave him an assignment of Rs. 3,00,000 on the revenue of Surat, [ Grant Duff's Vol. I, 191. Orme (Hist. Frag. 10) and Waring (Marathas, 71) place the transfer of the Sidis from Bijapur to the Moghals in 1660; but this is obviously wrong. As has been said, Sidi Sambal, first co-operated with Jay Singh only in 1666.] in February 1671. When Sambal was appointed admiral of the Moghal navy, Sidi Kasim seems to have received the command of Janjira, and Sidi Khairiyat of Danda-Rajpuri. Government of Janjira was thus separated from the admiral's charge.[ According to Orme (Frag. 57; K. K. ii 224) Yakut Khan and other Sidis preserved equal status and formed an aristocratic council for the general welfare of singulthisar republic.] Sidi Kasim took Sambal's place as Moghal admiral in 1677, [According to Khafi Khan (in Elliot and Dowson, VII. 290), this change in the governorship was owing to the death of Sidi Sambal. But Sidi Sambal was living till 1682, at first as the commander of the Moghal fleet, and after 1677 as the commander of the Maratha fleet.] and Khairiyat seems then to have succeeded Kasim in the command of Janjira island, as, according to the State records, he remained governor till his death in 1696.

The Sidi and the Marathas, 1970.

In 1670, on gaining the help of the Sidis, Khan Jahan, the Moghal governor of the Deccan, gathered ships and sending them down the coast attacked Sivaji's fleet which lay near Danda-Rajpuri, and killed a hundred Maratha sailors, tying stones to their feet and throwing them into the sea. Sivaji now raised a new fleet and there were many fights between the Marathas and the Abyssinians in which according to Musalman accounts, the Abyssinians were often victorious. According to Khafi Khan, Sidi Kasim was noted for courage, kindness and dignity. He added to his fleet, strengthened his fortress, and defended it against all attacks. He often took Maratha ships and was constantly planning how he could win hack Danda-Rajpuri from Sivajl. In 1671, during the Holi feast (February [Sarkar: Shivaji p. 264.]) when the Maratha garrison was off' their guard, Kasim sent by night four or five hundred men under his brother Sidi Khairiyat with rope ladders and other apparatus to attack the fort by land, while he with thirty or forty boats approached from the sea. At a given signal Sidi Khairiyat assaulted the place with loud cries from the land side. The garrison rushed to meet his attack and Kasim planting his ladders scaled the seawall. In spite of fierce resistance they pressed on and forced their way into the fort. A powder magazine took fire and exploded with a crash which disturbed Sivaji, asleep forty miles off in Rayagad, who woke with the words, 'Something is wrong in Danda-Rajpuri.' In the fort a number of men, including ten or twelve of Kasim's band, were killed. The smoke and noise made it hard to tell friend from foe, but Kasim raised his war-cry and the two parties of assailants joined and the place was taken.

Maratha defeat, 1671.

Kasim followed up his success by gaining six or seven forts in the neighbourhood of Danda-Rajpuri. Six forts surrendered after one or two days, but the commandant of the seventh held out for a week and then capitulated on terms, which Kasim faithlessly violated. Kasim granted quarter to the garrison and seven hundred persons came out. He made the children and pretty women slaves, and forcibly converted them to Islam; the old and ugly women he set free and the men he put to death. Kasim sent news of his victory to prince Muhammad Muazzam, governor of the Deccan, and to Khan Jahan. Both he and his brother Sidi Khairiyat had their rank raised and were presented with robes of honour. [Khafi Khan in Elliot and Dowson, VII. 289. This must have been Muazzam's second governorship (1667-1672). Elphinstone's History, 549, 555.] In September 1671 Sivaji sent an ambassador to Bombay to secure the aid of the English in an attack on Danda. But the President and Council at Surat advised Bombay neither to promise, nor to deny him any help as they did not think it convenient to help him against Danda, which place, if it were in his possession, would prove a great annoyance to the port of Bombay. [Sarkar: Shivaji p. 265.] Towards the end of 1672 Aurahgzeb sent a fleet of 36 vessels from Surat to assist the Sidi of Danda-Rajpuri by causing a diversion by sea. This squadron did Sivaji great mischief, burning and plundering all his sea port towns and destroying also above 500 of his vessels, (evidently trading boats). [Ibid : p. 265.]

Maratha villages, 1673.

From 1673, till Sidi Kasim's death in 1707, as admirals of the Moghal fieet, the Sidis were at constant war with the Marathas, sometimes-laying waste large tracts of Maratha territory, at other times stripped off their own lands and with difficulty holding the rock of Janjira. In 1673, Mr. Aungier, the Deputy Governor of Bombay, was much pressed for help both by Sivaji and the Sidis. But by maintaining a strict neutrality he gained the confidence of both parties. The French, however, sold 80 guns and 2,000 maunds of lead to Sivaji's fleet. The Dutch also, with their designs on Bombay promised some help. But Sivaji dared not trust the Dutch and remained friendly to the English, though he had by this time incurred a great loss in his vain attacks on the Sidi strongholds. Some time after (10th October) the joint Moghal-Sidi fleet came without warning into Bombay harbour, and, keeping to the bottom of the bay, landed in the Pen and Nagothana rivers, laid waste the Maratha villages from which the English drew most of their supplies, and carried off many of the people. Later on the Sidis came back and again laid the country waste. But a Maratha force from Rayagad surprised them, cut some hundreds to pieces, and forced the rest to fly. In 1674, Sivaji reduced the whole coast from Rajpuri or Janjira to Bardez near Goa.

After thus establishing his power over the whole of the central Kohkan except DandaRajpuri Sivaji was crowned with splendour ac Rayagad in June 1674 [Details are given in the Chapter 'Places', Raygad.]

Turning to review the Sidi-English relations, we find that earlier in April the Sidi's fleet again anchored off the Bomhay harbour. They were asked to leave, but, instead of leaving, many boats rowed up the harbour, and landing at Sion drove out the people and made preparations for passing the rains there. Troops were sent from Bombay and the Sidis were forced to retire. Soon after, 500 armed men attempted to land at Mazganv, but the guns of the fort kept them off. It was then agreed that no more than 300 Sidis should ever be on shore at the same time, and that they should have no arms but swords and be under the watch of guards from the garrison. This permission was to cease if they attacked Kurla, that is the north-east coast of Bombay harbour. In September the fleet sailed to Surat. They left Surat in the beginning of 1675, continued cruising along Sivaji's coasts without success, and returned to Surat in distress.

The Sidi burns Vengurala, 1675.

At the close of his Afghan war (1675) Aurahgzeb pressed fresh. operations against Sivaji. The Moghal fleet under Sidi Sambal was strengthened and sent down the coast to Vengurla plundering and burning. To stop the Sidi, Sivaji sent squadrons from Gheria and Rajapur, but the Sidi escaped by turning in to relieve Janjira which Sivaji was besieging. The siege was raised but soon it was renewed with greater vigour than before. The Pesva Moropant was sent (August 1676) with 10,000 men to co-operate with fleet and the former siege-troops. They felled all the wood around to make floating platforms with breast works, from which the walls were to be assaulted; but the attempt again failed as Sidi Kasim arrived with the Abyssinian fleet, broke the line of investment, infused life into the defence, made counter attacks and forced the Marathas to raise the siege (end of December 1676) [ Sarkar: Shivaji 268.].

Sidi Kasim the Moghal Admiral, 1677.

In the same year Sidi Sambal, who commanded the Sidi and the Moghal fleets, quarrelled with Sidi Kasim, the Governor of Janjira and with the Moghals, and, fearing to go to Surat, pressed for leave to pass the stormy season in Bombay harbour. Aungier managed to reconcile Sidi Sambal and the governor of Surat. But Sidi Sambal's influence was greatly weakened and he was practically supplanted as admiral of the Sidi fleet by Sidi Kasim who withdrew from Janjira. Sidi Kasim, who was respected by the Bombay Government, was allowed to fix his abode at Mazganv, and continued there till Moropant came as stated above with 10,000 men to renew the attack on Janjira. In the same year, with the Moghal ships and what remained of his own, Sidi Sambal sailed from Surat and cruised along Sivaji's coasts burning the town of Jaitapur, thirty miles south of Ratnagiri. He suffered a check at Jaitapur, and returned to Janjira where the garrison, strengthened by the arrival of Kasim, had destroyed Moropant's floating batteries and forced him to retire to Rayagad.

Sidi Kasim in Bombay, 1677.

In 1677, under orders from Delhi, Sambal promised to hand the Moghal fleet to Kasim at the close of the season. Afterwards the two leaders were reconciled, the fleets came together into Bombay harbour, and both Kasim and Sambal took up their quarters on the island. While in Bombay, Sambal crossed to the south shore of the harbour, seized four respected Brahmans, and confined them on board his ship. The Maratha Governor of Upper Ceul threatened the Bombay Government with the worst consequences if the four Brahmans were not set free. The Sidi at first denied that he had the prisoners, but at length admitted it, and the Brahmans were set free, and the persons who had aided Sambal were punished. While they were in Bombay a fresh quarrel between Sambal and Kasim ended in a fray in which several men were killed on both sides. The Bombay Government brought about a settlement, arranging that Sambal's family which had been kept by Kasim at Janjira should be restored to him, and that one of the Moghal ships should be left under Sambal's command. But this arrangement did not satisfy Sambal, and Sivaji seems to have persuaded him to abandon the Musalman cause and enter his service.

Shivaji builds a fort at Khanderi, 1679.

Kasim hoisted his flag as admiral of both fleets, and sailing from Bombay cruised along the Konkan coast, landing frequently and forcing even Brahmans to perform menial services. At the end of April 1678, Kasim returned to Bombay to rest for the monsoons. Sivaji wishing to avenge the degradation of his Brahman subjects, sent his admiral Daulat Khan with 4,000 men to Panvel, a town opposite Bombay with orders to cross the creek and burn the Sidi fleet then anchored at Mazganv. But insufficiency of boats and the violence of the monsoon prevented the army from crossing and Daulat Khan after vainly pressing the Portuguese to allow him a passage through their territory retired to Rayagad. Sidi Kasim sent his boats and plundered the Alibag coast, Sivaji's generals attempting in vain to burn his ships. In October 1678 Daulat Khan was again sent with a large army and a mightier train of artillery than before to renew the bombardment of Janjira, but Sidi Kasim could not pay his men for want of remittance from Surat and had to continue inactive in Bombay harbour. Sivaji now increased his fleet to twenty-two masted ghurabs and forty gallivats. When Sivaji found that he could not induce the Bombay Government to prevent the Sidis taking shelter and spending the stormy season in Bombay harbour, became enraged and landed troops on Khanderi 11 miles to the south of Bombay, and in spite of Portuguese and English remonstrances began to build a fort there.

The presence of Marathas at Khanderl was, in every way undesirable for the English particularly for those at Bombay, for, no ship could enter or issue from Bombay harbour without being seen from Khanderi. In fact Sivaji had his eye on it, long since 1672 and had intended to occupy it as an island of great strategic importance. He had already made some unsuccessful attempts in that direction. In September 1679, 150 of his men with four small guns, under the command of May Nayak Bhandari were carrying out the project. A request from the Deputy Governor of Bombay, "to quit the place as it belonged to island of Bombay" was declined by the Marathas in the absence of orders from Sivaji to that effect. The English, therefore, resolved to oppose the Maratha fleet if it tried to occupy and protect the place. Accordingly, a naval encounter took place off the island, on September 19 and ended in a reverse for the sons of the Ocean Queen. Lieutenant Francis Thorpe made a rash attempt to land on the island. He was killed with two other men, several others wounded and a few others left prisoners on the island. The Lieutenants' sibar was captured by the Marathas while two other sibars escaped to the English fleet standing outside the Bay of Khanderi into the open sea. Obviously these ships could not be brought closer to the island. Next day the Marathas carried off another English sibar, Sergeant Giles timidly offering no resistance. (Orme. MSS. 116).

Early in October the Maratha fleet got ready to go to the succour of Khanderi. The second battle with the English was fought on 18th October, 1679 [ This and following account is taken from Sarkar's Shivaji (pp. 272-275) Also see Orme, Frag., 80-81.]. At day-break the entire Maratha fleet of more than 60 vessels under Daulat Khan suddenly bore down upon the small English squadron consisting of the Revenge frigate, two ghurabs of two masts each, three sibars and two macvas,-eight vessels in all, with 200 European soldiers on board, in addition to the lascars and white sailors. The Marathas advanced from the shore a little north of Ceul, firing from their prows and moving so fast that the English vessels at anchor near Khanderi had scarcely time to get under weigh. In less than half an hour the Dover, one of the English ghurabs, having Sergeant Mauleverer and some English soldiers [ Surat Consultation, 3rd December, 1679:" Sergeant Mauleverer, etc., English, taken formerly by Shivaji in the Ghurab Dover, being in great want of provisions and all other necessaries We having duly considered, and perceiving how- cowardly they behaved themselves in the time of engagement, do order them to be stricken out of the muster rolls, but that they may not wholly perish, that some small allowance be made to them for victuals only if it can be securely conveyed to them (in the Maratha prison). " (F. R. Surat, Vol. 4). This was in answer to a letter from Mauleverer, dated 6th November, begging for provisions, clothing and medicines for the wounded and stating that the prisoners in the Maratha fort (Suragarh?) included 20 English, French and Dutch, 28 Portuguese, and 9 lascars. (Orme MSS. 116).] on board, with great cowardice struck its colours and was carried off by the Marathas. The other ghurab kept aloof, and the five smaller vessels ran away, leaving the Revenge alone in the midst of the enemy. But she fought gallantly and sank five of the Maratha gallivats, at which their whole fleet fled to the bar of Nagothana, pursued by the Revenge. Two days afterwards the Maratha fleet issued from the creek, but on the English vessels advancing they fled hack. Such is. the inefficiency of "mosquito craft" in naval battles fought with artillery that even fifty slender and open Indian ships were no match for a single large and strongly built English vessel. At the end of November the Sidi fleet of 34 ships joined the English off Khanderi and kept up a daily battery against the island. (Orme, 81-84.)

But the cost of these operations was heavily felt by the English merchants, who also realised that they could not recruit white soldiers to replace any lost in fight, and therefore, could not "long oppose him (Siva), lest they should imprudently so weaken themselves as not to be able to defend Bombay itself, if he should be exasperated to draw down his army that way." Moreover, during the monsoon storms the English would be forced to withdraw their naval patrol from Khanderi, and then Siva (Sivaji) would "take his opportunity to fortify and store the island, maugre all our designs." So, the Surat Council wisely resolved (25th October), that the English should "honourably withdraw themselves in time," and either settle this difference with Sivaji by means of a friendly mediator, or else throw the burden of opposing him on the Portuguese governor of Bassein or on the Sidi, and thus "ease the Hon'ble Company of this great charge." The Surat factory itself was in danger and could spare no European soldier for succouring Bombay. (F.R. Surat 4, Consult., 25 and 31 Oct. 3, 8 and 12 Dec. 1679.)

The dreaded reprisal by Sivajl against Bombay almost came to pass. "Highly exasperated by the defeat of his fleet before Khanderi," he sent 4,000 men to Kalyan-Bhivandi with the intention to land in Bombay by way of Thana. The Portuguese governor of Bassein having refused to allow them to pass through his country, the invaders marched to Panvel (a port in their own territory) opposite Trombay island, intending to embark there on seven sibars (end of October 1679). The inhabitants of Bombay were terribly alarmed. The Deputy Governor breathed lire, but the President and Council of Surat decided to climb down, and repeated their former order that Bombay should avoid a war with Siva (Sivaji) and "frustrate his designs of fortifying Khanderi either by treaty or by the Sidi's fleet assisting us to oppose him thereon". The two English captains on being consulted took the same view. At the end of December the Marathas dragged several large guns to Thal (on the mainland) and began to fire them at the small English craft lying under Underi for stress of weather. (Orme MSS. 116.)

But the hope of hindering the Maratha fortification of the island without fighting proved futile, and the English ships were withdrawn (January, 1680) from Khanderi, which, after "holding out (against the Sidis and the English) to the admiration of all", was freed from enemy vessels by the coming of the monsoons, and remained in Siva's (Sivaji's) hands. (F. R. Surat 108, Bombay to Surat, 1st Jan. 1680).

Sidi occupies Underi.

But in 1680 Kasim's fleet anchored at Underi (Henery), a small island about a mile in circumference, close to Khanderi, with 300 men and 10 large guns, fortified it (9th January 1680), and tried to silence the Maratha guns on Thal. Thereupon Sivaji's naval officer Daulat Khan with his fleet came out of the Nagothana river and attacked Underi on two nights, hoping to surprise it, "but the Sidi's watchfulness and good intelligence from Ceul frustrated his design". On 26th January, 1680, Daulat Khan assaulted the island at three points, ready to land 2,000 men and conquer it. But after a four hours' engagement he retreated to Ceul, having lost 4 ghurabs and 4 small vessels, 200 men killed, 100 wounded, besides prisoners,[ Two letters form Underi to Bombay state that Daulat Khan's fleet consisted of above 30 ghurabs and gallivats, and that he lost 137 men in killed and wounded. The letter of 28 Jan. adds, "Shivaji had threatened Daulat Khan that if he did not take Underi, if ever he came back to Nagaon again, he would have his life." On 6th March Daulat Khan came into the town of Rajapur from the fleet, wounded in the foot. (Orme MSS. 116).] and himself severely wounded. The Sidi lost only 4 men killed and 7 wounded, but no vessel, out of a fleet of 2 large ships, five three-masted frigates, one ketch and 26 gallivats, with 700 men on board. Such was the superiority of the Abyssinian ships to the opener and more slender vessels of the Marathas. The victory, however, could afford little relief to the Sidi; because, separated as he was from the mainland he was being starved and he had to make constant inroads into the Maratha territory to replenish his stock. Soon after this victory, in spite of the protests of the Bombay Government, Kasim entered Bombay harbour with his whole fleet and sending his boats to the Pen river burned many villages and carried off many prisoners. On this Sivaji and the English came to an agreement that the English should not allow the Sidi to pass the stormy weather in the harbour, unless he promised not to ravage the Maratha coast.

On the 4th of April Sivaji died. Besides by enriching Konkan with the spoils of Gujarat, the Deccan and the Karnatak Sivaji did much to improve the region by giving to its people highly paid employment in his army and in building and guarding his hill forts. He also introduced a more uniform and lighter land tax, suppressed irregular exactions and fostered trade. On his death the district passed to his son Sambhaji.

The Sidi plunders Bombay,1680.

Sidi now sent his small vessels from Underi into Bombay harbour, and started with the larger vessels, to cruise about Danda Rajpuri. At this time a rise in the rates levied on English goods encouraged the Sidis to suppose that the Emperor was unfriendly to the English. Contrary to their agreement, they pillaged the south shore of Bombay harbour and offered the captives for sale in Bombay. The Bombay council protested, but, beyond setting free as many of the prisoners as they could get hold of, they took no steps to punish the Sidis. A few days later (May 4) at Mazganv, in a fray between the English and the Sidls, several were wounded on both sides. Next day Sidi Kasim and the main body of his troops, without compliment or warning, came so close to the fort that guns were fired on his ships, but they were finally allowed to anchor on a promise that they would not attack the Maratha coast. Shortly after, Sambhaji tried to burn the Sidi's ships and landed two hundred men on Underi. But the attempt failed and most of the men were killed or taken prisoners. Eighty heads were brought in baskets to Mazganv, and Kaslm was arranging them on poles along the shore when he was stopped by the Bombay Government.

Sidi's Ravages,1681.

At the close of the year Kasim's fleet sailed down the coast, intending to attack Vengurla, but after various chases and fights he returned in 1681 to Bombay. From Bombay he sailed to Surat, leaving men and ships both at Underi and at Mazgahv. From Underi the Sid! several times attacked Bombay boats crossing for supplies to the Kolaba coast. Sambhaji made an attack on Underi but failed, and in return the Sid! boats sailed across from Bombay, ravaged the Kolaba coast, carried off some of the chief inhabitants, and, though several of them were Muhammedans, took them to Underi, and beat them without pity till they agreed to pay a ransom of Rs. 18,000. The English at Surat complained of this breach of agreement on the part of the Sidi. He retorted by demanding the value of the Maratha prisoners, whom, sixteen months before, the Bombay Government had prevented him from selling. In Surat the Governor encouraged the Sidis to beset the English factory, and, for two days, the factory was closed and four field pieces kept loaded at the gate. In the end of October Sid! Kasim appeared off Bombay harbour, and, in spite of the remonstrances of the Bombay Government, attacked all vessels trading with Maratha ports; he even went so far as to seize a vessel belonging to Bombay. Then, after burning a village on the Kolaba coast, his fleet sailed for Ceul, but failed in its attempt on the town.

Janjira besieged by Sambhaji, 1682.

In 1682 Sambhaji sent the Maratha general Dadaji Raghunath Despande to besiege Janjira, with the promise that if he took the fort he would be made one of the eight ministers or pradhans. Later on, Sambhaji, with Prince Akbar and 20,000 men, joined the besieging force from Rayagad; battered the island for thirty days, levelled its fortifications, and, with the help of one Khandoji Farjand, organised a plot for its cession. The plot was discovered and Khandoji was put to death. And, sheltered by a rock in the middle of the island, the garrison, under Sidi Khairiyat, gallantly continued the defence while Sidi Kaslm cleared the bay off Sambhaji's fleet. Sambhaji then attempted, with stones and fragments of rock, to fill the channel, which was eight hundred yards broad and thirty deep, but, before the work was completed, he was called away to meet a body of Moghal horse.

Sea Fights, 1682.

For some time after Sambhaji had left, Sidi Kaslm with his whole fleet continued to watch Janjira. His principal task, at this time was to co-operate with the Moghals who had arranged a three-pronged attack on Sambhaji, in Konkan, Shahabuddin proceeding from Kalyan in the north, Muazzam marching from Belganv across Ramsejghat and joining hands with the Portuguese at Goa, thus blockading Sambhaji from the south, while Azam Shah distracting the attention of Sambhaji by carrying on a foraging campaign into Baglan. The Sidi was expected all the while to cut off the supplies and prevent them from reaching Sambhaji's forces which were thus to be trapped on all sides. In April the Sidi sailed to Bombay, where the English, afraid of the Emperor's displeasure, allowed him to anchor. After the Sidis came, they had some fights with Sambhaji's boats, in which the Sidis took several prizes and ravaged the Maratha coast outside of the harbour, killing cows, carrying off women, and burning villages. They even passed as far inland as Mahad in Kolaba, and carried off the wife of Dadaji, Sambhaji's general. In retaliation Sambhaji and the Portuguese slopped all supplies to Bombay. On Sambhaji's leaving Rajpuri, Dadaji Raghunath gave up attempting to fill the channel between Janjira and the mainland. When Sidi Kasim sailed for Bombay, Dadaji gathered boats and made an attack on the island, but was beaten off with the loss of two hundred men. In October Sambhaji's fleet sailed from the Nagothana river to attack the Sidi, whose fleet was at anchor off Mazganv. As the Marathas drew near, the Sidi got under weigh, stood up the harbour, and choosing his position lay to and waited the attack. The Maratha attack was led by Sidi Misri, nephew of Sidi Sambal. who had gone over to the Marathas when he lost the command of the Moghal fleet. Kasim commanded the Sidi fleet in person, and though he had only fifteen vessels to Sambhaji's thirty, gained a complete victory. Sidi Misri was mortally wounded, and His own and three other vessels were taken. Enraged by this defeat Sambhaji threatened to fortify Elephanta, to annoy the English and prevent the Sidi vessels from anchoring at Mazganv during the stormy season. But this scheme fell through, and, in its stead, he suddenly proposed an alliance with the English against the Moghals and the Sidis. In November the Sidis entered the Pen river and carried 200 prisoners to Mazganv, the Bombay Council expostulating but not daring to resent.

Sambhaji, 1680-89.

Sambhaji displeased the people by giving up the regular rental introduced by Sivaji, went back to the old practice of cesses and exactions. His support of the rebel prince Akbar subjected the coasts to the ravages of the Moghal fleet and strengthened the Janjira Sidls in their raids into the inland parts.

Akbar wanted Sambhaji to join him in his north India campaign but it is not surprising that Sambhaji refused to move far away from his base of operations, particularly when he had reason to suspect some plot formation against him at home. In 1683 Sambhaji failed in an attack on Ceul and in the following year almost the whole district was ravaged by a Moghal army [ Nairne's Konkan, 75.]. Finally in 1689, by the fall of Rayagad, the control of the chief port of the district passed from the Marathas to the Moghals.

The Sidi attacks Bombay, 1689.

By 1683 the Moghal fleet had returned to Surat, while the Sidi, squadron remained in Bombay harbour. During this time they had frequent affrays with the English, in one of which two Enelish soldiers were cut down, and in another two or three of Sidi's soldiers were wounded [The details of the events between 1672 and 1683 are from Orme's Historical Fragments, 38-120.]. In 1689 the English having rupture with the Moghals which formed part of Sir John Child's ambitious scheme for increasing the power of the English, boats from Bombay captured several of the Sidi's vessels which were carrying provisions to the Moghal army at Danda-Rajpuri. Sidi Kasim wrote several civil letters to the English demanding his vessels. As he received no redress, on the 14th of February he landed at midnight at Sevri on the east of Bombay island with twenty thousand men, and, on the following day, took the fort of Mazganv, which the English garrison had deserted with such foolish haste that they left behind them eight or nine chests of treasure, four chests of arms, fourteen cannons and two mortars. The Sidi hoisted his flag in Mazganv fort, made it his headquarters and sent a party to plunder the island. Two companies of seventy men each, with several gentlemen volunteers, were sent from Bombay castle to drive the Sidis from Mazganv; but the attempt proved a complete failure. The Sidis were now masters of nearly the whole island. Batteries were raised against Bombay Castle and the garrison was greatly harassed. Two factors were sent to the Emperor, and with much difficulty were admitted to an audience. Among other requests, they asked that the charter which had been forfeited should be renewed, and that the Sidi should be ordered to leave Bombay. The charter was renewed, and, when certain conditions had been fulfilled by the English, the Sidis were ordered to leave Bombay, but this did not take place till June, 1690.[Hamilton's New Account, I., 220-28, and Ovington's Voyage to Surat, 151.] In 1689 Sidi Kasim helped the Moghal army under Etikad Khan to take the important fortress of Rayagad in Kolaba, and was rewarded by the grant of the Ratnagiri districts of Anjanvel and Sindhudurg. In 1696, Sidi Khairiyat, the Governor of Janjira, died. In 1707, on the death of Sidi Kasim, the Sidis unanimously appointed as his successor Surul Khan the commandant of the island fort of Padmadurg or Kansa-Killa about two miles north-west of Janjira.

The Angres 1690-1840.

About this time the Angre family, who during the eighteenth century rose to high power both in Kolaba and in Ratnagiri, first came to notice. The founder of the family was Tukoji Sankhpal. According to Grose, a well-informed writer, Tukoji was a Negro [There is no corroborating evidence in support of this statement. For details see Military System of the Marathas by S. N. Sen, pp. 170-71.] born in an island in the gulf of Hormuz, a Musalman by religion, who in 1643 was shipwrecked near Ceul. He helped Sahaji who was in the service of Adil Shah, in his war with the Moghals for the conquest of northern Konkan and gained a victory off Ceul, against the Portuguese of Revadanda [Dhabu: Kolabkar Angre Sarkhel, p. 2]. It is said that he married the daughter of Sahaji's minister, and had a son named Purab who was the father of Kanhoji. [This is wrong. Kanhoji's father was Tukoji himself (see Dhabu, p. 7). The version in the text is based on Account of Bombay, II, 214. Mr. Grose, who was a member of the Bombay Civil Service, wrote about 1750. Although he was well acquainted with the country, and took special interest in matters connected with the Hindu religion and with Hindu castes, the unlikeliness of the story is indeed very great. It is true that Shivaji's coronation at Raygad in 1674 is an example of the case of a man then regarded by a section of the people as belonging to a comparatively l6w caste rising to the highest rank among Hindu warriors by careful attention to Hindu rules and by liberality to Brahmans. A few examples of successful foreign warriors being admitted to be Hindus and marrying Hindu wives are given in the chapter on Thana History (Thana Gazetteer Vol. XIII, 1882) and the reader is left to draw his own conclusions on the subject.] Kanhoji, who is said to have got his name Angre from Angarvadi village in Maval hills six miles from Poona. His original surname was Sankhpal and Tukoji took service under Sivaji in about 1654 and distinguished himself in several actions. He was rewarded with a command of 200 and posted at Suvarnadurg some 20 miles south of Sidis frontier.

Kanhoji Angre, 1690-1729.

Here Kanhoji received the practical training of seamanship from the crude but faithful Koli sailors. [V. G. Dighe: Sardesai Commemoration Volume, p. 101.] The family history would have us believe that Kilfedar of Suvarnadurg, Mohite, being hard-pressed by the Sidi proposed surrendering the place. Kanhoji sent news of his treachery to the authorities and seized this chicken-hearted fellow. Taking on himself the command he not only declined yielding the place but boldly attacked the besiegers. In one of the sorties he fell in the enemy's hand, but extricating himself from his confinement, Kanhoji managed to reach the walls of the castle and beat off the Sidi back. He was then appointed second in command to Sidoji Gujar, the Sar-Subha of the Maratha navy and when the latter died in 1698 Kanhoji succeeded him. He soon showed himself a most daring and enterprising leader, plundering the ships of all nations, and sacking all undefended towns from Travancore to Bombay. He made Kolaba, the small island fort close to Alibag, his headquarters, and established stations at Suvarnadurg and Vijayadurg in Ratnagiri.

Marathas claim the western Sea.

To get a right perspective of Kanhoji's maritime activities they must be viewed as a part of the general struggle of the Maratha nation against the Moghal conquest of their homeland. This explains Angre's inveterate hostility to the Sidis who were the Moghal representatives afloat. The chief objective to which his policy was directed was to recover Maratha territory occupied by the Sidis during the interim that followed Sambhaji's execution, drive the Sidi to his island retreat, annihilate his independence and render him powerless for mischief. The western seas were to be Maratha waters and all who visited ports established in them were to be taught to respect Maratha sovereignty and secure his permission for trading in those waters by buying his passes. Whatever power refused to conform to his orders would do it at the peril of bringing on its merchantsmen his strong hand. His ambitious claim was challenged by the Sidis as well as the Western powers, the Portuguese, the English and the Dutch, who on account of the important trading interests they had established in western waters found such a demand most galling and injurious to their commerce. With their strongly built ships they were confident of their strength on the sea, manned as their ships were by skilful sailors and equipped as they were with far superior armaments. Their chief factories being established in the Moghal's territory they were afraid that their recognition of Maratha claim and any assistance given in pursuance thereof, would antagonise them with the Emperor and draw upon them his wrath. Their interests therefore, dictated that they ranged themselves on the side of the enemies of the Marathas when they could not maintain their neutrality. During the fifty years of Sarkhelship in the Angre family the Maratha power increased and almost overshadowed the Moghal Empire. This growth of the nation is reflected in the annihilation of some of the maritime rivals of the Angres and the submissive attitude of the remaining in the halcyon days of its rule.

In 1699 the Sidis defeated the Marathas, overran Rajpuri and Rayagad, and, in reward, were presented with Rayagad by the Emperor Aurahgzeb [Nairne's Konkan, 77.] In the same year some reverses at sea led the Sidis and Portuguese to join with the Moghals in a league against Kanhoji. But Kanhoji defeated their united forces, took Sagargad, conquered the country round, and forced his opponents to agree that of the revenues of Kolaba, Khanderi and Sagargad, two-thirds should go to Ahgre and one-third to the Moghals; that the whole revenue of Rajkot, the citadel of Ceul, should belong to Angre; that the revenue of Ceul should be divided equally between the Moghals and Angre; and that the revenue of Parhur, a village near Alibag, should belong to the Sidi.[ Report from Rao Saheb Bal Ramchandra Dhonde, Mamlatdar, received in preparation of the first edition of the Gazetteer.]

Ahgre's heavy hand thus fell on the Sidi and the Moghals. On 14th January 1700 Bombay Factory recorded that "the Sidis lately had several hot skirmishes with the Marathas who are very strong having about 8,000 horses and 12,000 foot, as reported at Marr, etc., and adjacent places to Danda-Rajpuri, burning several villages and doing considerable damage to each other [V. G. Digne Sardesai Com. Vol. p. 103.]." The war went on intermittently without a pause. On 2nd April 1701 it is recorded that "there is not yet right understanding at present between the Sidi and Sivaji as thought having had a skirmish of late where the former is reported hath 'had a considerable loss.... Sidi has been very urgent with us to send a surgeon to dress his wounded men."

Kanhoji challenges foreigners.

As his resources increased Kanhoji began challenging foreign foreigners. merchantmen that ventured on the sea without his passes. In 1702 a small trading vessel from Calicut with six Englishmen fell into his hands and was carried into one of his harbours. To a demand for its release he sent a word 'that he would give the English cause to remember the name of Kanhoji Angre'. In 1703 the Viceroy of Goa found it necessary to address him a friendly letter. "Two years later he is described as a rebel, and Mr. Reynolds was deputed to find him and tell him that he could not be permitted searching, molesting or seizing vessels in Bombay waters to which he returned a defiant answer, that he had done many benefits to the English, who had broken faith with him and henceforth he would seize their vessels wherever he could find them." In 1707 the Bombay frigate was blown up in an encounter with Angre's ships. In 1710 a Dutch sloop of war was captured and the Godolphin narrowly escaped the same fate. In the same year another heavy blow was struck at the English Company's shipping when Angre fortified Khanderi and made it a base for his warships.

Agreement with shahu.

Between 1707 and 1710, during her struggle with Sahu, Tarabai, the widow of Rajaram, placed Kanhoji in charge of the coast from Bombay to Savantvadi with authority in Rajmaci near Khandala and the Bhorghat in west Poona and over the district of Kalyan which seems to have stretched some distance north of Bhivanrdi. [Land grants of Angres are recorded ten miles north of Bhiwandi, Mr. W. F. Sinclair in Ind. Ant. IV., 65.] In 1713 Sahu sent a force under the Pesva Bahiropant Pihgle to protect the inland parts of the Kohkan and check the spread of Angre's power. On hearing of the Pesva's advance, Kanhoji marched to meet him, defeated him, and made him prisoner. He took the forts of Lohgad and Rajmaci and prepared to march on Satara. All available troops were brought against him and placed under the command "of Balaji Visvanath. Aware of Kanhoji's abilities, enterprise and resource, Balaji convinced Kanhoji of the wisdom of working in, the confederacy, assured him how an alliance with Sahii would benefit both parties and finally won him over. He agreed that if Kanhoji set the Pesva free, gave up his alliance with Sambhaji of Kolhapur, supported Sahu and restored all his conquests except Rajmaci, he would receive ten forts and sixteen fortified posts commanding the whole of the Kohkan from Devgad in the south to Khanderl in the north, and would he confirmed as admiral of the Maratha fleet with the titles of Vazaratmab and Sarkheb. [Grant Duff, Vol. I, 328. The ten forts were Khanderi and Kolaba on the Alibag coast, Avchitgad in Kolaba, and Suvamadurg, Vijaydurg, Jaygad, Yashvantgad, Devdurg, Kanakdurg, and Fatehgad in Ratnagiri.] As Srivardhan and other of the forti-fied posts which the Pesva had made over to Ahgre were in the Sidi's hands, the treaty was followed by an outbreak of hostilities between Kanhoji and the Sidi. But as the Pesva came to Ahgre's help the Sidi Surul Khan was forced to tender his submission. A treaty was (1714) concluded promising mutual forbearance and the equitable adjustment of rights and claims. These concessions made Kanhoji practically independent. He fixed his headquarters in the strong fortftess of Gheria or Vijayadurg, about thirty miles south of Ratnagiri and his cruisers scoured the sea. [ Nairne's Konkan, 79.] Almost the whole coast from Bombay to Goa was in his hands and there was scarcely a creek, a harbour, or a river-mouth where he had not forti fications and a boat station.

Kanhoji's relations with Sahu were marked with the greatest cordiality after the treaty of 1714. That treaty allowed him full independence in the management of his fief and assured him ample resources for the navy so long as he acknowledged the king of Satara as his liege-lord and paid him tribute. Sahu respected the admiral who almost single-handed recreated the navy and when the two met at Jejuri in March 1718 the occasion was mark-ed with great ceremony and pomp.

Relations with the English.

The peace with Sahu added immensely to Angre's prestige, increased his resources, and secured his strategical position. Strongly entrenched at Khanderi, Kolaba and Gheria, he could overawe his maritime neighbours, the English, the Sidi and the Portuguese. He was now in a position to defy western powers and to deride their efforts to check his aggressions. He was no longer a daring Maratha 'pirate', as his opponents used to call him so far. Kanhoji used his power with restraint for he thought it wise to patch up his differences with the English. He invited them for negotiations and agreed that no ship of any nation coming into Bombay harbour should be interfered with between Mahim and Khanderi, and that English merchants should have liberty of trade in Angre's ports on payment of the usual dues. In return the Governor engaged to give passes only to ships belonging to merchants recognised by the Company and to allow Angre's people full facilities in Bombay. [V. G. Dighe: Sardesai Commemoration Volume, p. 105.]

War with the English ,1718

The treaty concluded with the English proved but a temporary truce. Charles Boone, the Governor of Bombay, equipped his fighting marine and soon engaged himself in a war with the Sondha chief. Kanhoji who was ever on the watch of the maritime activities of the foreigners, seized the opportunity of capturing three merchantsmen, the Success, the Robert, and the Otter, as those vessels belonged to foreign merchants and, therefore, could claim no exemption from his passes. The English retaliated by the seizure of one of Angre's sibar that visited Malum. War was formally declared on 17th June 1718. An expedition against Gheria ended in an ignominious failure, as the soldiers of the Company at this period were ill-paid, ill-disciplined and had little training. [On the evening of the first day of the attack the Governer, Mr. Boone issued a notice that if any one would volunteer for the next day's service, he would be paid Rs. 40 on returning to Bombay, and that if any one lost a leg or an arm, he would be taken to London, paid £30 (Rs. 300) on arriving there, and be employed in the Company's service for the rest of his life. Low's Indian Navy, I, 98.] Not disheartened by this failure, Boone the Governor organised a second expedition, nearer, home against Khanderi. Much was expected from the assistance and local knowledge of a renegade Portuguese, Manuel de Castro who had been bribed to desert Angre's service. The attack, however, miscarried owing to the cowardice and want of discipline of the men and the well-directed fire from the castle. Two days later another attempt was made at landing but the party reaching the castle gate was driven back to the water and many were drowned. The squadron, there-fore, hastily withdrew to Bombay (24th November 1718). A second attempt on Vijayadurg in 1720 ended even in a greater ignominious failure; for Kanhoji, this time, seized an English vessel and carried her into Vijayadurg. Delighted by these successes Kanhoji wrote a taunting letter to the Bombay Govern-ment and scoffed at the efforts made to injure him [The following curious specimen of Kanhoji Angre's letter writing is from Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, pp. 343-44, 'I received your Excellency's letter and have understood all your Excellency writes. That the differences that continue even until now are through my means; that the desire of possessing what is another's is a thing very wide of reason; that such like insults are a sort of piracy; that such proceedings cannot continue long; that had I from my beginning cultivated trade and favoured the merchant, the port I now govern might, by the divine favour, have in some measure vied with the great port of Surat, and my name have become famous.' ' All this ', your Excellency says, ' is not to be brought about but by opening a fair trade; that the that is least expert in war generally comes off a sufferer thereby; and, that he who follows it purely through a love that he hath thereto, will one time or another find cause to repent; that if I had considered this something sooner, I might have found some benefit and convenience thereby. Your Excellency says, ' you are very well acquainted with the manner of my government from its beginning, and for that reason you would not on any account open a treaty with me until I set at liberty the people of your nation that are prisoners here; after that, you would receive any proposition from me that was friendly, or might tend to an accommodation. '

' All of this I very greatly admire, especially when I find your Excellency persuaded that I have been the cause of the past differences and disputes; the truth of which your Excellency will soon find when you examine both sides. Touching the desire of possessing what is another's I do not find the merchants exempt from this sort of ambition, for this is the way of the world; for God gives nothing immediately from himself but takes from one to give to another. Whether this is right or no, who is able to determine? It little behoves merchants to say that our government is supported by violence, insults, and piracies. The Maharaja Shivaji made war with four kings, and founded and established his power and that he himself was but his humble disciple; that he was ever willing to favour the merchants trading according to the laws of his country. This was our beginning. Whether by these means this government hath proved durable your Excellency well knows; so likewise did your predecessors. Whether it is durable or no I would have your Excellency consider, it is certain nothing in this world is durable, which if your Excellency does consider, the way of this world is well known. '

' Your Excellency is pleased to say, ' If I had regard to the weal of the people and favoured commerce, my power would be much augmented, and my port become like the port of Surat.' But I never have been wanting in favour to merchants who trade according to the laws of this country, nor in chastising those who break these laws, as your Excellency well knows. ' The increase of power depends on the divine will in which human diligence little avails. Until this day I have kept up the power that was necessary: Whether I shall continue it or no who can tell? That will be as God is pleased to determine.

' Your Excellency is pleased to write, ' That war proves most fatal to those where the use of the sword is not understood. ' But in the Government of his Excellency Charles Boone, nobody can say there was not loss on both sides; for victories depend on the hard of God, and for this reason great men take little notice of such losses. Your Excellency is pleased to write, ' That he who follows war purely through an inclination that he hath thereto, one time or another will find cause to repent.' Of this I suppose your Excellency hath found proof; for we are not always victorious, not always unfortunate. Your Excellency is pleased to write, ' That you well understood the manner of my government, and, for that reason, that you could not enter upon any treaty of peace with me, unless I would first set at liberty the people of your nation that are prisoners. ' I very well know your Excellency understands the manner of my government from its beginning, therefore, this gives me no wonder; but if your Excellency says you will admit any proposition after having your people released, I must then likewise say my people are prisoners under your Excellency. How can I then give liberty to yours? If your Excellency's intent was cordially to admit any overtures of peace for ending our present disputes, and if you really write to me for that end concerning the liberty of your people I am to assure you my intent is cordially the same. It is, therefore, necessary that some person of character intervene, and act as guarantee between us to whom I will presently send your Excellency's people. Your Excellency will afterwards do the like by mine. The prisoners on both sides, having by this means obtained their liberty, afterwards we shall enter on what relates to our friendship and treaty of peace for the avoidance of prejudice on both sides. For this end I now write to your Excellency, which I hope will meet with regard; and if your Excellency's intention be to treat of peace and friendship, be pleased to send an answer to this, that, conformable thereto, I may consider on what is most proper to be done. As your Excellency is a man of understanding, I need say no more.].

His Fleet.

About the same time the decay of Portuguese power and the withdrawal of the Moghal claims to the Korikan (1720) further increased Angre's importance [In 1720, when the Moghal claims to the Konkan were withdrawn, Balaji Vishvanath, first Peshwa, drew up schemes for collecting and distributing the revenues and for preserving a common interest among the Marathas. Under Balaji's scheme the Angre paid to the Satara ruler tribute in military stores and in European and Chinese wares. "They were also sometimes charged with the duty of executing states criminals. Grant Duff, Vol. I, 344.]. The hope of plunder drew to Kanhoji's standard numerous adventurers, including renegade Christians mostly Dutch' and Portuguese, Arabs, Musalmans, Negroes, a most daring and desperate band [Low's Indian Navy, I, 97.]. Kanhoji's fleet was composed of grabs and gallivats, ranging from 150 to 200 tons burden. The grabs carried broadsides of six and nine-pounder guns, and on their main decks were mounted two nine or twelve pounders pointed forwards through port-holes cut in the bulkheads and designed to be fired over the bows. The gallivats carried light guns fixed on swivels; some also mounted six or eight pieces of cannon, from two to four pounders, and all were impelled by forty or fifty stout oars. Eight or ten of these grabs and forty or fifty gallivats, crowded with men, formed the whole fleet, and even with smaller numbers, their officers often ventured to attack armed ships of considerable burden. The plan of their assault was this. Observing from their anchorage in some secure bay that a vessel was in the offing, they would slip their cables and put to sea, sailing if there was a breeze, if not making the gallivats take the grabs in tow. When within shot, they generally gather-ed as soon as they could astern of their victim, firing into her rigging until they succeeded in disabling her. They then drew nearer and battered her on all sides until she yielded. If she refused to yield, a number of gallivats, having two or three hundred men on each, closed with her, and the crews, sword in hand, boarded her from all sides. [Bombay Quarterly Review, III, 56.]

English-Portuguese alliance.

Kanhoji's career was unchecked and he now threatened to march his men into Bombay. [V. G. Dighe; Sardesai Com, Vol,, p. 108.] The two heavy defeats made the English forget for a time their jealousy of the Portuguese and seek their co-operation in crushing their common enemy. But the Portuguese were unfriendly towards the English on account of their commercial rivalry. They suspected the English of being in collusion with Kanhoji for destroying their trade and felt that even if they were to co-operate they might be deserted all of a sudden in the midst of a conflict with Angre. The repeated losses that Portuguese shipping had suffered, however, persuaded the Goa authorities to accept the overtures of the English and a treaty providing for a joint attack on Kolaba was concluded on 20th August, 1721. According to the treaty, Kolaba, in event of success, was to be occupied by the Portuguese while Gheria was to go to the English. The news of these hostile preparations soon reached Kanhoji who threw provisions and ammunition in the fort of Kolaba and requested King Sahu to succour him. On 29th November the expedition sailed from Bombay and joined the Portuguese force at Ceul. The combined army of 6,000 assisted as it was by a powerful fleet appeared invincible. The country between Ceul and Alibag, a space of ten miles was covered with wood and swamp near Kolaba. The crossing of the Kundlika and the march to Kolaba with heavy guns delayed the army on the road for over a fortnight. The time gained was sufficient for Pilaji Jadhav and Bajirav to pour horsemen through the Korikan passes and when the allies appeared before Kolaba on 12th December, they found themselves in great danger of being outnumbered by Maratha cavalry. While the Portuguese commander was surveying the field accompanied by Mathews, a Maratha horseman suddenly sprang upon the party from behind a bush and wounded Mathews with his lance.

As the Maratha strength was daily increasing it was necessary to deliver the attack without loss of time. The little English party, therefore, hastened to attack the walls but Bajirav simulta-neously threw himself against the Portuguese column and sent it flying. The English party under Col. Braithwaite also met with a hail of shot and stone and when the Portuguese force dispersed, its rear was threatened and was obliged to fall back. All the field guns and a great deal of ammunition fell in the hands of the Marathas.

There were now bickerings among the allies and each started blaming the other. The English commander behaved violently towards his Portuguese Captain. Fortunately for them Bajirav offered a treaty honourable to both the parties, which the Portuguese readily accepted on 9th January, 1722 and the alliance between the English and the Portuguese broke up without achieving any object.

The war with the English continued with pauses at intervals. When pressed elsewhere Kanhoji would hold forth the olive branch and express willingness to make peace on his own terms. Such an attempt was made in 1724 when Kanhoji wrote a friendly letter to the new Governor Phipps, but the negotiations took a devious turn and proved inconclusive. In 1724 the Vijayadurg garrison were equally triumphant in withstanding a formidable Dutch attack with seven ships, two bomb vessels, and a body of troops. Emboldened by these successes in 1727, Kanhoji attacked English vessels and took a richly laden Company's ship.

In 1728 Kanhoji seemed inclined to come to terms with the English. But, in 1729, he captured the Company's galley King William and took Captain Mc Neale prisoner. This officer, after a fruitless attempt to escape, was loaded with irons and so severely beaten that his life was despaired of. On 4th July, 1729 Kanhoji died [The date of Kanhoji's death is doubtful. According to Grant Duff (History P. 230) and Nairne (Konkan, 80) his death took place in 1728. According to Low (Indian Navy I, 104) and Grose, quoted by Low, Kanhoji died in 1731. The fact that Kanhoji's name is mentioned in the treaty between the English and the Savantvadi Chief in 1730 supports Grose's date. Peshwa Daftar Vol. III, p. 2, gives the year 1729. Dhabu's Kolabkar Angre Sarkhel (p. 48) gives 4th July, 1729 as the date with authorities which should put the controversy beyond a shadow of doubt.] after a short illness. Grose describes him as dark well-set and corpulent, 'quite the opposite of the fair, lean and wiry Sivaji'. He was full-faced with a sparkling eye and stern countenance, very severe in his commands, and exact in punishing. Otherwise he was liberal to his officers and soldiers with whom he affected a sort of military frankness, not to say familiarity. A careful perusal of his correspondence with English Governors of the time reveals his willingness for peace often misunderstood and the philosophic presentation of his case as a piece of astute statecraft. [See Grose's Account of Bombay, I, 95. For details of Kanhoji's life consult Military System of Marathas by S. N. Sen, Early Career of Kanhoji Angria and other papers, by S. N. Sen, Kanhoji Angre-Mulgaonkar.]

Sekhoji Angres. 1729-1734.

He left six sons., two legitimate, Sekhoji and Sambhaji, and four illegitimate Tulaji, Manaji, Dhondji, and Yesaji. [In 1840, when direct heirs failed, a descendant of Yesaji's contended that Yesaji was a legitimate son. But the claim was apparently unfounded.] The two legitimate sons divided their father's possessions, Sekhoji, the elder establishing himself at Kolaba, and Sambhaji the younger at Suvarnadurg in Ratnagiri. This division greatly reduced the power of the Ahgres. In 1731, while Sekhoji the Kolaba chief, was helping the Pesva's brother Cimaji Appa in an attack on Janjira, Ghazi Khan, a Moghal noble, established himself in Musalman or Upper Ceul, and overran and wasted the lands of Kolaba. Turning from Jafijira the Pesva and Sekhoji marched together against Ghazi Khan, defeated him, took him prisoner, and destroyed Rajkot the citadel of Musalman Ceul. [Report from Rao Saheb Bal Ramchandra Dhonde received for the first edition.] The expedition against Janjira, however proved a failure. Surul Khan not only defended his possessions but took the offensive and caused much loss in Sahu's districts. The Sidi, however, knew that the wars were ruining the country and he ever depended for his supplies on the mainland. He, therefore, adopted a policy of compromise and though he kept possession of Rayagad fort, ceded the Pesva half of Rajpuri, including the petty divisions of Tala, Ghosala [For the struggle against the Portuguese see Military System of the Mara-thas, Sen pp. 190-91.], Nizampur, Ghodegahv, Birvadi, and half of Govale in the pre-sent subdivisions of Roha and Mangahv [ Jervis'Konkan, 133. According to Grant Duff. Vol. I, 388-89 the date of this cession was 1735.]. Marathas on the other hand were determined upon turning the Sidis into a power positively subordinate to the Marathas and accordingly in 1732 they entered into a secret treaty with Yakub Khan, a converted Koli, one of the best of the Sidi's officers. [Yakub who was familiarly known as Shaikji, had the entire confidence of the Sidi. He was a descendant of one of the Koli chiefs of the Konkan and was here-ditary patil of Guhagar. He was taken prisoner when a child and bred a Musalman. He early distinguished himself, and, on getting command of a ship, became celebrated for his stratagem and bravery.] On condition of desert-ing his master's cause, Yakub was to receive the command of the Maratha fleet, almost the whole of the Sidis' possessions, and two per cent of the revenue of the lower Konkan from Pen to Kolhapur. His brother was to be appointed second in command at Rayagad, and in case of success Rs. 1,00,000 were to be distributed among the troops and crews. To aid this scheme, in 1733, a force was sent into the Konkan. But the intrigues failed, and, in the war that followed though the Sidi's fleet was seized at Rajpuri by the combined efforts of the Pesva and Ahgre, little impression was made on Janjira, and once more the Marathas withdrew baffled.

The Sidi and the English, 1733.

In spite of his survival against the attack of the Marathas the Sidi's power at sea was on the decline. Their fleet had shown itself no match for the Maratha fleet, and they were now, by their own confessions, unable to protect the shipping of Surat. [Bombay Quarterly Review, IV. 192.] At the same time the Court of Delhi had ceased to have any power in Surat. Tegbakt Khan, who was now the independent ruler of the city and castle, had owed much of his success in the recent troubles to English money and munitions of war. Under these circumstances the English endeavoured to obtain from Tegbakt Khan the position and revenues of admirals of Surat. As the Sidi was their ally, and an ally whom in the growing power of the Marathas they could ill afford to offend, the English were unwilling to attempt to gain the position of admirals by force. They had to content themselves with granting passes to traders, with making an expedition against the Koli pirates of Sultanpur in Kathiavad, and with using every effort to induce the Governor of Surat to transfer the fleet subsidy from Sidi to them. [Bombay Quarterly Review, IV, 188.] Tegbakt Khan at first was anxious to please the English. But when his power was firmly established his tone by degrees changed. The Marathas now enjoyed almost all the revenue of the country round Surat and Tegbakt Khan found himself badly off for money. He saw that so long as the admiral was weak he could keep a large share of the subsidy for his own use, but that, if the English were appointed to the charge of the fleet their power at sea would force him to pay them the full stipend. Influenced by these motives Tegbakt Khan, after long negotiations, refused to favour the English claims. This change in the governor's conduct was accompanied by so many acts of oppression that the English left Surat and remained on board their ships at the mouth of the Tapi. A Sidi fleet was sent to act against them, but they repulsed the fleet and blockaded the river. The blockade caused such distress in Surat that Tegbakt Khan was forced to redress the English grievances. The English did not press their claim to be made admirals of Surat, and at the close of the year (6th December, 1733) concluded an offensive and defensive alliance with the Janjira Sidis.

When free from the English claims Tegbakt Khan attempted to take advantage of the Sidi's weakness by keeping to himself the whole of the fleet subsidy. Failing in his efforts to obtain a share of the subsidy by peaceful means, the Sidi collected a fleet and seized several ships at the mouth of the Tapi. The English were called to mediate, and, in August 1735, Tegbakt Khan engaged to pay the Sidi Rs. 2,40,000 for arrears of subsidy and Rs. 1,50,000 for the current year. But the governor failed to perform his engagement, and Masud, the Sidi's agent at Surat, again interrupted trade, and raised his demands to Rs. 9,00,000. A second time the governor craved the assistance of the English, but this time they refused to interfere. The governor was left to make his own arrangements, and, after some concession, in February 1736, he succeeded in inducing the Sidi to restore all the ships he had taken. [On this occasion the governor, in lieu of the original subsidy, assigned the Sidi one-third of the customs by sea and land; one-third of the proceeds of the mint; an allotment from cotton and other funds; the revenue of the Bulsar division; certain dues from Bhavnagar in Kathiavad; and one-third share of the tolls in grain. Surat Diary from March 1735 to February 1736; Consultation book of the Bombay Government, 23rd April and 20th August 1735.]

In 1734, on the death of Sidi Surul Khan, Sidi Abdullah, the eldest of his sons, was murdered by his youngest brother [According to Janjira records, Sidi Abdullah was murdered by Sidi Sambal, a slave of Sidi Surul. Sambal ruled for two years and in 1736 was murdered by three slaves, Sidi Sallam, Sidi Faraz, and Sidi Sayyid, who placed Sidi Rahman on the throne.] who usurped the government to the prejudice of Sidi Rahman, an elder brother, who was absent from Janjira. Yakub Khan, the Janjira captain with whom the Marathas had entered into a secret treaty in. 1732, espoused the cause of Sidi Rahman and call-ed on Sahu for support.

Sidis defeated by the Marathas.

This was an opportunity for the Marathas. Both Chatrapati Sahu and Pesva Bajirav had long cherished a desire to destroy the power of the Sidi. Sahu's guru Brahmendrasvami who had established a holy shrine at Parasuram near Ciplun had a grievance against Sidi Saat who was in possession of an island fortress, Govalkot just opposite Ciplun; for Sidi Saat had destroy-ed the holy shrine in 1727 in a lit of mad anger. The Svami naturally looked to Sahu for getting his grievance redressed. Secondly, ever since 1689 when Rayagad was captured by Aurangzeb and subsequently handed over to Sidi for administration, it had remained in his hands and Sahu naturally looked upon the conquest of the old capital of Sivaji as a matter of prestige. Pesva also had a just grievance against the Sidi because Srivardhan, the home of the Pesva was a territory belonging to the Sidi and the Pesva used to receive a number of complaints from the people against the high handed rule of the Sidi. But more than those personal factors, Sidi represented the Moghal power in the west as did the Nizam in the east and the two followed a concerted policy against the Pesva. The campaign was directed by Sahu and had a good start. Sekhoji Angre was posted to attack Underi. Bakaji Naik [Sardesai 'New History of the Marathas', Vol. II p. 149.] a gallant officer of the Angres was directed towards Bankot and Mandangad, and Pratinidhi towards Anjanvel, while Bajirav and Fatehsingh directed their attack against Janjira. Even Mathurabai and Laksmlbal, the two widows of Kanhoji threw themselves whole-heartedly into the war. [Selections from Peshwa Daftar, 3, p. 2.] Within the next few weeks, Birvadi, Tala, Ghosala were occupied by the Marathas and Pratinidhi crowned his success by the conquest of Rayagad. The attack on Janjira both on land and on sea was so violent that the Sidis so far holding their own, now consented to hand over the whole charge to Sidi Rahman, the protege of the Pesva and quietly made way towards the south. Rahman was made to sign away half the revenue of Sidi's dominions. [The partition treaty of the Sidi's territory is given in full in Jervis' Konkan 131-36. Of the Sidi's territories the mahah of Mamie and Tala, the paiganas of Ghosala and Birvadi, the tappas of Godegaon and Nizampur. and half the tappa of Govale having 24½ villages were ceded to the Marathas. The territory that remained with the Sidi was the parganas of Nandgaon, Shrivardhan, Diva, and Mhasla, the tappa of Mandla, and the 24½ villages of Govale. To these the Poona records add, that the Sidi gave up all claim to share in the revenue of Nagothana, Ashtami (Roha), Pali, Asriadharne, and Antora. The date of the treaty is doubtful. Grant Duff, Vol. I, 389, gives 1735; Jervis in one passage (108) gives 1736 and in another (131).1732; the Poona records give 1736. It appears that the treaty concluded in the midst of the war was confirmed in 1736.] At this stage Sekhoji died on 28th August 1733[Sardesai, 'New History of the Marathas', Vol. II, p. 151. According to Dhabu, it was in 1734] and his brothers Sambhajl and Manaji started a domestic quarrel with the result that the intensity of the campaign was weakened. After some time however the campaign against the Sidi was vigorously pursued by Cimaji Appa, the Pesva's brother and Sidi Saat was killed near Revas in 1736. The whole struggle lasted for over three years from February 1733 to May 1736 and some spectacular successes were no doubt obtained. But the main object of the Marathas to oust the Sidi from Janjira and from Govalkot remained unfulfilled, due to the delay caused on account of the quarrels in the Angre family, as also to the inability of Sahu to control his subordinates and direct their movements in a co-ordinated manner.

It is further worth being noted that after three years, Sidi Rahman was removed from power in 1739 and his brother Sidi Hasan was appointed in his place. As the course of events would have it, the erstwhile enemies of each other, the Sidis and the Pesva, developed a sort of friendliness towards each other on account of the Pesva's effort to participate in the fraternal disputes in the Angre family and Sahu's vain efforts to settle them.

Angre Power Divided. Manaji Angre, 1734-59 , Sanbhaji Angre, 1734-42.

After the death of Sekhoji he was succeeded by his brother Sambhaji. who, choosing to stay at Suvarndurg with his half-brother Tulaji, appointed his other half-brothers Yesaji to the 'civil charge and Manaji to the naval and military command of Kolaba. Shortly after,' Manaji quarrelled with his brothers Sambhaji and Yesajl, and unable to stand against his brothers' superior force, took shelter with the Portuguese at Lower Ceul or Revdanda. Before long he left Revdanda, and bringing together a few followers, surprised and seized the fort of Kolaba. Mauaji was now the undisputed master of Kolaba, and, with the help of the Pesva, defeated Yesaji and made him prisoner. He was confined at Poynad and then at Alibag'. From Alibag he escaped to the Pesva, who decided that he had no claim on Kolaba. and, on his engaging not again to break the peace, settled ten khandis of rice and Rs. 400 a month on him and sent him to Revdanda [Bom. Gov. Rec. Pol. Dept. (1840), 1107, 21.]. Manaji successfully resisted Sambhaji's efforts to displace him, and forming an alliance with Sahu, tried to gain the fort of Anjanvel from the Sidi. The Bombay Government sent some gallies to help the Sidi. But, as they were ordered to take no active part in the contest, they were of little use, and the Marathas increased their power. The Pesva took possession of Raygad and Mahad, and Manajl seized some vessels and established him-self at Revas on the Pen river. As the Bombay Government could not allow Manaji to establish his power in the Bombay harbour, four cruisers were sent against him, but from discord among the British commanders the whole of Angre's fleet except one grab was allowed to escape. Meanwhile the British and the Sidi joined in an alliance against Ahgre. They agreed that all prizes made at sea should be given to the English and all prizes made on land to the Sidi; that if Khanderi was taken it should be handed to the English, that the fort of Kolaba should be demolished; and that the revenues of Kolaba were to be equally divided between the Sidi and the British. [Aitchison's Treaties, IV. (1876), 320-330.] In 1736, Sambhaji from Vijayadurg took the richly laden English ship Derby, the armed ship Restoration, and several other smaller vessels.

English exploit the situation.

Sambhaji arrived at Alibag from Vijayadurg, and tried to oust Manaji from Kolaba. The Bombay Government took full advantage of the situation to weaken the naval power of the Angres and helped Manaji in stores and money. The Pesva also supported him for which Manaji gave up the forts of Kotaligad and Rajmaci near Khandala, and agreed to pay an yearly tribute of Rs. 7,000 and to provide European and Chinese articles worth Rs. 3,000 more. [Grant Duff, Vol. I. 395. Mr. Bal informed the editor of the first edition that under this agreement, besides Kothligad and Rajmachi, the forts of Thai, Tirgad and Uran were made over to the Peshwa.] Besides helping Manaji with money and stores, the Bombay Government sent some ships which dispersed Sambhaji's fleet and forced them to take shelter in the Rajpuri creek. [Bom. Quar. Rev. IV. 76.] Little damage was done, and so successful were Sambhaji's raids on English shipping that he ventured to suggest a peace on condition that the Bombay Government should pro-vide their vessels with his passes and pay him a yearly sum of Rs. 20,00,000. These proposals were rejected. Manaji, whom the Bombay Government had helped in his wars with his brother Sambhaji gave much trouble to Bombay, seizing English vessels and taking possession of Elephanta and Karanja. On a promise to make restitution a hollow peace was concluded. [Bom. Quar. Rev. IV. 77.] In [For details of the war with the Portuguese see Sen Opp.. Cit. pp. 193-97 For details of the Dutch expedition against Gheria in 1739, due to their strained relations with the Angres, see, Early career of Kanhoji Angria and other papers. Sen pp. 26-53.] 1739, while the Portuguese were besieged at Bassein by the Marathas under Cimaji Appa, Manaji blocked the sea approach thus cutting off all supplies. In 1740 a Portuguese fleet was destroyed by Angre, and on the 14th October of the same year when articles of peace were signed between the Pesva and Viceroy of Goa, the Portuguese handed Ceul to the English who had acted as mediators, and in November, after the Marathas had fulfilled their part of the conditions, the English delivered Ceul to them. [Bom. Quar. Rev. IV. 89. The account of the cession of Chaul in the Quarterly Review based on English records is in harmony with the Portuguese records-(Dr. Da Cunha, 5th Oct. 1882). According to Grant Duff (History, Vol. I, 424), in the beginning of 1741 the Marathas attacked and took Chaul. the last place remaining with the Portuguese between Goa and Daman. Grant Duff's statement based on Maratha MSS. is not clear and does not agree with what he states in an-other passage (Vol. I, 411). According to the other passage, in 1740 Sambhaji Angre attacked Manaji's territory and took Chaul among other places. It is hard to understand how in 1741 (January) the Marathas took Chaul 'the last place remaining to the Portuguese,' if in 1740 it fell into the hands of Sambhaji as part of Manaji's territory. In this connection Sen in his Military System of the Marathas (pp. 196-97) has said ".So confident was Angre of his navat power that on his way to Gheria, he passed with his valuable prize within sight of Anjdiv and at a little distance of Agoada but the Portuguese attempted no rescue". Both the brothers-Sambhaji and Manaji-were able seamen and but for their mutual dissensions "they might have easily accom-plished their father's ambition-the conquest of the whole coast from Bombay to Goa".]

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