HISTORY

MARATHA PERIOD

Rise of the Maratha Power.

In 1636, the Nizamsahl dynasty came to an end. Towards the end of 1636 Sahaji Bhosale, the son of Maloji Bhosale, who had taken a considerable part in Nizamsahi affairs during the last years of the dynasty, was allowed to retire into the service of Mahmud Adil Sah of Bijapur (1626-1656). In 1637, besides giving Sahaji his jaglr districts in Poona, Mahmud Adil Sah conferred on him a royal grant for the desmukhi of twenty-two villages including Masur in the district of Karhad, the right to which had devolved on government through confiscation.

Sivaji.

Before the middle of the 17th century, Sahaji's son Sivaji, the founder of the Maratha empire, had begun to establish himself in the hilly parts of Poona in the north where he had been put in possession of his father's estate of Poona and Supa. By 1648 he obtained control over the strong forts of Torna in Bhor about thirty-five miles south-west of Poona, Kondana or Sinhgad about twelve miles south-west of Poona, Purandar about twenty miles south of Poona, and Rajgad in Bhor about five miles east of Torna. At this time the south of the Nira, as far east as Sirval and as far south as the range of hills north of the Krsna, was farmed by the hereditary desmukh of Hirdas Maval, a Maratha named Bandal, and the fort of Rohida was committed to his care. He early entertained a jealousy of Sivaji and kept a strong garrison and carefully watched the country round Purandar. The despdnde of the place was a Prabhu. War was the station of a Bijapur mokasadar or manager who had charge of Pandugad, Kamalgad and several other forts in the neighbourhood. Candrarav More, Raja of Javli, was in possession of the Ghatmatha from the Krsna to the Varna. The Bijapur government on charges of treason arrested Sahaji in 1648 and at the same time sent an army under Fateh Khan to attack Sivaji. Sivaji proved more than a match for him and defeated him in the battle of Belsar near Purandar. Sahaji was subsequently released by the end of the year 1649 and an effort was made to bring about reconciliation between him and Baji Ghorpade, the Mudhol Chief, who had been instrumental in his capture. To induce both parties to forget what had passed, Mahmud Adil Sah made them exchange their hereditary rights and inams as desmukhs. Baji Ghorpade thus obtained from Sahaji the desmukhi rights of twenty-two villages in Karhad which Sahaji had acquired in 1637 from Bijapur. This agreement however was not acted upon. In the meanwhile another attempt was made to seize Sivaji, and this time Baji Samraj was sent for the purpose. Sivaji frequently lived at the town of Mahad in Kolaba and the party of Samraj, passing through the territory of Candrarav More, lurked about the Par pass until an opportunity should offer. Sivaji anticipated the surprise, attacked the party near the bottom of the pass and drove them in great panic to the forests. Disturbances in the Karnatak prevented the Bijapur government from taking further active steps against Sivaji, who finding that his father had heen sent far away from the capital on a military campaign in Karnatak, began to devise new schemes for possessing himself of the whole Ghatmatha or hilly west Deccan. With this object in view Sivaji turned his attention to the Mores of Javli who were very powerful in that region. The ruling prince Yesvantrav was however none too friendly towards Sivaji and would not fall in line with the designs of Sivaji. In fact he had reasons to be grateful to Sivaji because it was he who was instrumental in enabling Yesvantrav to succeed to the jagir of Javli after the death of Daulatrav in 1648, who had died childless and whose widow had sought the help of Sivaji in adopting young Yesvantrav and carrying on the administration in his name during the latter's minority, with the assistance of one Hanmantrav More, a distant relation of the family. In course of time Yesvantrav grew jealous of his indeoendent position and impatient of Sivaji's interference. Sivaji spent years in negotiations for a peaceful way to gain his object. There was also understandable reason for Sivaji's patience. Afzal Khan, the subhedar of Wal, who had acted as the representative of the sovereign power of Bijapur since 1649 was anxious to prevent both Yesvantrav and Sivaji from growing very powerful in that region.. He had sent letters to Kanhou Jedhe and other saradars to join his standard for the purpose. There thus arose a triangular contest between the Mores, Sivaji and Afzal Khan. About the year 1654, Afzal Khan came to be transferred to Kanakgiri and Sivaji seized this opportunity of Afzal Khan's absence to deal resolutely with the affair. He took into his confidence some of the Maval desmukhs-, particularly Kanhoji Jedhe and Haibatrav Silimkar as also other neighbours of the Mores and sent a proposal to Javli stating terms which the Mores refused to accept. Then he dispatched a contingent of these desmukhs along with his commandar Sambhaji Kavji and a small force threatening their residence. This first attempt proved ineffectual, and Sivaji sent another force under Raghu-nath Ballal Korde. A battle was fought near Jayli in which Hanmantrav More was killed and Yesvantrav tied for his life and took shelter in the fort of Rairi. Partaprav Mere another scion of the family escaped to Bijapur to seek the help of Adil Sah to oust Sivaji from Javll (26-1-1656). Sivaji himself at once proceeded to Javll, stayed there for two months, and strengthened his hold upon the principality. In the meantime Yesvantrav started serious trouble afresh from the hill top of Rain, a large and lofty plateau near Mahad which belonged to the Mores. Sivaji sent troops with his agent Haibatrav Silimkar to Yesvantrav demanding submission. After a long negotiation, a meeting was arranged at the foot of Rairi in May. When the Mores came down to meet Sivaji, he had the principal offender Yesvantrav executed and carried his two sons Krsnaji and Baji as captives to Poona. The capture of the strong fort of Vasoth, which had also belonged to Mores, about fifteen miles west of Satara, subsequently called Vajragad by Sivaji and the conquest of Sivthar valley completed the conquest of Javli. Later on, the two sons of Yesvantrav were detected conducting secret intrigues with Bijapur; one of them was killed while the other escaped. The result of Sivaji's swift and decisive action towards Mores was on the whole helpful to his pursuits, because the turbulent chiefs in the surrounding area came to know what to expect from him if an open opposition were offered to his plans and desires. Sivaji followed up his conquest of Javli by surprising Rohida which he scaled at night at the head of the Mavles. Bandal, the desmukh who was in the fort at the time stood to his arms on the first moment of alarm; and although greatly outnumbered, his men did not submit until he was killed. At the head of them was Baji Prabhu Despande; Sivaji treated him with generosity, received him with great kindness, and confirmed him in all his hereditary possessions. He agreed to take service under Sivaji. The command of a considerable body of infantry was conferred upon him and he maintained his character for bravery and fidelity to the last. In 1656, to secure access to his possessions on the banks of the Nira and the Koyna and to strengthen the defences of the Par Pass Sivaji pitched upon a high rock near the source of the Krsna on which he resolved to build another fort commanding an extensive view of Konkan to the weat. The execution of the design was entrusted to Moro Trimal Pingle, who shortly before had been appointed to command the fort of Purandar in Poona. This man, when very young, had accompanied his father, then in the service of Sahaji to the Karnatak and returning to the Maratha country about the year 1653 had joined Sivaji. The able manner in which he executed every thing entrusted to him soon gained him the confidence of his master and the erection of Pratapgad, the name given to the new fort, confirmed the favourable opinion entertained of him. A new image of the goddess Bhavani, the prototype of his family deity, Bhavani of Tuljapur, was later installed in the fort and Sivaji made it a practice to visit the place on devotional grounds, whereby he effectively served his political object of keeping a watchful eye on the region around. On the death of Muhamad Adil Sah in 1656 and the succession of the Ali Adil Sah II, the Moghals under Aurahgzeb, then viceroy of the Deccan, invaded the Bijapur territories and Sarjerav Ghatge, Nimbalkar, and other Maratha estate holders promptly joined Khan Muhammad, the Bijapur prime minister with their troops. In 1658 Aurangzeb deposed his ailing father and ascended the throne by defeating his competitors.

About the year 1658, Bijapur was distracted by factions among its nobles owing to the youth of its sovereign Ali Adil Sah II. At last they became sensible of the necessity of making all active efforts to subdue Sivaji. For this purpose an army was assembled consisting of 5,000 horse and 7,000 choice infantry, a good train of artillery or what was considered as such, besides a large supply of rockets, a number of swivels mounted on camels, and abundance of stores. Afzal Khan, an officer of high rank, volunteered to command the expedition and declared that he would bring back the insignificant rebel and cast him in chains under the footstool of the throne. The army proceeded in September 1659 from Bijapur to Pandharpur and thence marched towards Wal. Sivaji on its approach, took up his residence in Pratapgad and sent the most humble messages to Afzal Khan. Afzal Khan, who had all the vanity of a Muhammedan noble, had also a thorough contempt for his enemy. An interview was agreed on, and the Bijapur troops with great labour moved to Javli. Sivaji prepared a place for the meeting below the fort of Pratapgad. It was Thursday, 10th of November 1659.

Afzal Khan meant treachery. On the appointed day Sivaji prepared to meet the Khan. The Khan advanced two or three paces to meet Sivaji. They were introduced to each other and further in the midst of the customary embrace, the tall and mighty Khan was able to hold the neck of comparatively short-statured Sivaji under his left arm. As the Khan tried to press it, he took out his dagger from his waist on the right side and tried to hit the left side of Sivaji. As Sivaji was clad in armour the steel weapon only made a sharp rubbing sound against his side but did not hurt him. Thereupon Sivaji, ever on his guard thrust the bicva in his left hand in the right side of the Khan. The Khan wore no armour and therefore the hit proved singularly effective and ripped open his bowels. The end of the Khan was not long delayed. A signal was given to the Maratha troops in the hills under the command of Netajl Palkar and Moropant Pihgle. They fell upon the Bijapur troops who were camping at the foot of the hill. Few of the Bijapur soldiers had time to mount their horses or to stand their arms. Netajl Palkar gave no quarter; but orders were sent to Moropant to spare all who submitted.

This success greatly raised the reputation of Sivaji. The immediate fruits were four thousand horses, several elephants, a number of camels, a considerable treasure, and the whole train of equipment which had been sent against him.

In 1659, Sivaji surprised the fort of Vasantagad about seven miles north-west of Karhad, levied contributions along the Krsna, and left a thana or garrison with a revenue collector in the gadhi or mud fort of Battis Sirala. In January 1661, Ali Adil' Sah II, disappointed in his hopes of crushing Sivaji, took the field in person and marched to Miraj. All the district authorities, some of whom had submitted to Sivaji, attended the royal camp to tender their allegiance. Ali Adil Sah recovered Panhala and Rahgna in Kolhapur which had fallen to Sivaji in the previous year and returned by way of Miraj. In 1660 Saista Khan was appointed governor of the Deccan to contain Sivaji, but Sivaji, carried a surprise attack on him at Poona.

On the defeat and disgrace of Saista Khan in 1663, Aurangzeb dispatched his generals Mirza Raja Jaysihgh and Diler Khan against Sivaji Recognising the superiority of Moghal forces, Sivaji submitted and signed the treaty of Purandar. In 1665, in accordance with the terms of the treaty of Purandar by which he was to co-operate with the Moghals to subdue Bijapur, Sivaji with a hody of 2,000 horse and 7,000 infantry joined Jaysingh and the combined army marched in November 1665. Their first operations were against Bajaji Naik Nirhbalkar, a relation of Sivaji and jagirdar of Bijapur. Phaltan was reduced and the fort of Tathvad scaled by Sivaji's Mavles. All the fortified places in their route were taken. Ali Adil Sah had prepared for a trial' of strength, but endeavoured to prevent the invaaion by promises of settling the demands of the Moghals. Jaysihgh however continued his advance and met with little opposition until near Mangalvedha in Solapur. The campaign, however, faile.d and Jaysihgh had to withdraw from the Bijapur territory in humiliation, As per the terms of the treaty of Purandar Sivaji visited Agra in May 1666. Aurahgzeb detained Sivaji but he miraculously escaped and reached Rajgad in November. Aurahgzeb now recalled Jaysingh and appointed prince Muazzam and Jaswantsihgh to take his place. In September 1667 Adil Sah concluded a treaty with Sivaji. In March 1668 the Moghals also entered into a treaty with Sivaji under the terms of which Sambhaji joined the Moghal camp in August 1668. In January 1670 Sivaji plundered Berar and captured Sinhagad, Kalyan and Bhivandi in quick succession. On January 5, 1671 Sivaji captured Salher. In February 1672 Junnar and Ramnagar were reduced.

Conflict broke out with the Moghals in 1670, which continued, till Sivajis death in 1680. Sivaji attacked the kingdom of Bijapur as well. Sivaji wrested all the forts ceded by him to the Moghals and carried on the war in Baglan.

Ali Adil Sah II died in 1672. He was succeeded by Sikandar Adil Sah, a boy of four.

The nobles of Bijapur decided that Khawas Khan should be at Bijapur looking after the administration of the kingdom and hold Gulbarga and Naldurg.

Abdul Karim Bahlol Khan was given the territory including Panhala and Miraj, and Muzaffar Khan was to hold the Karnatak Balaghat. Taking advantage of Ali Adil Sah's death, Sivaji captured Panhala, Satara and Parali in quick succession. He even possessed himself of Karwar and the surrounding country of Karnatak Balaghat. All efforts of Bijapur generals to oust him from this area failed.

In May 1673 Sivaji captured Parali fort and on 27th July of the same year Satara fell to his forces. The forts of Candan, Vandan, Pandavgad, Nandgiri and Tathvad all fell into Sivaji's hands before the fair season. In 1675 Sivaji again possessed himself of all the forts between Panhala in Kolhapur and Tathvad. When he was occupied in Kohkan and had taken with him all the infantry that could be spared, Nirhbalkar and Ghatge, the desmukhs of Phaltan and Malavadi, attacked Sivaji's garrisons, drove out the posts and recovered most of the open country for Bijapur. On the 6th June 1674 Sivaji was crowned as Chatrapati at Raygad. He started a new era from that date. In 1676 Sivaji for the third time took possession of the open country between Tathvad and Panhala. To prevent future inroads by neighbouring proprietors Sivaji gave orders to connect the two places by a chain of forts, which he named Vardhangad, Bhusangad, Sadasivgad and Macchindragad. Although of no great strength, they were well chosen to support his intermediate posts and to protect the highly productive tract within the frontier which they embraced. While engaged in this arrangement Sivaji was overtaken by a severe illness which confined him at Satara for several months. During his illness he planned the most important expedition of his life, the invasion of the Madras Karnatak. The discussion of his legal claim to share in half of his father's Karnatak possessions and the possibility of making this a cloak for more extensive acquisitions in the south was a constant subject of consultation. While Sivaji was in the Karnatak a body of horse belonging to Ghatge and Nimbalkar laid waste Panhala in the south and retired plundering towards Karhad. A detachment from Sivaji's army under Niroji Katkar overtook them at Kuril, attacked and dispersed them, recovering much valuable property. Sivaji returned from the Karnatak expedition in 1678.

On December 13th 1678, Sivaji's son Sambhaji joined the Moghals. In the same year Diler Khan marched from Akluj for the capture of Bhopalgad which was in possession of the Marathas. Sambhaji accompanied Diler Khan in Khaniipur taluka of Sangli district. Diler Khan mounted guns on the nearby hillock and bombarded the ramparts. The garrison surrendered the fort on 2nd April 1679. On the same day the Maratha dispatched reinforcements for the succour of the fort garrison. To counter the Maratha forces Diler Khan dispatched Ikhlas Khan, Raja Jaswantsihgh Bundella and Rasidali Rosanai alias Ilhamullah Khan. But finding the Maratha troops superior in strength he himself followed his nobles. The Maratha's were defeated. Diler Khan then returned to his camp. The Maratha's however recaptured Bhopalgad on 15th April 1679. Diler Khan next marched against Bijapur. He also attempted to seduce the Bijapur garrison of Miraj but without success. Shortly after Sambhaji returned to Sivaji's side. Throughout the year 1679 Sivaji exerted his utmost to assist Bijapur against the Moghals, by sending reinforcements and also by planning diversionary bands in Moghal territory. As a result, Diler Khan the Moghal general had to raise the siege and retire discomfited. At the time of his death in 1680, Sivaji, who during the last two years of his life had become an ally of Bijapur against the Moghals, possessed that part of Satara of which the line of forts built from Tathvad to Panhala distinctly marked the eastern boundary. Singnapur in the Man sub-division in the east with the temple of Mahadev was his hereditary inam village given by one of the Ghatges to his father Sahaji.

Sivaji's Institutions.

The various institutions of Sivaii are the key to the forms of government afterwards adopted by every Maratha State. Sivaji's regulations were gradually formed and enlarged, but after a certain period underwent no change by the extension of his territory until he assumed the ensign of royalty. Even then the alterations were rather in matters of form than in rules. The plans of Maratha expansion which were afterwards pursued so successfully by his nation may be traced from a very early period and nothing is more remarkable in regard to Sivaji than the foresight with which some of his schemes were laid and the fitness of his arrangements for the genius of his countrymen.

The foundation of his power was his infantry; his occupation of the forts gave him a hold on the country and a place of deposit for his plunder. His cavalry had not yet spread the terror of the Maratha name; but the rules of formation and discipline for his troops, the interior economy of his infantry and cavalry, the regulations for his forts, his revenue and judicial arrangements, and the chief offices through which his government was administered were fully developed. Sivaji's infantry was raised in the West Deccan and Konkan; the men of the West Deccan tract were called mavles or westerners and those of the Konkan, hetkaris or southerners. These men brought their own arms and required nothing but ammunition. Their dress, though not uniform, was generally a pair of short drawers coming half-way down the thigh, a strong narrow band of considerable length tightly girt about the loins, a turban, and sometimes a cotton frock. Most of them wore a cloth round the waist, which likewise answered the purposes of sal. Their common arms consisted of a sword, a shield and a matchlock. Some of the hetkaris, especially the infantry of Savantvadi, used a species of firelock, the invention of the lock for the flint having been early received from the Portuguese. Every tenth man, instead of fire-arms, carried a bow and arrows which were useful in night attacks and surprises when fire-arms were kept in reserve or forbidden. The Hetkaris excelled as marksmen but they could seldom be brought to the desperate sword-in-hand attacks for which the mavles were famous. Both of them had unusual skill in climbing, and could mount a precipice or scale a rock with ease, where men of other countries must have run great risk of being dashed to pieces. Every ten men had an officer called a naik and every fifty a havilddr. The officer over a hundred was termed jumladar and the commander of a thousand was styled ek-hazdri. There were also officers of five thousand, between whom and the sarnobat or the chief commander there was no intermediate step. The cavalry was of two kinds, bdrgtirs, literally bridlemen or riders who were supplied with horses and sileddrs who were self-horsed; Sivaji's bargirs were generally mounted on horses, the property of the State. A body of this description was termed pdgd or household troops, and Sivaji always placed more dependence on them than on the siledars or any horse furnished on contract by individuals; with both he had a proportion of his pagd mixed, to overawe the disobedient and to perfect his system of intelligence which abroad and at home penetrated into a knowledge of the most private circumstances, prevented embezzlement and frustrated treachery. The Maratha horsemen were commonly dressed in a pair of tight breeches covering the knee, a turban which many of them fastened by passing a fold of it under the chin, a frock of. quilted cotton and a cloth round the waist, with which they generally girded on their swords in preference to securing them with their belts. The horseman was armed with sword and a shield; a proportion in each body carried matchlocks, but the great national weapon was the spear, in the use of which and in the management of their horses they showed both grace and skill. The spearman had generally a sword and sometimes a shield; but the shield was unwieldy, and was carried only in case the spear should be broken. Over every twenty-five horsemen Sivaji had a havildar. To one hundred and twenty-five there was a jurnladar, and to every five jumlas or six hundred and twenty-five was a subhedar. Every subha had an accountant and auditor of accounts appointed by Sivaji. They were liable to be changed. They were invariably Brahmans or Prabhus. To the command of every ten subhas or six thousand two hundred and fifty horse, which were rated at only five thousand, there was a commander styled pane-hazdri with whom were also stationed a muzumdar or a Brahman auditor of accounts and a Prabhu registrar and accountant who was called amin. These were government agents. Besides these, every officer, from the jumladar upwards, had one or more kdrkuns or writers paid by himself as well as others in the pay of government. Except the sarnobat or the chief, no officer was superior to the commander of five thousand. There was one sarnobat for the cavalry and one for the infantry. Every jumla, subhd, and panc-hazdri had an establishment of news-writers and spies besides secrete intelligencers. Sivaji's head spy was a Maratha named Bahirji Nalk. The Marathas are peculiarly roused from indolence and apathy when charged with responsibility. Sivaji at the beginning of his career personally inspected every man who offered himself, and obtained security from persons already in his service for the fidelity and good conduct of those with whom he was not acquainted. This system of security must soon have made almost every man answerable for some of his comrades; and although it could have been in most instances but a form, owing to the ease with which the responsibility could be evaded, the demand of security was always a part of Sivaji's instructions to his officers. The mavles sometimes enlisted, merely on condition of getting a subsistence in grain; but the regular pay of the infantry was 1 to 3 pagodas a month; that of the bargirs or riders, was 2 to 5 pagodas and that of the siledars or self-horsed cavaliers 6 to 12 pagodas a month. All plunder as well as prize was the property of government. It was brought at stated times to Sivaji's darbdr or place of public audience and individuals formally displayed and delivered their captures. They always received some small proportionate compensation; they were praised, distinguished and promoted according to their success. In fact to collect plunder from the enemy's ranks was usually regarded by the Marathas as expressing a victory, of which in their estimation it could he the only tangible proof. The horses, especially at an advanced period of Sivaji's history, were subsisted during the fair season in the enemy's country; during the rains they were generally allowed to rest and were cantoned in different places near kurans or pasture lands, under the protection of some fort, where the grass of the preceding season was stacked and grain prepared by the time they returned. For this purpose persons were appointed to whom rent-free lands were hereditarily assigned. The system was preserved when many of Sivaji's institutions were neglected and it proved a great aid to the success of his countrymen.

Sivaji kept the Hindu festival of the Dasara with great pomp. It falls in October at the end of the south-west rains, and was particularly convenient for a general muster and review of his troops previous to their taking the field. At this time each horse was examined and an inventory and valuation of each soldier's effects were taken to be compared with what he brought back or eventually to be made good. If a horseman's effects were unavoidably lost, his horse killed, maimed or destroyed in government service they were on due proof replaced. On the other hand all plunder or articles discovered, of which no satisfactory account could be given, were carried to the credit of government, either by confiscating the article or deducting the amount from the soldier's arrears. It was at the option of the captors to keep almost any articles if fairly brought forward, valued, and paid for. The accounts were closed every year, and balances due by government were paid either in ready money or by bills on the collectors of revenue in favour of the officers, but never by separate orders on villages. The only exceptions to plunder made by Sivaji were in favour of cows, cultivators, and women; these were never to be molested nor were any but rich Muhammedans or Hindus in their service who could pay a ransom to be made prisoners. No soldier in the service of Sivaji was permitted to carry any female followers with him to the field on pain of death. His system of intelligence was the greatest check on every abuse, and his punishments were rigorous. Officers and men who had distinguished themselves, who were wounded, or who had suffered in any way, were always gratified by promotion, honour or compensation. Sivaji did not approve of the jagir or estate system; he confirmed many, but, with the exception of the establishment for his forts he seldom bestowed new military estates and gave away very few as personal assignments. Inam lands were granted by him as well in reward of merit as in conformity with the tenets of his faith; a gift of land, especially to Brahmans, being of all charities the most acceptable to the divinity. Sivaji's discipline, which required prompt obedience to superiors in every situation, was particularly strict in his forts. The chief person or killedar in the command of a fortress was termed havildar and under him there were one or more sarnobats. In large forts there was a samobat to guard each direction. Every tort had a head clerk and a commissary of grain and stores; the head clerk, a Brahman was termed sabnis; the commissary was commonly of the Prahhu caste and was called karkhanis. The orders regarding ingress and egress, rounds, watches, and patrols, care of water, grain stores, and ammunition were most minute, and the head of each department was furnished with distinct rules for his guidance from which no deviation was allowed. A rigid economy characterised all Sivaji's instructions regarding expenditure. The garrison was sometimes partly composed of the common infantry. Independent of them, each fort had a separate and complete establishment. It consisted of Brahmans, Marathas, Ramosis, Mahars and Mangs; the whole were termed gadkaris or fort-men. They were maintained by permanent assignments of rent-free lands in the neighbourhood of each fort, which with the care of the fort passed from father to son. The Ramosis and Mahars were employed on outpost duty. They brought intelligence, watched all the paths, misled inquiries, or cut off hostile stragglers. This establishment while new and vigorous was admirably suited to Sivaji's purpose as well as to the genius of the people. The gadkaris described the fort as the mother that fed them, and among other advantages, no plan could better provide for old or deserving soldiers.

Sivaji's revenue arrangements were founded on those of Dadaji Kondadev, Sivaji's Brahman manager, to whom Sivaji's education in Poona was entrusted (1641). The assessments were made on the actual state of the crop, the proportionate division of which is stated to have been three-fifths to the husbandmen and two fifths to government. As soon as Sivaji got permanent possession of any territory, every species of military contribution was stopped, all farming of revenue ceased, and the collections were made by agents appointed by himself. Every two or three villages were superintended by a karkun under the tarafdar or talukdar who had charge of a small district, and was either a Brahman or a Prabhu. A Maratha havildan was stationed with each of therp. Over a considerable tract there was a subheddr or mamlatdar who had charge of one or more forts in which his collections both of grain and money were secured. Sivaji never permitted the desmukhs and despandes to interfere in the management of the country; nor did he allow them to collect their dues until their amount had been ascertained, when an order was annually given for the amount. The patils, khots and kulkarnis were strictly superintended, and Sivaji's government, though popular with the common cultivators, would have been unpopular with village and district officers, of whom Sivaji was always jealous, had it not been for the recourse which all had of entering his military service.

The method which the ministers of the Maratha government afterwards adopted, of paying the revenue of villages, is said to have been early proposed to Sivaji. He objected to it, not only from fear of immediate oppression to the husbandmen, but from apprehending that it would in the end cause such a division of power as must weaken his government and encourage the village and district authorities to resist it as they frequently did that of Bijapur. With the same view he destroyed all village walls and allowed no fortification in his territory which was not occupied by his troops. Religious establishments were carefully preserved, and temples for which no provision existed had some adequate assignments granted to them, but the persons in charge were obliged to account for the expenditure. Sivaji never sequestrated any allowance fixed by the Muhammedan government for the support of tombs, mosques, or saints' shrines. The revenue regulations of Sivaji were simple and judged by the standards of those times undoubtedly judicious.

People were encouraged to clear the jungles, raise crops and revive the village pancayats. They were further assured that the authorities would not take anything more than whatever be due according to law. This persistent effort to foster the rule of law and to create an atmosphere of security endeared him to his people. It is just possible, however, that his judicious measures may not have been attended with immediate improvements and prosperity to the people as is sometimes alleged; for his districts were frequently exposed to great ravages, and he never had sufficient leisure to complete his arrangements by that persevering superintendence which alone can perfect such institutions. Still those districts taken by him from Bijapur which had been under the management of farmersi of direct agents of government undoubtedly experienced great benefit by the change The judicial system of Sivaji in civil cases was that of pancdyat or council which had invariably obtained in the country. Disputes among his soldiers were settled by their officers. He drew his criminal law from the Hindu sacred works or Sastras; but as the former rulers were Musalmans they had naturally introduced changes which custom had sanctioned and perpetuated. This accounts for the difference that long afterwards persisted between Hindu law and Maratha usage.

To aid in the conduct of his government, Sivaji established eight officers; first the Pesava or head manager which office was held by Moropant or Moresvar Trimbak Pingle; second, the Muzumdar or general superintendent of finance and auditor general of accounts, which office was held by Abaji Sondev, subhedar of the province of Kalyan; third, the Surnis or general record-keeper, superintendent of correspondence, examiner of letters, which office was held by Annaji Datto; fourth, the Vaknis or private record-keeper and superintendent of the household troops and establishment, which office was held by Dattaji-pant; fifth, the Sarnobat or the chief captain of whom there were two, Prataprav Guiar over the cavalry and Yesaji Kank over the infantry; sixth, the Dabir or minister for foreign affairs, an office held by Somanathpant; seventh, the Nyaya-dh'is or superintendent of justice an office managed by Niran Ravji and Gomaji Naik; and eighth the Nyaya Sastri or expounder of Hindu law, an office held first by Sarhbhu Upadhye and afterwards by "Raghunathpant.

The officers at the head of these civil situations, except the Nyayadhis and Nyaya Sastrl, held military commands and frequently had no leisure to superintend their duties. All therefore were aided by deputies called karbharis, who often had power to fix the seal or mark of their principals on public documents. When so empowered they were styled mutaliks. Each department and every district establishment had eight subordinate officers under whom was an adequate staff of assistants. These officers were, 1st the Karbhari, Muialik or Divan; 2nd the Mujumdar or auditor and accountant; 3rd the Phadnis or Phadnavis deputy auditor and accountant; 4th the Sabnis or clery sometimes styled dajtarddr; 5th the Karkhanis or commissary; 6th the Citrus or correspondence clerk; 7th the Jamadar or treasurer in charge of all valuables except cash; and 8th the Potns or cash-keeper. Attached to himself, Sivaji had a treasurer, a correspondence clerk, and an accountant besides a Farisnis or Persian secretary. His clerk was a Prabhu named Balaji Avji, whose astuteness and intelligence were remarked by the English at Bombay on an occasion when he was sent there on business. Balkrsnapant Hanmante, a near relation of Sivaji's head manager, was Sivaji's accountant. On Sivaji's enthronement at Raygad in 1674 the names of such offices as were formerly expressed in Persian were marked by Sanskritised titles. There was only one Nyayadhis or a judge.

Sambhaji.

After Sivaji's death, Rajaram, his younger son was placed on the throne at Raygad by his mother Soyarabai, who was supported by Sivaji's ministers Annaji Datto and others. They wrote letters to the killedar of Panhala, calling upon him to keep a strict watch upon Sambhajl. The news of Sivaji's death could not however be long concealed from Sambhaji, who took possession of Panhala and prepared for a march on Raygad. The Maratha Commander-in-Chief, Hambirrav Mohite who was near Karhad, and who probably had no intimation of the plans at Raygad went over to Sambhaji. In the mean time two of Sivaji's prominent ministers Moropant Pihgle and Annaji Datto, who had supported the accession of Rajaram, were moving towards Panhala, apparently to prevent Sambhaji from doing any mischief. Sambhaji however managed to capture and confine them both at Panhala under a rigorous watch. Determined to put down Soyarabai and her supporters, Sambhaji marched on Raygad and took possession of the capital on 18th June 1680, putting Rajaram and Soyarabai in close confinement. In gratitude for this easy success he immediately made a formal grant to his family goddess Bhavani of ten thousand gold hons a year. Matters thus appeared to move smoothly. Moropant Pihgle died in October 1680 and Sambhajl appointed his son Nilopant to Pesavaship. Annaji Datto was released and restored to his office. The formal coronation ceremony was performed on 10th January 1681. [ Magh Shudha 7, Shiva Charitra Pradip, p. 31.] The disturbed atmosphere of Maharastra appeared for a time to assume its normal tenor.

In 1681 Akbar, the son of Aurangzeb, rose in rebellion against his father. He was supported by the Rajputs. The rebellion failed and Akbar had to flee to the south to seek the support of Sambhaji who extended his hospitality and accommodated him at Pali in Konkan. The discomfited group of statesmen again revived their efforts and sought the support of Akbar in their designs against Sambhaji, who straightway communicated the whole plot to Sambhaji. His anger now knew no bounds with the result that he instantly put the conspirators like Annaji Datto. Balaji Avji and Hiroji Farjand to death (August-Seutembcr 1681). Soyarabai, the mother of Rajaram, died soon after. She probably committed suicide.

Sambhaji was now free to pursue his struggle against the Moghals. The emperor Aurangzeb descended with a mighty force in the Deccan in November 1681. On the Konkan side Sambhaji had to face the Sidis and the Portuguese who constantly harassed his possessions in that region, while on the Deccan plateau he had to watch the movements of the Moghals under Azam, the son of Aurangzeb who had reached Aurangabad by that time. In the following year 1683, Moghal contingents were further strengthened by the arrival, of prince Muazzam and Sahabuddin and they planned a three pronged attack on Sambhaji in Konkan, Sahabuddin penetrating from the north near Kalyan, Muazzam marching from Belgahv across Ramsej-ghat and joining hands with the Portuguese at Goa and thus blockading him from the south and the Sidis co-operating with both cutting off the supplies and preventing them from reaching the Maratha forces which were to be trapped both from the north and the south. Simultaneously Azam, who had just returned from a campaign in the Dharvad region, was expected to distract the attention of Sambhaji by carrying on a foraging campaign into Baglan. For four years Sambhaji incessantly faced the difficult situation. He defeated all the efforts of the Moghals, the Sidis and the Portuguese to destroy him. Akbar, the rebel prince, wanted Sambhaji to join him in his north Indian campaign for the conquest of Delhi; it is not surprising, that Sambhajl could give him only token assistance. Disappointed. Akbar, thereafter proceeded to Iran in February.

To turn to the Moghals: on his failure to destroy Sambhaji, Asad Khan decided to proceed against the Adilsahi and Kutb-sahi powers, with the object of destroying them before he could turn his attention once more to Sambhaji. Accordingly in 1684 he ordered his army to proceed to Bijapur. Sambhaji resolved to harass Aurangzeb from the rear and with that object in view concentrated his forces under Kavi Kalas at Panhala. He also asked his general Harhbirrav to be watchful in that region. Miraj fell to the Moghals in 1686 (March-April). Sambhaji's efforts to distract the attention of Aurangzeb in this manner, however, did not prove effective. Aurangzeb was able to capture Bijapur towards the end of 1687. He was now free to concentrate all his might against Sambhaji. While Aurangzeb was away at Golconda, the Moghals invaded Satara district. Khanazad Khan had been sent towards Miraj and Kadirdad Khan had been appointed killedar of Miraj. Sambhaji's sena-pati Hambirrav Mohite opposed him. An action was fought between them near Wai towards the end of 1687 in which Hambirrav lost his life on the battle field. In 1688 Aurangzeb sent considerable forces under Azam, against Sambhaji. Gazi-ud-din Firoz Jung too marched against the Maratha ruler. Aurangzeb himself left Bijapur at the end of 1688 and marched into Maharastra. While he was camping at Akluj in February 1689 the news of the dramatic capture of Sambhaji by the Moghal general Saikh Nizam Muqarrab Khan was communicated to him.

The hilly region below the Sahyadri range between Kolhapur and Satara were long held by the Sirkes who had now turned against Sambhaji. They now played their game, watched Sambhaji's movements and communicated them to the Moghal officers. For about a year after Hambirrav's death Sambhaji and Kavi Kalas struggled as best as they could. In November 1688 Sambhaji having learned that the Sirkes had attacked Kavi Kalas and forced him to run away to Visalgad for protection, rushed against them, forced them to flee and joined Kavi Kalas at Visalgad. Although the Sirkes were defeated, they had come to know of the movements of Sambhaji. They lost no time in communicating them to the Moghals. On the 1st February 1689, Sambhaji and Kavi Kalas started from Visalgad and on their way to Raygad halted at Sangamesvar. No sooner was this known than Saikh Nizam, the Moghal general, who was investing Panhala lost no time in rushing thither from Kolhapur. He seized them both alive, while their followers fled to Raygad. Saikh Nizam seated Sambhaji on his own elephant and the other captives were accommodated on horses and camels, all moving towards the Emperor's camp. Aurangzeb had marched from Akluj to Bahadurgad where the captives were presented before him. They were subjected to disgrace and severe ill-treatment. Sambhaji was blinded on the 14th February 1689 and put to death in the imperial camp at Koreganv on 11th March 1689, the Amavasya day of Phalguna, Saka 1610.

Rajaram.

At Raygad, on the news of his death, his younger brother Rajaram was declared regent during the minority of Sambhaji's son Sivaji afterwards known as Sahu. In October 1689 Raygad, the Maratha capital, fell to the Moghals and young Sivaji and his mother Yesubai were made prisoners and taken to the Moghal camp. Undaunted by these calamities the Marathas resolved to fight with the Moghals by dividing their own forces and thus widely extending the field of military operations. Rajaram moved from place to place until he reached Jinji, about eighty miles south-west of Madras in November 1689. Before leaving for the south, Rajaram entrusted the conduct of all operations. military and administrative, in western Maharaistra to Ram-candrapant Amatya. With him were associated Sankraji Narayan Saclv and the celebrated generals Santaji Ghorpade and Dhanajl Jadhav. Parasurampant PratinidhI too came to be associated with Ramcandrapant.

On the arrival of Rajaram at Jinji, Aurangzeb was forced to send a large force under Zulfiqar Khan to the south. Later the prince Kambaks and the prime minister Asad Khan joined Zulfiqar Khan at the end of 1691. Aurangzeb himself moved out of Maharastra and fixed his camp at Galgali in the district of Bijapur while prince Azam was posted on the borders of. Tamilnad.

The Marathas under their generals Santaji Ghorpade and Dhanaji Jadhav perfected the system of guerilla warfare. They fell on Moghal military outposts, blocked roads, destroyed provisions and surprised the forts captured by the Moghals. The Marathas were incessantly on the move. They threw in a number of daring leaders such as Hanumantrav Nimbalkar and Nemaji Sinde.

It was Santaji Ghorpade, however, who dealt mighty blows to the Moghals. In battle after battle he defeated the Moghal generals sent against him, such as Muqarrab Khan, Sarja Khan alias Mardan Khan, Khanazad Khan, Qasim Khan and others. The Marathas spread throughout the south. Well-equipped Maratha armies led by Dhanajl and Santaji marched to the relief of Jinji. It was only in 1698 that Jinji fell to the Moghals. Rajaram returned to Maharastra to continue the struggle against the Moghals. The Marathas now began to move north towards Bihar, Khandes, Gujarat and Malva. Aurangzeb who had in 1694 fixed his camp at Brahmapuri (Solapur district) now decided to march in person against the Maratha forts. Aurangzeb left his camp at Brahmapuri on 19th October 1699 and reached Miraj after 20 days. Here prince Muhammad Azam paid his courtesy call on the Emperor. Bedarbakht was at the time at Miraj. He was sent to pursue Rajaram. The Emperor ordered that all the territory between Satara and Panhala should be devastated. This was done by Ruhulla Khan and Hamid-ud-din Khan. In 1698 Rajaram remained for a short time at Satara which he made the seat of government. In 1699 he marched north, intending to raid Berar. He was however checked near Parenda and forced to return. Aurangzeb left Miraj and encamped under the fort of Vasantgad about seven miles northwest of Karhad. Batteries were prepared and in three days the garrison surrendered on 25th November 1699. The Emperor named the fort Kilid-e-fateh or the Key of Victory. Aurangzeb then marched to Satara, a movement wholly unexpected by the Marathas, who filled with the idea that Panhala in Kolhapur was about to be besieged, had directed all their preparations towards its defence. The provisions in Satara fort were not enough to stand more than a two months' siege. Satara was besieged. The fort surrendered on 21st April 1700. Immediately on the fall of Satara, Parali was invested. The siege lasted till the beginning of June, when, after a good defence, the garrison left the fort. The fort was called by the Emperor Nauras Tara. As the south-west monsoon burst with great violence, the Moghal army, suffered much distress and hardship before the camp could he moved from the hills. After much loss of men and animals, the army reached Khavaspur on the banks of the Man in Satara. Here Aurahgzeb ordered Bedar-bakht to proceed towards Miraj with a view to capture Panhala. Zulfiqar Khan was instructed to reinforce the prince. He accordingly went to Miraj and met the prince and both proceeded towards Panhala. The Emperor, subsequently (1st January 1701) reached Miraj from Khavaspur. _At Miraj Baksi Mukhalis Khan died on 3rd _January 1701. The Emperor stayed at Miraj for the whole month of Ramzam. Dhanaji, the Maratha general, attacked the Emperor's camp. The Emperor dispatched Hamid-ud-din Khan and Munim Khan to counter the Maratha attack. Severe engagements took place. On the report that Zulfiqar Khan was marching against them, Marathas dispersed. The Emperor then left Miraj and reached Panhala on 9th March 1701. After the capture of Panhala and Visalgad, the Emperor proceeded to Bahadurgad. On 2nd December 1702 he marched for the capture of Kondana and ordered Fateullah Khan to bring the artillery used for the capture of Visalgad. At Rahimatpur the Khan was attacked by the Marathas. Zulfiqar Khan was ordered to help Fateullah. After rescuing Fateullah, Zulfiqar Khan marched against Dhanaii. He reached Miraj and proceeded further when he got the news that,Dhanajl, the Maratha commander, intended to attack Cin Kilic Khan, the newly appointed subhedar of Bijapur. Zulfiqar Khan reached in time to help Cin Kilic Khan on hearing which Dhanaji marched towards Gulbarga.

Tarabai's Regency.

Rajaram had died at Sinhagad near Poona on 2nd March 1700, more' than a month before the fall of Satara. The news of Rajaram's death was received in the Emperor's camp at Satara with great reioicing. Tarabai, Rajaram's elder widow, assumed the government for her son Sivaji, a boy of ten. She carried on the struggle with great vigour.

The forts of Kondana (Sinhagad), Rajgad and Torna were captured by Aurangzeb who in 1704 marched to Bidar country in Gulbarga district. After the conquest of Vakinkheda, he returned to Ahmadnagar in 1706. The Marathas had now spread in Gujarat and Malva. They had also recaptured a number of forts in their homeland. Vasantgad fell to the Marathas in 1705 A.D. It was taken by the Pratinidhi Parasuram Trirhbak. The year 1706 saw running battles fought between the Maratha-Moghal forces. Zulfiqar Khan pursued the Marathas from Aurangabad to Miraj traversing the districts of Bid, Parbhani, Osmanabad, Solapur and Sangli. Due to the rainy season Zulfiqar Khan camped at a distance of 12 kos from Miraj. His army suftered greatly from lack of provision. Rains over, he again started the pursuit of the Maratha army. In the same year Mandhata, the son of Rav Kanhu Sirke who was a nobleman of Zulfiqar Khan promised to capture Mahima-ntgad (Hanumantgad) and Pariksitgad (Prasiddhagad) in one year. The Moghals however received setbacks everywhere and during the lifetime of Aurahgzeb, most of the forts. captured by the Moghals fell to the Marathas. Aurahgzeb, disappointed and frustrated in his dream of subjugating the Deccan retired to Ahmadnager where he died on 20th February 1707. [At the time of the death of Aurangzeb the Deccan was divided into six subhas (provinces) viz., Khandesh, Berar, Auransabad, Bidar, Bijapur and Hyderabad. Miraj (Murtazabad) district formed part of the Bijapur province whicn was composed of two sub-provinces and which besides Miraj included Ak'.uj (Asadnagar), Raibag, Naldurg, Dabhol (Mustafabad) and Panhala (Nabishah Durg), districts now in Maharashtra. Miraj at that time was the headquarters of the district and was divided into six talukas and had 225 villages. The total revenue of the Miraj district was Rs. 5,57,359. It may he noted here that the revenue returns were monthly and not annual and thus the annual revenue returns of the district would amount to Rs. 11,14,714.] In 1707, Tarabai made Panhala her headquarters.

Sahu.

After the death of Aurahgzeb, Azam, the second son of Aurahgzeb, marched to the north to contest the throne. On the way, Sahu, the son of Sambhaji was allowed to leave the Moghal camp in May 1707 and proceed to the Deccan. The Marathas immediately recovered Satara, Parali, Panhala, Sinhagad, Raygad, Purandar and other forts. On Sahu's approach Tarabai, unwilling to lose the power she had so long held, pretended to believe him an impostor and determined to oppose him. The first encounter between Sahu and Tarabai's forces under Dhanaji Jadhav and Parasurampant Pratinidhi took place at Khed where Sahu got an easy victory on 12th October 1707, as Dhanaji feeling that Sahu's cause was just, did not fight and the Pratinidhi finding himself single-handed withdrew from the field and fled to Satara. Sahu proceeded towards Sirval which guarded the way towards Rohida fort. Rohida surrendered. Sahu further proceeded to the south and took Candan Vandan. Tarabai now assigned the task of defending Satara to Pratinidhi and herself fled to Panhala for security and thence subsequently to Miilvan. Sahu approached Satara and on gaining possession of Satara formally seated himself on the throne on 12th January 1708.

The following appointments were made by him to the Ministry: —

Pesava; Bahiro Moresvar.

Sendpati; Dhanaji Jadhav.

Saciv : Naro Sahkar (minor) Mutalik Pantajl Sivdev.

Amatya: Balkrsna Vasudev alias, Amburavi Hanumante, Mutalik Balaji Visvanath and later Mahadaji Gadadhar.

Sumant: Mahadaji Gadadhar—Later Anandrav Raghunath.

Mantri: Ramcandrapant Punde—Later Ramcandra Trimbak and Naro Ram. Nyayadhish: Honaji Anant.

Panditrav: Mahadajl Gadadhar—Later Mudgalbhat Upadhye.

Pratinidhi : Gadadhar Pralhad (removed on 16-12-1710 for incompetency and replaced by Parasuram Trimbak).

It may here be noted that Dhanaji had the right of making collections in several districts.

In the prevailing confusion the revenue was realised on no fixed principle, but was levied as opportunity presented itself in the manner of contribution. The principal writers employed by Dhanaji in revenue affairs were Abaji Purandare, accountant of Sasvad near Poona, and another Brahman accountant originally belonging to Srivardhan in Janjira, a village claimed by the Sidi, which he had left for a career as early as in 1689 if not earlier. In the course of his activities he came to be associated with Purandares of Sasvad and was recommended to Dhanaji by Abaji Purandare and Parasuram Trirhbak. The name of the Srivardhan accountant, afterwards famous as the founder of the Pesava's power, was Balaji Visvanath Bhat. Shortly afterwards, Dhanaji Jadhav was deputed towards Khandes' for fighting with the Moghals (1708) and Sahu himself proceeded to the south towards Panhala and Visalgad. Having captured the forts he turned his attention towards Rahgna (March-June 1708) which was defended by Ramcandrapant on behalf of Tarabal. On the approach of the rainy season Sahu's army was cantoned at Panhala (27th June 1708). Dhanaji however was not destined to see him as he met his death at Vadganv on the banks of the river Varna, while returning from his Khandes campaign (June 1708). During this period Sahu neglected no preparations to enable him to reduce his rival.

At the opening of the fair season, after the Dasara festival, preparations were made to renew the war against Tarabal (1709). About this time an agreement with the Moghals waived the question of hereditary claim and made the reduction. of Tarabal less important to Sahu. Daud Khan Panni (1708-1713), whom Zulfiqar Khan left as his deputy in the Deccan, settled with such Maratha chiefs as acknowledged Sahu's authority, with certain reservations, to allow them one-fourth of the revenue, at the same time reserving the right of collecting and paying it through his own agents. Daud Khan's intimacy with most of the Maratha chiefs, his connection with Zulfiqar Khan, and the terms of friendship between Zulfiqar and Sahu, not only preserved Sahu's ascendancy, but, except in instances where independent plundering bands occasionally appeared, secured a fairly correct observance o£ the terms of the agreement. At the close of 1709 Sahu returned to Satara. During this period Balaji Visvanath always acted as the right-hand man of Sahu. This brought on Balaji the keen jealousy of Dhanaji's son Candrasen Jadhav, and of several others in his service. In 1710, the army had scarcely returned to Satara, when Tarabai encouraged by the commandant of Panhala marched from Malvan in Ratnagiri reinforced by the troops of Phond Savant, and returned to Panhala. Her hopes were now raised as Candrasen Jadhav left Sahu and joined Tarabai. She held her position firmly at Panhala and Sahu was in no mood to disturb her: but in 1714 in a coup d'etat at Kolhapur Tarabai and her son Sivaji were put into prison and Rajasbal and her son Sambhaji seized power (July 1714). Ramcandrapant exerted himself with renewed vigour to reorganise the administration at Kolhapur and uphold the claims of Sambhaji as a rival to Sahu. Still so long as Daud Khan's government continued Sahu was assured of Moghal support. He was surrounded by most of the experienced ministers and had acquired a name for himself by his conciliatory disposition. He had won over the Saciv to his side. He was not however equally successful in binding to his interest all the members of the Pratinidhi's family. In 1713, Sahu released Parasuram Trimbak (he was imprisoned for his refusal to surrender Satara to Sahu in 1707), restored his honours by the removal of Gadadhar Pralhad, and confirmed him in his formal charge of Visalgad and its dependencies. The Pratinidhi sent his eldest son Krsnaji Bhaskar to assume the management of the fort and the district, but he had no sooner obtained possession than he revolted, tendered his services to Sambhaji and was made Pratinidhi at Kolhapur. On this defection Parasuram Trirhbak was again thrown into confinement, and Sahu, under the belief that the revolt had been encouraged by him, intended to have him put to death. He was, however dissuaded from doing so by the timely mediation of Khando Ballal. In consequence of changes at the imperial court, Daud Khan was removed from the government of the Deccan and agreement between the Moghals and the Marathas ceased to exist. Candrasen Jadhav, who on the death of his father Dhanaii Jadhav had been appointed the Commander-in-Chief, was sent from Satara with considerable army and directed to levy the cauth, sardesmukhi, and ghasdana from the Moghal districts. He was attended by his father's accountant Balaji Visvanath who was now charged with collecting and appropriating a share of the revenue for Sahu, a situation of control which, under no circumstances, was likely to be favourably viewed by Candrasen. A quarrel ensued between the two. When sahu heard of this he carefully considered the whole case and resolved to extend protection to Balaji. In the conflict that followed Candrasen was defeated by Haibatrav Nimbalkar, the Sarlas-kar 1711. Candrasen retired to Kolhapur, and from Kolhapur he went to meet Cin Kilic Khan Nizam-ul-mulk, the Moghal viceroy of the Deccan in 1713 A.D., by whom he was well received and rewarded. Candrasen, who wanted to take revenge and Nizam-ul-mulk, who was disposed to favour the cause of Sambhaji and desirous of suppressing the ravages of Sahus officers, sent an army against Haibatrav. To support the latter, Sahu sent forward a body of troops under Balajl Visvanath whom he now dignified with the title of Sena karte i.e., organiser oi the army. A. battle was fought near Putandar in Poona, in which the advantage claimed by the Marathas is contradicted by their subsequent retreat to the Salpa pass twenty miles south of Purandar. A detachment of Marathas from the Moghal army took possession of the Poona district. At length an accommodation was made, hostilities ceased, and the Moghals returned to Aurangabad. The Emperor appointed Sahu to the command of 10,000 horse. During the rains of 1714 the Marathas resumed their activities. The desmukhs and despdndes in the Moghal districts of Maharastra fortified their villages on pretence of defending themselves, but they frequently joined or aided their countrymen of whatever party in escape, defence, and concealment.

As Nizam-ul-mulk favoured the Kolhapur party, Sambhaji's influence rose and Sahu's fell. The Ghorpades, both of Kapsi and Mudhol, joined the Kolhapur party. Sidojl Ghorpade, the son of Bahirji and nephew of the famous Santaji also declared for Sambhaji but, along with his ally Navab of Savnur was too intent on his schemes of conquest and plunder to quit the Karnatak. Krsnarav Khatavkar, raised to power by the Moghals, took post about the Mahadev hills within Satara limits, and without joining either Satara or Kolhapur plundered the country on his own account (1711). Damajl Thorat, a lawless upstart of the Kolhapur party who acknowledged no chief but his old patron Ramcandrapant, levied contributions in Poona (1716—1718). Udaji Cavhan, another of Ramcandrapant's officers took the mud fort of Battis Sirala about twenty miles south of Karhad, and in a short time became so formidable that Sahu was glad to enter into a compromise by conceding the cauth of Sirala and Karhad, which Udaji long continued to receive as a personal allowance. Several other Maratha chiefs declared for Sambhaji. Among these the most formidable was Kanhoji Angre who then held the coast from Savantvadi to Bombay, and was spreading his power over the province of Kalyan in Thana. Balaji Visvanath instilled some vigour into his councils and began to lead in public affairs. Damajl though, initially could not be subdued was ultimately reduced (May-June 1718). Krsnarav was also suppressed (December 1711). Balaji by skill and diplomacy won over Kanhojl Angre to Sahu's side and he was made the commander of the Maratha navy (February 1714).

Pesava Balaji Visvanath.

As Balaji performed this service entirely to Sahu's wishes, on his return to Satara he was received with great distinction, and in consequence of the failure of Bahiropant Pingle, that minister was removed from the dignity of Mukhya Pradhan and Balaji appointed Pesava in his stead. His friend Abaji Purandare was confirmed as his chief agent or mutatik and Ramajipant Bhanu, an ancestor of the celebrated Nana Phadnavis as his phadnavis. After the desertion of Candrasen Jadhav, Manaji More had received clothes of investiture as Commander-in-Chief or sena-pati (1712), but failed to perform the services which, were expected of him. He was now ordered, with Haibatrav Nirhbal-kar, to accompany Balajl into the Poona district to reduce Damaji Thorat. The force assembled by Balaji at this time was too powerful for Thorat. His fort was stormed and destroyed and he himself made prisoner.

The Pesava induced the Moghal agent in the Poona district, a Maratha named Baji Kadam, to make over the superior authority to him, on the promise that Rambhaji Nimbalkar's jagir should be respected.'

In all quarters Maratha affairs began to improve.. The influence of Balajl Visvanath continued to increase and no affair of importance was undertaken without his advice.

The ministry as far as practicable was composed of the old retainers, and the posts of those who adhered to the Kolhapur party were conferred on their near relations.

Sahu was not without ability. He was naturally generous, liberal to all. religious establishments, observant of the forms enjoined by the Hindu faith, and particularly charitable to Brahmans. The hilly West Deccan and the rugged Konkan were his birthright, but as his childhood was pleasantly spent in the pomp and luxury of the Moghal camp he had developed easy going habits. He occasionally showed violence and fpr a time anger overcame his indolence. In general, however, he was satisfied with the respect and homage paid to his person and the obedience which his ministers invariably professed to his commands. He was pleased at being free from the drudgery of business and in giving himself up to his fondness for hawking, hunting, and fishing. He did not foresee that he was delegating a power which might supersede his own. As he was the legitimate head of the Marathas, the importance of that nation was increased by the manner in which he was courted by the Moghals; and the dignities and rights conferred upon him in consequence of his position gave an influence and respect to the name of Sahu, which under other circumstances he could never have attained.

In 1715 Farrukhsivar, the emperor of Delhi, becoming jealous of the Sayyad brothers to whom he owed his elevation, appointed Sayyad Husain Ali Khan to the viceroyalty of the Deccan (May 1715, November 1718). in the hope that by separating the brothers he could weaken their power and compass their destruction. In January 1717, Khanderav Dabhade, who had established a line of posts along the Surat-Burhanpiir route and defeated two large Moghal armies, went to Satara, paid his respects to Sahu, and was raised to the rank of senapati of the empire, Manay More being removed for inability and misconduct. The Maratha officers encouraged by their success and by the secret overtures of Farrukhsiyar now extended their encroachments, and in addition to the cauth which they had agreed to receive from Daud Khan in lieu of all claims, they everywhere levied the sardesmukhi. Under these circumstances the Deccan Government of Sayyad Husain Ali Khan, distracted by Maratha depredations on one side and court intrigues on the other, had recourse to negotiations with Sahu. Sankaraji Malhar originally a writer under Sivaji and appointed Saciv by Rajaram at Jinji, had retired during the siege of that place to Benares. Tired of a life so little in accord with his former habits although a very old man, Sahkaraji took service with Husain Ali Khan when he was appointed to the Deccan. He soon gained the confidence of his master, and at an early period entered into a correspondence with his friends at Satara. He represented to the viceroy that if the Maratha claims were recognised, they would have an interest in the prosperity of the country; that this was the only way to restore tranquillity and a certain means of gaining powerful allies by whose aid he might rest secure from present intrigues and eventually defy the avowed hostility of the Emperor. Husain Ali approving of these views sent Sahkaraji Malhar to Satara to arrange an alliance between the Moghals and the Marathas. This mission opened a great prospect to the aspiring mind of Balaji Visvanath. Besides the cauth and sardesmukhi of the six subhds of the Deccan including the Bijapur and Hyderabad, Karnatak, with the tributary States of Mysore, Trichinopoli and Tanjore, Sahu demanded the whole of the territory in Maharastra which had belonged to Sivaji with the exception of his possessions in Khandes, and in lieu of Khandes, territory near the old districts as far as Pandharpur was to be substituted. The forts of Sivneri in Poona and of Trimbak in Nasik were also to be given up. The old districts in the Karnatak were also demanded, and confirmation of some conquests lately made by Kiinhoji Bhosle, the Send Sdheb Subhd in Gondvan and Berar. Lastly the mother and family of Sahu were to be sent from Delhi as soon as practicable. On these conditions Sahu promised to pay to the imperial treasury, for the old territory a yearly peskas or tribute of Rs. 10 lakhs; for the sardesmukhi or ten per cent of the whole revenue he bound himself to protect the country, to put down every form of disorder, to bring thieves to punishment to restore the stolen property, and to pay the usual fee of 651 per cent on the annual income for the hereditary right of sairdes-mukhi; for the grant of cauth no fee was to be paid, but he agreed to maintain a body of 15,000 horse in the emperor's service, to be placed at the disposal of the subheddrs, fauzdars and officers in different districts. The Karnatak and the subhds of Bijapiir and Hyderabad which were then overrun by the partisans of Sambhaji Raja of Kolhapur, Sahu promised to clear of plunderers, and to make good every loss sustained by the people of those provinces after the final settlement of the treaty. Sahkaraji Malhar had already sufficiently proved the desire to forward the interests of his countrymen, and Sahu appointed him (1717) to conclude the terms, which, according to the above proposals, were with some exception conceded by Husain Ali Khan (1718).

The territory and forts not under the viceroy's control were to be recovered at some season of leisure or in any manner which Sahu might think fit. Meanwhile a body of 10,000 horse were sent to join the viceroy. Santaji and Ranoji Bhosle, relations of the Sena Saheb Subhd, Udaji Pavar, Visvasrav and several other commanders were detached in charge of the Maratha troops for this duty. At the same time agents were sent to inquire into the state of the districts and collect the extensive shares of revenue now assigned to them, while the ministers were devising a system, for realising their claims which it was by no means so easy to realise. At the time when negotiations were going on between the Sayyads and the Marathas for a political and territorial settlement in the Deccan, the Maratha forces were busy during 1718-1720 in liberating the Svarajya territory and encountering the opposition of Maratha deserters and Moghal officers at different places. Pardulla Khan was the Moghal officer at Karhad. He refused to submit. The Thorat brothers were also ravaging the territory on both sides of the Varna river. At the end of the rainy season of 1718 Sahu with Balajl opened a campaign against Karhad and captured both Karhad and Islampur from Pardulla Khan. The fort of Yelavl was also captured from Sidoji Thorat. On Sahu's return the Thorat brothers with the help of Sambhaja took possession of Vadganv, Sirale and Astja. Balaji was at that time camping at Islampur. He requested Sahu for reinforcements. Fatehsihgh Bhosle and Srinivasrav Pratinidhi were accordingly dispatched. A battle was fought between the opposing forces in which Sahu's troops won a decisive victory.

The Emperor refused (1718) to ratify the treaty. An unworthy favourite encouraged him in his intrigues for the destruction of the Sayyads, he became less guarded in his measures, and an open rupture seemed inevitable. Husain Ali Khan prepared to march for the capital and solicited aid from Sahu. He also pretended to receive from Sahu a son of Sultan Muhammad Akbar, Muin-ud-din by name, then residing at the Maratha court. Such an opportunity was not neglected. Balajl Visva-nath and Khanderav Dabhade proceeded to join the viceroy with a large body of troops, for which he agreed to pay them a certain sum daily from the date of their crossing the Narmada until their return (November 1718-July 1719). Husain All Khan further promised that the treaty should be ratified and the family of sahu released and delivered to his officers. On his departure Sahu instructed Balaji Visvanath to endeavour to obtain the cession of the forts of Daulatabad and Canda and authority to levy the tribute which had for some time been imposed by the Marathas in Gujarat and Malva. The reason for this apparently extraordinary demand was that the chief who had already levied contributions in those provinces would break in and plunder, unless Sahu could receive such an authority as must oblige them to look to him only for what they termed their established contributions, and that under these circumstances Sahu would be responsible for the protection and improvement of their' territories. The combined army marched to Delhi where the wretched emperor Farrukhsiyar, after some tumult, was confined by the Sayyads (February 1719) and later put to death. Two princes of the line succeeded and died within seven months. Rosan Akhtar, the grandson of Sultan Muazzam was then raised (September 1719) to the imperial dignity with the title of Muhammad sah, but the two Sayyads held all the power. Balaji Visvanath and his Marathas remained at Delhi until the accession of Muhammad Sah (1720). During the tumult which preceded the confinement of Farrukhsiyar, Santaji Bhosle and 1,500 of his men were killed by the populace in the streets of Delhi. The army was paid by the Sayyads, according to agreement, and Sahu's mother and family were given over to Balaji Visvanath. As both the Pesavd and the senapati were anxious to return to the Deccan they were allowed to leave, and in accordance with the treaty with Husain Ali Khan, they received three imperial grants for the cauth, sardesmukhi and svardjya. [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, 337-38. When Grant Duff wrote (1826) the original grants were in the possession of the Raja of Satara. They were in the name of Muhammad Shah, dated in the first year of his reign A. H. 1131 (A.D. 1719). The emperor Muhammad Shah was not placed on the throne till 1720. During the months that intervened between the dethronement of Farrukhsiyar and his elevation, two princes had filled the throne whose names were expunged from the records.] The cauth or one-fourth of the whole revenue of the six subhas of the Deccan including the Hyderabad and Bijapur Karnatak and the tributary States of Tanjore, Trichinopoli and Mysore, [The deed for the chauth, dated 22nd Rabi-uI-Akhir A.H. 1131 granted to Shahu the fourth of the revenue of the six subhas of the Deccan simply on condition that he should maintain 15,000 horse to aid the military governors keeping order. Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, p. 337 note.] the sardesmukhi or ten per cent over and above the couth; [ The sardeshmukhi grant is dated 4th Jamadi-ul-Aval or twelve days after that of the chauth. It does not. specify in the body of the deed that it is granted as an hereditary right; but the customary fee on such occasions is stated on the back of the instrument as follows:—

The sardeshmukhi was estimated at Rs. 1,80,51,730. Peshkash or established fee on hereditary rights conferred, 651 per cent, amounted to Rs. 11,75,16,762; the immediate payment on delivering the deed to one-fourth or Rs. 2,93,79,190-8-0; the remainder payable by instalments to Rs. 8,81,37,571 -8-0; the fee so calculated was commuted to Rs. 1,17,19,390 in consequence of the depopulated state of the country. Qtam; Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, p. 338. (Foot-note).] and the svardjya, literally, Self-Rule, that is the districts held by Sivaji at the time of his death, which were granted to Sahu, excepting the detached possessions in Khandes, the fort of Trimbak with the adjoining district, and the conquests south of the Vardha and the Tungabhadra rivers, which were not ceded. In lieu of such of these claims as lay to the north of the Bhima, districts beyond the line of forts. from Tathvad to Macchindragad in Satara, as far east as Pandharpur, were wholly ceded to Sahu, and also those districts which Aurangzeb had promised him at the time of his marriage in that Emperor's camp. The country watered by the Yerla, Man, and Nira, celebrated for good horses and hardy men, the home of some of the oldest families in Maharastra, who had not hitherto formally acknowledged the descendants of Sivaji, including the whole of the district of Satara, was by this cession placed under Sahu's authority. [The following is a list of the sixteen districts included in the grant of swarajya, Poona, Supa, including Baramati, Indapur, Wai, the Mavals, Satara, Karhad, Khatav, Man, Phaltan, Malkapur, Tarla, Panhala, Ajra, Junnar and Kolhapur; the parganas north of the Tungabhadra including Kopal, Gadag, Haliyal and all the forts which were captured by Shivaji; the Konkan including. Ramnagar, Gandevi, Jawhan Cheul, Bhiwandi, Kalyan, Rajpuri, Dabhol, Javlim Rajapur, Phonda, Ankola, and Kudal. Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. 1, 338.] The Marathas pretended that the conquests of Berar by Parsoji and Kanhoji Bhosle, and their right to tribute in Gujarat and Malva were confirmed at the same time: but though some very indefinite verbal promise may have been given and Balaji Visvanath left an agent for the purpose, as is alleged, of receiving the sanads, subsequent events prove the unwillingness of Delhi authorities to implement the understanding.

The absence of Balaji from Satara encouraged Thorat, then under Sambhaji's protection, to carry out his depredatory activities. After his return from Delhi Sahu and Balaji in November 1719 marched against Sambhaji. The forts of Asto and Yelavi were captured. Thorat (Yesvantrav) was pursued towards Panhala and killed in an action. Balaji. subsequently laid siege to Kolhapur. In the December of 1719 Balaji was camping at Belganv and Rukadi. He then proceeded towards Tarala and Digraj in the early months of 1720. An action was fought between his forces and Sambhaji at Urunvahe on 20th March 1720. Balaji then returned to Satara.

When Balaji Visvanath started for Delhi, he had left his divan Abaji Purandare as his mutalik or deputy in charge of his seal of office, and the duties of Pesava continued to be carried oh at the Maratha court in Balaji's name. On Balaji's return to Satara with the imperial deed the scheme for collecting and distributing the revenue which all admit to have been projected by Balaii was examined, and the system which had already been partially introduced was now openly accepted. The sardes mukhi or ten per cent on the revenue of the subhds of the Deccan was first set aside and termed by the ministers the Raja's vatan, a gratifying sound to the ears of a Maratha whether prince or peasant. The imposition of the sardesknukhi reduced to a proportionate degree the actual collections from a country the resources or which were already drained to the utmost, but the nominal revenue continued to be the same. To have collected even one-fourth of the standard assessment would probably at this period have been impossible but the Marathas in all situations endeavoured to secure, in lieu of their cauth, at least twenty-five per cent of the real balances. Although they seldom could collect it, they always stated the cauth as due upon the tankha or standard assessment, because of their anxiety to maintain the dignity of what after all, came to be a paper transaction, but which always gave them a legal excuse to press their claims of receiving their dues in full. In regard to the sardesmukhi, it suited both their foreign and domestic policy to keep that claim undefined; but their system in practice, that of exacting as much as they could, was as simple as it was invariable. Of the seventy-five per cent which remained to the Moghals, one-third or twenty-five per cent was received according to established usage by the fauzdar, and the balance was collected sometimes for the imperial exchequer, but generally on account of some jagirdar, to whom most of the Moghal conquests in the Deccan were assigned for the support of troops. This general mode of appropriating the revenue explains the seizures, resumptions and cessions of territory under the name of jagir during the later wars in the Deccan between the Nizam and the Pesava. It likewise explains the practice which prevailed in many villages, even up to the British conquests, of bringing fifty per cent of the net revenue to account under the head of jagir, for which the kulkarni in less than a century could assign no reason except the custom of their forefathers. The term svarajya or Self-Rule, which in the first instance was applied to that part of the territory north of the Tungabhadra possessed by Sivaji at his death, on the return of Balaji Visva-nath was extended to the whole of the Maratha claims exclusive the sardesmukhi. Of these claims one-fourth or twenty-five per cent was appropriated to the head of the State in addition to the sardesmukhi. This fourth was known by the name of the Raja's babti. The balance was termed mokasa. Of the mokasa two shares were left at the disposal of the Raja; the one was sahotra or six per cent and the other nadgaua or three per cent both calculated on the whole svarajya. The balance of mokasa was sixty-six per cent of the whole of the Maratha claims exclusive of the sardesmukhi. The sahotrd was bestowed by Sahu on the Pant Saciv as an hereditary assignment; it was collected by the Saciv's own agents only within the territory wholly possessed by the Marathas; separate collectors were sent by the Rdjd to realise it in distant districts. The nddgaudd was granted to different persons at the Raja's pleasure. Independent of salaries from the treasury the Pradhans had many inam villages conferred on them. Balaji Visvanath received several districts near Poona in personal jagir, including the fort of Lohagad. The Pratinidhi, the Psaava and the Pant Saciv were charged with the collection of the babti on the Raja's account. Thus there were distinct agents for realising the bdbti and sardesmukhi, for the sahotra of the Pant Saciv, for the nadgauda of the assignee to whom it belonged, and for the mokasa to different officers for maintaining troops. The mokasa was distributed among a great number of chiefs as military jagir burdened according to the circumstances with dues to the head of the State, both of money and of troops. The districts of old Maratha jagirdars were free from the cauth but they were generally liable to the payment of sardesmukhi besides furnishing their quota of horse. Such jagirs, in a grant of mokasa for a large tract were always stated as deductions and long before districts were conquered, formal grants and assignments of their revenue were distributed. Numberless personal jagirs and inams of lands of whole villages were alienated by Sahu; the former commonly required the performance of some service but the latter were entirely freehold. The Raja's authority was considered necessary to collect the revenue thus conceded, but the authority for which they were constantly petitioning was a formal affair. The revenue collectors thought that the Raja's sanad was sufficient for levying tribute in districts not specified in the imperial deeds. A district once overrun was said to be under tribute from usage; other districts were plundered by virtue of letters patent.

Particular quarters of the country were assigned to the leading officers, which as far as they can now be ascertained, were as follows. The Pesavd and Senapati charged with the command of a great proportion of the Raja's personal troops, were ordered to direct their attention to the general protection and defence of the territory. The Pesavd had authority to levy the government dues in Khandes and part of the Balaghat to the north-east of Solapur; the sendpati was vested with similar authority in Baglan and a right to realise the dues established by usage from Gujarit. Kanhoji Bhosle, the Sena Saheb Subha had charge of Berar Payinghat and was privileged to conquer and exact tribute from Gondvan to the east. The Sarlaskar had the charge of Gangthadi including part of Aurangabad. Fatehsingh Bhosle was appointed to the Karnatak; while the general charge of the old territory from the Nira to the Varna, and the collections from Hyderabad and Bidar were left to the Pratinidhi and the immediate agents of the Raja. The Citnis had particular charge of several districts in the Konkan. The Pant Saciv enjoyed the revenue of the whole sahotra besides his old possessions in jagir. The agents for collecting the Raja's- zaminadri dues were styled naib sardesmukhs. Kanhoji Angre, retaining his districts in the Konkan, levied his cauth, as he termed it, by continuing to plunder the ships of all nations that appeared on the coast without his permission and would not recognise his right of sovereignty over sea. He used to pay a tribute to the Raja in guns, muskets, military stores, and ammunition. He also presented frequent nazars in articles from Europe and China; and he was sometimes charged with the very extraordinary duty of executing State criminals.

All the principal Maratha officers as a further means of preserving intercourse and union had particular claims assigned to them on portions of revenue or on whole villages in the districts of each other. The greatest Maratha commanders or their principal revenue agents were eager to own their native village; but although vested with the control, they were proud to acknowledge themselves of the family of the patil or kulkarni; and if heirs to a minas field, they would sooner have lost wealth and rank than been dispossessed of such a vatan or inheritance. Yet on obtaining the absolute sovereignty, they never assumed an authority in the interior village concerns beyond the rights and privileges acquired by birth or purchase, according to the invariable rules of the country. Such is a brief outline of the system and arrangements settled by the Maratha ministry on the return of Balajl Visvanath; and such was the mode by which a common interest was created, and for a time preserved among the Maratha chiefs; while the character of Sahu, the influence and power of Balaji Visvanath and the ability of his sons Bajlrav and Cimaji to give a lead to the Maratha confederacy, paved the way, though by gradual steps, for the supremacy of the Pesavas.

Pesava Bajirav.

In 1720, Nizam-ul-mulk, the governor of Malva, throwing off his dependence on the Sayyads, determined to possess himself of the Deccan. He overran Khandes and defeated the Moghal troops under Dilavar Ali Khan at Burhanpur slaying their commander. The troops of Sahu under Kanhoji Bhosle, the Send Saheb Subha, and Haibatrav Nimbalkar speedily joined Sankaraji Malhar who since the departure of Husain Ali Khan had lived with the deputy viceroy Alam Ali Khan. Khanderav Dabhade who had just returned from Delhi was likewise despatched from Satara with a body of horse. Alam All Khan was defeated and killed at Balapur in Berar Payinghat by the troops of Nizam-ul-mulk, (10th August 1720). On this occasion the Marathas behaved as faithful auxiliaries and fought with bravery. They lost no person of note except Sankaraji Malhar who was mortally wounded and made prisoner. Soon after, events happened at Delhi by which the power of the Sayyads was destroyed, Muhammad Sah was freed from their control and Nizam-ul-mulk confirmed as viceroy of the Deccan. Meanwhile several important changes had taken place at the Maratha court, chiefly owing to the death of two leading ministers, Parasuram Trirhbak in 1718, and Balajl Visvanath in April 1720. Sripatrav the second son of the Pratinidhi, had succeeded his father Parasuram Trirhbak before the return of Balaji Visvanath from Delhi. The Pesava's health had suffered from the fatigue of the journey to Delhi and the labour he had bestowed on different arrangements after his return. He obtained leave from Sahu to retire for a short time to Sasvad in Poona where his family resided, but his constitution was exhausted and he survived for only a few days. At the time of his death (2nd April 1720), he left two sons, Bajirav and Cimaji. The robes of Pesavaship were conferred upon Bajirav in Sahu's camp at Masur, 30 miles east of Satara on 17th April 1720, exactly, a fortnight after his father's death. The rise of Gaokvads is almost contemporary, for the troops of Khanderav Dabhade behaved with so great bravery in the battle of Balapur and one of his officers Damaji Gaikvad, the ancestor of the Gaikvads of Baroda, so particularly distinguished himself on that occasion, that on his return the young Pesavd Bajirav recommended him to Sahu in the warmest manner. The Raja in consequence appointed him second in command under Khanderav with the title of Samser Bahadur. Damaji died soon afterwards and was succeeded by his nephew Pilaji Gaikvad. Cimaji, the second son of the late Pesavd, who received Supa in jagir was appointed to a similar command under his brother Bajirav. Abajipant Purandare, their father's chief manager, according to the rule of appointment, was reinvested by Sahu with scrupulous ceremony. During the short interval between the death of Balaji Visvanath and the appointment of Bajirav, Abajipant Purandare transacted ordinary affairs with the seal of the late Pesava; but a great part of the business fell into the hands of Khando Ballal Citnis and Sripatrav Pratinidhi. Khando Ballal gave his attention principally to the Angrc, the Sidi. and the affairs of the Konkan; while the Pratinidhi aided by Anandrav Sumant Pradhan conducted important negotiations with Nizam-ul-mulk. Anandrav's son Mahtaji was employed as Sahu's agent with Nizam-ul-mulk, who while he apprehended an attack from Husain Ali Khan, conciliated Sahu by momising to give up all that the royal grants conceded. No sooner was he apprised of the ascendancy acquired by his parry at Delhi and of the loss the Marathas had sustained in the death of Balaji Visvanath than he began to start objections to the establishment of Sahu's collectors, founded on some pretensions set up by Sambhaji and Candrasen Jadhav. The wise precautions of Balaji Visvanath, and the communion of interest which the distribution of the ceded revenue had produced, placed the Raja of the Marathas in a far more commanding situation than that in which he had stood during the first period of Nizam-ul-mulk's government of the Deccan. The agent remained at Aurangabad where his arrangements would probably have been of little avail, but a vast army of Marathas that was assembling in the Cahgthadi under the Sarlaskar Sultanji Nirhbalkar inflicted a crushing defeat upon the Moghals on 15th December 1720. In the Southern Maratha country in Miraj prant the Marathas received stiff opposition from Mubariz Khan. Sahu therefore dispatched Sripatrav Pratinidhi in September 1720 to establish Maratha supremacy in that region. The campaign continued till the rainy season of the following year and is known as the Bankapur campaign. Severe battles were fought at Kundgol and Bhilavadi and the Moghals suffered heavily. It was this show of force that ultimately hastened the delivery of orders on the part of Nizam-ul-mulk to allow Raja Sahu to establish his collectors. A fresh order or farman obtained by the Maratha agent at Delhi from Muhammad Sah opportunely arrived to remove from Nizam-ul-mulk the appearance of having yielded to menace, 'and afforded an opportunity of evincing the promptitude with which he obeyed the imperial commands.

Bajirav soon after his appointment as Pesavd set out with an army for Khandes where he levied his mokasa although not without opposition. From the period of his accession he gave a considerable portion of his attention to extending Maratha conquests to the north, and his aims were early turned to Malva. Circumstances generally obliged him to return yearly to Satara and Poona. During the three expeditions, before the rains of 1724, though he had sent detachments into Malva, it is not ascertained that he crossed the Narmada in person until the middle of that year; nor did he remain in Malva for any length of time until upwards of eleven years after his accession as Pesava. Affairs in the Deccan required his presence, and with the intrigues of Nizam-ul-mulk and domestic opposition, restrained bcth his ambition and enterprise. At different times before the year 1724 Bajirav had defeated the subhedar of Burhanpur and an officer named Daud Khan sent against him by Azim-ulla Khan from Malva. In one of these battles two of Bajirav's officers who afterwards rose to high rank first came into notice. One was Malharji Holkar, a siledar or self-horsed trooper, who commanded a party of his own horse. He was a Maratha Dhangar, a native of the village of Hol on the Nira, of which his father was caugula or patil's assistant. He had served under Kanthaji Kadam Bande, one of the Raja's officers and had gathered a small body of horse. The other officer was Ranoji Sinde descended from a younger branch of the family of Kanherkhed, a village' fifteen miles east of Satara. The Sindes, according to local legends, have been distinguished horsemen since the time of the Bahamani dynasty. There are two Maratha families or rather clans named Sinde, the one distinguished by their hereditary patil village of Kanherkhed and the other by the title of Ravirav. Both families claim Rajput descent. Those of Kanherkhed had a mansab under Aurangzeb and Sinde's daughter, who was given in marriage by that Emoeror to Sahu, died in captivity at Delhi. Sinde remained faithful to the Moghals, and as his fate was never known, it is conjectured that he was killed in some distant country possibly with Azam Sah in the battle of Agra in 1707. The family had fallen into dacay and Ranoji who revived its fame was reduced to a state of abject poverty serving as a bargir or rider, first in the troop of Balaji Visvanath and afterwards in that of Balaji's son.

Another officer who gained fresh honour about this time was Udaji Pavar Visvasrav. His father was first raised by Ram-candrapant Amatya when he governed the country during the siege of Jinji, and the young man joined Sahu and obtained the command of a considerable body of horse. He was employed on various services and appears to have been an active partisan. Like most contemporary Maratha leaders of experience, such as Kanthaji Kadam Bandc, Pilaji Gaikvad, and Kanhoji Bhosle, he calculated on the surest advantage in the most distant ventures where his appearance was least expected. He made incursions into Gujarat and Malva, plundered Gujarat as far as Lunavada, and found Malva so drained of troops that he was able to remain some time in the country intimating to the Raja that if supported, he might collect the cauth and sardesmukhi in every direction. How long he maintained his station in the country on his first inroads is uncertain, but it is probable that he was obliged to retire from Dhar, a fortress in the west of Malva where he first established himself, upon the appointment of Girdhar Bahadur, whose exertion in the defence of Malva posed a challenge to the Marathas.

The progress of Udaji Pavar, the successes of Kanthaji Kadam Bande and Pilaji Gaikvad in Gujarat, and the dissensions between Nizam-ul-mulk and the imperial court opportunely occurred to favour the Pcsavd's views of spreading Maratha conquests in North India. Bajirav who was early trained by his father to business was bred a soldier as well as a statesman. He unted the enterprise, vigour and hardihood of a Maratha chief with the polish, astuteness, and address of a clever diplomat. He was fully acquainted with his father's financial schemes and chose the part of the plan which was calculated to direct the Maratha arms in a common effort. The genius of Bajirav enlarged his father's schemes. He had both the head to plan and the hand to do. To the unceasing industry and minute watchfulness, he added a judgment that taught him the leading points of importance which tended to spread Maratha sway. Bajirav's views of spreading Maratha power in Upper India were at first disapproved by Sahu, and from prudence as well as rivalry were opposed by Sripatrav, the Pratinidhi. Jealousy in public places is a passion which some persons can rarely hide. This rivalry between Bajlrav, and Sripatrav, probably tended to preserve the Raja's ascendancy longer. The Pesava's first proposal for exacting what he called the established tribute from Malva and extending Maratha conquests into North India was violently and for a time successfully opposed by the Pratinidhi. Sripatrav represented it as rash and imprudent. He held that, though the head of the State might not be called to account for casual 'nroads, to allow the Pesava to make raids must draw on the Marathas the whole power of the empire, and orecipitate hostilities with Nizam-ul-mulk whose victorious army was still at their gates; that far from being prepared for resistance there was a total want of regularity even in their arrangements; that they could scarcely quell a common insurrection; and that to enter on a war before they had secured what had been ceded was the extreme of folly and of rashness. The Pratinidhi added that he was a soldier as well as the Pesava, and when expedient as ready as Bajlrav to head an expedition; that after they had established their collectors and arranged other parts of the country it would be advisable, before pursuing their conquests in the north, to reduce the Karnatak and to recover the countries conquered by Sivaji; that Fatehsihgh Bhosle's troops could scarcely venture to cross the Krsna, and that the first efforts should be made in that quarter.

These were probably the real opinions of Sripatrav. The wisdom of Bajirav was of a higher order. He comprehended the nature of predatory power; he perceived its growth in the turbulence and anarchy for which the system of distributing the revenue was the first remedy; he foresaw that confusion abroad would tend to order at home; that as commander of distant expeditions he should acquire the direction of a larger force than any other chief of the empire; that the resources of the Deccan would not only improve by withdrawing the hordes of horse which unprofitably consumed them, but must fall under the control of that person who could most readily procure employment and subsistence for the troops, while Bajirav concealed his private designs and partly admitted the justice of Sripatrav's views, he endeavoured by his commanding eloquence to arouse enthusiasm or ambition in Sahu. He went over the conquests of Sahu's famous grandfather and reminded him of the powerful kings and the mighty emperor with whom Sivaji had successfully contended. He painted the present condition of India, the weakness, indolence and imbecility of the Moghals, and the activity, energy and enterprise of the Marathas. If, he said, the great Sivaji had been of the same opinion as the Pratinidhi, he would have thought it necessary, before venturing into the Karnatak, to reduce Bijapur and Goiconda. As to their domestic quarrels beyond the Krsna, it would be time to think of them hereafter; by the Raja's good fortune every desire would be accomplished. Bajirav ended a speech of considerable length, with the words: Now is our time to drive strangers from the land of the Hindus and to gain undying renown. By turning our efforts to North India the Maratha flag shall fly from the Krsna to the Atak. You shall plant it, replied Sahu, in the Kinnar Khand beyond the Himalayas, a noble son of a worthy father. Let us; strike, said Bajlrav, at the trunk of the withering tree; the branches must fall of themselves.

At what time Sahu's consent was obtained is not known. The form of obtaining the Raja's consent on all such occasions was rigidly observed by the Pesavas at a stage when their supremacy was far advanced. By virtue of that authority and their station as mukhya pradhans or chief ministers, even when their usurpation became complete, it befitted their constitutional status to act. as nominal servants and real masters to rule the Maratha chiefs as the delegates of their prince.

During the early years of his Pesavaship, Bajirav had to tread the ground very carefully: for Bajirav knew that Nizam-ul-mulk was not the man who would easily forget that the Marathas had helped Alam Ali at Balapur. He had also to encounter Mubariz Khan who had been specially commissioned by the previous emperors to punish the Marathas for their encroachments and who therefore bore a bitter enmity towards them. Bajirav had to make a choice and to decide whom to placate and whom to antagonise. A personal diplomatic meeting with Nizam-ul-mulk on 4th January 1721 at Cikalthana east of Calisgativ yielded no fruitful results. At this hour Nizam-ul-mulk was called to Delhi by the Emperor for accepting Wazirship. After some hesitation he decided to go to Delhi (21st October 1721). He, however, soon realised that he could not hold his position in the flippant atmosphere of " Delhi politics and decided to choose the earliest opportunity to return to the Deccan with a view to hold almost an independent position of power there, although he would not mind nominally acknowledging the suzerainty of the Emperor. Accordingly, on 27th December 1723 he marched straight to the south, informing the Emperor that he felt it his imperative duty to drive the Marathas from Malva and Gujarat. By long and rapid marches he reached Ujjain. The enraged Emperor decided to punish the rebel Nizam-ul-mulk and called upon Mubariz Khan and Raja Sahu to do their best to put him down with all the force at their command. This proved a welcome opportunity for Bajirav, who proceeded to the north, crossed Narmada on 8th May and arrived in close proximity to the Nizam's camp at Sihore. Mubariz Khan was for some time undecided as to what course he should take, whether to obey the imperial orders and fight the Nizam or to befriend him. The Nizam however took his own decision to placate the Marathas and fight with Mubariz Khan. At this hour Mubariz Khan also had opened negotiations with the Marathas when he discovered that he had to face Nizam-ul-mulk. This gave an opportunity to the Marathas to raise their demands and gain supremacy not only in the Deccan but also in Malva and Gujarat. There was a formal meeting between Nizam-ul-mulk and Bajirav at Nalchha near Dhar on 18th May 1724 where usual diplomatic formalities were undergone but ultimately each one was left guessing as to what course the other would follow. The Nizam now lost no time in proceeding to the south and met his rival Mubariz Khan in the battle of Sakharkheda on 1st October 1724 where he gained a decisive victory. Mubariz Khan was killed. The emperor now made a virtue out of necessity and confirmed Nizam-ul-mulk as the subhedar of the Deccan. The battle of Sakharkheda is a turning point in the history of the Later Moghals as it marks the gradual disintegration of the Moghal Empire; for, the Nizam henceforth no longer cared to receive orders from Delhi and followed his own policy in maintaining his own position.

In 1725, Hamid Khan, officiating governor of Gujarat and the uncle of Nizam-ul-mulk, granted the cauth in Gujarat to Kanthaji Kadam Bande and Pilaji Gaikvad for the aid they gave him against Mubariz Khan, at one time governor of Gujarat. They proceeded to levy their assignments. The division of the money led to perpetual, disputes Pilaji, as the agent of Dabhade Senapati, considered himself the superior authority. in Gujarat and Kanthaji as an officer of the Raja despised his pretensions. An agreement was signed by which the cauth east of the Mahi was assigned to Pilaji and that to the west to Kanthaji. Meanwhile Bajirav took advantage of the confusion caused by Moghal dissensions to carry his arms into Malva, where, though opposed by Raja Girdhar, he was successful for two seasons in obtaining plunder and contributions. Nizam-ul-mulk against whom the imperial forces were acting in Gujarat, seems to have connived at his incursions. Bajirav, by virtue of the authority vested in him by Sahu granted deeds to Pavar, Holkar, and Sinde to levy cauth and sardesmukhi and to keep half the mokasa in payment of their troops. In 1726, the Pesava with a large army under Fatehsingh Bhosle, marched into the Madras Karnatak, plundered the districts, and levied a contribution from Srirangapattam. But Bajirav was dissatisfied with the result, and on returning to Satara he found more serious reasons of dissatisfaction in the measures pursued by the Pratinidhi. The cause of his displeasure originated in the artful schemes of Nizam-ul-mulk, which, but for the penetration and vigour of Bajirav, would probably have unlinked the chain by which Balaji Visvanath had joined the interests as well as the inclinations of most of the Hindu chieftains of the Deccan.

In 1727, Nizam-ul-mulk, though relieved from immediate apprehensions from the Emperor Muhammad Sah, whose power was daily declining, became alarmed at the spreading power of the Marathas. He beheld in their systematic and persevering encroachments on the divided revenue of the Deccan and the Karnatak, the extinction of his own resources as well as those of the empire, and took measures to avert these evils by endeavouring to consolidate his own power and to create divisions among the Marathas. In these measures he overlooked the ability of his opponent Bajirav and little thought that the pursuit of his own schemes should strengthen the power of the Pesava. Nizam-ul-mulk, encouraged by appearances and the support and alliance of Candresen Jadhav, Rav Rambha Nirhbalkar jagirdar of Barsi, and Sambhaji Raja of Kolhapur, resolved to complete the design he had formed. With this view he espoused the cause of Sambhaji and endeavoured 10 create a complete division in the Maratha government by reviving the former feuds between Sahu and Sambhaji.

Nizam-ul-mulk began by formally hearing the claims of Sambhajl in a demand made for an equal division of the revenue; and according to a prevalent custom in the Deccan, sequestrated the property in dispute by removing the collectors of the sardesmukhi and displacing the mokasadars of Sahu until their respective rights should be adjusted. Assuming this privilege as viceroy he pretended to become the friend and arbiter of both parties. Bajirav was not to be duped by the old artifice of engaging the Maratha cousins in an hereditary dispute. He quickly turned the Nizam's weapons to his own advantage; for Sahu, true to the feeling of a Maratha, of whom even among the peasantry the mildest man becomes voilent when a vatan is concerned, though for some time he had been reconciled to Nizam-ul-mulk, was at once on hearing of this interference roused to implacable resentment against him, and, for the time being, against all who had vindicated or who dared to justify his conduct. He looked to Bajlrav for counsel and for vengeance; for these he would have bartered life, and for these he virtually sold the supremacy of his empire. At first he determined to lead his army, but it was represented that to march in person would place him on an equality with Sambhaji of Kolhapur; none but the emperor was worthy of contending with him. Full powers were therefore given to Bajirav. The great influence which the Pesava bad gained was shown in the promptness with which many of the most unruly and factious of the siledar families gathered round the standard of the nation.

Nizam-ul-mulk perceived his mistake, and sought to amend it by writing to Sahu and the Pratinidhi that he was solely actuated by a wish to benefit the Raja in order to prevent the usurpation of the Konkani Brahmans by whose creatures every situation was filled; that the mokasadars and collectors of the sardesmukhi had been replaced by others belonging to the Raja's relation, Sambhajl, whom he had appointed the Raja's deputy, as sardesmukh of the six subhas of the Deccan; and that the Raja when freed from the control of the Kohkani Brahmans might afterwards appoint agents entirely of his own selection. But Sahu was too shrewd to be misled by such specious pleas and far from falling a victim to the cunning plans of creating a rift between him and Bajirav in this manner, they resolved to teach the Nizam a lesson. Both parties prepared to attack each other as soon as the rains should subside and enable their horse to cross the rivers. In the war that ensued, Bajlrav ravaged Jalna and Mahur, made a lightning dash into Gujarat and Khandes and finally inflicted a severe defeat upon the Nizam at Palkhed near Aurangabad in February 1728, forcing him to agree to negotiations. Bajirav demanded that Sambhaji should be sent to his camp: that security should be afforded for the future collection of the Maratha shares of the revenue by giving up several fortified places; and that all arrears not yet realised should be made good. Nizam-ul-mulk agreed to all the articles except that of delivering up Sambhaji Bajirav pointed out that he was a near relation of the Raja's and that he would be treated with equal respect. It was at last settled that Nizam-ul-mulk should guarantee his safe arrival in Panhala, when Sahu should be at liberty to take what steps he might think proper for the settlement of their family disputes. The battle of Palkhed is thus an important landmark in the history of the Marathas, as it once for all settled the dispute between Bajirav and the Pratinidhi, prevented the Nizam from making pretensions to playing the role of a middleman between the rival parties at the Maratha Court and finally led the Maratha nobility to look to Bajirav as the maker of Maratha destiny.

Bajirav was negotiating with Sar Buland Khan who was then the subhedar of Gujarat, in the hope of obtaining the cession of the cauth and sardesmukhi of that province. After the ratification of the treaty with Nizam-ul-mulk, Cimaji Appa, the Pesava's brother marched with a large army and exacted a heavy contribution from Petlad and plundered Dholka, but on the promise that if the cauth and sardesmukhi were yielded the districts should be secured from depredation. Sar Buland Khan agreed to the Pesava's, proposals, and in 1729 granted the sardesmukhi. or ten per cent of the whole revenue both on the land and customs except the port of Surat and the district round it, together with the cauth or one-fourth of the whole collections on the land and customs except Surat, and five per cent on the revenues of the city of Ahmadabad.

In 1729, Muhammad Khan Bahgas, then governor of Allahabad having entered Bundelkhand and established himself in the territory of Raja Chatrasal, the Rajput Prince solicited aid from Bajlrav which was readily granted. Bahgas was reduced to the greatest distress and the province was evacuated by his troops. Chatrasal in return for this service conferred on Bajirav, a fort and district in the neighbourhood yielding Rs. 2 lakhs of yearly revenue. The governor of Malva Girdhar Bahadur had been killed in the battle of Amjhera against the Marathas (Nov. 1728). Jaysihgh succeeded him. Towards the end of 1730 he was transferred. Muhammad Bahgas succeeded him as governor. But he could make little headway against the Marathas, who were now fairly established in Malva. Bahgas was recalled in September 1732, and succeeded by Savai Jaysihgh. Nothing could be more favourable to the views of Bajirav. As Jaysihgh was situated, the honour of the Rajput was in conflict with the subsisting arrangement between him and the Marathas. This may account for his hesitating to comply with their demands; but he at last came to an agreement with Bajirav and yielded him the government of Malva.

Kanhoji Bhosle, the Sena Saheb Subha had been accused of disobedience (1728) and confined at Satara (1731) and Raghuji the son of Kanhoji's cousin Bimbaji had been appointed Sena Saheb Subha in his stead (1729). Raghuji had accompanied Sahu in his excursions and by his boldness and skill had ingratiated himself with Sahu and obtained a great ascendancy over him. Sahu married him to the sister of one of his own wives of the Sirke family. On receiving the sanads for Berar, Raghuji gave a bond to maintain a body of 5,000 horse for the service of the State to pay yearly a sum of Rs. 9 lakhs and exclusive of ghasdana or forage money, a tribute which since the time of Rajaram, the Sena Saheb Subha had been allowed to reserve, and also to pay to the head of the government half of all other tribute, prize, property and contributions. He also bound himself to raise 10,000 horse when required and to accompany the Pesava or to proceed to any quarter where he might be ordered. This arrangement was effected during the absence of Sripatrav Pratinidhi who had been sent into the Konkan by the Raja. The Pratinidhi being a friend of Kanhoji Bhosle endeavoured to obtain some mitigation of his sentence, but failed. Kanhoji who was an officer of great enterprise, died at Satara in 1736-1737, after having lived there for about six years as a prisoner.

While Bajirav's presence was necessary in the north to support Cimaji in Gujarat, Sambhaji Raja of Kolhapur, instigated by Udaji Cavhan refused to listen to overtures made by Sahu and encamped on the north side of the Varna with all his baggage, women and equipments, and began to plunder the country. The Pratinidhi surprised Sambhaji's camp and drove him to Panhala with the loss of the whole of his baggage (March 1730). Sahu himself had marched up to Bhilavadi in this campaign. Many prisoners were taken, among others Tarabai and her daughter-in-law the widow of Sivaji of Kolhapur. Both these persons were allowed to reside in the fort of Satara (1730). This defeat brought on an immediate accommodation between the two brothers. Although Sahu was victorious he arranged a ceremonious meeting with his brother and conciliated him (27th February 1731). The meeting was arranged at Jakhinvadi near Karhad. Fatehsingh Bhosle, Sripatrav Pratinidhi, Naro Ram Mantri, Balaji Bajirav, Bhavanisahkar Moresvar, Abajipant Purandarc, Krsnaji Dabhade, Nimbalkar and Pandhare were sent to Panhala to escort Sambhaji. They met Sambhaji at Panhala on 16th December 1730. Sambhaji accompanied by the above dignitaries reached Jakhinvadi halting at Navli, Vadganv or the bank of the river Varna, Islampur and Vathar. Sahu also had moved to Karhad from Satara. The brothers first met at Jakhinvadi and then at Karhad. Later both of them went to Satara where Sambhaji stayed for two months. On 13th April 1731, the treaty of Varna was signed between the two cousins.

Following were the important terms of the treaty of Varna. The Varuna Mahal was to be transferred to Sambhaji. The territory to the south of the river Varna and stretching right up to the bank of the Tuhgabhadra was to be assigned to SambhajI's independent sovereignty in all essentials. He was however subordinate to Sahu as far as his foreign relations were concerned. It was also stipulated that the southern districts beyond the Tuhgabhadra right up to Ramesvar should be supposed common for joint endeavour. Koppal was to be assigned to Sambhaji in exchange for Ratnagiri. Sambhaji was to transfer Miraj, Athni, Tasgahv and other places in Bijapur to Sahu.

Many of the terms of the treaty were not observed. Sambhaji never participated in the Maratha campaigns beyond Tuhgabhadra and hence he was not a party to the conquest of the territory between the Varna and the Tmigabhadra and that beyond Tuhgabhadra. Sambhaji did not transfer the parts of Miraj, Athni in possession of Udaji to Sahu which were later captured by Sahu during his Miraj campaign.

Although enemies were not wanting to detract from the reputation of the Pesava and to extol that of his rivals, the success of the Pratinidhi did not materially affect the ascendancy which Bajirav had attained. Nizam-ul-mulk, however, was still bent on opposing him. In 1729 he had persuaded the Pratinidhi and Sahu to grant exemption of cauth for the province of Hyderabad. He now found a fit instrument for his purpose in Trirhbakrav Dabhade. Even since the Pesava had obtained the deeds of Gujarat from Sar Buland Khan, Dabhade had been negotiating with other Maratha chiefs and assembling troops in Gujarat. At length finding himself at the head of 35,000 men he had resolved to march for the Deccan in the next season.

Bajirav was well aware of the Senapati's enmity, but was not alarmed by his preparations until he discovered that Nizam-ul-mulk was to support him in the Deccan. On learning their intention he at once determined to anticipate them, though, when joined by all his adherents, his whole army did not amount to more than half of that of Dabhade. Dabhade gave out that he was proceeding to protect the Raja's authority, and was supported by Pilaji Gaikvad, Kanthaji and Raghuji Kadam Bande, Udaji and Anandrav Pavar, Cimaji Damodar and Kuvar Bahadur with many others. Bajlrav proved that Dabhade Senapati was in alliance with Nizam-ul-mulk and declared that he-was leagued for the purpose of dividing the Maratha sovereignty with the Raja of Kolhapur.

The preparations of Nizam-ul-mulk hastened the march of Bajirav, and as his army, though so inferior in number, was composed of the old paga horse or the Raja's house-hold troops and some of the best Maratha mankaris, he moved rapidly towards Gujarat (10th October 1730). At the same time he began negotiating from the day he left Poona and continued until the hour of attach. In the battle which took place (1st April 1731) between Baroda and Dabhoi in Gujarat, the death of Trirhbakrav Dabhade, the Senapati, and many who commanded under him left complete victory to Bajirav with the almost unquestioned leadership of the Maratha Confederacy. A treaty was concluded and the Pesava returned to Satara on 14th May 1731. He would have punished Nizam-ul-mulk's treachery, but the Nizam warded off the blow which he could with difficulty have withstood, by directing its aim against the head of the empire. Bajirav, readily agreed to the Nizam's views. It suited his favourite policy, and it gave employment to persons likely to disturb the domestic arrangements he aimed at establishing. Troops were immediately sent towards Malva under his brother Cimaji whole he himself remained for a time engaged in the intericr arrangements of the government at Poona and Satara.

The victory over Dabhade, like the issue of every civil war, left impressions on the minds of many not easily effaced. The Pesava adopted every means of conciliation in his power. Yesvantrav, the son of Trirhbakrav Dabhade, was raised to the rank of Senapati, but being too young to take the management on himself, his mother Umabai became his guardian and Pilaji Gaikvad their former Mutalik or deputy was confirmed in that situation with the title of Sena Khds Khel or Captain of the Sovereign Tribe in addition to his hereditary title" of Samsher Bahadur. An agreement was drawn up under the authority of Sahu and subscribed by the Pesava and Senapati, that neither party should enter the boundary of the other in Gujarat and Malva. Within the limits of Gujarat the Senapati was to have entire management, but he bound himself to pay one-half of the revenue to government through the Pesava. All contributions levied from countries not specified in the deeds given under the authority of Sar Buland Khan were to be made over to the Raja after deducting expenses:

Perceiving Bajirav's complete ascendancy, the appointment of the Hindu prince Abhaysingh to supersede Sar Buland Khan, the imbecility of the emperor, and the treachery as well as venality of his courtiers, and knowing also that he had rendered himself in the highest degree obnoxious, Nizam-ul-mulk had good grounds for apprehending that the Pesava might be able to obtain the viceroyalty of the Deccan. The plan which under these circumstances he adopted seems to have been framed for the purpose of diverting the Marathas from destroying the resources of his own country and of making his own power a balance between that of the emperor and the Pesava.

Kanhoji Bhosle's disobedience and his consequent confinement at Satara, as well as Pratinidhi's sympathy for him have already been referred to above. Whether Nizam-ul-mulk had made any preparations to take advantage of that situation is uncertain; but Cimaji Appa reasonably felt that Nizam meditated an attack. He therefore pitched his camp about forty miles east of Satara, leaving Pilaji Jadhav with an inconsiderable body of horse. In Konkan Savant, the principal desmukh of Vadi, occupied his hereditary territory in that quarter but having suffered from Kanhoji Angre's attacks before the last peace (1730) between the Rajas of Satara and Kolhapur he always bore an enmity to Angle's family. Kanhoji Ahgre's death happened in July 1729. All attempts to reduce his power before that time on the part of the English, the Portuguese, and the Dutch had failed. In the quarrels between his sons which followed Kanhoji's death, Bajirav helped Manaji and obtained from him the cession of Kotaligad in Thana and Rajmaci in Poona. The Sidi, besides defending, against the Marathas, the districts which had been placed under his charge by Aurangzeb, including Mahad, Raygad, Dabhol and Anjanvel, frequently levied contributions from Sahu's districts. As force was not likely to prevail, the Pratinidhi, Jivaji Khanderav Citrus, and others of the Raja's ministers formed schemes for ruining the Sidi by intrigue. For this purpose the Pratinidhi gained one Yakub Khan, a daring chief, who possessed the confidence of the Sidi. To aid this scheme, a force was sent into the Konkan in 1733 under the Pratinidhi, his chief agent Yamaji Sivdev, and Udaji Cavhan. The intrigues were unsuccessful, and war ensued in which the Pratinidhi was worsted and the fort of Govalkot in Ratnagiri though strongly garrisoned was disgracefully surprised and taken. Cimaji Appa incurred the Raja's, displeasure for not sending assistance to Sripatrav after repeated orders. Pilaji Jadhav was at length despatched, but as none of the other officers at Satara. would undertake to support the Pratinidhi except on condition of receiving the conquered districts in jagir, he was compelled to return to Satara with great loss of reputation. About this time the Sidi died (February 1733) and a quarrel ensued between his sons. Yakub Khan immediately embraced the cause of Sidi Rehman, one of the sons, and called on Sahu for support hut nothing could be done until the return of Bajirav, who, after leaving Holkar and Sinde in Malva, returned to the Deccan, and on crossing the Godavari intimated to the Raja that he should march straight to Danda-Rajpuri. All the disposable infantry was: directed to join the Pesava and Pilaji Jadhav was sent off, reinforced with a body of horse, to support Malharrav Holkar in Malva. Sidi Rehman and Yakub Khan joined Bajirav who began operations by attacking some of the forts. Fatehsihgh Bhosle and the Pratinidhi proceeded to co-operate, but the only help they gave was to recover Sivaji's capital Raygad, the commandant of which had been previously corrupted by Yakub Khan. The Pesava reduced the forts of Tala and Ghosala (May-August 1733) and besieged Janjira but was obliged to listen to overtures made by the besieged, who ceded to the Marathas the forts of Raygad, Tala, Ghosala, Avcitgad and Birvadi. After this successful close of hostilities, Bajlrav, with additional power and influence, returned to Satara and was appointed subhedar of the late acquisitions. Holkar completely overran Malva and the country south of the Carhbal and took possession of several places. Afterwards, on the persuasion of Kanthaji Kadam Bande, he made an incursion into Gujarat, and they both levied contributions as far as the Banas and plundered several towns to the north of Ahmadabad including Idar and Palanpur.

In the north, Bajirav levied the cauth and sardesmukhi in Malva and applied through Raja Jaysingh for their formal cession in that province, and likewise for a confirmation of the deeds granted by Sar Buland Khan for Gujarat. The Turani Moghals who formed a considerable party in the ministry were decidedly against so disgraceful a compromise. With the object of achieving his purpose Bajirav started on a campaign towards the north (October 4, 1735). First, he wanted to estimate the attitude of the Rajputs and therefore proceeded through Malva and reached Udaipur in February, 1736. The Rana received him very warmly and agreed to pay a lakh and a half annually as cauth. During his tour through Rajputana, presents and tributes poured upon Bajirav from all quarters. Khan Dauran, the Mir Baksi of the Moghals, who was usually guided by Jaysingh sent five to ten thousand rupees every day. On the 4th of March 1736. Bajirav met Jaysingh who offered to pay five lakhs cauth annually for Jaipur and promised to obtain from the emperor written grants for the provinces of Malva and Gujarat. Efforts were now made to arrange for Bajirav's personal meeting with the emperor who however not caring to meet Bajlrav in person at Delhi sent his own agent Yadgar Khan to Jaysingh with certain proposals rending to effect as advantageous a bargain as possible. Bajirav at once rejected the offer and communicated his counter proposals through his own agent Dhondo Govind. The emperor was displeased at this and declined to reply. Bajirav knew that the emperor could not be persuaded otherwise than by a trial of strength and he decided to take up the challenge. However, as the season was far advanced he retired to the Deccan (May 1736) only to come back again early in January 1737 with all the contingents of Maratha sardars gathering round his standard. As the advance party under Malharrav Holkar crossed the Jamuna and got into the Doab evidently for forage and plunder, they were suddenly attacked by the party of Vazir Sadat Khan and driven away (March 12, 1737). In the scuffle that ensued a number of Maratha soldiers were killed and those that were overtaken bv the Moghals were slaughtered. The Vazir became so elated with (his success that he wrote boastful letters to the emperor informing him as to how the Marathas had been signally defeated and driven away. When Bajirav heard of this he resolved to teach the emperor a wholesome lesson by himself falling upon Delhi and burning its outlying parts. In two long marches he reached Delhi on 28th March 1737, but on a second thought desisted from any destructive operations. The presence of Bajirav at the gates of Delhi was enough to strike terror in the palace and there was a great commotion in the city. Thereupon Bajirav withdrew a little distance to Jhil Lake to allay the scare that had been created. A force of 8.000 soldiers despatched by the emperor against him was completely defeated. Bajirav set out on his return to Satara. where he paid his respects to the Raja and immediately proceeded into the Konkan to repulse an attack of the Portuguese on Manaji Angre (1737). The Pesava succeeded and took Manaji under his protection on condition of his paying a yearly sum of Rs. 7,000 and presenting annually to the Raja, foreign articles from Europe or China to the value of Rs. 3.000 or more. The war with the Portuguese led to the invasion of Salsette. and Bajirav, to secure his conquests in Thana and maintain the war against the Portuguese, entertained some Arabs and a very large body of infantry principally Mavles and Hetkaris. News from Delhi obliged him to withdraw part of his forces from the Konkan.

In the meanwhile the emperor sent earnest appeals to Nizam to come to Delhi for saving the situation. He was granted all his demands to persuade him to take up the task of warding off the Maratha danger from the north. The Nizam now went back upon his promise that he had given to Bajirav and proceeded to the north on April 7, 1737. In fact Bajirav had a shrewd suspicion of this development as the two met each other when Bajirav was going to the south and the Nizam to the north apparently on a specious plea of offering his submission to the emperor. Bajirav therefore lost no time to proceed to the north again as soon as the rainy season was over. He assembled all the troops he could collect and by the time he reached the Narmada, November 30, 1737, found himself at the head of 80.000 men. Proceeding further Bajirav, with his skilful manoeuvering operations, was successful in confining Nizam-ul-mulk in the fortress of Bhopal in December 1737 and preventing him from gathering supplies from outside. Finding himself in a tight corner Nizam-ul-mulk at last sued for peace and on the 7th January 1738 signed a convention at Doraha Sarai, 64 miles north of Sironj, promising in his own handwriting to grant to Bajirav the whole of Malva and the complete sovereignty of the territory between the Narmada and the Cambal. To obtain a confirmation of this agreement from the emperor, and to use every endeavour to procure the payment of a subsidy of Rs. 50 lakhs to defray his expenses, the Pesava remained for a time levying contributions south of the Carhbal and carrying on negotiations at court where the threatened invasion of Nadir Sah was creating alarm (January 1739). At the same time the war with the Portuguese was being vigorously carried on by the Pesava's brother Cimaji and several forts in Thana were taken by the Marathas (March 1737). Raghuji Bhosle had in the meanwhile defeated and killed the subhedar Sujayat Khan of Berar and returned loaded with booty (December 1737). News now arrived of the arrival of Nadir Sah, the defeat of the Moghals (February 13, 1739), the death of Khan Dauran, the capture of Sadat Khan, and finally that the victorious Persian was dictating the term of ransom. The subsequent intelligence which Bajirav received at Nasirabad in Khandes informing him of the imprisonment of the emperor, the plunder of Delhi, and the dreadful massacre of many of its inhabitants (March 7, 1739) seemed for a time to overwhelm him. " Our quarrel with Raghuji Bhosle is insignificant," said the Pesava ; "the war with the Portuguese is as naught; there is but one enemy in Hindustan". He appears to have conceived that Nadir Sah would establish himself as emperor, but he was not dismayed when he heard reports that a hundred thousand Persians were advancing to the south. " Hindus and Musalmans," said Bajirav, " the whole power of the Deccan must assemble, and I shall spread our Marathas from the Narmada to the Cambal ". He called on Nasir Jung, the Nizam's second son, to arm against the common foe, and Cimaji Appa was ordered to desist from the Kohkan warfare and join him with all speed. Cimaji was now in possession of the whole of Salsette and had begun the siege of Bassein. Notwithstanding offers of submission, Cimaji prosecuted the siege and on the 5th of May 1739 Bassein fell. Holkar and Sinde, as soon as Bassein fell, were sent to join Bajirav with all speed, but by that time news arrived of the retreat of Nadir Sah. Nadir Sah restored the throne to its degraded owner and wrote letters to all the princes of India announcing the event. Among others, he addressed a letter to Sahu and one to Bajirav. (April 25, 1739). He informed Bajirav that he had reinstated Muhammad Sah and now considered him as a brother; that although Bajirav was an ancient servant possessing a large army, he had not afforded the emperor assistance; hut that all must now attend to Muhammad Sah's commands; for if they did not he would return with his army and inflict punishment upon the disobedient.

Shortly after the departure of Nadir Sah, (May 1, 1739) Bajirav sent a letter to the emperor expressive of his suhmission and obedience, and a nazar of 101 gold mohars. This was acknowledged in suitable terms and a splendid khillat was sent in return. He was assured by the emperor that the rank, possessions, and inheritance already conferred on him would be confirmed, and that he might depend on finding his interests best promoted by continuing steadfast in his duty to the imperial government.

After the death of Aurangzeb in 1707, even though the Moghals withdrew from the Svaraj territory, many Moghal officers held numerous forts with the active support of the Nizam. With the firm establishment of Sahu's power, the Marathas undertook the liquidation of these forts. This task was executed during 1730—35 when Mahuli, Cakan, Karnala, and Pali fell to the Marathas. Miraj was captured in 1739 after the successful campaign of Sahu.

Similarly on the western coast, the Sidi of janjira held ?rd of the present Kolaba district. During the period stated above, Raygad was captured and Sidi was defeated. All his possessions except the tiny island of Janjira were incorporated into the Svaraj territory.

When these events of tremendous importance were taking place on the political map of India, Sahii decided to open up a campaign in the Southern Maratha country with the twin object of eliminating the menace of Udaji Cavhan and the capture of Miraj, a stronghold of the Moghals since the time of Aurangzeb.. The campaign dragged on for two years. Udaji Cavhan was defeated and his stronghold, Athni was captured by the Pratinidhi on 8th November 1739. Yamajipant subjugated Bhopalgad, commanded by Udaji Cavhan and brought back the Gaikvad brothers as prisoners to Sahu. ' On October 3, 1739, Miraj capitulated. The fort was visited by Sahu and handed over for management to Balaji bin Sivaji Salunke. Sahu, at the start of the campaign, encamoed at Umbraj for two years and then proceeded on the Miraj campaign. The actual campaign took about four to six months and the capture of the Miraj fort was delayed due to its strength and the stiff opposition the Maratha forces under Santaji Dubai and Apajirav (son of Bahiropant Pingle) encountered. Balaji Bajirav accompanied Sahu in this campaign. During this campaign Sahu was well aware of the political, situation in India and sent commands to his officers regarding the tactics to be followed by them. Sahu returned from the campaign to Satara in February 1740.

To return to the Maratha-Nizam struggle—although no new subhedar nor any deputy of Nizam-ul-mulk was appointed to Malva, no sanad was sent conferring the government on Bajirav. This omission the Pesava considered a breach of faith on the part of Nizam-ul-mulk; but as the Nizam's army was still in Hindustan, and as some of Bajirav's best officers and troops were in the Konkan he deferred enforcing his claims until a fitter opportunity presented itself. In the meantime he was busy arranging the affairs of the province of Malva and strengthening his connection with the Rajput princes in the western quarter along the banks of the Cambal from Kota to Allahabad, but especially with the Rajas of Bundelkhand.

These arrangements to secure the northern frontier were preparatory to a war with Nizam-ul-mulk or an expedition into the Karnatak. The last success against Nizam-ul-mulk, his departure from the terms of agreement, his great age, the probability of contentions among his sons encouraged or stimulated the Pesava to attempt the subjugation of the Deccan.

In prosecution of his plans of conquest in the Deccan, Bajirav seizing the opportunity afforded by the absence of Nizam-ul-mulk at Delhi, about the end of 1739 began operations against the Nizam's son Nasir Jung. Nasir Jung was relentlessly pursued and surrounded near Aurangabad. He came to terms with Bajirav and in the beginning of 1740 the districts of Handia and Khargon on the banks of the Narmada were conferred on Bajirav in jagir. The Pesava without visiting Poona or Satara, set off with his army towards North India.

In the meantime Manaji Ahgre was attacked by his brother and applied for help to the Pesava's son Balaji Bajirav, generally called Nana Saheb, who was with the Raja in the neighbourhood of-Satara. Five hundred men were sent to support the garrison and an express letter despatched to Cimaji Appa for instructions. Cimaji had ordered his nephew to repair to Kolaba in person and applied to the Governor-in-Council at Bombay with whom he had concluded a treaty and maintained a friendly intercourse since his late campaign in the Konkan to suoport the garrison at Kolaba. The English and Balaji had succeeded in humbling Sarhbhaji, Manaji's brother, when Cimaji Appa joined them. They were concerting plans for the reduction of Rcvdanda when news reached them of the death of Bajirav which happened on the banks of the Narmada at Raver on the 28th of April 1740. On receiving the intelligence, Sankaraji Narayan was appointed Subhedar of the Konkan and Khanduji Mankar was left in command of a body of troops, while Cimaji Appa and his nephew, after the usual mourning ceremon'es, returned to Poona and shortly after to Satara. Bajirav left three sons Balaji Bajirav, Raghunathrav afterwards so well known as Raghoba, and Janardan Baba who died in early youth. He also left one illegitimate son by a Muhammedan mother, whom he bred as a Musalman and named Samser Bahadur.

The army which entered the Karnatak under the command of Raghuji Bhosle was composed of troops belonging to the Raja, the Pesava, the Pratinidhi, Fatehsingh Bhosle, and various chiefs of lesser note. The Ghorpades of Sondur and Guti were invited to join by letters from Sahu and the Pesava; and Murarrav the grand-nephew of the famous Santaji Ghorpade and the adopted son and heir of Murarrav of Guti appeared under the national standard for the first time since the death of his distinguished relation. The whole force amounted to 50,000 men. Dost Ali, the Navab of the Karnatak, fell and the Divan was made a prisoner. After this, the Marathas began to levy contributions all over the Karnatak until bought off by the Navdb's son and heir Safdar Ali, with whom, before retiring they entered into a secret compact to destroy Canda Saheb then in possession of Trichinopoli, While the main body of his army remained encamped on the Sivganga, Raghuji Bhosle returned to Satara and endeavoured to prevent BalajT Bajirav's succession as Pesava by proposing Babuji Naik of Baramati, a relative but an enemy ot the late Pesava, for the vacant office. Babuji Naik was possessed of great wealth and his enmity to Bajirav arose from a very common cause viz., thta of having lent money which his debtor could not repay. Raghuji's party used the irritated creditor as their tool and proposed to Sahu that he should be raised to the vacant Pesavaship. But Sahu turned a deaf ear to Raghuji's proposals and Balaji Bajirav was almost immediately invested with the robes of Pesavaship on 25th June, 1740. Raghuji, on finding his schemes abortive, proceeded towards the Karnatak to reap the expected harvest at Trichinopoli accompanied by Sripatrav, the Pratinidhi, and Fateh singh Bhosle. Trichinopoli surrendered on the 26th of March 1741, and Canda Saheb was brought a prisoner to Satara where he remained in the custody of an agent of Raghuji Bhosle's till he was set free in 1748. Murarrav Ghorpade was left in com mand of the fort of Trichinopoli, and a part of his garrison was composed of infantry belonging to the Pesava. Their expenses were defrayed by Sahu, besides which it was settled that Rs. 29,000 of the share of tribute from the province of Arkot should be annually paid to Balaji Bajirav.

One of the first acts of the new Pesava was to forward petitions to Delhi respecting various promises made to his father. These applications were transmitted through Jaysingh and Nizam-ul-mulk. A supply of ready money was what BalajT most earnestly craved and Rs. 15 lakhs as a free gift were granted by the emperor. Proposals for an agreement were then drawn up in the joint names of the Pesava and Cimaji Appa in which thev asked to have the government of Malva, which, on the death of Bajirav, was conferred on Azam-ulla Khan. If the government of Malva was granted they promised to pay their respects to the emperor; to prevent any other Maratha crossing the Narmada; to send a body of 500 horse under an officer of rank to remain in attendance on the emperor's person; and to ask no more than the gift of money already bestowed. They agreed to send 4.000 horse for service who would punish refractory landholders as far as their numbers would enable them, and they promised not to sequestrate the rent-free lands or jagirs assigned for charitable or religious purposes. No notice seems to have been taken of the application. But Balaji, whose disposition was conciliatory, was anxious to have the government of Malva conferred as a right according to the treaty with his father. With this object when Nizam-ul-mulk was marching to the Deccan, in order to suppress his son Nasir Jung's revolt, Balaji paid him a respectful visit at Edlabad on January 7, 1741. At this time he sustained a great loss in the death of his uncle Cimaji Appa which happened at the end of January 1741. Eleven days before this event, Khanduji Mankar under Cimaji's direction bad reduced Caul Revdanda, the last place remaining with the Portuguese between Goa and Daman. Cimaji Appa from his successes against the Portuguese had earned a reputation among the Mararhas for his ability to conduct military operations. He was also highly respected for his purity of private life, particularly in singular contrast in that respect to his elder brother.

On the death of his uncle, the Pesava returned from the northern districts and spent nearly a year in civil arrangements at Poona and Satara. Continuing to show the greatest respect for the Raja, he obtained from Sahu a grant by which the whole territory conquered from Portuguese was conferred on him, and also, except in Gujarat, the exclusive right of collecting the revenues and of levying contributions north of the Narmada. In 1742. Bhaskarpant, the Divan of Raghuji Bhosle of Berar, carried his arms eastwards, but the Pesava, eager to establish his power over those territories for which the authority obtained from the Raja was as usual assumed as a right, marched, though late in the season, towards Hindustan and made himself master of Gadha and Mandla before the rains set in. He was obliged to encamp on the banks, of the Narmada during the rainy season, and probably meditated an expedition into Allahabad when he was called upon to defend his rights in Malva which was invaded by Damaji Gaikvad and Baburav Sadasiv. This inroad seems to have been instigated by Raghuji to obstruct the Pesava's progress eastward: and on Balaji's arrival in Malva the army of Gujarat retired. On this occasion Anandrav Pavar was confirmed by the Pesava in the possession of Dhar and the surrounding districts, a political measure which not only secured Pavar in his interests, but opposed a barrier on the western side of Malva to incursions from Gujarat. Since the Pesava's arrival at Mandla a negotiation had been going on between him and the emperor. The cauth of the imperial territory was promised and a khillat more splendid than had ever been conferred on his father was transmitted to Balaji. It does not appear that any deed for collecting this general cauth was ever granted by Muhammad Sah; sums of money and convenient assignments were the mode of payment. The object in the pending treaty was on the Pesava's part to obtain sanads for the promised government of Malva, and on the part of the court of Delhi to procrastinate and to widen the breach between the Pesava and Raghuji Bhosle.

In the meantime Bhaskarpant had invaded Bihar. The Maratha army consisted of 10,000 or 12,000 horse and report had swelled their numbers to nearly four times that number. Bhaskarpant obtained the possession of the town of Hugli and most of the towns from Katva to the neighbourhood of Midna-pur fell into the hands of the Marathas. Raghuji also advanced to Bengal. The emperor ordered Safdar Jung, the Navab of Oudh, to drive out Bhaskarpant, and at the same time applied to Balaji Bajirav to afford his aid. As inducements to the Pesava an assignment for the arrears of cauth due from Azima-bad was sent to him by the emperor and an assurance of confirming him in the government of Malva. The reward was prized too highly and the service was too desirable to be refused. On Balaji's approach, Raghuji decamped and retreated towards the- hills. Balaji overtook, attacked, and defeated Raghuji's army (April 10, 1743). Bhaskarpant retreated through Orissa and Balaji retired to secure the long-promised government. The Pesava's conduct left no reasonable excuse on the part of Muhammad Sah for refusing to perform the engagement; but to save the credit of the imperial name, the feeble palliative of conferring the appointment on the Pesava as. the deputy of Prince Ahmad, the emperor's son, was adopted. The rest of the treaty differs little from the former proposals made in the joint names of Balaji and his uncle Cimaji, except that instead of 4,000, Balaji promised to furnish 12.000 horse the expense of the additional 8,000 being payable by the emperor. The Raja of Jaipur between whom and Balaji the most friendly intercourse subsisted, was a guarantee for the observance of treaty with Muhammad Sah. and Malharrav Holkar, Ranoji Sinde. and Pilaji Jadhav declared in due form that should the Pesava recede from his duties they would quit his service. The Pesava returned to Satara to pay his respects and go through the form of submitting his accounts of the revenue. These accounts were made out by the Pesava as a general in command of a body of the Raja's troops.

In 1744. Raghuji Bhosle sent agents to the Pesava assuring him of his sincere desire of reconciliation and of his conviction that the plans of Bajirav were those best suited to his own and to the real interests of the Maratha nation. He continued the same profession with apparent sincerity, but as he was on full march towards Satara, the Pesava thought it necessary to be on his guard, particularly as Damaji Gaikvad was also approaching. The Pratinidhi had become infirm by sickness, but his mutalik Yamaji Sivdev was an active and an able man, averse to the Pesava's supremacy, and, although not leagued with Raghuji, intimately connected with the faction of Dabhade. Under these circumstances Balaji Bajlrav had to choose between a war with the Maratha chiefs or the surrender of Bengal to Raghuji. The question did not admit of hesitation; he chose the surrender of Bengal to Raghuji. At the same time as it was understood that the country north of the Mahanadi as well as of the Narmada was comprehended in his agreement with the emperor, he made a merit of conceding his right to levy tribute to Raghuji, and a secret compact in which the Raja was used as a mediator was finally concluded. The object of the contracting parties seems avowedly to have been not so much an alliance as an agreement to avoid interference with each other. The Raja's authority was in this instance convenient to both. A sanad was given to the Pesava conferring on him his original mokasa, all the jagirs bestowed on himself or acquired by his father or grand-father, the governments of the Konkan and Malva, and the shares of revenue of tribute from Allahabad, Agra, and Ajmer; three sub-divisions in the district of Patna, Rs. 20,000 from the province of Arkot, and a few detached villages in Raghuji's districts. On the other hand, it was settled that the revenues and contributions from Lucknow, Patna and lower Bengal including Bihar should be collected by RaghujI who was also vested with the sole authority of levying tribute from the whole territory from Berar to Cuttack. It was also agreed that Damaji Gaikvad should be obliged to account to the Pesava for the amount of the contributions he had levied in Malva, but nothing was urged at this time respecting the large arrears due from Dabhade to the head of the government. It does not appear that any settlement was concluded, but Damaji seems to have remained in the Deccan, although his presence was much required in Gujarat. The Pesava's southern and eastern boundaries in North India were well defined by the Narmada, the Son, and the Ganga but the sanad delivered on this occasion authorised him to push his conquests northwards as far as practicable.

Raghuji Bhosle was intent on reviving his lost footing in Bengal; and the Pesava in order to excuse himself to the emperor for not acting against Raghuji remained in the Deccan. As soon as the season opened Bhaskarpant was sent with 20,000 horse into Bengal by Raghuji, but he, along with twenty officers, was treacherously murdered on 30th March 1744 by Alivardi Khan in an entertainment near Kalva and the army retreated to Berar in great confusion. Raghuji himself proceeded to the scene of action, and, although partially defeated near Mursida-bad while returning, succeeded in maintaining his hold over Orissa. Shortly after Raghuji had entered Bengal, Balaji Bajirav went (1745) to Malva, addressed letters to the emperor full of assurances of perpetual fidelity, but excused himself from paying his respects in the royal presence. The Pesava also sent his agents to Alivardi Khan demanding cauth in accordance with the emperor's grant. Thus the Navab now came to be pressed between two enemies, the Bhosle and the Pesava. In 1747 Alivardi Khan was once again severely defeated by Raghuji's son Janoji at Burdvan. The menace of Bhosle's invasions thus continued to hang over Bengal till at last the Navab came to a settlement with him by a solemn treaty concluded in March 1751 by which the Navab agreed to part with Orissa and pay twelve lakhs of rupees annually by way of cauth to be collected from Bengal. As for Pesava's claims it appears they were never implemented, on the plea put up by the emperor that the Pesava had failed to protect Alivardi Khan from the attacks of Bhosle. Soon after 1747 the Pesava came to be far too preoccupied with the affairs at Satara to be abb to pursue matters relating to Bengal.

In 1746, the Pesava sent his cousin Sadasiv Cimaji Bhau accompanied by Sakharam Bapu, the writer of Mahadajipant Purandare, on an expedition into the Karnatak to punish some of the desmukhs who had driven out the posts of the Pesava's old creditor Babuji Naik Baramatikar. The latter at the instigation of Raghuji Bhosle had obtained the cauth and sardesmukhi between the Krsna and the Tungbhadra in farm from the Raja for an yearly sum of Rs. 7 lakhs but the opposition he experienced and the heavy charges for maintaining the troops totally ruined him in a few years. The expense of the present expedition added to his embarrassment, but he would not, as was proposed to him, agree to give up the contract in favour of Sadasiv Cimaji. Sadasiv Cimaji levied contributions as far as the Tungabhadra and reduced Bahadur Banda near Koppal to which the Marathas had a claim of long standing. On Sadasiv Cimaji's return from this expedition, he was invested by the Raja with the same rank as had been enjoyed by his father, that is second-in-command under the Pesava, and being ambitious and bolder than his cousin, the Pesava, he began to assume considerable power. He chose as his writers Vasudev Josi and Raghunath Hari, two able men brought up under KanhojT Angrc. In 1747 the Pesava himself concluded a new and more specific agreement with the Rajas of Bundelkhand, by which, after deducting the district which had been ceded to the late Pesava, one-third of the territory estimated at Rs. 16½ lakhs was made over to Balaji Bajirav besides a like share from the profits of the diamond mines of Panna. During this period of comparative tranquillity the Pesava encouraged agriculture, protected the villagers and grain merchants, and improvement was everywhere visible. But about this time events occurred in North India, in the Deccan, and in the Madras Karnatak which were the forerunners of fresh troubles and great revolutions in every part of India.

Nizam-ul-mulk died in 1748. His son Nasir Jung was soon called upon to de I with the rebellion of his sister's son Muzaffar Jung, who had se'. ed Arkot. Nasir Jung marched to the south. He was, however, killed while meeting an attack by Canda Saheb of Arkot and his French supporters. Muzaffar Jung was proclaimed as Nizam. But he too was killed shortly after by Pathan chiefs. The French then raised Salabat Jung the younger son of Nizam-ul-mulk as the Nizam, and accompanied him to the Deccan.

In 1749, the eastern part of the Deccan which was completely drained of troops presented an inviting field to the Pesava, but domestic arrangements of the utmost importance demanded his presence at Satara. Raja Sahu had for some years been in a state of mental imbecility brought on, it was said, through grief for the death of his youngest wife Sagunabai of the Mobile family. As his health declined, Sahu recovered the use of his intellect, and the dependents of the Pesava about his person urged him to adopt a son. The Raja on the loss of his only child, some time before his derangement, contrary to all his former invectives against him bad declared that he would adopt Sambhaji Raja of Kolhapur provided he had an issue. As Sambhaji had no children, it was proposed that an inquiry should be made for some lineal descendant of Vithoji, the brother of Maloji, the grandfather of the great Sivaji. Search was accordingly made, but none was discovered. It was then suggested that he should take the son of some respectable siledar of the Paul family. This proposal, Sahu said, he had a strong reason for declining. For some time he thought of adopting Mudhoji who was the son of Sagunabai's sister and who belonged to the Bhosle family of Nagpur. Tarabai, who had been all the while carefully watching the course of events, was quick to see that there was a golden opportunity for her to fish in the troubled waters. She declared that she had a grandson Ramraja, Sivaji's posthumous son born in 1726 at Panhala whose life she had managed to save by the exchange of another infant born at the same time. Because of the probable danger to his life the prince's existence had been kept a secret by getting him conveyed out of the fort of Panhala. The child was subsequently carried to Tuljapur and thence to Barsi in Solapur district, where he was brought up in obscurity. The exchanged infant, said Tarabai, soon expired and as it was widely taken to be the death of the prince, his existence elsewhere of the real prince remained a well guarded secret. Such an assertion on the part of Tarabai, did not of course meet with universal credence. Even Sahu at first hesitated to put implicit faith in the story, but after satisfying himself with some proof and words of faith he came to be inclined to accept the story as true. It was, however, loudly asserted by the partisans of Sambhaji that the so-called son of Sivaji was spurious and plans were pursued to oppose his claims to Satara. The elder surviving wife of Sahu, Sakvarbai of the Sirke family, on being acquainted with the declaration on the part of Tarabal which deprived her of all charge of power, also incited Sambhaji to oppose the alleged grandson of Tarabai whom she declared an impostor. She promised to aid Sambhaji to her utmost, and engaged Yamaji Sivdev in her cause. jagjivan, the younger brother of Sripatrav who had been appointed Pratinidhi on the death of Sripatrav in 1747 also promised her all the support in his power. Damaji Gaikvad gave his assent to the proposal, and emissaries were despatched into the Ghatmatha and the Konkan, a tract ever prone to soldiery, to raise men and he prepared for her purpose. Balaji Bajirav repaired to Satara with an army of 35,000 men, to guard his own interests, as also to prevent any untoward development. While the interested parties were thus busy in their own plans Sahu lay on his death bed (1749) vigilantly attended by Sakvarbai, who as has been pointed out was opposed to the accession of Ramraja. The Pesava, however, caught an opportunity to obtain a secret interview with Sahu whose inclinations he promised to honour and give effect to. The Raja therefore signed a note empowering the Pesava to govern the whole Maratha confederacy (Rajmandal, as it is actually called in the note) on condition of his not entertaining the claims of Sambhaji and assuring the Pesava that whosoever succeeded as Chatrapati would continue him in the office of the Pesava. This paper also directed that Kolhapur State should always be considered an independent sovereignty; that the jagirs now existing were to be confirmed to the holders, leaving power to the Pesava to conclude such arrangements with the jagirdars as might be beneficial for extending Hindu power, for protecting the temples of God, the cultivators of the fields, and whatsoever was sacred or useful. The Pesava now resolved to act decisively yet cautiously. Although he knew Tarabai's capacity of intrigue very well he considered it most expedient to support the assertion of Tarabai although he might have his own doubts about her avowals, for he knew that the voice of the country was too strong and an heir of the house of Sivaji would have been joined by thousands. Sambhaji at this stage was out of the picture and Sakvarbai would have liked to adopt a scion from the Nagpur branch because she could only thus maintain her supremacy after the death of her husband; but Sakvarbai, to conceal her plot, always gave out that in the event of Sahu's death she would perform sati. This declaration proved her ruin, for the interested parties took care to circulate the report until it became so general, that its non-fulfilment would, in the eyes of the whole country, have been a reflection on the honour of the family. Sahu breathed his last on 15th December, 1749. Tarabai came down from the fort to have a last look at him. Govindrav Citnis went and conversed with her. She advised Govindrav to arrange that Sakvarbai should become sati. The Citnis reported this proposal to the Pesava who consulted the Pratinidhi, Fatehsingh Bhosle and others. They unanimously supported Tarabai's suggestion about Sakvarbai becoming sati. Her brother Kanhoji Sirke was sent for. He went and communicated the proposal to his sister. Sakvarbai had not yet recovered from the first emotions of consternation and rage at finding her plans frustrated; for, within a few moments of Raja's death a body of horse had galloped into the town of Satara. Every avenue about the town was occupied by troops and a garrison of the Pesava was placed in the fort, while a party was detached to reinforce the escort of Ramraja who had not arrived when Sahu died.. In this situation as she revolved in her mind the proposal of her brother, she came to the conclusion that if she refused and lived after her hushand she would have to suffer untold miseries at the hands of the Pesava who was strong enough to control the situation. The brother returned and communicated her assent. Then preparations were made. Along with Sakvarbai two of Sahu's concubines, Laksmi and Sakhu, also burnt themselves on the same pyre.

Ramraja.

Immediately after Sahu's death the Pesava put Sakvarbai's partisans, the Pratinidhi and his Mutalik Yamaji Sivdev, under arrest. Orders were also sent in his name to Yesvantrav Dabhade and Raghuji Bhosle requiring their presence at Satara. Yesvantrav Dabhade had become totally imbecile by debauchery, and as had probably been foreseen neither Dabhade nor Damaji Gaikvad, the commander of his army, attended. Most of the other jagirdars were present, but if any were disposed to resist the Pesava's authority, they remained passive until they should see what part Raghuji Bhosle would play. Raghuji's ambition was now controlled by the caution of age and the leaching of experience. He was not only intent on directing yearly raids into Bengal, but owing to the absence of his son Janoji in the Karnatak with 10,000 horse and to the number of troops which he was compelled to leave in his own territories he arrived at Satara in the month of January 1750, with a force of only 12,000 men. His disposition was pacific towards Balaji but he made some demur in acknowledging Ramraja. He required, in testimony of his being Bhosle and the grandson of Rajaram, that Tarabai should first eat with him in this presence of the caste, deposing on the food they ate together that Ramraja was her grandson. When this was complied with in the most solemn manner, Raghuji declared himself satisfied; and after a long conference with the Pesava he gave his assent to the propriety of the plans submitted for his consideration. As a proof of the good understanding which subsisted between them, Balaji took occasion to proceed in advance to Poona, leaving the Raja in Raghuji's charge, and requesting that he would accompany him to Poona with the whole of the jagirdars, for the purpose of concluding the arrangements made by the will of the late Raja, Sahu. It may also be noted that in the note left by Sahu, Raghuji had been expressly excluded from succession. From this period (1750) Poona took the place of Satara as the main centre of activities of the Marathas.

In the success of his schemes, Balaji almost overlooked Tarabai who though upwards of seventy years of age, soon convinced him that it was dangerous to slight a woman of her spirit. On pretence of paying her devotions at her husband's tomb at Sinhagad near Poona she went there and endeavoured to persuade the Pant Saciv to declare for her as head of the Maratha empire. Balaji, after much persuasion, induced her to come to Poona, and having flattered her ambition with the hope of a large share in the administration, at last obtained her influence with Ramraja in confirming the many schemes he had now to carry into effect. Raghuji Bhosle received new deeds for Berar, Gondvan, and Bengal, and some lands which had belonged to the Pratinidhi adjoining Berar. The title deeds for half of Gujarat were sent to Yesvantrav Dabhade, which, as he had never yet accounted for a share of the revenue to the state, gave Damaji Gaikvad to understand what he might expect from the growing power of the Pesava. The whole of Malva estimated to yield about Rs. 150 lakhs of yearly revenue except about Rs. 10 lakhs was divided between Holkar and Sinde, and Rs. 74½ lakhs were conferred on Holkar and Rs. 65½ lakhs on Snide. The remaining Rs. 10 lakhs were held by various jagirdars of whom Anandrav Pavar's share was the most considerable. All of them were subservient to the views of the Pesava and from them he had no opposition to fear. Balaji Bajirav, without intending to employ them, confirmed the eight Pradhans, and for a short time nominated Gangadha Srinivas as Pratinidhi, but on the application of Raghuji Bhosle and of some other jagirdars, when about to return to their districts, he made them a promise to release Jagjivan Parasuram and accordingly restored him to his rank and liberty. As the Raja's establishment was to be much reduced, and it was necessary to secure in his interests such of his officers as he could not employ, the Pesava reserved a great part of the Pmtinidhi's lands as jagirs and assignments to the persons in question, particularly the tract west of Karhad between the Urmodi and the Varna where he apprehended an insurrection supported by the Raja of Kolhapur. Fatehsihgh Bhosle, the adopted son of Sahu, was confirmed in the possession of his jagir, in various minor claims, in shares of revenue, and in the title of Raja of Akkalkot, which, except the detached claims alluded to, were being enjoyed by his descendants till the time of merger. An appointment created by Sahu for a relation of the Mantri, which was termed Ajahut sardesmnkh or general agent for collecting the sardesmukhi was nominally preserved; but jagir lands were assigned in lieu of the right of interference in the collection of the ten per cent on the six subhas of the Deccan. The appointment of Sarlaskar was taken away from the family of Somvarhsi and given to Nimbaji Naik Nimbalkar. All these changes and appointments were made in the name of Ramraja, but it was now well understood that the Pesava's authority was supreme in the State and generally admitted without dissatisfaction. Yamaji Sivdev, who recovered his liberty at the same time with the Pratinidhi, occupied the fort of Sangola near Pandharpur where he raised an insurrection and made head against the Pesava until he was suppressed by the Pesava's cousin Sadasiv Cimaji. In the measures which have been detailed the Pesava owed much of his success to his Divan Mahadajipant, who, next to his cousin Sadasivrav, possessed greater influence over Balaji Bajirav than any of his advisers. Sadasivrav on his expedition to Sangola was accompanied by Ramraja for the purpose of giving Yamaji Sivdev no excuse for resistance. During their stay at that place, the Raja is said to have agreed to renounce the entire power and to lend his sanction to whatever measures the Pesava might pursue, provided a small tract round Satara was assigned to his own management, conditions to which Balaji subscribed but which actually were never realised. The Raja under a strong escort returned from Sarigola to Satara. The Pesava in order to soothe Tarabal whose great age did not render her less active and intriguing, incautiously removed his troops from the fort of Satara, and having placed in it the gadkaris and old retainers who had great respect for the widow of Rajarani, gave up the entire management to her. The Raja was kept with a separate establishment in the town of Satara, but perfectly at large, and a splendid provision was. assigned to him and his officers, the expense of which amounted to the yearly sum of Rs. 65 lakhs.

In 1751, when the Pesava left for Pangal, south of Hyderabad to confront Salabat Jung, the Nizam, then returning to Hyderabad. Tarabai sounded Ramraja in regard to his assuming the control usurped by his servant Balaji, the Pesava ; but not finding him fit for her purpose, she pretended to have no serious intentions in the proposal. At the same time she sent messengers to Damaji Gaikvad, representing the unguarded state of the country and recommending his immediate march to Satara to rescue the Raja and the Maratha State from the power of the Pesava. Damaji at once acted on this request and Tarabai, as soon as information was received of the Gaikvad's approach, invited the Raja into the fort of Satara and made him prisoner. She then reproached him for want of spirit; regretted that she had ever rescued him from a life of obscurity for which only he could have been destined: declared that he could not be her grandson or the descendant of the great Sivaji; that he was neither a Bhosle nor a Mohite, but a baseborn Gondhali changed in the house where he had been first conveyed, and that she would make atonement on the banks of the holy Krsna for ever having acknowledged him. She ordered the havildar to fire upon his attendants, most of whom unconscious of what had happened remained near the gate of the fort; and she directed the guns to be pointed at the houses in the town below belonging to the partisans of the Pesava. Trirhbakpant commonly called Nana Purandare. Govindrav Citnis, and the officers in the Pesava's interests at Satara were at first disposed to ridicule this attempt as that of a mad old woman, but on hearing of the approach of Damaji Gaikvad from Songad, they quitted the town and assembled troops at the village of Arla on the banks of the Krsna. On the advance of the Gaikvad by the Salpa pass, although they had 20,000 and their opponent only 15,000 men they made an irresolute attack and retired to Nimb about eight miles north of Satara where they were followed the next day, attacked, and defeated by the Gujarat troops. Damaji Gaikvad immediately went to pay his respects to Tarabal, and several forts in the neighbourhood were given to her. Satara was well stored with provisions, and the Pratinidhi promised to aid Tarabai's cause. News of these proceedings reached the Pesava. Before he returned Nana Purandare had redeemed his lost credit by attacking and compelling the army of Damaji Gaikvad to retire to the Jore Khora (Jore valley) about twenty-live miles north-west of Satara where they expected to he joined by the Pratinidhi from Karhad and by troops from Gujarat. In this hope they were disappointed; and as Sankarajipant, subhe-dar of the Kohkan, was assembling troops in their rear and the Pesava s army which had marched nearly 400 miles in thirteen days was close upon them, Damaji sent a messenger to treat with Balaji. Balaji solemnly agreed to abide by the terms proposed and enticed Damaji to encamp in his neighbourhood, where, as soon as he got him into his power, he demanded the payment of all the arrears due from Gujarat, and the cession of a large portion of his territory. Damaji represented that he was but the agent of Dabhade the Senapati, and bad no authority to comply with what was required. On this reply the Pesava sent private orders to seize some of the family of the Gaikvad and Dabhade, who lived at Tajeganv in Poona, and treacherously surrounded, attacked, and plundered the camp of Damaji Gaikvad and sent him into confinement at Poona. This defeat of Damaji, instead of damping the spirits of Tarabai, only served to incense her still more. The imprisonment of Ramraja was made more strict. Guards and servants were made to suffer indescribable hardships on ground of suspicion. The Pratinidhi was deprived of his post on the ground of incapacity. At the same time she started a low intrigue with the Nizam's Court offering the Pesavaship to his minister, Ramdaspant. It is difficult to understand how in all this she was serving the Maratha State. Perplexing as the affair was, Tarabai's conduct in the end proved advantageous to the Pesava as it took from him the odium of being the first to confine the Raja to the fort of Satara. Tarabai did not merely confine Ramraja to the fort. His prison was a damp stone dungeon and his food was of the coarsest grain. Damaji Gaikvad was the only man whom the Pesava dreaded, but as he was now a close prisoner at Poona, Balaji proceeded towards Aurahgabad in prosecution of his engagements with Ghazi-ud din. Ramdaspant, Raja Raghunathdas as he was also called, the Divan of Salabat Jung, opened a communication from Ahmadnagar with Tarabai and Sambhaji of Kolhapur.

During Balaji's absence at Aurahgabad, Tarabai occupied the districts of Wai and Satara aided bv 5,000 or 6,000 Marathas and Ramosis whom she had employed in her service. A large force was sent by the Pesava to invest Satara and starve her into submission. Anandrav Jadhav, the commandant of the fort, convinced of the folly of resistance, formed the design of carrying the Raja out of her power. When this came to her knowledge she ordered him to be beheaded; a sentence which the garrison executed on their own commander, as well as on several others subsequently implicated in a like scheme. Baburav Jadhav, a person unconnected with the late commandant and a relation of the Jadhavs of Sindkhed was appointed to the command of the fort. In 1753, the Pesava before leaving for the Karnatak endeavoured to pave the way to a compromise with Tarabai. On his march to the Karnatak he sent to assure Tarabai that if she would submit, the control of the Raja's person and establishment should remain at her disposal. To this Tarabai would not listen to unless Balaji Bajirav would come to Satara, acknowledge her authority, and give, such personal assurances as would satisfy her. Encouraged by the approach to Poona of Janoji Bhosle, the son and heir of Raghuji Bhosle, and on assurances of safety and protection from the Pesava, Tarabai, leaving the garrison of Satara and the custody of Ramraja's person to Baburav Jadhav repaired to the Pesava's capital accompanied by Bimbaji Bhosle, the youngest brother of Janoji who had attached himself to her party and married one of her relations of the Mohite family. At Poona Tarabai was received with so much attention and consideration that she agreed to the Pesava's proposals as formerly made, provided he would promise to accompany her to the temple of Jejuri and there solemnly swear to abide by his present declarations. The Pesava consented on condition that Baburav Jadhav should be dismissed, to which Tarabai reluctantly agreed. This reconciliation between Tarabai and the Pesava was the result of a great tact and restraint, with which the Pesava tickled womanly pride and showed her the futility of any opposition to his designs. Ramraja, however, according to the conditions of agreement with her, continued to remain in confinement, even in later years up to the time of her death which took place in 1761. On the whole it must be said that Ramraja was a prince deficient in ordinary ability, and the miserable thraldom he underwent during the long confinement broke his spirit and ruined his health.

Before Sahu's death (1749), little improvement had taken place in the civil administration of the country. Balaji Bajirav (1740—1761) appointed fixed mamlatdars or subhedars each of whom had charge of several districts. The territory between the Godavari and the Krsna including the greater part of Satara, the best protected and most productive under Maratha rule, was entrusted to the Pesava's favourites and courtiers, some of whom were his relations. They held absolute charge of the police, the revenue, and the civil and criminal judicature, and in most cases had power of life and death. They were bound to furnish regular accounts, but they always evaded settlement. They governed by deputies and remained at Court whether in the capital or in the field in attendance upon the Pesava. Their districts were in consequence extremely ill-managed and in very great disorder; the supplies furnished for the exigencies of the State were tardy, and in comparison with the established revenues, insignificant. The beginning of a better system is ascribed to Ramcandra Baba Senvi and after his death Sadasivrav Bhau improved on his suggestions. Balaji Bajirav Pesava was sensible of the advantage to be gained from bringing the collectors under control. Me had not sufficient energy for the undertaking himself, but he supported his cousin's measures. Pancayats the ordinary tribunals of civil justice, began to improve, because the supreme power, if it did not always examine and uphold their decrees, at least did not interfere to prevent the decisions of the community. In short the condition of the whole population was in his time improved and the Maratha peasantry sensible of the comparative comfort which they then enjoyed have ever since blessed the days of Nana Saheb Pesava.

To counter the Nizam's interference in Maratha politics, Balaji Bajirav brought in Gazi-ud-din, the eldest son of Nizam-ul-Mulk as a claimant to the vice-royalty of the Deccan. Gazi-ud-din ceded the province of Khandcs to the Marathas. On his sudden death in 1752, the Marathas forced the Nizam Salabat Jung to confirm the cession of Khandes. Jalna and Sangamner (which included Nasik and Trimbak) also passed under the control of the Marathas. Following the departure of the French, the Nizam was defeated near Udgir in 1760 and made to part with Bijapur, Solapur and other districts including Ahmadnagar which had been earlier captured by the Marathas.

In the north the Marathas undertook the conquest of the Punjab on behalf of the Moghals. The province had been ceded to Ahmad Sah Abdali, the king of Afghanistan. The Marathas occupied Lahore. On the arrival of Ahmad Sah they fell back. This Afghan-Maratha conflict led to the great struggle at Panipat.

Death of Balaji Bajirav.

In 1761 the Marathas sustained the crushing defeat of Panipat, and Pesava Balaji who never recovered from that terrible blow died on June 23, 1761. Immediately after his death Madhavrav the second son of the Pesava Balaji Bajirav, then in his seventeenth year, went to Satara accompanied by his uncle Raghunathrav and received investiture as Pesava on 19th July, from the nominal Raja, who remained in precisely the same state of imprisonment under the obdurate Tarabai, until her death on 9th December 1761 at the age of eighty-six at Satara. Therefore, the Pesava Madhavrav I formally crowned Ramraja at Sahunagar on 23rd March 1763. Since then his lot became much improved, although he was not allowed to assert himself as Chatrapati, a role for which he possessed neither the training nor the capacity. He was only allowed to appoint agents for the management of his estates in several villages and the collection of his other hereditary claims as desmukh of Indapur.

Patwardhans of Sangli.

As the Patvardhans have been closely associated with the history of the Marathas during the post-Panipat period and as they figured during the subsequent British rule as rulers or jagirdars of small principalities such as Sangli, Miraj and Tasganv in this district, it is convenient at this stage to follow the later history of the district along with the family history of the Patvardhans. The founder of this family was one Har or Hari Bhatt bin Ballam Bhatt, a native of the village of Kotavda in the Ratnagiri district. This man, after distinguishing himself by a long series of devotional austerities, was appointed upadhya or family priest to Naro Mahadev, chief of Icalkaranji in the Kolhapur State. On the occasion of the marriage of this chief's son to the daughter of Bajaji Visvanath, the first Pesava, in 1713 [Life of Gopal Govind Patwardhan by R. A. Lagu, page 7.] Har Bhatt was brought to the notice of the Pesava, and his sons Govind and Ramcandra were ere long taken into the service of the latter. A third son Trimbak obtained service with the Raja of Akkalkot. After the death of Balaji Pant Pesava, Har Bhatt's family continued to enjoy the favour of his successors, and Govindrav with his son Gopalrav took an active part in the events of Balaji Bajirav's reign. In 1759 Gopalrav distinguished himself in certain opera-lions against the Nawab of Saonur, half of whose territory was surrendered to the Pesava who subsequently gave a part of it as jahagir to Rastes and Patvardhans. He also received from the Nawab a grant in inam of the fort of Dodvad, with the land assigned for its support, which formed part of the present possessions of the Patvardhan family. It was in the reign of the Pesava Madhavrav Ballal, however, that the fortunes of the Patvardhans reached their zenith. In 1761 the fort of Miraj with some thanas and customs duties was assigned to Govindrav for the maintenance of troops [ For an early historical account of Miraj, see Miraj in Places of Interest.]. In the course of the struggle between Madhavrav and his uncle Raghunathrav, the Patvardhans consistently supported the Pesava but were for a time deprived of their jagir by Raghunathrav when for some time he had been in charge of the Maratha affairs. The disaffected Patvardhans even joined the Nizam but the quarrel was soon made up and the Patvardhans were restored to their jagir in 176.3. In the same year saranjami lands of the annual rental of upwards of Rs. 25 lakhs were assigned to him in association with his nephews Parasuram Ramcandra and Nilkanth Trimbak Patvardhan for the maintenance of 8,000 horse. The saranjam was composed of a number of districts situated in different parts of the country between the 15th and 18th parallels of north latitude, some lying to the north of Pandharpur and others being so far south as the Tungabhadra. The most compact portion of the saranjam, as well as the richest, was that in the neighbourhood of Miraj and adjoining the eastern frontier of Kolhapur. The headquarters of saranjamdars were here, and the intention of the Pesava evidently was to hold the Raja of Kolhapur in check by the establishment of such a powerful saranjam in his immediate vicinity. A considerable part of the Patvardhan's possessions being near the Mysore frontier the duty devolved on them of watching Haidar Ali also and bearing the first brunt of his attacks when he and his son chose to invade the Maratha territory.

Gratitude to their benefactor Madhavrav led the Patvardhans to aid that Pesava actively in his struggle for power with his ambitious uncle and guardian Raghunathrav, generally known as Raghoba Dada. Whenever the latter gained the upper hand he showed his resentment, as by the attack and capture of Miraj on one occasion (in 1762), but his enmity was not so dangerous as the vindictive feeling which descended to his son Bajirav, the last of the Pesavas, which nearly occasioned the ruin of the Patvardhan family, as will be seen further on. Besides taking a prominent part in the internal politics of the Manitha empire during Madhavrav's. reign, the Patvardhans were actively employed in all the campaigns against Haidar Ali and in the war with Janoji Bhosle of Nagpur. Before the death of Madhavrav the grant of the saranjam was renewed to the family, the title deeds being made out in the names of Vamanrav, the brother of Gopajrav, and his cousins Parasuram Ramcandra and Raghu-nathrav Nilkanth. Though the family was not as yet divided, these chiefs resided severally at Miraj, Tasganv and Kurundvad, and may be said to represent separate branches. In addition to the saranjam Madhavrav bestowed on the Petvardhans during his life-time the districts of C kodi and Manoli, but they never held these districts for any length of time continuously.

After the death of Madhavrav Pesava and the murder of his brother and successor Narayanrav, the Patvardhans followed the standard of Raghunathrav until it became known that the widow of the murdered Pesava was in a condition that gave hopes of an heir to the gadi. The celebrated Nana Phadnavis then formed a council of regency, governing in the name of the widow, but the Patvardhans did not openly take part against Raghunathrav till the birth of Madhavrav Narayan put him in the position of an usurper. They then openly espoused the cause of the infant Pesava, but they soon had to leave Poona for their own territory to aid in repelling invasions made by Haidar Ali from different quarters.

Even before the death of their great patron Madhavrav Ballal the Patvardhans had been engaged in constant hostilities with the Raja of Kolhapur, and these hostilities were now carried on with great vigour, as the Raja had entered into alliance with Raghunathrav in conjunction with Haidar Ali of Mysore, who advanced with the declared intention of taking possession of the whole country south of the Krsna. The Patvardhans, therefore, took no part in the war with the English which broke out at this time, as they were fully occupied with their hostilities against Kolhapur and with resisting the invasion from Mysore. In the latter operations they were not very successful as they suffered more than one severe defeat, and Pandurangrav, the brother of Gopajrav was wounded and taken as a prisoner to Srirariga-pattam. where he died [Gopalrao died in 1771.].

Parasuram Bhau.

The leadership of the Patvardhans then devolved on his cousin Parasuram Bhau. After some rather unsuccessful operations against Haidar Ali, a temporary truce, it would appear, left Parasuram Bhau at liberty to return to his own capital and carry on the war with the Kolhapur Raja, from whom he took Akevat, Sirol, and Bhudargad. A treaty was then concluded with the Raja, and the Patvardhan Chief was thus enabled to proceed to Poona where he arrived in time to play a very distinguished part in the war with the English, which followed the repudiation of the convention of Vadganv in 1779. The success of the operations against General Goddard, by which that officer was compelled to retreat from Khandala to Bombay with heavy loss, was attributable in a great measure to Parasuram Bhau's skill and exertions.

The Patvardhan Chief was next employed against Tipu of Mysore, who attempted to reduce the fort of Nargund. By specious promises the latter induced the Marathas to retire, and as soon as they were out of the way seized Nargund and Kittur. These acts brought on a war which lasted for about a year. Peace was then concluded, but very soon the conduct of the Mysore prince led to the formidable combination of the English, the Nizam, and the Marathas, who in 1790 commenced operations against him. Parasuram Bhau was appointed to command Maratha forces on this occasion. In conjunction with a British detachment under Captain Little he besieged Dharvar for seven months, after which the place capitulated (6-4-1791). He then took the fort of Kusgal and after waiting to realise the revenue of the district joined the other Maratha commander Haripant, and moved towards Srirangapattam, which was being besieged by Lord Cornwallis. Before they arrived, however, the British were compelled by want of provision to raise the siege and make a hasty retreat.

Marathas met the retreating British troops at Melkote about 20 miles north of Srirangapattam. They had with them huge supplies of grain with which they relieved the starvation of the British armies. "The Bazar of the Maratha camp presented the greatest variety of articles, English broad-cloth, Birmingham pen-knives, the richest Kashmir shals, rare and costly jewellery together with oxen, sheep, poultry and all that the most flourishing towns could furnish" [ Marshman as quoted in Sardesai, III, p. 188.] Cornwallis, Parasuram Bhau and Haripant had a very cordial meeting on 28th May at Moti Talav followed by conferences and deliberations on the best plan to be followed hereafter against Tipu Sultan. The campaigning season had then drawn to a close, the rains had already begun to fall, and the Kaveri was in flood. It was therefore decided to defer an attack upon Srirangapattam till after the rains and utilise the interval in preparing for an effective assault. Parasu-ram Bhau was then detached from the main army, with Captain Little, to keep open the communications with the north. He preferred, however, to utilise his time and means by taking possession of the district of Bednur, and this occupation delayed him so long that, though repeatedly summoned by Lord Cornwallis, who had resumed the siege, he only arrived at Srirangapattam just as the armistice which preceded the treaty with Tipu had been arranged.

On his return to Tasganv Parasuram occupied himself with a war with Kolhapur. In the course of this his son was defeated and taken prisoner. Though the latter was treated kindly and at once released, the Patvardhan, incensed at the repulse, renewed hostilities with such vigour that the town of Kolhapur was only saved from capture by the suhmission of the Raja who agreed to pay Rs. 3 lakhs and to give hostages for the payment of the amount. Not long after this war was declared against Nizam Ali, and Parasuram Bhau commanded the, Maratha army on the last occasion when all the Maratha chiefs assembled under the Pesava's standard. In the battle of Kharda he had a narrow escape of his life, but was saved by the bravery of his son to win a decisive victory.

In 1795, the Pesava Madhavrav died. As the heir to the gadi was Bajirav, the son of Raghunathrav, whom Nana Phadnavis and the Patvardhans had always opposed and whose schemes they had been the main instruments of defeating, they resolved to prevent his succession by getting the widow of the deceased prince to adopt a son. Bajirav, however, heard of this and secured the services of Daulatrav Sinde. The result of this step was that his opponents thought it advisable to come to terms with him and accept him as the Pesava. A series of plots and counterplots ensued. Parasuram Bhau and Nana Phadnavis conceived the idea of getting Bajirav's brother Cimaji Appa adopted by Narayanrav's widow and invested as Pesava, and in pursuance of this plot had him seized and invested against his will. The two chief conspirators however, had for some time past been suspicious of one another, and just at this juncture Nana fled to the Konkan under the apprehension that Parasuram Bhau was about to make him a prisoner. An open rupture then took place. Nana made overtures to Bajirav and incited the Raja of Kolhapur to attack Parasuram Bhau's jagir, while Parasuram gave up Nana's jagir to Sinde and appropriated his houses at Poona. The long series of intrigues finally ended in the apprehension of both by Sinde.

Struggle with Kolhapur

Parasuram Bhau, however, was not long kept in confinement, as a general was wanted to oppose the Raja of Satara who had collected forces and was assuming independence. The Patvardhan offered his services, which were accepted. He soon defeated the Raja, but on the completion of this duty was much too wary to disband his troops. He then offered to head the contingent intended to co-operate with the English in the new war with Tipu that broke out in 1799. Owing however to the duplicity of Bajirav the promised aid was never given to the British, and part of the force intended to co-operate with them was turned against the Raja of Kolhapur who had been actively employed for some time in recovering the places that had been taken from him by the Patvardhans, and in overrunning and pillaging Parasuram Bhau's jagir, in the course of which operations the latter's palace at Tasganv was burnt to the ground. Incensed at these losses Parasuram Bhau without waiting for reinforcements, hurried on operations against the Raja who was aided by Citursing, the brother of the Raja of Satara. His eagerness and resentment were such that he kept the field during the rainy season. In September he encountered the Kolhapur troops under the Raja at the village of Pattankudi, where he was defeated and mortally wounded (16-9-1799). It was reported at the time that as the wounded chief lay on the ground Visvasrav, brother of the notorious Sarjerav Ghatge, took him up on his horse and carried him to the Raja. He was "so highly gratified at this success that in a fit of revenge he inflicted indignities on the dead body and prevente'd the funeral rites being performed. [ Sardesai: New History of the Marathas, Vol. III, p. 345.]"

Ramcandrarav Appa Saheb, eldest son of the deceased chief, fled after the battle to Poona to implore the aid of the Pesava. This was readily granted, and a considerable force consisting of the Vincurkar's and the Pratinidhi's troops and five of Sinde's regular battalions under European officers were despatched to Kolhapur. The force met with a slight check at Sirol, but was reinforced and advanced to the capital. The Raja was there defeated and obliged to flee to Panhala, and the siege of the town was begun. The siege was raised in consequence of an intrigue at Poona. On the death of Nana Phadnavis, which took place during the siege, the Pesava arranged with Sinde that the latter should attack and possess himself of the late Parasu-ram Bhau's territory. The besieging force then broke up, Sinde's battalions marching on Tasganv and Appa Saheb flying to the Karnatak leaving his jagir to be overrun and devastated.

Efforts of the English to restore the estate of Patvardhans.

Orders were then sent from Poona to the Pesava's sar subhe- dar in the Karnatak, Dhondo Pant Gokhale, to sequestrate the Patvardhan's territory in that province. As the sar subhedar was engaged in hostilities at the time with Dhundia Vagh, a freebooter who had escaped from Srirangapattam, and was now plundering the country at the head of a considerable force, he kept the order secret, and thus got the Patvardhans to co-operate with him. When he was killed shortly afterwards in an engagement with Dhundia he was accompanied by Cintamanrav Patvardhan (the son of Pandurangrav whose death at Sriranga-pattam, has been noted. above), who was wounded on the occasion. After Gokhale's death Cintamanrav joined Colonel Wellesley (afterwards the Duke of Wellington), who had been sent to put down Dhundia, and the two sons' of Parasuram Bhau shortly afterwards joined the British forces. The Patvardhans tried to get the English general to join them in an attack on Kolhapur, but he declined to do so, and managed to keep the peace between his allies. The result of the combined operations was that Dhundia, on the 10th of September 1800, was defeated and killed at Konagal. At the suggestion of the British Resident at Poona the order for the sequestration of the Patvardhans' districts in the Karnatak was rescinded, and Colonel. Wellesley handed over the' districts released from the grasp of Dhundia to the sons of Parasuram Bhau. The duplicity of Bajirav's conduct, however, at this time was such that the Patvardhans seriously entertained the notion of entering the service of the Mysore prince, but the project was not carried out. Just at this time Sinde was obliged to remove his troops from Tasganv in consequence of the war with Holkar, and the Patvardhans were then enabled to return to their homes.

At the end of 1802, the Pesava, driven out of Poona by Holkar, signed the treaty of Bassein and General Wellesley marched from Srirangapattam to restore him to his capital. The Patvardhans immediately joined him and begged him to obtain for them the good offices of the British Resident. He did his best to reassure them, though the conduct of Bajirav, even at this juncture, was such as to make them naturally most suspicious, and they accompanied him to Poona. After the restoration of the Pesava, General Wellesley looked into the claims of the Patvardhans before him, and promised to do justice. Appa Saheb and Cintamanrav were induced to visit Bajirav and further promises were made, but nothing had been settled when the British General left Poona to carry on the war against Sinde and the Bhosle. He had hoped that the Patvardhans and other Maratha chiefs would join him, but they met with no encouragement from the Pesava to do so, and, indeed, seem to have been secretly dissuaded by him.

Their conduct on this occasion nearly led to the ruin of the family. At the close of the war, Bajirav, on the pretence of rewarding those who had done good service and punishing those who had failed to render due assistance, determined to make over the lands of the Patvardhans to Bapu Gokhale. As the latter felt himself unable to take over the saranjam without the assistance of the English, he applied to General Wellesley. Without deciding whether or not such aid would be given, which was for the Governor-General's consideration, the British commander pointed out in forceful language the impolicy, the injustice, and even the ingratitude of the course the Pesava wished to pursue towards the Patvardhans. In writing to the Governor-General he recapitulated all the arguments he had used, and suggested that the Pesava's formal consent should be obtained to the British Government acting as arbitrator between him and the southern jagirdars. This suggestion was approved, and Mr. E. Strachey was appointed to conduct the enquiries and negotiate the proposed settlement. Before leaving the Southern Maratha Country, General Wellesley took advantage of an interview he had with Hari Parasuram at Tasganv, to point out what just grounds of complaint the Patvardhans had on their part given to the Pesava, and to show how matters might be settled satisfactorily.

The proposed settlement, however, fell through for the time in consequence of the unwillingness of both the parties concerned to avail themselves of the means thus offered to them of putting matters on a satisfactory footing. Bajirav only wanted to ruin the Patvardhans and displayed his characteristic duplicity, while they, on the other hand, distrusted him and had an exaggerated notion of their own power. The British Government, therefore, withdrew its mediation and left the Pesava and the jagirdars to settle matters hetween them as they best could. The latter consequently assumed a semi-independent position, and only attended to the requisitions of the Poona Government when it suited them to do so. Cintamanrav even harboured freebooters pursued by Bajirav's troops, and actually attacked the Pesava's districts. The latter, in the meantime, consolidated his position by crushing a number of minor jagirdars and watched his opportunity for dealing similarly with the Patvardhans.

Pandharpur Settlement, 1811.

A struggle was thus impending between these jagirdars and their sovereign, which would have Jed to most serious consequences. Mr. Mount Stuart Elphinstonc, the Resident at Poona, perceived this, and saw that if the war commenced it would probably spread and affect British interests. He, therefore, proposed to the Governor-General in 1811 a scheme of mediation similar in most respects to that which General Wellesley had suggested. On this being approved he submitted to the Pesava a draft of the terms which he thought should he offered, and having obtained his consent, he proceeded to Pandharpur at the head of a force strong enough to crush opposition, and summoned the Patvardhans. After some delay and attempts, at evasion the latter accepted the terms. They thus bound themselves to give up all land and revenues which they had usurped and were holding without authorisation; to serve the Pesava according to the conditions on which they held their saranjdm ; to carry on no hostilities unless duly authorised to do so, and to submit their disputes to the Pesava. On the other hand, the Pesava agreed to take no notice of past offences and to revive no old claims while the British Government guaranteed to the jagirdars their lawful possessions so long as they served the Pesava with fidelity.

Jagir divided.

About this time several divisions of the saranjam took place among the members of the Patvardhan family which require notice. The first division was between Cintamanrav and his uncle Gangadharrav. The latter, on the death of his brother Pandurang-rav, had been left guardian to his nephew and, with the proverbial policy of a paternal uncle under such circumstances had appropriated a considerable portion of his ward's property. Cintamanrav in 1801 set to work to recover his possessions, and acted with such vigour that Gangadharrav had to shut himself up in the fort of Mirai, where he would have been besieged had not the other members of the family interposed and persuaded the uncle and nephew to agree to an amicable division. This arrangement was, in 1808, sanctioned by. the Pesava, who further exempted Gangadharrav from feudal allegiance to the senior branch of the family. It was arranged, too, that Gangadharrav should have the fort of Mirai, Rs. 1 lakh being assigned to Cintamanrav for building a fort at Sangli, which he made his headquarters. The example thus Set was followed by other members of the family. In 1811 the sons of Parasuram Bhau divided their father's estate into two portions, Jamkhindi valued at Rs. 4,54,160 and subject to the service of 1,278 horse, being held by the elder Ramcandrarav and Tasganv valued at Rs. 2,08,77, with service of 640 horse by the younger brother Ganpatrav. In the same year the Kurund-vad branch was also divided and the separate estate of Kumndvad with a revenue of Rs. 1,27,989 and subject to the service of 280 horse was held by Trimbak Raghunath and that of Sedbal or Kagwad with a revenue of Rs. 1,00,691 and subject to the service of the same number of house, i.e., 280 was held by Ganpat Konher Rav. [West: Memoir of Southern Maratha States, p. 30.]

The settlement of Pandharpur secured its main object, the preservation of the peace of the country, by putting a stop to the disputes between the Pesava and the Patvardhans, but the relations between the two parties continued to be anything but cordial. The leading members of the family, however, were with Bajirav when the treaty of Poona was signed on 3-6-1817, [Aitchison, Vol. Ill, p. 79.] and though Cintamanrav had been very violent in his opposition to this engagement, the Resident secured the interests of the Patvardhans by a special article (number 16) in the treaty. The text of the article is as follows: " Whereas certain articles of agreement (six in number) regarding the settlement of the southern Jagheerdars were presented by the Resident at Poona is His Highness Row Pundit Prudhan Bahadur on the 6fh July 1812 A. D., to which, after a modification suggested by His Highness and submitted to him on the seventh of the same month, His Highness gave his entire consent, those articles are hereby recognised and declared to be binding on both parties as much as if they formed part of the present treaty, and whereas various disputes have arisen regarding the muster of the troops of the said Jagheerdars and the manner and period of their service, His Highness Row Pundit Prudhan Bahadur hereby agrees to be entirely guided by the advice of the British Government with regard to those subjects, and to issue no orders to the Jagheerdars without full concert with the British Government. His Highness hereby agrees to restore to the said Jagheerdars any of the lands included in their sunnuds which may now be in His Highness's possessions" [ Treaties and Engagements, Vol. III by C. V. Aitchison, p. 85, article XVI 1863. Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government No. C XIII new series. A Memoir of the states of the Southern Maratha Country draun up for Government by Captain Edward W. West 1869.].

This article was most distasteful to Bajirav, and it was not till he had exhausted every form of remonstrance that he agreed to it reluctantly.

Settlement of 1818

Immediately after the attack on the Residency at Poona and the battle of Khadki in November 1817, Mr. Elphinstone sent circular letters to the jagirdars setting forth the causes of the war with the Pesava, and advising the several chiefs to withdraw their troops and stay quietly at home, in which event they would be guaranteed against any loss of territory or dignity. The Patvardhans who had joined the Pesava's standard after the battle did not immediately respond to this invitation, but some of them sent vakils to the Resident. With a view to deprive them of any grounds for hostility against the British, Mr. Elphinstone instructed General (afterwards Sir Thomas) Munro ' To treat the country immediately under the Pesava and the jagir of Gokhale as hostile, and that of all the other jagirdars as friendly'. General Munro was also entrusted with the task of making a settlement with the jagirdars based on that of Pandharpur, and was authorised to offer considerable additions to the possession of those who should come in within a specified period. The Patvardhans did not by any means comply with the letter of the communication made to them by the British authorities, but they at a very early period of the war, ceased to render any but a very nominal assistance to the Pesava, and most of them left his camp before long on one pretext or another.

General Munro having been obliged by ill health to leave the Southern Maratha Country before the completion of the task assigned to him, Mr. Elphinstone himself negotiated with the several chiefs and fixed the terms granted to them. These terms were similar for the most part to those agreed on at Pandharpur in 1811, but some additional clauses were inserted to secure the due administration of justice in the jagirdar's territory and to prevent criminals from the neighbouring British districts being harboured there. The strength of the contingents to be supplied for service was considerably reduced and personal tainats or attendants were granted to several members of the family. The terms offered were gladly accepted by all except, Cintamanrav of Sangli, who declined to serve the British Government and was allowed to cede territory of the annual rental of Rs. 1,35,000 in commutation of service. The chiefs with whom treaties were thus made were Cintamanrav of Sangli, Ganpatrav of Miraj, [The treaty was made in his name as he was the head of the Miraj branch of the family, but since he was a minor at the time his estate was managed and all negotiations were carried on by his uncle Madhavrao.] Ganpatrav of Tasganv, Ganpatrav of Sedbal, Kesavriiv of Kurundvad, and Gopalrav of Jamkhindi. Diplomatic correspondence between Cintamanrav and Elphinstone during the critical years 1817 to 1819 throws light upon the chief's desperate perseverance to maintain his position of independence. As per Pandharpur agreement of 1812, he was first called upon by Elphinstone in his letter of 10-10-1817 to join Bajirav in his fight against the Pendharis; but finding that the forces of Bajirav had adopted a threatening attitude towards the English which at last led to the battle of Khadki, Elphinstone blamed Cintamanrav for having joined the Pesava. Thereupon Cintamanrav was quick to expose the inconsistency of Elphistone's attitude towards him and said that Pandharpur agreement in no case had enjoined him to leave his master, the Pesava, and join the Company in case of a conflict between the two. Subsequently Cintamanrav was called upon by Chaplin, the Commissioner of the Deccan, in October 1818 to muster his forces to suppress a rising in the south and a karkun was sent to inspect the muster. Cintamanrav objected to the karkun coming for such an inspection and argued that he would accept none except the Pesava as his superior and that it would be against the will of Ganapati (Patvardhan's family deity) to submit to any one else. He, however, promised to help the British as their ally. Later on he issued a proclamation of independence and sent a copy of it to Elphinstone. Matters having reached a point of crisis, Elphinstone sent an ultimatum to him and ordered his forces which reached Mhaisal near Sangli. At last before 1819 Cintamanrav saw the utter helplessness of his position and submitted. History indeed would record him as a bright spark of the dying flicker of Maratha independence.

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