HISTORY

MARATHA RULE

Shahu, 1707-1749.

AURANGZEB DIED IN 1707. By the advice of Zulfikar Khan Aurangzeb's second son, prince Azam Shah, determined to release Shahu and promised that if he succeeded in establishing his authority and continued steadfast in his allegiance he should receive the tract conquered from Bijapur by his grandfather Shivaji with an additional territory between Bhima and Godavari [Grant Duff's Marathas, 314. ]. On Shahu's approach Tarabai, unwilling to lose the power she had so long held, pretended to believe him an impostor and determined to oppose him. The first encounter between Shahu and Tarabai's forces under Dhanaji Jadhav and Parashurampant Pratinidhi took place at Khed where Shahu got an easy victory on 12th October 1707, because Dhanaji feeling that Shahu's cause was just, did not fight and the Pratinidhi finding himself single-handed withdrew from the field and fled to Satara. Shahu proceeded towards Shirval which guarded the way towards Rohida fort. Tarabai had assigned to Shankaraji Narayan Sachiv, the work of guarding the western hilly region round about. He was one of those who had expressed his loyalty towards Tarabai by taking an oath on boiled rice and milk (Malbar Ramrao Chitnis: Thorale Shahu Maharaj p. 14). Shahu invited Shankaraji to see him for a talk, but he would not go. Shahu then himself decided to see him. Shankaraji made all possible efforts to avoid him but finding his position rather critical, and himself divided between the conflict of loyalties, he suddenly put an end to his life [Grant Duff says that he performed Jal Samadhi or water death, a form to which Hindu devotees were partial. The victim seated himself on a wooden platform supported in deep water by earthen pots with their mouths turned down. Small holes were bored in the earthen pots and the platform sank. (Grant Duff Vol. I, p. 320). Whatever the truth about the manner of Shankaraji's death, the dates and the sequence given by Duff are wrong. Shankaraji met his death in 1707.], rather than prove unfaithful to the oath that he had taken. Thereupon Shahu went to console his aggrieved widow and promised to continue her son Naro Shankar in her husband's post, and confirmed Shankaraji's Mutalik in his office: as before. This measure firmly secured to Shahu the support of Pant Sachiv's party who never afterwards departed from their allegiance to him. Shahu further proceeded to the South and took Chandan Vandan. Tarabai now assigned the task of defending Satara to Pratinidhi and herself fled to Panhala for security and thence subsequently to Malvan. Shahu on approaching Satara seized the families of all who were acting against him and sent an order to Parashuram Trimbak to surrender Satara. Parashuram did not obey, but Shaikh Mirah a Muhammedan officer who commanded under him confined him and gave up the fort [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, 315.]. On gaining possession of Satara, Shahu formally seated himself on the the throne on 12th January 1708. (Marathi Daftar, Rumal I. p. 118. Edited by V. L. Bhave). Gadadhar Pralhad was appointed Pratinidhi and Bahiropant Pingle was made Peshva. Dhanaji Jadhav was confirmed in his rank of Senapati or chief captain and the right of making collections in several districts was entrusted to him. In the prevailing confusion the revenue was realised on no fixed principle, but was levied as opportunity presented itself in the manner of contribution. The principal writers employed by Dhanaji in revenue affairs were Abaji Purandare, accountant of Sasvad near Poona, and another Brahman accountant originally belonging to Shrivardhan in Janjira, a village claimed by the Sidi, which he had left for a career as early as in 1689 if not earlier. Since then he held different posts as Sar-Subhedar of Poona (Sardesai: Marathi Riyasat 5, Punya Shloka Shahu p. 50) and Daulatabad, and played an important part in the War of Independence as a mediator between the Moghal and the Maratha camps and occasionally extended a helping hand to Shahu during his long period of confinement. In the course of his activities he came to be associated with Purandares of Sasvad and was therefore recommended to Dhanaji by Abaji Purandare and Parashuram Trimbak. The name of the Shrivardhan accountant, afterwards famous as the founder of the Peshva's power, was Balaji Vishvanath Bhatt. Shortly afterwards Dhanaji Jadhav was deputed towards Khandesh for fighting with the Moghals and Shahu himself proceeded to the south towards Panhala and Vishalgad. Having captured the forts he turned his attention towards Rahgana which was defended by Ramechandrapant on behalf of Tarabai. On the approach of the rainy season Shahu's army was cantoned at Panhala. Dhanaji however was not destined to see him as he met his death at Vadganv on the banks of the river Varna, as he was returning after finishing his Khandesh campaign. (27th June 1708) (Sardesai: Marathi Riyasat, Punya Shloka Shahu p. 53). During this period Shahu neglected no preparations to enable him to reduce his rival. Among other expedients he made an unsuccessful application to Sir Nicholas Waite, the Governor of Bombay for a supply of guns, ammunition, European soldiers, and money [Bruce's Annals in Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, 318.].

At the opening of the fair season, after holding the Dasara holiday, preparations were made to renew the war against Tarabai (1709). But about that time an agreement with the Moghals waived the question of hereditary claim and made the reduction of Tarabai less important to Shahu [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, 319.]. Daud Khan Panni, whom Zulfikar Khan left as his deputy in the Deccan, settled with such Maratha chiefs as acknowledged Shahu's authority, with certain reservations, to allow them one-fourth of the revenue, at the same time reserving the right of collecting and paying it through his own agents. Daud Khan's intimacy with most of the Maratha chiefs, his connection with Zulfikar Khan, and the terms of friendship between Zulfikar and Shahu, not only preserved Shahu's ascendancy, but, except in instances where independent plundering bands occasionally appeared, secured a fairly correct observance of the terms of the agreement. At the close of 1709 Shahu returned to Satara and married two girls, one from the Mohite and the other from the Shirke family. His other two wives who were married to him while in Aurahgzeb's camp were with his mother at Delhi, where one of them, the daughter of Shinde shortly afterwards died. During this period Balaji Vishvanath always acted as the righthandman of shahu. This brought on Balaji the keen jealousy of Dhanaji's son Chandrasen Jadhav, and of several others in his service. In 1710, the army had scarcely returned to Satara, when Tarabai encouraged by the commandant of Panhala, marched from Malvaii in Ratanagiri reinforced by the troops of Phond Savant, and made Panhala and the neighbouring town of Kolhapur her residence. Her hopes were now raised as Chandrasen Jadhav left Shahu and joined Tarabai under circumstances to be narrated later for over three years. Tarabai held her position firmly at Panhala and Shahu was in no mood to disturb her; but in 1714 coup d'etat at Kolhapur in which Tarabai and her son Shivaji were put into prison and Rajasbai and her son Sambhaji were placed on the throne (1714). [According to Jadunath Sarkar Tarabai was removed from administration and her place was taken by Rajas Bai in the year 1712 (Cambridge History, Vol.IV,p.392).] It is believed that Ramechandrapant who was never fully trusted by Tarabai had a hand in this court revolution. Whatever the truth, there is no doubt that Ramchandrapant exerted himself with renewed vigour to reorganise the administration at Kolhapur and uphold the claims of Sambhaji as a rival to Shahu. Still so long as Daud Khan's government continued Shahu was secured in the ascendancy. He was surrounded by most of the experienced ministers and had acquired a name for himself by his conciliatory disposition. It has already been said that he had won over Sachiv to his side. But he was not equally-successful in binding to his interest all the members of the Pratinidhi's family. In 1713. Shahu released Parashuram Trimbak, restored his honours by the removal of Gadadhar Pralhad, and confirmed him in his formal charge of Vishalgad and its dependencies. The Pratinidhi sent his eldest son Krshnaji Bhaskar to assume the management of the fort and district, but he had no sooner obtained possession than he revolted, tendered his services to Sambhaji and was made Pratinidhi at Kolhapur. On this defection Parashuram Trimbak was again thrown into confinement, and Shahu, under the belief that the revolt had been encouraged by him, intended to have put him to death but was dissuaded from his design by the timely mediation of Khando Ballal [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, 321.]. In consequence of changes at the imperial court, Daud Khan was removed from the government of the Deccan and the agreement between the Moghals and the Marathas was dissolved. Chandrasen Jadhav, who on the death of his father Dhanaji Jadhav had been appointed chief captain, was sent from Satara with a considerable army and directed to levy the chauth, sardeshmukhi, and ghasdana from the Moghal districts. The was attended by his father's accountant Balaji Vishvanath who was now charged with collecting and appropriating a share of the revenue for Shahu, a situation of control which, under no circumstances, was likely to be favourably viewed by Chandrasen. The old jealousy was increased tenfold, and in a dispute about a deer run down by one of Balaji's horsemen, the suppressed hatred burst forth. Balaji was forced to flee for his life. He fled first to Sasvad in Poona but the Sachiv's agent at Sasvad did not think it prudent to protect him. With a few followers, amongst whom were his sons Bajirav and Chimaji, Bajaji attempted to cross to Pandugad, a fort in the opposite valley, but Chandrasen's horsemen were already on his track searching for him everywhere. In this extremity he contrived to hide for a few days until two Marathas, Pilaji Jadhav and Dhumal, then common cavaliers in his service, by their influence with their relations, gathered a small troop of horse, and promised at the risk of their lives to carry him and his sons to the machi or village attached to the hill fort of Pandugad. When Shahu heard of this quarrel between Chandrasen and Balaji he carefully considered the whole case and resolved to extend protection to Bajaji. Thereupon, Chandrasen demanded of Shahu that Bajaji should be given up, and in case of refusal threatened to renounce his allegiance. Shahu, though not prepared to punish this insolent demand, refused to give up Balaji and sent orders to Haibatrav Nimbalkar Sar Lashkar, then near Ahmadnagar, at once to march on Satara. Meanwhile Bajaji Vishvanath was in Pandugad surrounded by the Senapati's troops. Haibatrav, who was annoyed that he had not been made Senapati and was incensed at Chandrasen's behaviour, eagerly obeyed the order to march against him. Hearing of Haibatrav's arrival at Phaltan Chandrasen quitted Pandugad and marched to Devur about fifteen miles to the south-east. The armies met, Chandrasen was defeated, retired to Kolhapur, and from Kolhapur he went to meet Chin Kilich Khan Nizam-ul-mulk, the Moghal viceroy of the Deccan, by whom he was well received and rewarded [Grant Duff's Marathas, 189-191.]. Chandrasen for revenge and Nizam-ul-mulk who was disposed to favour the cause of Sambhaji and desirous of suppressing the ravages of Shahu's officers sent an army against Haibatrav. To support him, Shahu sent forward a body of troops under Balaji Vishvanath whom he now dignified with the title of sena karte i.e. organiser of the army. A battle was fought near Purandhar in Poona, in which the advantage claimed by the Marathas is contradicted by their subsequent retreat to the Salpa pass twenty miles south of Purandhar. A detachment of Marathas from the Moghal army took possession of the Poona district. At length an accommodation was made, hostilities ceased, and the Moghals returned to Aurangabad. When the war was over the emperor Farrukhsiyar appointed Shahu to the command of 10,000 horse. But for seventeen months the policy and vigour of Nizam-ul-Mulk greatly controlled the Marathas. [Grant Duff', Marathas, Vol. I, 331.] During the rains of 1714 the Marathas resumed their depredations. All the deshmukhs and deshpandes in the Moghal districts of Maharashtra fortified their villages on pretence of defending themselves, but they frequently joined or aided their countrymen of whatever party in escape, defence, and concealment [Grant Duffs Marathas, Vol. I, p. 325. Khanderav Dabhade who acknowledged Shahu as his chief and had established himself about Nanded in Rajpipla, carried on depredations at this time in Gujarat.].

Balaji Vishvanath Peshva1713-1720.,

As Nizam-ul-mulk favoured the Kolhapur party, Sambhaji's influence rose aud Shahu's fell. The Ghorpades. both of Kapshi and Mudhol, joined the Kolhapur party. Sidoji Ghorpade, the son of Bahirji and nephew of the famous Santaji also declared for Sambhaji, but, along with his ally the Nawab of Savanur was too intent on his schemes of conquest and plunder to quit the Karnatak [About this time Sidoji gained a great acquisition in the fort of Sondur, a place of singular strength within twenty-five miles of Belari. Grant Duff's Marathas.Vol.I.325.]. Krishnarav Khatavkar, a Brahman, raised to power by the Moghals, took post about the Mahadev hills within Satara limits, and without joining either Satara or Kolhapur plundered the country on his own account. Damaji Thorat, a lawless upstart of the Kolhapur party who acknowledged no chief but his old patron Ramechandrapant, levied contributions in Poona. Udaji Chavhan, another of Ramechandra-pant's officers took the mud fort of Battis Shirala about twenty miles south of Karad, and in a short time became so formidable that Shahu was glad to enter into a compromise by conceding the chauth of Shirala and Karad, which Udaji long continued to receive as a personal allowance. Several other petty wasters declared for Sambhaji. Among these the most formidable was Kanhoji Angre who then held the coast from Savantvadi to Bombay, and was spreading his power over the province of Kalyan in Thana. So great was the anarchy that, without a sudden change of fortune and greater efficiency in Shahu's government, his authority over the Marathas must soon have ceased. Balaji Vishvanath instilled some vigour into his counsels and began to lead in public affairs. He set out to reduce Damaji Thorat; but, together with his frient Abaji Purandhare, and his two sons Bajirav and Chimaji, he was treacherously seized by Thorat and thrown into confinement. After many indignities their ransom was settled and paid by Shahu who now applied to the Sachiv to suppress Thorat. The Sachiv and his manager advanced against Thorat, but they too were defeated and thrown into confinement. At the same time two other expeditions were prepared at Satara, one under the Peshva Bahiropant Pingle which went to guard the Konkan and repel Angre and the other commanded by Balaji Vishvanath was ordered to suppress Krishnarav Khatavkar. Krishnarav had become so bold that he marched to Aundh about ten miles south of-Khatav, to meet Shahu's troops. He was totally defeated principally through the bravery of Shripatrav, the second son of Parashuram Trimbak, the Pratinidhi, whose father had urged him to perform some action which might wipe away the misconduct of his elder brother and procure his father's release. Shahu accordingly once more restored the Pratinidhi to liberty and rank. Krishnarav submitted, was pardoned, and received the village of Khatav. This success was of. considerable importance, but a like good fortune did not attend the Peshva's expedition. Bahiropant was defeated and made prisoner by Angre who' took Lohagad and Rajmachi in West Poona, and was reported to be marching on Satara. All the force that could be spared was gathered to oppose him. It was placed under Balaji Vishvanath whose former connection with Angre would, it was hoped, lead to some settlement. Balaji's negotiations were successful, and Angre, on condition of large cessions [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, 327. Angre received ten forts and sixteen fortified places of less strength with their dependent villages and was confirmed in command of the fleet and in his title of sarkhel.] in the Kohkan, gave up his Deccan conquests except Rajmachi, renounced Sambhaji, released the Peshva, and agreed to maintain the cause of Shahu. As Balaji performed this service entirely to Shahu's wishes, on his return to Satara he was received with great distinction, and in consequence of the failure of Bahiropant Pingle, that minister was removed from the dignity of Mukhya Pradhan and Balaji appointed Peshva in his stead (1714) [According to Jadunath Sarkar Balaji Vishvanath was appointed on 17th November 1713. (Sardesai - New History of the Marathas, Vol. II, p. 24).]. His friend Abaji Purandare was confirmed as his chief agent or mutalik and Ramajipant Bhanu an ancestor of the celebrated Nana Fadnavis as his fadnavis [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, 328.]-. After the desertion of Chandrasen Jadhav, Manaji More had received clothes of investiture as chief captain or Senapati, but failed to perform the services which were expected of him. He was now ordered, with Haibatrav Nimbal-kar, to accompany Balaji into the Poona district to reduce Dannaji Thorat. As it was feared that the Sachiv, who was still Thorat's prisoner at Hingahganv in Poona, might be killed if the place were attacked, Yesubai, the Pant Sachiv's mother, prevailed on Balaji to obtain his release before hostilities began. In this Balaji succeeded and Yesubai in gratitude made over to the Peshva the Sachiv's rights in the Poona district and gave him the fort of Purandar as a place of refuge for his family who then lived in Sasvad. Balaji obtained a confirmation of the grant of Purandar from Shahu. The force assembled by Balaji at this time was too powerful for Thorat. His fort was stormed and destroyed and himself made prisoner [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, 329.].

In 1715 Haibatrav quarrelled with Shahu for not appointing him Senapati, retired to the Godavari, and was never reconciled. The Peshva induced the Moghal agent in the Poona district, a Maratha named Baji Kadam, to make over the superior authority to him, on the promise that Rambhaji Nimbalkar's jagir should be respected [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol I, 329. The Peshva suppressed sonic banditti which infested the Poona district, restored order in the villages, stopped revenue-farming, and encouraged tillage by low and gradually increasing assessments, Ditto.].

In all quarters Maratha affairs began to improve. Still after a period of such confusion, weakness, and anarchy, the rapid expansion of their power is in any view very remarkable and at first sight seems incredible. The influence of Balaji Vishvanath continued to increase and no affair of importance was undertaken without his advice. A conciliatory policy was agreeable to Shahu and dictated all Balaji's measures. The system of Shivaji was the groundwork of their arrangements; but since the time of Sambhaji (1680-1689), the necessity of preserving the Raja's supremacy by profusely issuing deeds confirming to every successful Maratha leader the possession of all the territory in which he could establish himself, was ruinous both to their union and their resources as a nation. Still the nature of the tribute which Shivaji's genius had instituted suggested a remedy for the endless divisions which every additional acquisition of territory was likely to create. The expedient adopted, which is given below, although it ensured its end only temporarily, must be considered as the most ingenious decree ever adopted by the ingenious persons of those days.

The ministry as far as practicable was composed of the old retainers, and the posts of those who adhered to the Kolhapur party were conferred on their near relations.

About this time both Parsoji Bhonsle and Haibatrav Nimbalkar died. Parsoji's son Kanhoji was confirmed by Shahu in all his father's possessions and succeeded to his title of Sena Saheb Subha, but the rank of Sar Lashkar was conferred on Davalji Somavanshi together with the right and honours of the post. Haibatrav's son, annoyed at being set aside, quitted Shahu's standard and joined Nizam-ul-Mulk. Shahu was not without ability. He was naturally generous, liberal to all religious establishments, observant of the forms enjoined by the Hindu faith, and particularly charitable to Brahmans. The Hilly west Deccan and the rugged Konkan were his birthright, but as his childhood was pleasantly spent in the pomp and luxury of the Moghal camp he had developed easy going habits. He occasionally showed violence and for a time anger overcame his indolence. In general however he was satisfied with the respect and homage paid to his person and the obedience which his ministers invariably professed to his commands. He was pleased at being free from the drudgery of business and in giving himself up to his fondness for hawking, hunting, and fishing, he did not foresee that he was delegating a power which might supersede his own. As legitimate head of the Marathas, the importance of that nation was increased by the manner in which he was courted by the Moghals; and the dignities and rights conferred upon him in consequence of his situation gave an influence and respect to the name of Shahu, which under other circumstances he could never have attained. Both the sons of Shivaji, Sambhaji and Rajaram, followed the example of their father from the period when he mounted the throne and always declared their independence. Shahu acknowledged himself a vassal of the throne of Delhi, and while styling himself king of the Marathas, affected, in his transactions with the Moghals, to consider himself merely as a zamindar or head deshmukh of the empire [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, 331.].

In 1715 Farrukhsiyar, the emperor of Delhi, becoming jealous of the Sayyid brothers to whom he owed his elevation, appointed the younger Sayyid Husain Ali Khan to the viceroyalty of the Deccan, in the hopes that by separating the brothers he should weaken their power and compass their destruction. In 1716, Khanderav Dabhade. who had established a line of posts along the Surat-Burhanpur route and defeated two large Moghal armies, went to Satara paid his respects to Shahu, and was raised to the rank of Senapati of the empire Manaji More being removed for inability and misconduct. The Maratha officers encouraged by their success and by the secret over hires of Farrukhsiyar now extended their encroachments, and in addition to the chauth which they had agreed to receive from Daud Khan in lieu of all claims, they everywhere levied the sardesmukhi Under these circumstances the Deccan government of Sayyid Husan Ali Khan, distracted by Maratha depredations on one side and con intrigues on the other, had recourse to negotiations with Shahi Shankaraji Malhar originally a writer under Shivaji and appointe Sachiv by Rajaram at Jinji, had retired during the siege of that place to Benares. Tired of a life so little in accord with his former habits although a very old man, Shankaraji took service with Husain Ali Khan when he was appointed to the Deccan. He soon gained the confidence of his master, and at an early period entered into a correspo dence with his friends at Satara. He represented to the. viceroy that if the Maratha claims were recognised, they would have an interest the prosperity of the country; that this was the: only way to restore tranquillity, and a certain means of gaining powerful allies by whose aid he might rest secure from present intrigues, and eventually defy the avowed hostility of the emperor. Husain Ali approving of the views sent Shankaraji Malhar to Satara to arrange an alliance between the Moghals and the Marathas. This mission opened a great prospect to the aspiring mind of Balaji Vishvanath. Besides the chauth and sardeshamukhi of the six subhas of the Deccan including the Bijapur and Hyderabad Karnataks, with the tributary states of Mys Trichinopoli and Tanjore, Shahu demanded the whole of the territory in Maharashtra which had belonged to Shivaji with the exception of his possessions in Khandesh, and in lieu of Khandesh territory near the old districts as far east as Pandharpur was to be substituted. The forts of Shivneri in Poona and of Trimbak in Nasik were also to be given up. The old districts in the Karnatak were also demanded and a confirmation of some conquests lately made by Kanhoji Bhonsle the Sena Saheb Subha in Gondavan and Berar. Lastly the mother and family of Shahu were to be sent from Delhi as soon as practicable. On these conditions Shahu promised to pay to the imperial treasury for the old territory a yearly peshkash or tribute of Rs. 10 lakhs the sardeshmukhi or ten per cent. of the whole revenue he bound himself to protect the country, to put down every form of disorder to bring thieves to punishment or restore the stolen property, and to pay the usual fee of 651 per cent. on the annual income for the hereditary right of sardeshmukhi; for the grant of chauth no fee was to be paid, but he agreed to maintain a body of 15,000 horse in the emperor's service, to be placed at the disposal of the subhedars, fauzdars and officers in different districts. The Karnatak and the subhas of Bijapur and Hyderabad which were then overrun by the partizans of Sambhaji Raja of Kolhapur, Shahu promised to clear of plunderers, and to make good every loss sustained by the people of those provinces after the final settlement of the treaty. Shankaraji Malhar had already sufficiently proved his desire to forward the interests of his countrymen, and Shahu appointed him (1717) to conclude the terms, which, according to the above proposals, were with some exception conceded by Husain Ali Khan.

The territory and forts not under the viceroy's control were to be recovered at some season of leisure or in any manner which Shahu might think fit. Meanwhile a body of 10,000 horse were sent to join the viceroy. Santaji and Parsoji Bhonsle, relations of the Sena Saheb Subha, Udaji Pavar, Vishvasrav and several other commanders were detached in charge of the Maratha troops for this duty. At the same time agents were sent to inquire into the state of the districts and collect the extensive shares of revenue now assigned to them, while the ministers were devising a system, for realising their claims which it was by no means so easy to realise.

The emperor refused (1718) to ratify the treaty. An unworthy favourite encouraged him in his intrigues for the destruction of the Sayyids, he became less guarded in his measures, and as an open rupture seemed inevitable. Husain Ali Khan prepared to march for the capital and solicited aid from Shahu. He also pretended to receive from Shahu a son of Sultan Muhammad Akbar then residing at the Maratha court. Such an opportunity was not neglected. Balaji Vishvanath and Khanderav Dabhade proceeded to join the viceroy with a large body of troops, for which he agreed to pay them a certain sum daily from the date of their crossing the Narmada until their return. Husain Ali Khan further promised that the treaty should be ratified and the family of Shahu released and delivered to his officers. On his departure Shahu instructed Balaji Vishvanath to endeavour to obtain the cession of the forts of Daulatabad and Chanda [Chanda is about a hundred miles south of Nagpur.] and authority to levy the tribute which had for some time been imposed by the Marathas in Gujarat and Malva. The reason for this apparently extraordinary demand was that the chief who had already levied contributions in those provinces would break in and plunder, unless Shahu could receive such an authority as must oblige them to look to him only for what they termed their established contributions, and that under these circumstances Shahu would be responsible for the protection and improvement of their territories. The combined army marched to Delhi where the wretched emperor Farrukhsiyar after some tummult was confined by the Sayyids and put to death. Two princes of the line succeeded and died within seven months. Rohsan Akhtar, the grandson of Sultan Muazzam was then raised (1719) to the imperial dignity with the title of Muhammad Shah, but the two Sayyids held all the power. Balaji Vishvanath and his Marathas remained at Delhi until the accession of Muhammad Shall (1720). During the tumult which preceded the confinement of Farrukhsiyar, Santaji Bhonsle and 1,500 of his men were killed by the populace in the streets of Delhi. The army was paid by the Sayyids, according to agreement, and Shahu's mother and family were given over to Balaji Vishvanath. As both the Peshva and the Senapati were anxious to return to the Deccan they were allowed to leave, and in accordance with the treaty with Husain Ali Khan, they receive three Imperial grants for the chauth, sardeshmukhi, and svarajya [Grant Duffs Marathas, Vol. I,. 337-38. When Grant Duff wrote (1826) the original grants were in the possession of the Raja of Satara. They were in the name of Muhammad Shah, dated in the first year of his reign A. H. 1131 (A. D. 1719). The emperor Muhammad Shah was not placed on the throne till 1720. During the months that intervened between the dethronement of Farrukhsiyar and his elevation, two princes had filled the throne whose names were expunged from the records.]

Grant of Chauth and sardeshmukhi, 1720.

The chauth or one-fourth of the whole revenue of the six subhas of the Deccan including the Hyderabad and Bijapur, Karnataks and the tributry states of Tanjore, Trichinopoli and Mysore [The deed for the chauth dated 22nd Rabi-ul-Akhir A. H. 1131 granted to Shahu the fourth of the revenue of the six suhhas of the Deccan simply on condition that he should maintain 15,000 horse to aid the military governors in keeping order. Grand Duff's Marathas, Vol. 1, p. 337 note.], the sardes-mukhi or ten per cent. over and above the chauth [The sardeshmukhi grant is dated 4th Jamadi-ul-Aval or twelve days after that of the chauth. It does not specify in the body of the deed that it is granted as an hereditary right; hut the customary fee on such occasions stated on the back of the instrument as follows:

The Sardeshmukhi was estimated at- Rs. 1,80,51,730. Peshkash or establish fee on hereditary rights conferred, 651 per cent., amounted to Rs. 11,75,16,762 the immediate payment on delivering the deed to one-fourth or Rs. 2,93,79,190-8-0; the remainder payable by instalments to Rs. 8,81,37,571-8-0 The fee so calculated was commuted to Rs. 1,17,19, 390 in consequence of the depopulated state of the country. Grant Duff's Marathas Vol. I, p. 338 (footnote).] ; and the svarajya literally, Self Rule, that is the districts held by Shivaji at the time of his death, which were granted to Shahu, excepting the detached possessions in Khandesh, the fort of Trimbak with the adjoining district, and the conquests south of the Vardha and the Tungabhadra rivers, which were not ceded. In lieu of such of these claims as lay to the north of the Bhima, districts beyond the line of forts from Tathvad to Machhindragad in Satara, as far east as Pandharpur, were wholly ceded to Shahu, and also those districts which Aurangzeb had promised to him at the time of his marriage in that emperor's camp. The country watered by the Yerla, Man, and Nira, celebrated for good horse and hardy men, the home of some of the oldest families in Maharashtra, who had not hitherto formally acknowledged the descendants of Shivaji, including the whole of the present district of Satara, was by this cession placed under Shahu's authority [The following is a list of the sixteen districts included in the grant of svarajya; Poona, Supa, including Baramati, Indapur, Wai, the Mavals, Satara. Karad, Khatav, Man, Phaltan, Malkapur, Tarla, Panhala, Ajra, Junnar, and Kolhapur; the parganas north of the Tungbhadra including Kopal, Gadag, Haliyal, and all the forts which were captured by Shivaji; the Konkan including. Ramnagar, Gandevi, Jawhar, Chenl, Bhiwandi, Kalyan, Rajpuri, Dabhol, Javli, Rajapur, Phonda, Ankola. and Kudal. Grant Puff's Marathas, Vol I, 338]. The Marathas pretended that the conquests of Berar by Parsoji and Kanhoji Bhonsle, and their right to tribute in Gujarat and Malva were confirmed at the same time; but though some very indefinite verbal promise may have been given and Balaji Vishvanath left an agent for the purpose as is alleged of receiving the sanads, subsequent events prove the unwillingness of Delhi authorities to implement the understanding.

When Balaji Vishvanath started for Delhi, he left his divan Abaji Purandare as his mutalik or deputy in charge of his seal of office, and the duties of Peshva continued to be carried on at the Maratha court in Bajaji's name. On Balaji's return to Satara with the Imperial deed the scheme for collecting and distributing the revenue which all admit to have been projected by Balaji was examined, and the system which had already been partially introduced was now openly accepted. The sardeshmukhi or ten per cent, on the revenues of the subhas of the Deccan was first set aside and termed by the ministers the Raja's vatan, a gratifying sound to the ears of a Maratha whether prince or peasant. The imposition of the sardeshmukhi reduced to a proportionate degree the actual collections from a country the resources of which were already drained to the utmost, but the nominal revenue continued the same. To have collected even one-fourth of the standard assessment would probably at this period have been impossible but the Marathas in all situations endeavoured to secure, in lieu of their chauth, at least twenty-five per cent, of the real balances. Although they seldom could collect it, they always stated the chauth as due upon the tankha or standard assessment, because of their anxiety to maintain the dignity of what after all, came to be a paper transaction, but which always gave them a legal excuse to press their claims of receiving their dues in full. In regard to the sardeshmukhi, it suited both their foreign and domestic policy to keep that claim undefined; but their system in practice, that of exacting as much as they could, was as simple as it was invariable. Of the seventy-five per cent, which remained to the Moghals, one-third or twenty-five per cent, was received according to established usage by the fauzdar and the balance was collected sometimes for the Imperial ex-chequer but generally on account of some jagirdar, to whom most of the Moghal conquests in the Deccan were assigned for the support of troops. This general mode of appropriating the revenue explains the seizures, resumptions, and cessions of territory under the name of jagir during the later wars in the Deccan between the Nizam and the Peshva. It likewise explains the practice which prevailed in many villages, even up to the British conquests, of bringing fifty per cent., of the net revenue to account under the head of jagir, for which the kulkarni in less than a century could assign no reason except the custom of their forefathers. The term svarajya or Self Rule, which in the first instance was applied to that part of the territory north of the Tungbhadra possessed by Shivajl at his death, on the return of Balaji Vishvanath was extended to the whole of the Maratha claims exclusive of the sardeshmukhi. Of these claims one-fourth or twenty-five per cent, was appropriated to the head of the state in addition to the sardeshmukhi. This fourth was known by the name of the Raja's babti. The balance was termed mokasa. Of the mokasa two shares were left at the disposal of the Raja; the on was Sahotrd or six per cent, and the other nadgauda or three pe cent., both calculated on the whole svarajya. The balance of mokas was sixty-six per cent, of the whole of the Maratha claims exclusive of the sardeshmukhi. The sahotra was bestowed by Shahu on the Pant Sachiv as an hereditary assignment; it was collected by the Sachiv's own agents only within the territory wholly possessed by the Marathas; separate collectors were sent by the Raja to realise it in distant districts. The nadgauda was granted to different persons at the Raja's pleasure. Independent of salaries from the treasury the Pradhans had many inam villages conferred on then Balaji Vishvanath received several districts near Poona in person; Jagir, including the fort of Lohagad. The Pratinidhi, the Peshvi and the Pant Sachiv were charged with the collection of the babti on the Raja's account. Thus there were distinct agents for realising the babti and sardeshmukhi, for the Sahotra of the Pant Sachiv, for the nadgauda of the assignee to whom it belonged, and for the mokasa to different officers for maintaining troops. The mokasa was distributed among a great number of chiefs as military jagir, burdened according to the circumstances with dues to the head of the state both of money and of troops. The districts of old Maratha Jagirdars were freed from the chauth but they were generally liable to the payment of sardeshmukhi, besides furnishing their quota of horse. Such jagirs, in a grant of Mokasa for a large tract were always stated as deductions and long before districts were conquered, formal grants and assignments of their revenue were distributed. Number less personal Jagirs and inams of lands of whole villages were alienate by Shahu; the former commonly required the performance of some service but the latter were entirely freehold. The Raja's authority was considered necessary to collect the revenue thus conceded, but the authority for which they were constantly petitioning was a formal affair. The revenue collectors thought that the Raja's sanad was sufficient for levying tribute in districts not specified in the imperial deeds. A district once overrun was said to be under tribute from usage; other districts were plundered by virtue of letters patent.

Particular quarters of the country were assigned to the leading officers, which, as far as they can now be ascertained, were as follows. The Peshva and Senapati charged with the command of a great proportion of the Raja's personal troops, were ordered to direct their attention to the general protection and defence of the territory. The Peshva had authority to levy the government dues in Khandesh and part of the Balaghat to the north-east of Sholapur; the senapati was vested with similar authority in Baglan and a right to realise the dues established by usage from Gujarat. Kanhoji Bhonsle the Sena Saheb Subha had charge of Berar Payinghat and was privileged to conquer and exact tribute from Gondvan to the east. The Sar Lashkar had Gangthadi including part of Aurangabad. Fateh Sing Bhonsle was appointed to the Karnatak; while the general charge of the old territory from the Nira to the Varna, and the collections from Hyderabad and Bedar were left to the Pratinidhi and the immediate agents of the Raja. The Chitnis had particular charge of several districts in the Konkan. The Pant Sachiv enjoyed the revenue of the whole Sahotra besides his old possessions in Jagir. The agents for collecting the Raja's zamindar dues were styled naib sardeshmukhs. Kanhoji Angre, retaining his districts in the Konkan, levied his chauth, as he termed it, by continuing to plunder the ships of all nations that appeared on the coast without his permission and would not recognise his right of sovereignty over sea. He used to pay a tribute to the Raja in guns, muskets, military stores, and ammunition. He also presented frequent nazars in articles from Europe and China; and he was sometimes charged with the very extraordinary duty of executing state criminals.

All the principal Maratha officers as a further means of preserving intercourse and union had particular claims assigned to them on portions of revenue or on whole villages in the district of each other. The greatest Maratha commanders or their principal revenue agents were eager to own their native village; but although vested with the control, they were proud to acknowledge themselves of the family of the patil or kulkarni; and if heirs to a miras field, they would sooner have lost wealth and rank than been dispossessed of such a vatan or inheritance. Yet on obtaining the absolute sovereignty, they never assumed an authority in the interior village concerns beyond the rights and privileges acquired by birth or purchase, according to the invariable rules of the country. Such is a brief outline of the system and arrangements settled by the Maratha ministry on the return of Balaji Vishvanath; and such was the mode by which a common interest was created, and for a time preserved, among the Maratha chiefs; while the character of Shahu, the influence and power of Balaji Vishvanath, the ability of his sons Bajirav and Chimaji to give a lead to the Maratha confederacy paved the way, though by gradual steps, for the supermacy of the Peshvas.

Nizam Independent,1720,

In 1720, Nizam-ul-mulk the governor of Malva, throwing off his dependence on the Sayyids, determined to possess himself of the Deccan. He overran Khandesh and defeated the Moghal troops under Dilavar Ali Khan at Burhanpur slaying their commander. The troops of Shahu under Kanhoji Bhonsle, the Sena Saheb Subha, and Haibatrav Nimbalkar speedily joined Shankaraji Malhar who since the departure of Husain Ali Khan had lived with the deputy viceroy Alam Ali Khan as the envoy of Shahu. Khanderav Dabhade who had just returned from Delhi was likewise despatched from Satara with a body of horse. Alam Ali Khan was defeated at Balapur in Berar Payinghat by the troops of Nizam-ul-mulk, and fell surrounded by Marathas slain in his defence (10th August 1720). On this occasion the Marathas behaved as faithful auxiliaries and fought with bravery. They lost no person of note except Shahkaraji Malhar who was mortally wounded and made prisoner [Grant Duffs Marathas, Vol. I, 349.]. Soon after, events happened at Delhi by which the power of the Sayyids was destroyed, Muhammad Shah was freed from their control and Nizam-ul-mulk confirmed as viceroy of the Deccan [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, 351.]. Meanwhile several important changes had taken place at the Maratha court, chiefly owing to the death of two leading ministers, Parashuram Trimbak in 1718, and Balaji Vishvanath in 1720. Shripatrav the second son of the Pratinidhi had succeeded his father Parashuram Trirhbak before the return of Balaji Vishvanath from Delhi. The Peshva's health had suffered from the fatigue of the journey to Delhi and the labour he had bestowed on different arrangements after his return. He obtained leave from Shahu to retire for a short time to Sasvad in Poona where his family resided, but his constitution was exhausted and he survived for only a few days.

Bajirav BallalPeshva,1720-1740.

At the time of his death (2nd April 1720), he left two sons Bajirav and Chimaji. The robes of Peahvaship were conferred upon Bajirav in Shahu's camp at Masur, 30 miles east of Satara on 17th April 1720 exactly a fortnight after his father's death [Sardesai; New History of the Marathas, Vol. II, p. 66.]. The rise of Gaikvads is almost contemporary, for the troops of Khanderao Dabhade behaved with so great bravery in the battle of Bajapur and one of his officers Damaji Gaikvad the ancestor of the Gaikvads of Baroda so particularly distinguished himself on that occasion, that on his return the young Peshva Bajirav recommended him to Shahu in the warmest manner. The Raja in consequence; appointed him second in command under Khanderav with the title of Samsher Bahadur. Damaji died soon afterwards and was succeeded by his nephew Pilaji Gaikvad. Chimaji the second son of the late Peshva, who received Supa in jagir was appointed to a similar command under his brother Bajirav Abajipant Purandare, their father's chief manager, according to the rule of appointment, was reinvested by Shahu with scrupulous ceremony. During the short interval between the death of Balaji Vishvanath and the appointment of Bajirav, Abajipant Purandare transacted ordinary affairs with the seal of the late Peshva; but a great part of the business fell into the hands of Khando Ballal chitnis and Shripatrav Pratinidhi. Khando Ballal gave his attention principally to the Angre, the Sidi, and the affairs of the Konkan; while the Pratinidhi aided by Anandrav Suinant Pradhao conducted important negotiations with Nizam-ul-mulk. Anandrav's son Mahtaji was employed as Shahu's agent with Nizam-ul-mulk, who while he apprehended an attack from Husain Ali Khan, conciliated Shahu by promising to give up all that the royal grants conceded. No sooner was he apprised of the ascendancy acquired by his party at Delhi and of the loss the Marathas had sustained in the death of Balaji Vishvanath than he began to start objections to the establishment of Shahu's collectors, founded on some pretensions set up by Sambhaji and Chandrasen Jadhav. The wise precautions of Balaji Vishvanath, and the communion of interest which the distribution of the ceded revenue had produced, placed the Raja of the Marathas in a far more commanding situation than that in which he had stood during the first period of Nizam-ul-mulk's government of the Deccan. The agent remained at Aurahgabad where his arrangements would probably have been of little avail, but a vast army of Marathas that was assembling in the Gangthadi under the Sar Lashkar Sultanji Nimbalkar inflicted a crushing defeat upon the Moghals on 15th December 1720 and it was this show of force that ultimately has tend the delivery of orders on the part of Nizam-ul-mulk to allow Raja Shahu to establish his collectors. A fresh order or farman obtained by the Maratha. agent at Delhi from Muhammad Shall opportunely arrived to remove from Nizam-ul-mulk the appearance of having yielded to menace, and afforded an opportunity of evincing the promptitude with which he obeyed the imperial commands [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, 354.].

Bajirav soon alter his appointment as Peshva set out with an army for Khandesh where he levied his Mokasa although not without opposition. From the period of his accession he gave a considerable portion of his attention to extending Maratha conquests to the north, and his aims were early turned to Malva. Circumstances generally obliged him to return yearly to Satara and Poona. During the three expeditions, before the rains of 1724, though he had sent detachments into Malva, it is not ascertained that he crossed the Narmada in person until the end of that year; nor did he remain in Malva for any length of time until upwards of eleven years after his accession as Peshva. Affairs in the Deecan required his presence, and with the intrigues of Nizam-ul-mulk and domestic opposition, restrained both his ambition and enterprise. At different times before the year 1724 Bajirav had defeated the Subheddr of Burhanpur and an officer named Daud Khan sent against him by Azim-ulla Khan from Malva. In one of these battles two of Bajirav's officers who afterwards rose to high rank first came into notice. One was Malharji Holkar a Shiledar or self-horsed trooper who commanded a party of his own horse. He was a Maratha Dhangar, a native of the village of Hol on the Nira, of which his father was chaugula or Patil's assistant. He had served under Kanthaji Kadam Bande one of the Raja's officers and had gathered a small body of horse. The other officer was Ranoji Shinde descended from a younger branch of the family of Kanhairkhed a village fifteen miles east of Satara. The Shindes according to local legends have been distinguished horsemen since the time of the Bahamani dynasty. There are two Maratha families or rather clans named Shinde, the one distinguished by their hereditary patil village of Kanhairkhed and the other by the title of Ravirav. Both families claim Rajput descent. Those of Kanhairkhed had a mansab under Aurangzeb and Shinde's daughter, who was given in marriage by that emperor to Shahu, died in captivity at Delhi. Shinde remained faithful to the Moghals, and, as his fate was never known, it is conjectured that he was killed in some distant country possibly with Azam Shah in the battle of Agra in 1707. The family had fallen into decay and Ranoji who revived its fame was reduced to a state of abject poverty serving as a bargir or rider first in the troop of Balaji Vishvanath and afterwards in that of Bajaji's son. To contrast this original with his subsequent condition, he is said to have carried the Peshva's slippers, and to have been marked by Bajirav as fitted for a place of trust by the care he took of his humble charge.

Another officer who gained fresh honour about this time was Udaji Pavar Vishvasrav. His father was first raised by Ramchandrapant Amatya when he governed the country during the siege of Jinji, and the young man joined Shahu and obtained the command of a considerable body of horse. He was employed on various services and appears to have been an active partisan. Like most contemporary Maratha leaders of experience, such as Kanthaji Kadam Bande, Pilaji Gaikvad, and Kanhoji Bhonsle, he calculated on the surest advantage in the most distant ventures where his appearance was least expected. He made incursions into Gujarat and Malva, plundered Gujarat as far as Lunavada. and found Malva so drained of troops that he was able to remain some time in the country intimating to the Raja that if supported, he might collect the chauth and sardeshmukhi in every direction. How long he maintained his station in the country on his first inroads is uncertain, but it is probable that he was obliged to retire from Dhar, a fortress in the west of Malva where he first established himself, upon the appointment of Girdhar Bahadur, whose exertion in the defence of Malva was the chief cause which prevented the Marathas getting a firm footing in that province for more than ten years after the accession of Bajirav.

The progress of Udaji Pavar, the successes of Kanthaji Kadam Bande and Pilaji Gaikvad in Gujarat, and the dissensions between Nizam-ul-Mulk and the Imperial court opportunely occurred to favour the Peshva's views of spreading Maratha conquests in North India. Bajirav who was early trained by his father to business was bred a soldier as well as a statesman. He united the enterprise, vigour, and hardihood of a Maratha chief with the polish, astuteness, and address of a clever diplomat. He was fully acquainted with his father's financial schemes and chose the part of the plan which was calculated to direct the predatory hordes of Maharashtra in a common effort. The genius of Bajirav enlarged his father's schemes, and unlike many belonging to his caste, he had both the head to plan and the hand to do. To the unceasing industry and minute watchfulness, he added a judgment that taught him the leading points of importance which tended to spread Maratha sway. Bajirav's views of spreading Maratha power in Upper India were at first disapproved by Shahu, and from prudence as well as rivalry were opposed by Shripatrav, the Pratinidhi. Jealousy in public places is a passion which some persons can rarely command or hide. This rivalry between Bajirav, the Konkanasth Peshva and Shripatrav, the Deshasth Pratinidhi probably tended to preserve the Raja's ascendancy longer. The Peshvas first proposal for exacting what he called the established tribute from Malva and extending Maratha conquests into North India was violently and for a time successfully opposed by the Pratinidhi. Shripatrav represented it as rash and imprudent. He held that, though the head of the State might not be called to account for casual inroads, to allow the Peshva to make raids must draw on the Marathas the whole power of the empire, and precipitate hostilities with Nizam-ul-Mulk whose victorious army was still at their gates; that so far from being prepared for resistance there was a total want of regularity even in their arrangements, that they could scarcely quell a common insurrection; and that to enter on a war before they had secured what had been ceded was the extreme of folly and of rashness. The Pratinidhi added that he was a soldier as well as the Peshva, and when expedient as ready as Bajirav to head an expedition; that after they had established their collectors and arranged other parts of the country it would be advisable, before pursuing their conquests in the north, to reduce the Karnatak and to recover the countries conquered by Shivaji; that Fatehsing Bhonsle's troops could scarcely venture to cross the Krshna, and that the first efforts should be made in that quarter.

These were probably the real opinions of Shripatrav. The wisdom of Bajirav was of a higher order. He comprehended the nature of predatory power; he perceived its growth in the turbulence and anarchy for which the system of distributing the revenue was the first remedy; he foresaw that confusion abroad would tend to order at home; that as commander of distant expeditions he should acquire the direction of a larger force than any other chief of the empire; that the resources of the Deccan would not only improve by withdrawing the hordes of horse which unprofitably consumed them, but must fall under the control of that person who could most readily procure employment and subsistance for the troops. While Bajirav concealed his private designs and partly admitted the justice of Shripatrav's views, he endeavoured by his commanding eloquence to arouse enthusiasm or ambition in Shahu. He went over the conquests of Shahu's famous grandfather and reminded him of the powerful kings and the mighty emperor with whom Shivaji had successfully contended. He painted the present condition of India, the weakness, indolence and imbecility of the Moghals, and the activity, energy and enterprise of the Marathas. If, he said, the great Shivaji had been of the same; opinion as the Pratinidhi, he would have thought it necessary before venturing into the Karnatak to reduce bijapur and Golkonda. As to their domestic quarrels beyond the Krshna, it would be time to think of them hereafter; by the Raja's good fortune every desire would be accomplished. Bajirav ended a speech of considerable length, with the words: Now is our time to drive strangers from the land of the Hindus and to gain undying renown. By turning our efforts to North India the Maratha flag shall fly from the Krshna to the Attak. You shall plant it, replied Shahu, in the Kinnar Khand beyond the Himalayas; a noble son of a worthy father. Let us strike, said Bajirav, at the trunk of the withering tree; the branches must fall of themselves.

At what time Shahu's consent was obtained is not known. The form of obtaining the Raja's consent on all such occasions was rigidly observed by the Peshvas at a stage when their supremacy was far advanced. By virtue of that authority and their station as mukhya pradhans or chief ministers, even when their usurpation became complete, it befitted their constitutional status to act as nominal servants and real masters to rule the Maratha chiefs as the delegate of their prince [ Grant Duffs Marathas, Vol. T, 362.].

During the early years of his Peshvaship, Bajirav had to tread the ground very carefully; for Bajirav knew that Niam-ul-Mulk was not the man who would easily forget that the Marathas had helped Alam Ali at Balapur. He had also to encounter Mubariz Khan who had been specially commissioned by the previous Emperors to punish the Marathas for their encroachments and who therefore bore a bitter enmity towards them. Bajirav had to make a choice and to decide whom to placate and whom to antagonisc. A personal diplomatic meeting with Nizam-ul-Mulk on 4th January 1721 at Chikalthan, east of Chalisganv yielded no fruitful result. At this hour Nizam-ul-Mulk was called to Delhi by the Emperor for accepting Wazirship. After some hesitation he decided to go' to Delhi entrusting his charge of the Deccan to Mubariz Khan. (21st October 1721). He, however, soon realised that he could not hold his position in the flippant atmosphere of Delhi politics and decided to choose the earliest opportunity to return to the Deecan with a view to hold almost an independent position of power there, although he would not mind nominally acknowledging the suzerainty of the Emperor. Accordingly, resigning his Wazirship on 27th December 1723 he marched straight to the South, informing the Emperor that he felt it his imperative duty to drive the Marathas from Malva and Gujarat. By long and rapid marches he reached Ujjain. The enraged Emperor decided to punish the rebel Nizam-ul-Mulk and called upon Mubariz Khan and Raja Shahu to do their best to put him down with all the force at their command. This proved a welcome opportunity for Bajirav, who proceeded to the north, crossed Narmada on 8th May and arrived in close proximity to the Nizam's camp at Sihore. Mubariz Khan was for some time undecided as to what course he should take, whether to obey the imperial orders and fight the Nizam or to befriend him. Nizam however took his own decision to placate the Marathas and light with Mubariz Khan. At this hour Mubariz Khan also had opened negotiations with the Marathas when he discovered that he had to face Nizam-ul-Mulk. This gave an opportunity to the Marathas to raise their demands and gain supremacy not only in the Deccan but also in Malva and Gujarat. There was a formal meeting between Nizam-ul-Mulk and Bajirav at Nalchha near Dhar on 18th May 1724 where usual diplomatic formalities were undergone but ultimately each one was left guessing as to what course the other would follow. Nizam now lost no time in proceeding to the south and met his rival Mubariz Khan in the battle of Sakharkhedla on 30th September 1721 where he gained a decisive victory and Mubariz Khan was killed. The Emperor now made a virtue out of necessity and confirmed Nizam as the Subhedar of the Deccan and appointed Girdharbahadur as the Subhedar of Malva. The battle of Sakharkhedla is a turning point in the history of the Later Moghals as it marks the gradual disintegration of the Moghal Empire; for. Nizam henceforth no longer cared to receive orders from Delhi and followed his own policy in maintaining his own position.

In 1725, Hamid Khan, the uncle of Nizam-ul-Mulk, for the aid he gave him against Mubariz Khan, granted the chauth in Gujarat to Kanthaji Kadam Bande and Pilaji Gaikvad, who proceeded to levy their assignments,. The division of the money led to prepetual disputes. Pilaji, as the agent of Dabhade, Senapati, considered himself the superior authority in Gujarat and Kanthaji as an officer of the Raja despised his pretensions. An agreement was signed by which the chauth east of the Mahi was assigned to Pilaji and that to the west to Kanthaji [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, 365.]. Meanwhile Bajirav took advantage of the confusion caused by Moghal dissensions to carry his arms into Malva, where, though opposed by Raja Girdhar, he was successful for two seasons in obtaining plunder and contributions. It is probable that Nizam-ul-Mulk against whom the Imperial forces were acting in Gujarat, may have connived at his incursions, but there is no proof of any direct communication with the Peshva. Bajirav, by virtue of the authority vested in him by Shahu granted deeds to Pavar, Holkar, and Shinde to levy chauth and sardeshmukhi and to keep half the mokasa in payment of their troops. In 1726, the peshva with a large army under Fatehsing Bhonsle, marched into the Madras Karnatak, plundered the districts, and levied a contribution from Seringapattam. The Marathas lost a number of men without gaining the expected advantages. Bajirav had objected to the expedition, and was dissatisfied with the result, and on returning to Satara he found more serious reasons of dissatisfaction in the measures pursued by the Pratinidhi. The cause of his displeasure originated in the artful schemes of Nizam-ul-Mulk, which, but for the penetration and vigour of Bajirav, would probably have unlinked the chain by which Balaji Vishvanath had joined the interests as well as the inclinations of most of the Hindu chieftains of the Deccan [Grant Duffs Marathas, Vol. I, 367.].

In 1727 Nizam-ul-Mulk, though relieved from immediate apprehensions from the Delhi Emperor Muhammad Shah whose power was daily declining, became alarmed at the spreading power of the Marathas. He beheld in their systematic and persevering encroachments on the divided revenue of the Deccan and the Karnatak, the extinction of his own resources as well as those of the empire, and took measures to avert these evils by endeavouring to consolidate his own power and to create divisions among the Marathas. In these measures he overlooked the ability of his opponent Bajirav and little thought that the pursuit of his own schemes should strengthen the power of the Peshva. He had fixed on Hyderabad, the ancient capital of the Kutb Shahi kings, as fittest for the seat of his new government, and was anxious on any terms to remove the Maratha collectors from that quarter. Although Nizam-ul-Mulk had confirmed the Imperial grant in Shahu's favour, a great deal of what was yielded was not actually given up. Numerous points had remained unadjusted. Shahu's part of the agreement to prevent plundering was not fulfilled and constant discussions were the consequence. A new authority for a part of the old territory was granted by Nizam-ul-Mulk, which particularly specified the fixed personal jagirs that Shahu agreed to exempt from sequestration. Jagir assignments in the old territory about Poona which the Nizam had given to Rambhaji Nimbalkar one of the disaffected officers who had joined him, were exchanged for new grants to the eastward about Karmala, a measure on the part of Nizam-ul-Mulk particularly conciliatory to Shahu. After this a settlement was concluded through the Pratinidhi by which Shahu agreed to relinquish the chauth and sardeshmukhi in the neighbourhood of Hyderabad. An equivalent in money was to be paid for the chauth, and for the sardeshmukhi Shahu received some jagir territory near Indapur in Poona of which district he was an hereditary deshmukh [Half of this deshmukhi was bought by Shahaji Bhonsle, the father of Shivaji after he entered the service of Mahmud Adil Shah. Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, p. 369, note 2.], and a jagir in Berar was conferred on the Pratinidhi. Nizam-ul-Mulk had thus effected his first object by negotiation, but the exchange met with the decided disapproval of Bajirav who was ever an enemy to consolidation and disputes ran so high between him and the Pratinidhi that Nizam-ul-Mulk, encouraged by appearances and the support and alliance of Chandrasen Jadhav, Rav Rambha Nimbalkar jagirdar of Barsi, and Sambhaji Raja of Kolhapur, resolved to complete the design he had formed. With this view he espoused the cause of Sambhaji and endeavoured to create a complete division in the Maratha government by reviving the former feuds between Shahu and Sambhaji.

Nizam-ul-Mulk began by formally bearing the claims of Sambhaji in a demand made for an equal division of the revenue; and according to a prevalent custom in the Deccan, sequestrated the property in dispute by removing the collectors of the sardeshmukhi and displacing the mokasadars of Shahu until their respective rights should be adjusted. Assuming this privilege as viceroy he pretended to become the friend and arbiter of both parties. Bajirav was not to be duped by the old artifice of engaging the Maratha cousins in an hereditary dispute. He quickly turned the Nizam's weapons to his own advantage, for Shahu, true to the feeling of a Maratha, of whom even among the peasantry the mildest men became violent when a vatan is concerned, though for some time he had been reconciled to Nizam-ul-Mulk, was at once on hearing of this interference roused to implacable resentment against him, and for the time against all who had vindicated or who dared to justify his conduct. He looked to Bajirav for counsel and for vengeance; for these he would have bartered life, and for these he virtually sold the supremacy of his empire. At first he determined to lead his army, but it was represented that to march in person would place him on an equality with Sambhaji of Kolhapur; none but the emperor was worthy of contending with the king of the Hindus. Full powers were therefore given to Bajirav. The great influence which the Peshva had gained was shown in the promptness with which many of the most unruly and factious of the Shiledar families gathered round the standard of the nation.

Nizam-ul-Mulk perceived his mistake, and sought to amend it by writing to Shahu and the Pratinidhi that he was solely actuated by a wish to benefit the Raja in order to prevent the usurpation of the Konkani Brahmans by whose creatures every situation was filled; that the mokasdars and collectors of the sardeshmukhi had been replaced by others belonging to the Raja's relation, Sambhaji, whom he had appointed the Raja's deputy, as Sardeshmukh of the six subhas of the Deccan; and that the Raja when freed from the control of the Konkani Brahmans might afterwards appoint agents entirely of his own selection. But Shahu was too shrewd to be misled by such specious pleas and far from falling a victim to the cunning plans of creating a rift between him and Bajirav in this manner, they resolved to teach Nizam lesson. Both parties prepared to attack each other as soon as the rains should subside and enable their horse to cross the rivers. In the war that ensued, Bajirav ravaged Jalna and Mahur, made a lightening dash into Gujarat and Khandesh and finally inflicted a severe defeat upon Nizam at Palkhed near Paithan in 1728, forcing him to agree to negotiations. Bajirav demanded that Sambhaji should be sent to his camp; that security should be afforded for the future collection of the Maratha shares of the revenue by giving up several fortified places; and that all arrears not yet realised should be made good. Nizam-ul-Mulk agreed to all the articles except that of delivering up Sambhaji. Bajirav pointed out that he was a near relation of the Raja's and that he would be treated with equal respect. It was at last settled that Nizam-ul-Mulk should guarantee his safe arrival in Panhala, when Shahu should be at liberty to take what steps he might think proper for the settlement of their family dispute. Battle of Palkhed is thus an important landmark in the history of the Marathas, as it once for all settled the dispute between Bajirav and the Pratinidhi, prevented the Nizam from making pretensions to playing the role of a middleman between the rival, parties at the Maratha Court and finally led the Maratha nobility to look to Bajirav as the maker of Maratha destiny.

Bajirav was then negotiating with Sar Buland Khan who was then the Subhedar of Gujarat, in hopes of obtaining the cession of the Chauth and sardeshmukhi of that province. After the ratification of the treaty with Nizam-ul-mulk, Chimaji Appa, the Peshva's brother marched with large army and exacted a heavy contribution from Petlad and plundered Dholka, but on promising that if the chauth and sardeshmukhi were yielded the districts should be secured from depredation, Sar Buland Khan agreed to the Peshva's proposals, and in 1729 granted the sardeshmukhi or ten per cent, of the whole revenue both on the land and customs except the port of Surat and the district round it, together with the chauth or one-fourth of the whole collections on the land and customs except Surat, and five per cent. on the revenues of the city of Ahmadabad.

In 1729, Muhammad Khan Bangash, the new governor of Malva having entered Bundelkhand and established himself in the territory of Raja Chhatrasal, the Rajput Prince solicited aid from Bajirav. Aid was readily granted. Bangash Khan was reduced to the greatest distress and the province was evacuated by his troops. Chhatrasal in return for this service conferred on Bajirav a fort and district in the neighbourhood of Rs. 2¼ lakhs of yearly revenue. Grant Dulf's story that Chhatrasal adopted Bajirav as his son, and at his death, which happened soon after, bestowed on him one-third of his possessions or an equal share with his two sons Jagatraj and Hirdesa is not borne out by reliable records [D. V. Potdar's essay in Historical and Economic studies p. 7.]. In 1734, Raja jaysingh was appointed to the government of the provinces of Agra and Malva and nothing could be more favourable to the views of Bajirav. As Jaysingh was situated, the honour of the Rajput was at variance with the subsisting arrangement between him and the Marathas. This may account for his hesitating to comply with their demands, but he at last came to an agreement with Bajirav and yielded him the government of Malva. in the following year, and for the time the emperor, by Jaysingh's persuasions, tacitly acquiesced in the arrangement [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, p. 382.].

During the Peshva's absence Kanhoji Bhonsle, the Sena Saheb Subha had been accused of disobedience and confined at Satara, and Raghuji the son of Kanhoji's cousin Bimbaji had been appointed Send Saheb Subha in his stead (1729). Raghuji had accompanied Shahu in his excursions and by his boldness and skill as a hunter had ingratiated himself with Shahu-and obtained a great ascendancy over him. Shahu married him to the sister of one of his own wives of the Shirke family, which, except their having the same surname, and that possibly they may have been originally relations and rivals for the hereditary right or patil of their villages, is the only connection which can be traced between the Bhonsle families of Satara and Nagpur [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, p. 384. There is a tradition of their having been rivals in hereditary dispute which may have been invented to prejudice the Raja of Satara against the Bhonsles of Nagpur and to Prevent their desire to adopt any member of that family. It is a point of honour to maintain the herditary difference.]. On receiving the sanads for Berar, Raghuji gave a bond to maintain a body of 5,000 horses for the service of the State, to pay yearly a sum of Rs. 9 lakhs and exclusive of ghasdana or forage money, a tribute which since the time of Rajaram, the Send Saheb Subha had been allowed to reserve, and also to pay to the head of the government half of all other tribute, prize, property, and contributions. He also bound himself to raise 10,000 horses when required and to accompany the Peshva or to proceed to any quarter where he might be ordered. This arrangement was effected during the absence of Shripatrav Pratinidhi who had been sent into the Konkan by the Raja. The Pratinidhi being the friend of Kanhoji Bhonsle endeavoured to obtain some mitigation of his sentence, but failed. Kanhoji, who was an officer of great enterprise died at Satara in 1734, after having lived there for about four years a prisoner at large [He had made some partial conquests in Gondvan and headed one incursion into Cuttak,].

While Bajirav's presence was necessary in the north to support Chimaji in Gujarat, Sambhaji Raja of Kolhapur, instigated by Udaji Chavhan refused to listen to overtures made by Shahu and encamped on the north side of the Varna with all his baggage, women and equipments, and began to plunder the country. The Pratinidhi surprised Sambhaji's camp and drove them to Panhala with the loss of the whole of their baggage. Many prisoners were taken, among others Tarabai and her daughter-in-law Rajasbai the widow of Shivaji of Kolhapur. Both these persons were, placed in confinement in the fort of Satara (1730). This defeat brought on an immediate accommodation between the two brothers. Although Shahu was victorious he arranged a ceremonious meeting with his brother and conciliated him. Except some forts, the Maratha districts and claims in the tract of which the rivers Varna and Krshna to the north and the Tungbhadra to the south as the boundaries were wholly ceded to Sambhaji. Kopal near the Tungbhadra was relinquished by Shahu in exchange for Ratnagirl, and the territory of the Konkan, extending from Salshl to Ankola in North Kanara was given over to Sambhaji. In exchange for these places in the south Miraj, Tasganv, Athni, and several villages along the north bank of the Krshna and some fortified places in Bijapiir were given to Shahu. The fort of Vadganv occupied by Udaji Chavhan on the south bank of the Varna was destroyed. This treaty of Varna, (13-4-1731), as it is called was an offensive and defensive agreement between the two brothers and provided for the division of further conquests to the south of Tungbhadra which, on co-operation, were to be equally shared. Grants of inam land or hereditary rights conferred by either party within respective boundaries were confirmed.

Although enemies were not wanting to detract from the reputation of the Peshva and to extol that of his rivals, the success of the Pratinidhi did not materially affect the ascendancy which Bajirav had attained; but Nizam-ul-Mulk was still bent on opposing him and found a fit instrument for his purpose in Trimbakrav Dabhade. Ever since the Peshva had obtained the deeds from Sar Buland Khan, Dabhade had been negotiating with other Maratha chiefs and assembling troops in Gujarat. At length finding himself at the head of 35,000 men he had resolved to march for the Deccan in the next season.

Bajirav was well aware of the Senapati's enmitcy, but was not alarmed by his preparations until he discovered that Nizam-ul-Mulk was to support him in the Deccan. On learning their intention he at once determined to anticipate them, though, when joined by all his adherents, his whole army did not amount to more than half of that of Dabhade. Dabhade gave out that he was proceeding to protect the Raja's authority, and was supported by Pilaji Gaikvad, Kanthaji and Raghuji Kadam Bande, Udaji and Anandrav Pavar, Chimnaji Damodar and Kuvar Bahadur with many others. Bajirav proved that Dabhade Senapati was in alliance with Nizam-ul-Mulk and declared that he was leagued for the purpose of dividing the Maratha sovereignty with the Raja of Kolhapur, a measure inconsistent with sound policy and contrary to the divine ordinances of the Shastras.

The preparations of Nizam-ul-Mulk hastened the march of Bajirav, and as his army, though so inferior in number, was composed of the old paga horse or the Raja's house-hold troops and some of the best Maratha mankaris, he moved rapidly towards Gujarat. At the same time he began negotiating from the day he left Poona and continued until the hour of attack. In the battle which took place (1st April) between Baroda and Dabhoi in Gujarat, the death of Trimbakrav Dabhade the Senapati and many who commanded under him left complete victory to Bajirav with almost unquestioned leadership of the Maratha confederacy. A treaty was concluded in August and at the close of the monsoon the Peshva returned to Satara. He would have punished Nizam-ul-Mulk's treachery, but the Nizam warded off the blow which he could with difficulty have withstood by directing its aim against the head of the empire. Bajirav, readily agreed to the Nizam's views. It suited his favourite policy, and it gave employment to persons likely to disturb the domestic arrangements he aimed at establishing. Troops were immediately sent towards Malva under his brother Chimaji while he himself remained for a time engaged in the interior arrangements of government at Poona and Satara. Such appear to have been the rise and progress of the events and intrigues which ended in a secret compact between Bajirav and Nizam-ul-mulk which secured to Bajirav supremacy as Peshva and to the Nizam a kingdom in the Deccan.

The victory over Dabhade, like the issue of every civil war, left impressions on the minds of many not easily effaced. The Peshva adopted every means of conciliation in his power. He continued Dabhade's charitable practice called dakshina of patronising Shastris and Vaidiks according to their merit and feeding thousands of Brahmans for a few days at Poona. Yeshvantrav, the son of Trimbakrav Dabhade, was raised to the rank of Senapati, but being too young to take the management on himself, his mother Umabai became his guardian and Pilaji Gaikvad their former Mutalik or deputy was confirmed in that situation with the title of Sena Khas Khel or Captain of the Sovereign Tribe in addition to his hereditary title of Samsher Bahadur. An agreement was drawn up under the authority of Shahu and subscribed by the Peshva and Senapati, that neither party should enter the boundary of the other in Gujarat and Malva. Within the limits of Gujarat the Senapati was to have entire management, but he bound himself to pay one-half of the revenue to government through the Peshva. All contributions levied from countries not specified in the deeds given under the authority of Sar Buland Khan were to be made over to the Raja after deducting expenses [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, p. 378.].

Perceiving Bajirav's complete ascendancy, the appointment of the Hindu prince Abhaysingh to supersede Sar Buland Khan, the imbecility of the emperor, and the treachery as well as venality of his courtiers, and knowing also that he had rendered himself in the highest degree obnoxious, Nizam-ul-Mulk had good grounds for apprehending that the Peshva might be able to obtain the viceroyalty of the Deccan. The plan which under these circumstances he adopted belongs to the higher order of politics. It seems to have been framed for the purpose of diverting the Marathas from destroying the resources of his own country and of making his own power a balance between that of the emperor and the Peshva. Before invading Malva in person Bajirav had an interview with Nizam-ul-Mulk and endeavoured to induce him to advance a subsidy for the aid he was affording, but the Nizam considered the inducement sufficiently strong without paying his auxiliaries. The districts in Khandesh were to be protected by the present agreement of the Peshva in his passage to and from Malva and nothing more than the usual tribute was to be levied in the six subhas of the Deccan, a proposal to which Bajirav readily acceded. Bajirav on crossing the Narmada. assumed command of the army in Malva and sent his brother and Pilaji Jadhav back to Satara to maintain his influence at court and to concert measures for settling the Konkan which was very disturbed. In Gujarat Pilaji Gaikvad, who was assassinated by Abhaysingh's emissaries, was succeeded by Damaji (1732).

Kanhoji Bhonsle's disobedience and his consequent confinement at Satara, as well as Pratinidhis's sympathy for him have already been referred to above. Whether Nizam-ul-Mulk had made any preparations to take advantage of that situation is uncertain; but Chimaji Appa reasonably felt that Nizam meditated an attack. He therefore pitched his camp about forty miles east of Satara, leaving Pilaji Jadhav with an inconsiderable body of horse being the only troops at Satara in the immediate interests of the Peshva. When Bajirav advanced into Malva, it was his design to engage the Raja's mind with petty affairs in the Konkan. Divisions of authority, contending factions and the turbulent disposition of some of its inhabitants afforded ample field within the small tract from Goa to' Bombay for engaging and fatiguing attention. Savant, the principal deshmukh of Vadi occupied his hereditary territory in that quarter but having suffered from Kanhoji Angre's attacks before the late peace (1730) between the Rajas of Satara and Kolhapur he always bore an enmity to Angre's family. Kanhoji Angre's death happened in 1728, and all attempts to reduce his power before that time on the part of the English, the Portuguese, and the Dutch had failed. In the quarrels between his sons which followed Kanhoji's death, Bajirav helped Manaji and obtained from him the cession of Kotaligad in Thana and Rajmachi in Poona. The Sidi, besides defending against the Marathas, the districts which had been placed under his charge by Aurangazeb, including Mahad, Raygad, Dabhol and Anjanvel, frequently levied contributions from Shahu's districts. As force was not likely to prevail, the Pratinidhi, Jivaji Khanderav Chitnis, and others of the Raja's ministers formed schemes for ruining the Sidi by intrigue. For this purpose the Pratinidhi gained one Yakub Khan, a daring pirate who possessed the entire confidence of the Sidi. To aid this scheme, a force was sent into the Konkan in 1733 under the Pratinidhi, his chief agent Yamaji Shivdev, and, Udaji Chavhan. The intrigues were unsuccessful, and war ensued in which the Pratinidhi was worsted and the fort of Govalkot in Ratnagiri though strongly garrisoned was disgracefully surprised and taken. Chimaji Appa incurred the Raja's displeasure for not sending assistance to Shripatrav after repeated orders. Pilaji Jadhav was at length despatched, but as none of the other officers at Satara would undertake to support the Pratinidhi except on condition of receiving the conquered districts in jagir, he was compelled to return to Satara, with great loss of reputation. About this time the Sidi died and a quarrel ensued between his sons. Yakub Khan immediately embraced the cause of Sidi Rehman one of the sons and called on Shahu for support (1735); but nothing could be done until the return of Bajirav, who, after leaving Holkar and Shinde in Malva, returned to the Deccan, and on crossing the Godavari intimated to the Raja that he should march straight to Danda-Rajpuri. All the disposable infantry were directed to join the Peshva, and Pilaji Jadhav was sent off, reinforced with a body of horse, to support Malharrav Holkar in Malva. Sidi Rehman and Yakub Khan joined Bajirav who began operations by attacking some of the forts. Fattehsing Bhonsle and the Pratinidhi proceeded to co-operate, but the only help they gave was to recover Shivajis capital Raygad, the commandant of which had been previously corrupted by Yakub Khan. The Peshva reduced the forts of Ta]a and Ghosala and besieged Janjira but was obliged to listen to overtures made by the besieged, who ceded to the Marathas the forts of Raygad, Tala, Ghosala, Avchitgad, and Birvadi. After this successful close of hostilities, Bajirav, with additional power and influence, returned to Satara and was appointed Subheddr of the late acquisitions [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, p. 389.] . Holkar completely overran Malva and the country south of the Chambal and took possession of several places. Afterwards, on the persuasion of Kanthaji Kadam Bande, he made an incursion into Gujarat, and they both levied contributions as far as the Banas and plundered several towns to the north of Ahmedabad including Idar and Palanpur.

In 1736, Bajirav, owing to the vast army he had kept up to secure his conquests and to overcome his rivals, had become deeply involved in debt. His troops were in arrears; the bankers to whom he already owed a personal debt of many lakhs of rupees, refused to make further advances, and he complained bitterly of the constant mutinies and clamours in his camp which occasioned him much vexation and distress [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, p. 390. " I have fallen into that hell of being beset by creditors, and to pacify savkars and shiledars I am falling at their feet till I have rubbed the skin from my forehead." Thus wrote Bajirav to his mdhapurush, the Svami of Dhavadshi, a village within a few miles of Satara. The Svami was a much venerated person in the country. The Peshva's letters to the Svami detail the actions of his life in a familiar manner without disguise and are invaluable. Ditto, Vol. I, p. 387.] . Part of the distress originated in the high rates of interest which he was obliged to pay in order to outbid Nizam-ul-MuIk and secure the best of the Deccan soldiery. He levied the chauth and sardeshmukhi in Malva and applied through Raja Jaysingh for their formal cession in that province, and likewise for a confirmation of the deeds granted by Sar Buland Khan for Gujarat. The Turani Moghals who formed a considerable party in the ministry were decidedly against a compromise so disgraceful. With the object of achieving his purpose Bajirav started on a campaign towards the north. First, he wanted to estimate the attitude of the Rajputs and therefore proceeded through Malva and reached Udaipur in February, 1736. The Rana received him very. warmly and agreed to pay a lakh and a half annually as chauth. During his tour through Rajputana, presents and tributes poured upon Bajirav from all quarters. Khan Daman, the Mir Bakshi of the Moghals, who was usually guided by Jaysingh sent five to ten thousand rupees every day. On the 4th of March, Bajirav met Jaysingh who offered to pay five lakhs chauth annually for Jaipur and promised to obtain from the Emperor written giants for the provinces of Malva and Gujarat. Efforts were now made to arrange for Bajirav's personal meeting with the Emperor who however not caring to meet Bajirav in person at Delhi sent his own agent Yadgar Khan to Jaysingh with certain proposals tending to effect as advantageous a bargain as possible. Bajirav at once rejected the offer and communicated his counter proposals through his own agent Dhondo Govind. The Emperor was displeased at this and declined to reply. Bajirav knew that the Emperor could not be persuaded otherwise except by a trial of strength and he decided to take up the challenge. However as the season was far advanced he retired to the Deccan only to come back again early in January 1736 with all the contingents of Maratha Sardars gathering round his standard. As the advance party under Malharrav Holkar crossed Jamuna and got into the Dodb evidently for forage and plunder, they were suddenly attacked by the party of Vazir Sadat Khan and driven away. In the scuffle that ensued a number of Maratha soldiers were killed and those that were overtaken by the Moghals were slaughtered. The Vazir became so elated with this success that he wrote boastful letters to the Emperor informing him as to how Marathas had been signally defeated and driven away. When Bajirav heard of this he resolved to teach the Emperor a wholesome lesson by himself falling upon Delhi and burning its outlying parts. In two long marches he reached Delhi on 28th March but on a second thought desisted from any destructive operations. The presence of Bajirav at the gates of Delhi was enough to strike terror in the palace and there was a great commotion in the city. Thereupon Bajirav withdrew a little distance to Jhil Lake to allay the scare that had been created. A force of 8,000 soldiers despatched by the Emperor against him was completely defeated. No further trial of strength ever took place. Upon a promise of obtaining the government of Malva and Rs. 13 lakhs Bajirav set out on his return to Satara, where he paid his respects to the Raja and immediately proceeded into the Konkan to repulse an attack of the Portuguese on Manaji Ahgre (1737). The Peshva succeeded and took Manaji under his protection on condition of his paying a yearly sum of Rs. 7,000 and presenting annually to the Raja, foreign articles from Europe or Ghina to the value of Rs. 3,000 more. The war with the Portuguese led to the invasion of Salsette, and Bajirav, to secure his conquests in Thana and maintain the war against the Portuguese, entertained some Arabs and a very large body of infantry principally Mavlis and Hetkaries. News from Delhi obliged him to withdraw part of his forces from the Konkan.

In the meanwhile the Emperor sent earnest appeals to Nizam to come to Delhi for saving the situation and was granted all his demands to persuade him to take up the task of warding off the Maratha danger from the north. Nizam now went back upon his promise that he had given to Bajirav and proceeded to the North. In fact Bajirav had a shrewd suspicion of this development as the two met each other when Bajirav was going to the south and Nizam to the north apparently on a spacious plea of offering his submission to the Emperor. Bajirav therefore lost no time to proceed to the north again as soon as the rainy season was over. He assembled all the troops he could collect and by the time he reached the Narmada found himself at the head of 80,000 men, though Yeshvantrav Dabhade and Raghuji Bhonsle had not joined him (1738). Proceeding further Bajirav with his skillful manoeuvering operations was successful in confining Nizam in the fortress of Bhopal and prevent him from gathering supplies from outside. Finding himself in a tight corner Nizam at last sued for peace and on the 7th January 1738 signed a convention at Doraba Sarai, 64 miles north of Sironj, promising in his own handwriting to grant to Bajirav the whole of Malva and the complete sovereignty of the territory between the Narmada and the Chambal. To obtain a confirmation of this agreement from the Emperor, and to use every endeavour to procure the payment of a subsidy of Rs. 50 lakhs to defray his expenses [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, p. 399.], the Peshva remained for a time levying contributions south of the Chambal and carrying on negotiations at court where the threatened invasion of Nadir Shah was creating alarm. At the same time the war with the Portuguese was being vigorously carried on by the Peshva's brother Chimaji and several forts in Thana were taken by the Marathas. Raghuji Bhonsle made an incursion to the north as far as Allahabad, defeated and slew the Subhedar Shuja Khan and returned loaded with booty. These expeditions undertaken without regular sanction were highly resented by Bajirav. He marched from Poona for the purpose of punishing Raghuji's misconduct and sent forward Avji Kavde to plunder in Berar. Avji was defeated by Raghuji in the end of February 1739. Bajirav was preparing to avenge his loss when news reached him of the arrival of Nadir Shah, the defeat of the Moghals, the death of Khan Dauran, the capture of Sadat Khan, and finally that the victorious Persian was dictating the term of ransom at was defeated by Raghuji in the end of February 1739. Bajirav The subsequent intelligence which he received at Nasirabad in Khandesh informing him of the imprisonment of the Emperor, the plunder of Delhi, and the dreadful massacre of many of its inhabitants seemed for a time to overwhelm him. Our quarrel with Raghuji Bhonsle is insignificant, said the Peshva; the war with the Portuguese is as naught; there is but one enemy in Hindustan. He appears to have conceived that Nadir Shah would establish himself as Emperor, but he was not dismayed when he heard reports that a hundred thousand Persians were advancing to the south. Hindus and Musalmans, said Bajirav, the whole power of the Deccan must assemble, and I shall spread our Marathas from the Narmada to the Chambal. He called on Nasir Jung the Nizam's second son to arm against the common foe, and Chimaji Appa was ordered to desist from the Konkan warfare and join him with all speed. Chimaji was now in possession of the whole of Salsette and had begun the siege of Bassein. Notwithstanding offers of submission, Chimaji prosecuted the siege and on the 16th of May Bassein fell. Holkar and Shinde as soon as Bassein fell were sent to join Bajirav with all speed, but by that time news arrived of the retreat of Nadir Shah. Nadir Shah restored the throne to its degraded owner and wrote letters to all the princes of India announcing the event. Among others, he addressed a letter to Shahu and one to Bajirav. He informed Bajirav that he had reinstated Muhammad Shah and now considered him as a brother; that although Bajirav was an ancient servant possessing a large army, he had not afforded the Emperor assistance; but that all must now attend to Muhammad Shah's commands for if they did not he would return with his army and inflict punishment upon the disobedient [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, p. 405,].

Shortly after the departure of Nadir Shah, Bajirav sent a letter to the. Emperor expressive of his submission and obedience, and a nazar of 101 gold mohars. This was acknowledged in suitable terms and a splendid khillat was sent in return [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, p. 406. A khillat comprehends the shirpav or head to foot dress, that is clothes for the turban, trousers, girdle and gown complete, and jewels, horse, elephant and arms according to circumstances and rank of the parties. Bajirav received two ornaments of jwels for the turban and a pearl necklace together with a horse and an elephant.]. He was assured by the Emperor that the rank, possessions, and inheritance already conferred on him would be confirmed, and that he might depend on finding his interests best promoted by continuing steadfast in his duty to the Imperial Government.

Although no new subhedar nor any deputy of Nizam-ul-Mulk was appointed to Malva, no sanad was sent conferring the government on Bajirav. This omission the Peshva considered a breach of faith on the part of Nizam-ul-Mulk; but as the Nizam's army was still in Hindustan, and as some of Bajirav's best officers and troops were in the Konkan he deferred enforcing his claims until a fitter opportunity. In the meantime he was busy arranging the affairs of the province of Malva and strengthening his connection with the Rajput princes in the western quarter along the banks of the Chambal from Kota to Allahabad, but especially with the Rajas of Bundelkhand.

These arrangements to secure the northern frontier were preparatory to a war with Nizam-ul-Mulk or an expedition into the Karnatak. The late success against Nizam-ul-Mulk, his departure from the terms of agreement, his great age, the probability of contentions among his sons encouraged or stimulated the Peshva to attempt the subjugation of the Deccan. The deficiency of his resources was the chief obstacle which deterred him from this undertaking. On the other hand the prospect of contributions and plunder by which he might liquidate his debts and perhaps some secret encouragement from Arkot, where according to Colonel Wilks the Marathas were invited by the Divan of Safdar Ali, were strong allurements for venturing into the Karnatak. But Bajirav was critically situated, and circumstances compelled him to choose the Deccan as the theatre of his operations. Dabhade's or rather the Gaikvad's party who possessed very considerable resources was always hostile to the Peshva; Raghuji Bhons'e was jealous of the Brahman ascendency; he meditated a revolution by getting the Raja into his own power; and as Shahu had no prospect of an heir, Raghuji might have contemplated the acquisition of Maratha supremacy by being adopted as his son. Fattehsingh Bhonsle, the only Maratha likely to supersede him in the Raja's choice, possessed neither ability nor enterprise, and had failed to create power by acquiring popularity among the soldiery. Raghuji had many difficulties to overcome in prosecuting a scheme of the kind. Although a party existed hostile to the Peshva, Bajirav's friends and dependents surrounded the Raja and possessed his ear, if not his entire confidence; not could Raghuji Bhonsle or Damaji Gaikvad concert a plan or transact the slightest business without its being known to Peshva's men. Should Bajirav quit the position which he occupied between the territories of those two, there would be no obstacle to their uniting against him. The subsisting difference between Raghuji and Bajirav arose from Raghuji's having plundered the province of Allahabad and not having joined Bajirav when he was ordered according to the terms on which he held his lands and title. The Peshva affirmed that Raghuji had no authority to levy contributions north of the Narmada and declared his determination, at the time of marching from Poona in the end of 1738, to enforce restitution not to the owners but to the Maratha State and to punish the aggression. A temporary compromise took place on the arrival of the Persians at Delhi; but the dispute was unsettled and nothing but a sense of injury to their mutual interests prevented an open war.

The state of affairs laid the foundation of schemes which had a great effect in extending the spreading but unstable power of the Marathas. Though there are few direct proofs to illustrate this part of their history, it is certain that Bajirav and Raghuji had a meeting and that they were reconciled, and there is reason to suppose that Bajirav unfolded as much of his schemes to Raghuji as were necessary to engage his co-operation, and the plunder of the Karnatak, an eventual addition to his own territories in the Deccan, and a future partition of Bengal and North India may have been urged by the Peshva to excite Raghuji's ambition and cupidity. In this conference may also be seen the real source from which a host of Marathas were poured into the Karnatak.

In prosecution of his plans of conquest in the Deccan, Bajirav seizing the opportunity afforded by the absence of Nizam-ul-Mulk at Delhi, about the end of 1739 began operations against the Nizam's son Nasir Jung. The war proved unprofitable and the Marathas gladly entered on terms of accommodation and a treaty was concluded at Mungi-Paithan by which both parties pledged themselves to maintain peace and mutually to refrain from plundering in the Deccan. Handia and Khargon, districts on the banks of the Narmada, were conferred on Bajirav in jagir, and the Peshva without visiting Poona or Satara, in great vexation amounting almost to despair, set off with his army towards North India [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, p. 411. Thus he wrote to his mahapurush about this time: I am involved in difficulties in debts, and in disappointments and like a man ready to swallow poison. Near the Raja are my enemies, and should I at this time go to Satara they will put their feet on my breast. I should be thankful I could meet death.].

Bajirav's Death1740.

In the meantime Manaji Angre attacked by his brother had applied to the Peshva's son Balaji Bajirav, generally called Nana Saheb, who was with the Raja in the neighbourhood of Satara. Five hundred men were sent to support the garrison and an express despatched to Chimaji Appa for instructions. Chimaji had ordered his nephew to repair to Kolaba in person and applied to the Governor in Council at Bombay with whom he had concluded a treaty and maintained a friendly intercourse since his late campaign in the Kohkan to support the garrison at Kolaba. The English and Balaji had succeeded in humbling Sambhaji, Manaji's brother when Chimaji Appa joined them. They were concerting plans for the reduction of Revdanda when news reached them of the death of Bajirav which happened on the banks of the Narmada on the 28th of April 1740. On receiving the intelligence, Shankaraji Narayan was appointed Subhedar of the Kohkan and Khanduji Mankar was left in command of a body of troops, while Chimaji Appa and his nephew, after the usual mourning ceremonies, returned to Poona and shortly after to Satara. Bajirav left three sons Balaji Bajirav, Raghunathrav afterwards so well known to the English, and Janardan Baba. who died in early youth. He also left one illegitimate son by a Muhammedan mother, whom he bred a Musalman and named Samsher Bahadur.

Balaji Bajirav Peshva, 1740-61.

The army which entered the Karnatak under the command of Raghuji Bhonsle was composed of troops belonging to the Raja, the Peshva, the Pratinidhi, Fattesingh Bhonsle, and various chiefs of lesser note. The Ghorpades of Sondur and Guti were invited to join by letters from Shahu and the Peshva; and Murarrav the grand-nephew of the famous Santaji Ghorpade and the adopted son and heir of Murarrav of Guti appeared under the national standard for the first time since the death of his distinguished and ill-requited relation. The whole force amounted to 50,000 men. Dost Ali, the Navab of the Karnatak, fell and the Divan was made a prisoner. After this, the Marathas began to levy contributions all over the Karnatak until bought off by the Navab's son and heir Safdar Ali, with whom, before retiring, they entered into a secret compact to destroy Chanda Saheb then in possession of Trichinopoli, while the main body of his army remained encamped on the Shivganga, Raghuji Bhonsle returned to Satara and endeavoured to prevent Balaji Bajirav's succession as Peshva by proposing Babuji Naik of Baramati, a connection but an enemy of the late Peshva, for the vacant office. Babuji Naik was possessed of great wealth and his enmity to Bajirav arose from a very common cause that of having lent money which his debtor could not repay. Raghuji's party used the irritated creditor as their tool and proposed to Shahu that he should be raised to the vacant Peshvaship. But Shahu turned a deaf ear to Raghuji's proposals and Balaji Bajirav was almost immediately invested with the robes of Peshvaship on 25th June, 1740. Raghuji, on finding his schemes abortive, proceeded towards the Karnatak to reap the expected harvest at Trichinopoli accompanied by Shripatrav, the Pratinidhi and Fattehsingh Bhonsle. Trichinopoli surrendered on the 26th of March 1741, and Chanda Saheb was brought a prisoner to Satara where he remained in the custody of an agent of Raghuji Bhonsle's till he was set free in 1748 [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, p. 422. Chanda Saheb or Husain Dost Khan does not appear to have been confined in the fort nor to have endured a close imprisonment, but merely to have had an attendant guard wherever he went. This supposition is confirmed by the ease with which Dupleix appears to have intrigued with him during his term of imprisonment.]. Murarrav Ghorpade was left in command of the fort of Trichinopoli, and a part of his garrison was composed of infantry belonging to the Peshva. Their expenses were defrayed by Shahu, besides which it was settled that Rs. 20,000 of the share of tribute from the province of Arkot should be annually paid to Balaji Bajirav.

One of the first acts of the new Peshva was to forward petitions to Delhi respecting various promises made to his father. These applications were transmitted through Jaysingh and Nizam-ul-Mulk. A supply of ready money was what Balaji most earnestly craved and Rs. 15 lakhs as a free gift were granted by the Emperor. Proposals for an agreement were then drawn up in the joint names of the Peshva and Chimaji Appa. in which they asked to have the government of Malva, which, on the death of Bajirav, was conferred on Azam-ulla-Khan. If the government of Malva was granted, they promised to pay their respects to the Emperor; to prevent any other Maratha crossing the Narmada; to send a body of 500 horse under an officer of rank to remain in attendance on the Emperor's person; and to ask no more than the gift of money already bestowed. They agreed to send 4,000 horse for service who would punish refractory landholders as far as their numbers would enable them, and they promised not to sequestrate the rent-free lands or jagirs assigned for charitable or religious purposes. No notice seems to have been taken of the application. But Balaji, whose disposition was conciliatory, was anxious to have the government of Malva conferred as a right according to the treaty with his father. With this object when Nizam-ul-Mulk was marching to the Deccan, in order to suppress his son Nasir Jung's revolt, Balaji paid (1741) him a respectful visit near the Narmada and sent a body of his troops to join him. At this time he sustained a great loss in the death of his uncle Chimaji Appa which happened at the end of January 1741. Eleven days before this event, Khanduji Mankar under Chimaji's direction had reduced Revdanda, the last place remaining with the Portuguese between Goa and Daman. Chimaji Appa from his successes against the Portuguese has earned a reputation among the Marathas for his ability to conduct military operations. He is also highly respected for his purity of private life, particularly in singular contrast in that respect, to his elder brother.

On the death of his uncle, the Peshva returned from the northern districts and spent nearly a year in civil arrangements at Poona and Satara. Continuing to show the greatest respect for the Raja, he obtained from Shahu a grant by which the whole territory conquered from the Portuguese was conferred on him, and also, except in Gujarat, the exclusive right of collecting the revenues and of levying contributions north of the Narmada. In 1742, Bhaskarpant, the Divan of Raghuji Bhonsle of Berar, carried his arms eastwards, but the Peshva, eager to establish his power over those territories for which the authority obtained from the Raja was as usual assumed as a right, marched though late in the season, towards Hindustan and made himself master of Garha and Mundela before the rains set in. He was obliged to encamp on the banks of the Narmada during the rainy season, and probably meditated an expedition into Allahabad when he was called upon to defend his rights in Malva which was invaded by Damaji Gaikvad and Baburav Sadashiv. This inroad seems to have been instigated by Raghuji to obstruct the Peshva's progress eastward; and on Balaji's arrival in Malva the army of Gujarat retired. On this occasion Anandrav Paar was confirmed by the Peshva in the possession of Dhar and the surrounding districts, a politic measure which not only secured Pavar in his interests, but opposed a barrier on the western side of Malva to incursions from Gujarat. Since the Peshva's arrival at Mundela a negotiation had been going on between him and the Emperor through the mediation of Raja Jaysingh supported by Nizam-ul-Mulk. The chauth of the imperial territory was promised and a khillat more splendid than had ever been conferred on his father was transmitted to Balaji. It does not appear that any deed for collecting this general chauth was ever granted by Muhammad Shah; sums of money and convenient assignments were the mode of payment. The object in the pending treaty was on the Peshva's part to obtain sanads for the promised government of Malva, and on the part of the court of Delhi to procrastinate and to widen the breach between the Peshva and Raghuji Bhonsle.

In the meantime Bhaskarpant had invaded Bihar. The Maratha army consisted of 10,000 or 12,200 horse and report had swelled their numbers to nearly four times that number. Bhaskarpant obtained the possession of the town of Hugh' and most of the towns from Katva to the neighbourhood of Midnapur fell into the hands of the Marathas. Raghuji also advanced to Bengal. The Emperor ordered Safdar Jung the Navab of Oudh to drive out Bhaskarpant, and at the same time applied to Balaji Bajirav to afford his aid. As inducements to the Peshva an assignment for the arrears of chauth due from Azimabad was sent to him by the Emperor and an assurance of confirming him in the government of Malva. The reward was prized too highly and the service was too desirable to be refused. On Balaji's approach, Raghuji decamped and retreated towards the hills. Balaji overtook, attacked, and defeated Raghuji's army. Bhaskarpant retreated through Orissa and Balaji returned to secure the long-promised government. The Peshva's conduct left no reasonable excuse on the part of Muhammad Shah for refusing to perform the engagement; but to save the credit of the imperial name, the feeble palliative of conferring the appointment on the Peshva as the deputy of Prince Ahmad, the Emperor's son, was adopted. The rest of the treaty differs little from the former proposals made in the joint names of Balaji and his uncle Chimaji, except that instead of 4,000, Balaji promised to furnish 12,000 horse the expense of the additional 8,000 being payable by the Emperor. Jaysingh, betwen whom and Balaji the most friendly intercourse subsisted, was guarantee for the observance of treaty with Muhammad Shah, and Malharrav Holkar, Ranoji Shinde, and Pilaji Jadhav declared in due form that should the Peshva recede from his duties they would quit his service. The Peshva returned to Satara to pay his respects and go through the form of producing his accounts of the revenue. These accounts were made out by the Peshva as a general in command of a body of the Raja's troops [Grant Ouff's Marathas, 259. It is a remarkable fact that after the Rajas of Satara had become perfect ciphers in the Maratha Government, the Peshva's accounts continued to the last to be made out in the manner described.].

In 1744 Raghuji Bhonsle sent agents to the Peshva assuring him of his sincere desire of reconciliation and of his conviction that the plans of Bajirav were those best suited to his own and to the real interests of the Maratha nation. He continued the same profession with apparent sincerity, but as he was on full march towards Satara, the Peshva thought it necessary to be on his guard, particularly as Damaji Gaikvad was also approaching. The Pratinidhi had become infirm by sickness, but his mutalik Yamaji Shivdev was an active and an able man, adverse to the Peshva's supremacy, and, although not leagued with Raghuji, intimately connected with the faction of Dabhade. Under these circumstances Balaji Bajirav had to choose between a war with the Maratha chiefs or the resignation of Bengal to Raghuji. The question did not admit of hesitation; he chose the resignation of Bengal to Raghuji. At the same time as it was understood that the country north of the Mahanadi as well as of the Narmada was comprehended in his agreement with the Emperor, he made a merit of conceding his right to levy tribute to Raghuji, and a secret compact in which the Raja was used as a mediator was finally concluded. The object of the contracting parties seems avowedly to have been not so much an alliance as an agreement to avoid interference with each other. The Rajas authority was in this instance convenient to both. A sanad was given to the Peshva conferring on him his original mokasa, all the Jagirs bestowed on himself or acquired by his father or grandfather, the governments of the Kohkan and Malva, and the shares of revenue or tribute from Allahabad, Agra, and Ajmer; three sub-divisions in the district of Patna, Rs. 20,000 from the province of Arkot, and a few detached villages in Raghuji's districts. On the other hand, it was settled that the revenues and contributions from Lucknow, Patna and lower Bengal including Bihar should be collected by Raghuji who was also vested with the sole authority of levying tribute from the whole territory from Berar to Cuttack. It was also agreed that Damaji Gaikvad should be obliged to account to the Peshva for the amount of the contributions he had levied in Malva, but nothing was urged at this time respecting the large arrears due by Dabhade to the head of the government. It does not appear that any settlement was concluded but Damaji seems to have remained in the Deccan, although his presence was much required in Gujarat. The Peshva's southern and eastern boundaries in North India were well defined by the Narmada, the Son, and the Ganga but the sanad delivered on this occasion authorised him to push his conquests northwards as far as practicable[Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, p. 432.].

Raghuji Bhonsle was intent on reviving his lost footing in Bengal; and the Peshva in order to excuse himself to the Emperor for not acting against Raghuji remained in the Deccan. As soon as the season opened Bhaskarpant was sent with 20,000 horse into Bengal by Raghuji, but along with twenty officers was treacherously murdered on 30th March 1744 by Alivardi Khan in an entertainment near Kalva and the army retreated to Berar in great confusion. Raghuji himself proceeded to the scene of action, and, although partially defeated near Murshidabad while returning, succeeded in maintaining his hold over Orissa. Shortly after Raghuji had entered Bengal, Balaji Bajirav went (1745) to Malva, addressed letters to the Emperor full of assurances of perpetual fidelity, but excused himself from paying his respects in the royal presence. The Peshva also sent his agents to Alivardi Khan demanding chauth in accordance with the Emperor's grant. Thus the Navab now came to be pressed between two enemies, the Bhonsle and the Peshva. In 1747 Alivardi Khan was once again severely defeated by Raghuji's son Janoji at Burdvan. The menace of Bhonsle's invasions thus continued to hang over Bengal till at last the Navab came to an accommodation with him by a solemn treaty concluded in March 1751 by which Navab agreed to part with Orissa and pay twelve lakhs of rupees annually by way of chauth to be collected from Bengal. As for Peshva's claims it appears they were never implemented, on the plea put up by the Emperor that Peshva had failed to protect Alivardi Khan from the attacks of Bhonsle. Soon after 1747 Peshva came to be far too preoccupied with the affairs at Satara to be able to pursue matters relating to Bengal.

In 1746 the Peshva sent his cousin Sadashiv Chimaji Bhau accompanied by Sakharam Bapu, the writer of Mahadajipant, Purandare, on an expedition into the Karnatak to punish some of the deshmukhs who had driven out the posts of the Peshva's old creditor Babuji Naik Baramatikar. That person by the interest of Raghuji Bhonsle had obtained the chauth and sardeshmukhi between the Krshna and Tungbhadra in farm from the Raja for the yearly sum of Rs. 7 lakhs; but the opposition he experienced and the heavy charges for maintaining the troops totally ruined him in a few years. The expense of the present expedition added to his embarrassment, but he would not, as was proposed to him, agree to give up the contract in favour of Sadashiv Chimaji. Sadashiv Chimaji levied contributions as far as Tungbhadra and reduced Bahadur Bhenda to which the Marathas had a claim of long standing. On Sadashiv Chimaji's return from this expedition, he was invested by the Raja with the same rank as had been enjoyed by his father, that is second-in-command under the Peshva, and being ambitious and bolder than his cousin, the Peshva, he began to assume considerable power. He chose as the writers Vasudev Joshi and Raghunath Hari, two able men brought up under Kanhoji Angre. In 1747 the Peshva himself concluded a new and more specific agreement with the Rajas of Bundelkhand, by which, after deducting the district which had been ceded to the late Peshva, one-third of the territory estimated at Rs. 16½ lakhs was made over to Balaji Bajirav besides a like share from the profits of the diamond mines of Panna. During this period of comparative tranquility the Peshva encouraged agriculture, protected the villagers and grain merchants, and improvement was everywhere visible. But about this time events occurred in North India, in the Deccan, and in the Madras, Karnatak which were the forerunners of fresh troubles and great revolutions in every part of India.

In 1749, eastern part of the Deccan which was completely drained of troops presented an inviting field to the Peshva, but domestic arrangements of the utmost importance demanded his presence at Satara. Raja Shahu had for some years been in a state of mental imbecility brought on, it was said, through grief for the death of his youngest wife Sagunabai of the Mohite family [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, p. 441. Shahu was for some time afflicted with that harmless silly madness which is sometimes ludicrous, even whilst it excites commisseration. It first appeared on an occasion when he had to receive a visit from two Maratha Sardars in full darbar, by his dressing out his favourite dog in gold brocade, covered with jewels and putting his own turban on the dog. He never resumed any covering for his head after he recovered his senses. This dog had once saved his life when hunting a tiger, and amongst other freaks, he issued sanads conferring a jagir upon him, and entitling him to use a palanquin in all which the Raja was humoured and palanquin establishment kept.]. As his healthdeclined, Shahu recovered the use of his intellect [Shahu had some wit and his reply to a letter about this time from Raja Jaysingh of Jaipur shows that he retained it to the last. The Raja asked what he had performed for the Hindu faith and what charities he had bestowed, I have, replied Shahu, conquered from the Musalmans the whole country from Rameshwar to Delhi and I have given it to the Brahmans. Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, p. 441.], and the dependents of the Peshva about his person urged him to adopt a son. The Raja on the loss of his only child, some time before his derangement, contrary to all his former invectives against him had declared that he would adopt Sambhaji Raja of Kolhapur provided he had issue. As Sambhaji had no children, it was proposed that an inquiry should be made for some lineal descendant of Vithoji, the brother of Maloji, the grandfather of the great Shivaji. Search was accordingly made, but none was discovered. It was then suggested that he should take the son of some respectable shiledar of the patil family. This proposal, Shahu said, he had a strong reason for declining. For some time he thought of adopting one Mudhoji who was the son of Sagunabai's sister and who belonged to the Bhonsle family of Nagpur. Tarabai who had been all the while carefully watching this course of events was quick to see that there was a golden opportunity for her to fish in the troubled waters. She declared that she had a grandson Ramraja, [His real name was Rajaram, but as Tarabai according to Hindu custonm would not utter the name of her husband, she transposed the terms and made it Ramraja.] Shivaji's posthumous son born in 1726 [Exact birth date of Ramraja is not available: See Sardesai, Marathi Riyasat, Vol. VI, Peshwa Balaji Bajirav (1749-61), p. 19.] at Panhala whose life she had managed to save by the exchange of another infant born at the same time. Because of the probable danger to his life the prince's existence was kept a secret by getting him conveyed out of the fort of Panhala and sent to a sister of Bhavanibai. The child was subsequently carried to Tuljapur and thence to Barsi in Sholapur district, where he was brought up in obscurity. The exchanged infant, said Tarabai, soon expired and as it was widely taken to be the death of the prince, his existence elsewhere remained a well guarded secret. Such an assertion on the part of Tarabai, did not of course meet with universal credence. Even Shahu at first hesitated to put implicit faith in the story, but after satisfying himself with some proof and words of faith he came to be inclined to accept the story as true. It was, however, loudly asserted by the partisans of Sambhaji that the so-called son of Shivaji was spurious and plans were pursued to oppose his claims to Satara. The elder surviving wife of Shahu, Sakvarbai of the Shirke family, on being acquainted with the declaration on the part of Tarabai which deprived her of all change of power, also incited Sambhaji to oppose the alleged grandson of Tarabai whom she declared an impostor. She promised to aid Sambhaji to her utmost, and engaged Yamaji Shivdev in her cause. Jagjivan, the younger brother of Shripatrav who had been appointed Pratinidhi on the death of Shripatrav in 1747, also promised her all the support in his power. Damaji Gaikvad gave his assent to the proposal, and emissaries were despatched into the Ghatmatha and the Kohkan, a tract possessing ever prone to solidery, to raise men and be prepared for her purpose. Balaji Bajirav repaired to Satara with an army of 35,000 men, to guard his own interest as also to prevent any untoward development. While the interested parties were thus busy in their own plans Shahu lay on his death bed (1749) vigilantly attended by Sakvarbai, who as has been pointed out was opposed to the accession of Ramraja. The Peshva, however, caught an opportunity to obtain a secret interview with Shahu whose inclinations he promised to honour and give effect to. The Raja therefore signed a note empowering the Peshva to govern the whole Maratha confederacy (Rajmandal, as it is actually called in the note) on condition of his not entertaining the claims of Sambhaji and assuring the Peshva that whosoever comes as Chhatrapati would continue him in the office of the Peshva [Sardesai (New History of the Marathas' Vol. II, p. 272-73. The text of the note is published in Kavyetihas Sangraha).]. This paper also directed that Kolhapur State should always be considered an independent sovereignty; that the jagirs now existing were to be confirmed to the holders, leaving power to the Peshva to conclude such arrangements with the jagirdars as might be beneficial for extending Hindu power, for protecting the temples of the God, the cultivators of the fields, and whatsoever was sacred or useful [The question whether Ramraja was or was not the son of Shivaji II and whether the deed of cession to the Peshva, was or was not really executed by Shahu is one that has been much discussed; and the historians Mountstuart Elphinstone and Grant Duff take opposite sides' the former doubting and the latter, on the whole maintaining the genuineness of both the letter and the deed. (Elphinstone's History of India, IV edition, p. 642; Grant Duff's Vol. I, p. 443 note). Subsequent research in Maratha history has tended to support Grant Duff in this controversy. It is sufficient to state that Ramraja was eventually acknowledged by the Marathas as the adopted son and successor of Shahu.]. The Peshva now resolved to act decisively yet cautiously. [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, p. 442. The following letter from Sadashiv Chimaji to the Peshva throws very useful light on the situation. After compliments: It seems impossible to judge of what will be the result of all this. The Bai's doings are not to be depended upon; keep continually on your guard. The Bai is not a person to blunder in that which she sets about. Let nothing induce you to act contrary to what has hitherto been professed, or let anything appear respecting your intentions; but in the event of the Raja's decease, you must take the upper hand of all. While the Raja is in existence, do not allow so much as a grain of oil-seed to appear different in your conduct. As matters proceed continue to write to me constantly. Despatched 16th Saval.] Although the knew Tarabai's capacity of intrigue very well he considered it most expedient to support the assertion of Tarabai although he might have his own doubts about her avowals, for he knew that the voice of the country was too strong and an heir of the house of Shivaji would have been joined by thousands. Sambhaji at this stage was out of the picture and Sakvarbai would have liked to adopt a scion from the Nagpur branch because she could only thus maintain her supremacy after the death of her husband; but Sakvarbai, to conceal her plot, always gave out that in the event of Shahu's death she would burn with the body. This declaration proved her ruin, for the interested parties took care to circulate the report until it became so general that its non-fulfilment would, in the eyes of the whole country, have been a reflection on the honour of the family.

Shahu's Death 1749.

Shahu breathed his last on 15th December, 1749. Tarabai came down from 1749. the fort to have a last look at him. Govindrav Chitnis went and conversed with her. She advised Govindrav to arrange that Sakvarbai should become sati [Sardesai: New History of the Marathas, Vol. II, p. 274.]. The Chitnis reported this proposal to the Peshva who consulted the Pratinidhi, Fattehsingh Bhonsle and others. They unanimously supported Tarabai's suggestion about Sakvarbai becoming sati. Her brother Kanhoji Shirke was sent for. He went and communicated the proposal to his sister. Sakvarbai had not yet recovered from the first emotions of consternation and rage at finding her plans frustrated for, within a few moments of Raja's death a body of horse had galloped into the town of Satara. Every avenue about the town was occupied by troops and a garrison of the Peshva was placed in the fort, while party was detached to reinforce the escort of Ramraja who had not arrived when Shahu died. In this situation as she revolved in her mind the proposal of her brother, she came to the conclusion that if she refused and lived after her husband she would have to suffer untold miseries at the hands of the Peshva who was strong enough to control the situation. The brother returned and communicated her assent. Then preparations were made. Along with Sakvarbai two of Shahu's concubines, Lakshmi and Sakhu, also burnt themselves on the same pyre [A statue of Shahu was afterwards erected on the burning ground where it still stands. Grant Duff is of opinion that Kanhoji was promised by the Peshwa that a jagir would be given to him in the Konkan, if he persuaded his sister to burn herself not only for the honour of Shirke family but for the honour of all India under the sway of the late Raja. He further avers that many of the men of those times who knew the secret did not look upon the Salt as in conformity with their faith and always mentioned the incident with detestation; (Grant Duff Vol. I. p. 444) but Sardesai differs and says 'When she saw that she could not manage to snatch power out of the Peshwa's hands she preferred to die.' (Sardesai: New History of the Marathas p. 274).].

Ram Raja 1749-1777.

 Balaji Bajiroa Peshva, 1740-61.

Immediately after Shahu's death the Peshva put Sakvarbai's partisans, the Pratinidhi and his Mutalik Yamaji Shivdev, under arrest. Orders were also sent in his name to Yeshvantrav Dabhade and Raghuji Bhonsle requiring their presence at Satara. Yeshvantrav Dabhade had become totally imbecile from debauchery, and as had probably been foreseen neither Dabhade nor Damaji Gaikvad the commander of his army attended. Most of the other jagirdars were present, but if any were disposed to resist the Peshva's authority, they remained passive until they should see what part Raghuji Bhonsle would play. Raghuji's ambition was now controlled by the caution of age and the teaching of experience. He was not only intent on directing yearly raids into Bengal, but owing to the absence of his son Janoji in the Karnatak with 10,000 horse and to the number of troops which he was compelled to leave in his own territories he arrived at Satara in the month of January 1750, with a force of only 12,000 men. His disposition was pacific towards Balaji but he made some demur in acknowledging Ram Raja. He required, in testimony of his being Bhonsle and the grandson of Rajaram, that Tarabai should first eat with him in presence of the caste, deposing on the food they ate together that Ram Raja was her grandson. When this was complied with in the most solemn manner, Raghuji declared himself satisfied; and after a long conference with the Peshva he gave his assent to the propriety of the plans submitted for his consideration. As a proof of the good understanding which subsisted between them, Balaji took occasion to proceed in advance to Poona, leaving the Raja in Raghuji's charge, and requesting that he would accompany him to Poona with the whole of the jagirdars, for the purpose of concluding the arrangements made by the will of the late Raja, Shahu. It may also be noted that in the note left by Shahu, Raghuji had been expressly excluded from succession. From this period (1750) Poona took the place of Satara as the main centre of activities of the Marathas.

In the success of his schemes, Balaji almost overlooked Tarabai, who though upwards of seventy years of age, soon convinced him that it was dangerous to slight a woman of her spirit. On pretence of paying her devotions at her husband's tomb in Sinhgad near Poona she went there and endeavoured to persuade the Pant Sachiv to declare for her as head of the Maratha empire [As Sinhgad belonged to the Sachiv and afforded a centre for intrigue against the Peshva, he categorically demanded possession of that fort from the Sachiv. The Sachiv refused to do so tnd was at once arrested. The fort was surrounded on 6th July and Sachiv was set free. (Sardesai—New History of the Marathas, Vol.II,p.291).]. Balaji,after much persuasion, induced her to come to Poona, and having flattered her ambition with the hope of a large share in the administration, at last obtained her influence with Ram Raja in confirming the many schemes he had now to carry into effect. Raghuji Bhonsle received new deeds for Berar, Gondvan, and Bengal, and some lands which had belonged, to the Pratinidhi adjoining Berar. The title deeds for half of Gujarat were sent to Yeshvantrav Dabhade, which, as he had never yet accounted for a share of the revenue to the state, gave Damaji Gaikvad to understand what he might expect from the growing power of the Peshva. The whole of Malva estimated to yield about Rs. 150 lakhs of yearly revenue except about Rs. 10 lakhs was divided between Holkar and Shinde, and Rs. 74½ lakhs were conferred on Holkar and Rs. 65½ lakhs on Shinde. The remaining Rs. 10 lakhs were held by various Jagirdars of whom Anandrav Pavar's share was the most considerable. All of them were subservient to the views of the Peshva and from them he had no opposition to fear. Balaji Bajirav, without intending to employ them, confirmed the eight Pradhans, and for a short time nominated Gangadhar Shrinivas as Pratinidhi; but on the application of Raghuji Bhonsle and of some other Jagirdars, when about to return to their districts, he made them a promise to release Jagjivan Parashuram and accordingly restored him to his rank and liberty. As the Raja's establishment was to be much reduced, and it was necessary to secure in his interests such of his officers as he could not employ, the Peshva reserved a great part of the Pratinidhi's lands as jagirs and assignments to the persons in question, particularly the tract west of Karad between the Urmodi and the Varna where he apprehended an insurrection supported by the Raja of Kolhapur. Fattehsingh Bhonsle the adopted son of Shahu was confirmed in the possession of his jagir, in various minor claims, in shares of revenue, and in the title of Raja of Akkalkot, which, except the detached claims alluded to, were being enjoyed by his descendants till the time of merger. An appointment created by Shahu for a relation of the Mantri, and which was termed Ajahut sardeshmukh or general agent for collecting the sardeshmukhi was nominally preserved; but jagir lands were assigned in lieu of the right of interference in the collection of the ten per cent, on the six sabhas of the Deccan. The appointment of Sar Lashkar was taken from the family of Somvanshi and given to Nimbaji Naik Nimbalkar. All these changes and appointments were made in the name of Ram Raja, but it was now well understood that the Peshva's authority was supreme in the state and generally admitted without dissatisfaction. Yamaji Shivdev, who recovered his liberty at the same time with the Pratinidhi, threw himself into the fort of Sangola near Pandharpur where he raised an insurrection and made head against the Peshva until he was suppressed by the Peshva's cousin Sadashiv Chimaji. In the measures which have been detailed the Peshva owed much of his success to his Divan Mahadajipant, who, next to his cousin Sadashivrav, possessed the greatest influence over Balaji Bajirav of any of his advisers. Sadashivrav on his expedition to Sangola was accompanied by Ram Raja for the purpose of giving Yamaji Shivdev no excuse for resistance. During their stay at that place, the Raja is said to have agreed to renounce the entire power and to lend his sanction to whatever measures the Peshva might pursue, provided a small tract round Satara was assigned to his own management, conditions to which Balaji subscribed but which actually were never realised. The Raja under a strong escort returned from Sangola to Satara. The Peshva in order to soothe Tarabai whose great age did not render her less active and intriguing, incautiously removed his troops from the fort of Satara, and having placed in it the gadkaris and old retainers who had great respect for the widow of Rajaram, gave up the entire management to her. The Raja was kept with a separate establishment in the town of Satara, but perfectly at large, and a splendid provision was assigned to him and his officers, the expense of which amounted to the yearly sum of Rs. 65 lakhs [Grant Duffs Marathas, Vol. I, p. 450.].

In 1751, when the Peshva left for Aurangabad, to support the claims of Ghazi-ud-din, the elder son of the Nizam to the viceroyalty of the Deccan, Tarabai sounded Ram Raja, in regard to his assuming the control usurped by his servant Balaji the Peshva; but not finding him fit for her purpose, she pretended to have had no serious intentions in the proposal. At the same time she sent messengers to Damaji Gaikvad, representing the unguarded state of the country and recommending his immediate march to Satara to rescue the Raja and the Maratha state from the power of the Peshva. Damaji at once acted on this request and Tarabai, as soon as certain accounts were received of the Gaikvad's approach, invited the Raja into' the fort of Satara and made him prisoner. She then reproached him with his want of spirit; regretted that she had ever rescued him from a life of obscurity for which only he could have been destined; declared that he could not be her grandson or the descendant of the great Shivaji; that he was neither a Bhonsle nor a Mohite, but a baseborn Gondhali changed in the house where he had been first conveyed [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, p. 452. Ram Raja was first concealed in the house of a Gondhali or a gondhal dancer.], and that she would make atonement on the banks of the holy Krishna for ever having acknowledged him. She ordered the Havildar to fire upon his attendants, most of whom unconscious of what had happened remained near the gate of the fort; and she directed the guns to be pointed at the houses in the town below belonging to the partisans of the Peshva. Trimbakpant dommonly called Nana Purandare, Govindrav Chitnis, and the officers in the Peshva's interests at Satara were at first disposed to' ridicule this attempt as that of a mad old woman, but, on hearing of the approach of Damaji Gaikvad from Songad, they quitted the town and assembled troops at the village of Arla on the banks of the Krshna. On the advance of the Gaikvad by the Salpa pass, although they had 20,000 and their opponent only 15,000 men they made an irresolute attack and retired to Nimb about eight miles north of Satara where they were followed the next day, attacked, and defeated by the Gujarat troops. Damaji Gaikvad immediately went to pay his respects to Tarabai, and several forts in the neighbourhood were given to her. Satara was well stored with provisions, and the Pratinidhi promised to aid Tarabai's cause. News of these proceedings recalled the Peshva. Before he returned Nana Purandare had redeemed his lost credit by attacking and compelling the army of Damaji Gaikvad to retire to the Jore Khora (Jore valley) about twenty-five miles north-west of Satara where they expected to be joined by the Pratinidhi from Karad and by troops from Gujarat. In this hope they were disappointed; and as Shankarajipant Subhedar of the Konkan was assembling troops in their rear and the Peshva's army which had marched nearly 400 miles in thirteen days was close upon them, Damaji sent a messenger to treat with Balaji. Balaji solemnly agreed to abide by the terms proposed and enticed Damaji to encamp in his neighbourhood, where, as soon as he got him into his power, he demanded the payment of all the arrears due from Gujarat, and the cession of a large portion of his territory. Damaji represented that he was but the agent of Dabhade the Senapati, and had no authority to comply with what was required. On this reply the Peshva sent private orders to seize some of the family of the Gaikvad and Dabhade who lived at Taleganv in Poona, and treacherously surrounded, attacked, and plundered the camp of Damaji Gaikvad and sent him into confinement at Poona [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, p. 453. In consequence of this treachery, it is said that Damaji ever after refused to salute the Peshva except with his , lefthand.]. This defeat of Damaji, instead of damping the spirits of Tarabai, only served to incense her still more. The imprisonment of Ram Raja was made more strict. Guards and servants were made to suffer indescribable hardship on ground of suspicion. Pratinidhi was deprived of his post on ground of incapacity. At the same time she started a low intrigue with the Nizam's Court offering the Peshvaship to his minister, Ramdaspant. It is difficult to understand how in all this she was serving the Maratha State although on the authority of Grant Duff it must be stated that Marathas of the times were strongly of opinion that she was the rightful regent and that Balaji had usurped the sphere of power and influence that was her due. Perplexing as the affair was Tarabai's conduct in the end proved advantageous to the Peshva as it took from him the odium of being the first to confine the Raja to' the fort of Satara. Tarabai did not merely confine Ram Raja to the fort. His prison was a damp stone dungeon and his food was of the coarsest grain. Damaji Gaikvad was the only man whom the Peshva dreaded, but as he was now a close prisoner at Poona, Balaji proceeded towards Aurangabad in prosecution of his engagements with Ghazi-ud-din. Ramdaspant, Raja Raghunathdas as he was also called, the Divan of Salabat Jung opened a communication from Ahmadnagar with Tarabai and Sambhaji of Kolhapur. [ Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, p. 454.]

During Balaji's absence at Aurangabad Tarabai occupied the districts of Waiand Satara aided by 5,000 or 6,000 Marathas and Ramoshis whom she had entered in her service. A large force was sent to invest Satara and starve her into submission. Anandrav Jadhav, the commandant of the fort, convinced of the folly of resistance, formed the design of carrying the Raja out of her power. When this came to her knowledge she ordered him to be beheaded; a sentence which the garrison executed on their own commander, as well as on several others subsequently implicated in a like scheme. Baburav Jadhav, a person unconnected with the late commandant and a relation of the Jadhavs of Sindkhed was appointed to the command of the fort. In 1753, the Peshva before leaving for the Karnatak endeavoured to pave the way to a compromise with Tarabai. On his march to the Karnatak he sent to assure Tarabai that if she would submit, the control of the Raja's person and establishment should remain at her disposal. To this Tarabai would not listen to unless Balaji Bajirav would come to Satara, acknowledge her authority, and give, such personal assurances as would satisfy her. [Grant Duffs Marathas, Vol. I, p. 464.] Encouraged by the approach to Poona of Janoji Bhonsle the son and heir of Raghuji Bhonsle, and on assurances of safety and protection from the Peshva, Tarabai, leaving the garrison of Satara and the custody of Ram Raja's person to Baburav Jadhav repaired to the Peshva's capital accompanied by Bimbaji Bhonsle the youngest brother of Janoji who had attached himself to her party and married one of her relations of the Mohite family. At Poona Tarabai was received with so much attention and consideration that she agreed to the Peshva's proposals as formerly made, provided he would promise to accompany her to the temple of Jejuri and there solemnly swear to abide by his present declarations. The Peshva consented on condition that Baburav Jadhav should be dismissed to which Tarabai reluctantly agreed. This reconciliation between Tarabai and the Peshva was the result of great tact and restraint on the part of the Peshva with which he tickled womanly pride and showed to her the futility of any opposition to his designs. Ram Raja however as per conditions of agreement with her continued to remain in confinement, even in later years up to the time of her death which took place in 1761. On the whole it must be said that Ram Raja was a prince deficient in ordinary ability, and the miserable thraldom he underwent during the long confinement broke his spirit and ruined his health. [Grant Duffs Marathas, Vol. I, p. 472.]

Before Shahu's death (1749), little improvement had taken place in the civil administration of the country. Balaji Bajirav (1740-1761) appointed fix mamlatdars or subhedars each of whom had charge of several districts. The territory between the Godavari and the Krshna including the greater part of Satara, the best protected and most productive under Maratha rule, was entrusted to the Peshva's favourites and courtiers some of whom were his relations. They held absolute charge of the police, the revenue, and the civil and criminal judicature, and in the most cases had power of life and death. They were bound to furnish regular accounts, but they always evaded settlement. They governed by deputies and remained at court whether in the capital or in the field in attendance upon the Peshva. Their districts were in consequence extremely ill-managed and in very great disorder; the supplies furnished for the exigencies of the State were tardy, and in comparison with the established revenues, insignificant. The beginning of a better system is ascribed to Ramchandra Baba Shenvi and after his death Sadashivrav Bhau improved on his suggestions. Balaji Bajirav Peshva was sensible of the advantage to be gained from bringing the collectors under control. He had not sufficient energy for the undertaking himself, but he supported his cousin's measures. Panchayats, the ordinary tribunals of civil justice began to improve, because the supreme power if it did not always examine and uphold their decrees, at least did not interfere to prevent the decisions of the community. Most of the principal Brahman families of the Deccan date their rise from the time of Balaji Bajirav. In short the condition of the whole population was in his time improved and the Maratha peasantry sensible of the comparative comfort which they then enjoyed have ever since blessed the days of Nana Saheb Peshva.

Battle of Panipat, 1761. Madhavrav Peshva 1761-1772

In 1761 the Marathas sustained the crushing defeat of Panipat, and Peshva Balaji who never recovered from that terrible blow died on June 23,1761 Immediately after his death Madhavrav the second son of the Peshva Balaji Bajirav, then in his seventeenth year, went to Satara accompanied by his uncle Raghunathrav and received investiture as Peshva on 19th July, from the nominal Raja, who remained in precisely the same state of imprisonment under the obdurate Tarabai, until her death on 9th December 1761 at the age of eighty-six at Satara. To the last moment she maintained her inveterate hatred against Balaji Bajirav and Sadashivrav, declaring that she died contended having lived to hear of their misfortunes in the battle of Panipat and their death. Thereafter the Peshva Madhavrav I formally crowned Ram Raja at Shahunagar on 23rd March 1763 [ Shahu Roznishi 99.

 At first the management of affairs was entirely in the hands of Raghunathrav: but Madhavrav the young Peshva, soon became desirous of having a share in the administration, and disputes arose between him and his uncle. The latter retired and having obtained help from the governor of Aurangabad and collected a large force of Marathas, marched on Poona, defeated his nephew's army and again took charge of the Government. Soon after this Madhavrav acquired the management of the Government, and kept on good terms with his uncle till A. D. 1768, when Raghunath retired from court raised a force and encamped near Dhodap in the Chandor range; but he was soon defeated and taken prisoner, and was kept in custody till the close of Madhav's reign. (Dekhan History, Musalman and Marathas, Part I, by W. W. Lock p. 603, Sardesai—New History of Marathas, pp. 468-72)]. Since then his lot became much improved, although he was not allowed to assert himself as Chhatrapati, a role for which he possessed neither the training nor the capacity. He was only allowed to appoint agents for the management of his patil dues in several villages and the collection of his other hereditary claims as deshmukh of Indpaur. [Grant Duffs Marathas, Vol. I, p. 533.]

In 1762, [Grant Duffs Marathas, Vol. I, p. 538.] Raghunathrav, who had assumed chief control over the young Peshva, displaced Shrinivas Gahgadhar, more commonly known by his original name Bhavanrav, who had succeeded his uncle Jagjivan Pratinidhi, and raised his infant son Bhaskarrav to the dignity of Pratinidhi and appointed Naro Sharikar Raja Bahadur to the office of mutalik, which was in effect conferring the office of Pratinidhi upon him. In 1763, when this and other acts of Raghunathrav had made him unpopular, Raja Pratapvant Vittal Sundar a Yajurvedi Brahman the Divan of Nizam Ali, persuaded his master that he had now an opportunity of completely reducing the Marathas, and that his best policy was to overthrow the power of the Peshva, to depose Ram Raja as unfit to govern, and to appoint Janoji Bhonsle to act in his place. To this scheme Janoji readily agreed, but Nizam Ali, whose duplicity rendered him true to no plan while his minister was negotiating, secretly renewed a correspondence with the Raja of Kolhapur, by which he intended to have an eventual competitor in reserve in case Janojis claims should prove inconvenient. [Grant Duffs Marathas, Vol. I, p. 540. The letters were addressed to Jijibai the widow of Sambhaji who acted as regent during the minority of her adopted son named Shivaji.] Everything seemed to promise success. Bhavanrav the dispossessed Pratinidhi and many of the Peshva's officers joined the Nizam and hostilities were renewed. In the war which followed Janoji deserted and the Nizam was severely defeated at Rakshasbhuvan on 10th August 1763 his Divan Vitthal Sundar being found among the slain. Throughout the battle the young Peshva particularly distinguished himself both by personal energy and judicious support which he sent not only to his uncle but to different points of the attack. Nizam, therefore entered into a treaty with Raghunathrav, who was much aided by the young Peshva. Bhavanrav was restored to the rank of Pratinidhi upon the death of Bhaskarrav which happened about the same time. [Grant Duffs Marathas, Vol. I, p. 543.] Peshva Madhavrav after regaining his power from Raghunathrav seized every interval of leisure to improve the civil government of his country. In this laudable object he had to contend with violent prejudices and with general corruption; but the beneficial effects of the reforms he introduced came to be universally acknowledged, and his sincere desire to protect his subjects by the equal administration of justice reflects the highest honour on his reign. His endeavours were aided by the celebrated Ram Shastri Prabhune a resident of the village of Mahuli near Satara. By 1772 the supremacy and gradual usurpation of the Satara Raja's authority also superseded that of the other Pradhans as well as of the Pratinidhi. Forms of respect instituted with their rank were maintained, but they were only of importance in the state according to the strength and resources of their hereditary jagirs and of a superior description of soldiery, who, on pay much inferior to what they might elsewhere have obtained, adhered to some of them, with that pride in their chief, which caught the fancies of men in all countries and dignified military vassalage. Of all these personages at the period of Madhavrav's death, Bhavan-rav, the Pratinidhi was the most considerable both for the greater number of his vassals and for his warlike character.

Narayanrav Peshva 1772-73. Madhavrav. Peshva, II 1774-1796.

Madhavrav died in November 1772, and Narayanrav his younger brother early in December repaired to Satara where he was invested as Peshva by the Raja. Next year (1773) the commandant of Raygad in Kolaba who was in rebellion against the Peshva, on being required to surrender replied that he held the fort for the Raja of Satara and would maintain it against the Peshva until the Raja was released. On this an order was caused to be written from Ramraja to the commandant who then surrendered the fort to the Peshva [Grant Duffs Marathas, Vol. II, p. 2.]. On the murder of Narayanrav in the same year, Amrtrav the adopted son of Raghunathrav attended by Bajaba Purandare was despatched to Satara for the robes of office for Raghunathrav which was accordingly given [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. II, p. 6-7.]. In the troubles which followed, the ministers who had sided with Gahgabai, the widow of Narayanrav were on the point of releasing the Raja of Satara as a measure calculated to insure them the aid of many of the Maratha soldiery who were discontended or neutral. But the retreat of Raghunathrav caused them to abandon the design. In April 1774 as a son and heir was born to Gangabai, Sakharam Bapu and Nana Fadnis were deputed by Gahgabai to receive the robes of office for her son which were sent from Satara by the Raja in charge of Madhavrav Nilkanth Purandare. [In August 1773 a disturbance arose among some of the troops of Pooua and their leaders burst into the palace; Narayanrav took refuge with his uncle Raghunath but was followed and murdered in his presence and there was reason to believe that Raghunath was implicated in the murder (Dekhan History p. 604), Sardesai-New History of Marathas, Vol. III pp. 26-27).]

Death of Ram Raja 1777.

[Originally contributed by Mr. J. \V. P. Muir-Mackenzie, C. S.] In the reign of Madhavrav Ballal (1761-72) Tasgahv and its neighbourhood were taken from Kolhapur and added to the Peshva's territory as jdgirs of the Patvardhans. In 1777 they were temporarily recovered for Kolhapur but Mahadji Shihde succeeded in preventing their permanent loss. At the close of the year (1777) Ram Raja died at Satara having previously adopted a son of Trimbakji Raja Bhonsle a patil of the village of Vavi a descendant of Vithoji, the brother of Malojl, the grandfather of the great Shivaji. Trimbakaji Raja commanded a body of 200 horse with which his son served as a shiledar when chosen as heir to the throne but, similar to his predecessor with no power to assert himself. He was styled Shahu Maharaj [On account of the prevailing ideas as regards purity of blood there was a general feeling that there were only a few old families, with whom the Raja of the Marathas could intermarry. Until a long time afterwards the Raja of Satara would have thought himself degraded by a marriage with the daughter of Nimbalkar and Jadhav although from them Shivaji was descended from the maternal line. This feeling, probably sanctified and strengthened by the Upadhyas and Shastris, explains the reason why it was scarcely known that Shahu was married in Aurangzeb's camp to a daughter of Shinde of Kannairkhed. See also Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. II, p. 69.]. At the same time Bhavanrav Pratinidhi died and was succeeded by his son Parashuram. In 1788 Bajaba Purandare was confined in Vandan by Nana Fadnis as one of Raghunathrav's chief adherents. In 1790 Parashuram Bhau was occupied near Tasganv raising levies for the Maratha contingent to the army engaged in the first English campaign against Tipu. Two battalions of Bombay Native Infantry with Artillery arrived at Ktimta near Tasganv on the 18th of June travelling by Sangameshvar and the Amba pass. They seem to have remained in this neighbourhood some three weeks.

In 1792 the phantom Raja of Satara gave the formality of his permission to the Peshva to assume the dignity of Vakil-ul-Mutlak bestowed on him by the no less phantom Moghal emperor of Delhi.

Bajirav Peshva, II 1796-1818.

The Rastes of Wai seem at this time to have exercised great influence in the court of the Peshva at Poona where they sided with the ministerial party against the encroachments of Mahadji Shinde. In the September 1795 Parashuram Bhau, after taking part in the battle of Kharda and the subsequent arrangements returned to Tasganv. Throughout this year, owing to the dread that Mahadji Shinde intended to make the Raja an instrument for suppressing the Peshva's ascendancy, Nana Fadnis almost entirely confined the Raja to the fort of Satara, where not even his relations were allowed to visit him. Parashuram Bhau was also summoned in haste from Tasganv to Poona to cope with the difficulties which had arisen over the succession due to the suicide of Peshva Madhavrav. Nana's proposal that Bajirav Raghunath should succeed occasioned a rupture with Shinde. On the advance of Shinde's army Nana Fadnis repaired in alarm to Satara with some idea of restoring the Raja to supremacy. But, owing to his recent treatment of him, Shahu had no confidence in Nana and Nana retired to Wai. From Wai he returned to Satara to receive the robes of investiture for Chimaji Appa the Peshva set up by Shinde's general Baloba as a rival to Bajirav Raghunath, but suspecting designs against him on the part of Baloba, Nana remained at Wai. Chimajl was installed in May and a pretence made at a reconciliation between Nana and Baloba. But Haripant the eldest son of Parashuram Bhau who was bringing the message crossed the Nira on his way to Wai at the head of four or five thousand horse [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. II, p. 260.]. Nana took alarm and fled to Mahad in Konkan throwing a strong garrison into Pratapgad. Nana's intrigues were successful in gaining Shinde to his cause, but his partisans in Shinde's camp betrayed the conspiracy from want of caution and part of them had to take refuge in the hills south of the Nira. The troops met at Wai and shortly afterwards 10,000 men were gathered in the Sahyadris and declared for Bajirav. In October the army was joined by the regular battalions in the Peshva's service under Mr. Boyd. Baloba was aided by Shinde and the army marched for Poona with Nana at its head in Bajirav's interest. The Patvardhan estates near Tasgahv were attacked by the Kolhapur Raja at Nana's instigation and Parashuram Bhau was made prisoner. Owing to Bajirav's treachery this triumph was shortlived, and, in 1797, Nana was arrested in Poona. and subsequently taken to Ahmadnagar as a prisoner, on 6th April 1798. The Raja of Satara at the same time seized the fort and confined Nana's agent. But to the Peshva's disgust, when Shivram Narayan Thatte came to receive charge, the Raja, instigated by Shinde refused to give up the fort. Madhavrav Raste, was sent against the Raja but had to retire to Maleganv. Parashuram Bhau, who was then confined at Wai was released on promise of quelling the disturbance. He soon assembled a considerable force and advanced to Satara in the height of the rains crossing the Vena by an unknown ford. The Raja had only a small force which was overcome after a slight struggle in the suburbs. The Raja, who had thrown himself into the fort, surrendered for want of provisions. His brother Chitursingh as he is popularly called, escaped to Kolhapur closely pursued by a body of Raste's troops joined by others of the Pratinidhi which encamped near the Varna for more than a year. In 1798 they were cut off almost to a man by four hundred horse reinforced from Kolhapur. Chitursingh next made a raid as far as Pal and took all the guns and dispersed the whole of a force of over 2,000 men collected by Raste. He again retreated to the Varna and kept 7,000 men continually on the move throughout the Satara territories. The Kolhapur forces also attacked and pillaged Tasganv the capital of Parashuram Bhau's jagir. Parashuram Bhau was determined to avenge the wrong and organised an extensive campaign against Kolhapur towards the end of 1798. Parashuram Bhau fixed his camp at Pattankudi near Nipani abut 30 miles south of Kolhapur. This was suddenly attacked by Chhatrapati on 16th September 1799 when Parashuram Bhau taken unawares was killed fighting for life. This only served to concentrate all the forces of the state in the effort to reduce Kolhapur which was only saved by distractions at the Peshva's court in Poona. The southern part of Satara must have formed the principal base of these operations which included the investment of the town of Kolhapur by the armies of the Peshva.

This struggle of the two Chhatrapatis of Satara and Kolhapur with their common enemies was in a sense an effort to make themselves free from the thraldom and subordination in which they had been held long by the Peshvas. The only function that the Satara Chhatrapati was at this time called upon to perform was to supply robes of Peshvaship to anybody at a requisition coming from Poona at the sweet will now of Nana, then of Bajlrav, again of Shinde or Parashuram Bhau, whether the person to be so invested had fitness to rule the state or not. The Chhatrapati and even more than he, his brother Chitursingh were smarting under these painful conditions. Kolhapur also was being constantly harassed by the Patvardhan Sardars of the Peshva. It was no wonder therefore that the two should have combined in a common cause and put up a strong resistance. It cannot however be said that it was any grand piece of diplomacy to bring about a revolution in the Maratha confederacy by which the Chhatrapati could assert his own position in the Raj Mandal. Such a plan even if it were carried out with tact, had little chance of success in those troubled times. As it was, it was no more than a struggle to fish in troubled waters and at best a desperate effort to take mad revenge against their immediate opponents.

In 1802, after Bajirav's flight from Yeshvantrav Holkar, Shahu of Satara was reluctantly induced by the persuasion of Chitursingh to invest Vinayakrav the nephew of Bajirav as Peshva; but this step proved to be of no avail as towards the end of November 1802 Bajiraw put himself under British protection, a step which changed the whole character of the Poona situation. In 1803 when General Wellesley advanced on Poona he was joined by the Patvardhans and the Patankars among other jagirdars of the Satara territory.

After the war of 1803, the territories of the Peshva suffered considerably from plundering insurgents and freebooters. The distress was also aggravated by a famine in the Deccan through deficiency of rain which destroyed vast numbers of men and horses, but by the end of 1804 British supremacy had restored order. That year the country of the Patvardhans about Tasganv was in a state of considerable disturbance which was not quelled till an arrangement was effected in the interests of Bajirav by Khanderav Baste. In 1805 the district was the scene of ravages by Fattehsingh Mane a general of Holkar's with an army of 10,000 men. He was defeated by Balvantrav Fadnis Mutalik of Karad aided by Chintamanrav Patvardhan.

Pratapsinh 1810-39.

The young Pratinidhi, Parashuram Shrinivas, was at this time at Karad, under the restraint of his Mutalik or deputy whose doings were supported by the mother of the Pratinidhi and connived at by the Peshva. In 1806 a quarrel ensued, and Bapu Gokhale the Peshva's general was sent with troops to enforce submission, while the Pratinidhi was confined in the mud fort of Masur. Next year the Pratinidhi was rescued by Tai Telin, his mistress, the wife of an oil-seller. In 1807 this woman gained possession of the fort of Vasota in the extreme west of Javli and from it descended on Masur and rescued the Pratinidhi. The Pratinidhi declared for the Raja of Satara and against the Peshva. Many of the people of the district rose with him but his excesses and inability disgusted them. Bapu Gokhale again went against him; and a slight engagement ensued near Vasantgad. The Pratinidhi was severely wounded and carried to Poona; and his estates sequestrated. His mistress still held out and Bapu Gokhale had to take the hill forts one by one advancing by the Koyna valley. He met with no difficulty except at Vasota which held out under Tai Telin for eight months. On 4th of May 1808 Shahu [The famous Chitnis Bakhar was written by Malharrav Ramrav Chitnis at the instance of Shahu but the work was completed only after his death.] the Raja of Satara. died and was succeeded by his son Pratapsinh. Bapu Ghokale was allowed by the Peshva to take all the benefit of these conquests. He levied heavy exactions over the whole district and seized all the Pratinidhi's jewels and private property. In 1811 the Peshva demanded back his territory, which, with that usurped by the Patvardhans and Rastes, was brought under his control by British influence, while Rastes estate was finally sequestrated by him in 1815. The same year Trimbakji Dehgle was sent into confinement at Vasantgad for allegedly instigating the murder of Gangadhar Shastri, the Baroda minister, and was then delivered to the custody of the British Government. He afterwards escaped and infested, among other places, the Mahadev hills, supported by the Mangs and Ramoshis.

Trimbakji Dengle's Insurrection, 1817.

Trimbakji Dengle on being given up to the British Government was confined in Thana. He escaped and retired to the hills near Shingnapur in east Satara. Early in January 1817 he was at Phaltan, and constantly changing his residence between that place and Pandharpur, extended his range as far as the Mahimangad and Tathvad forts. On the 29th January he had 500 men near Berad in Phaltan and Nateputa in Malsiras, 300 near Shingnapur, 600 near Mahimangad, and 400 near Phaltan, a total 1,800 men almost all foot and the bulk of them Mangs and Ramoshis. Upto the 18th of February cavalry and infantry continued to join them near Shinganapur while the 18th of March was fixed for the outbreak. Trimbakji's head-quarters were at Berad in Phaltan, where he used to sleep in the forest guarded by five hundred Ramoshis. In spite of the large number of troops who were collected, the Peshva denied the existence of any insurrection or gathering of armed men, and though he sent Bapu Gokhale into the district with troops they professed to hear no news of insurgents. On the 7th of March after the serious messages addressed to the Peshva by Mr. Elphinstone the troops were partly dispersed. In April the operations of Colonel Smith drove the insurgents from their haunts in Shingnapur, and when Colonel Smith left for Poona, a detachment under Major Mac Donald prevented their remaining in Man or in Jath State. In May Pandavgad was taken by the so-called rebels. But Mr. Elphinstone suspected collusion on the part of the Peshva's officers for the purpose of eventually delivering the forts to Trimbakji. The Peshva made the rising a pretext for gaining Mr. Elphinstone's acquiescence to his taking the forts while his forces assembled near Satara. The Peshva's plan was thought to be to retire to Satara with his brother, with whom he had effected a reconciliation, and thence to Vasota or to Dharvad in the Karnatak with a force of 10,000 horse and foot under Naropart Apte. He relied on a successful resort to the old Maratha style of warfare as well as on the improbablity, as he believed, of the English proceeding to extremities. In May followed the treaty of Poona and subsequently General Smith's troops were drawn to the North Deccan in operations against the Pendharis. Soon after the Peshva had an interview with Sir John Malcolm at Mahuli at which Sir John misled by the Peshva's professions advised him to recruit his army. All this time the Peshva was actively engaged in his schemes against the British and while at Mahuli appointed Gokhale leader of all his measures investing him with full powers of government by a formal writing under his own seal confirmed with an oath. He did this not only in pursuance of his own policy, but also as security to the chiefs who were afraid to stand by him on account of his vacillation.

Pratapsinh Imprisoned in Vasota.

To aid his preparations Bajirav gave Gokhale as much as one crore of rupees and he made the Raja of Satara privy to his designs against the English, but having discovered that he was plotting with the English, Bajirav sent him and his family to Vasota, a remote hill fort on the edge of the Sahyadris. The recruiting and arming of forts rapidly proceeded, the Peshva returned to Poona, and his power was destroyed on the 5th of November in the battle of Kirkee.

Battle of Kirkee, 5th November 1817.

General Smith arrived at Kirkee on the 13th and took Poona on the 17th. The Peshva fled towards Satara. After securing Poona General Smith followed on the 22nd. On the 26th he reached the Salpa pass, halted there on the 27th, and on the 28th ascended the pass without opposition. On the top he was attacked by six hundred horse with a few rockets. But the advance soon drove them back with loss. They gathered strength as they retired, and towards the close of the march showed three to five thousand on the front and as many more in the rear. Gallopper guns, that is light field pieces, were opened in the evening with great effect. The second battalion of the 9th Regiment under Major Thacker had the rear guard and masked a gallopper gun under a division of auxiliaries which the Marathas were preparing to charge. It opened with grape and did great execution. Throughout the day the Marathas lost about one hundred and twenty men while General Smith had only one havildar and a sepoy slightly wounded. The next day the Marathas appeared to be somewhat hesitating in the morning but in the evening showed about five thousand horse out of range. Taking advantage of a rise in the ground the English pushed their guns on, within range. They opened with great effect upon the Marathas who stood in a group and inflicted a loss of many men and horses. The war, however, could not be brought to a decisive end because the Marathas would not give a straight fight and that the English suffered from a want of cavalry to keep them at a distance, while the grain supplies for their followers ran short, and owing to the close order which had to be kept on the marches which began at two or three in the morning, the camps could not be reached till two or three in the afternoon. General Smith was now close on the Peshva who till then had remained at Mahuli. From Mahuli Bajirav fled to Pandharpur. He had sent for the Raja of Satara from Vasota but had to start before he arrived. It was not till the middle of December that he was joined by the Raja and four thousand horse under Naropant Apte which had escorted the Raja from Vasota. The Peshva after going as far north as Junnar again turned south and the Raja was with the Peshva at the famous battle of Koreganv on the Bhima river.

Pursuit of the Peshva, 1818.

On the 5th of January 1818 the Peshva was fleeing towards Satara and General Pritzler taking up the pursuit marched direct upon Mahuli by the Salpa pass. He met with a body of the Marathas on the 8th of January close to Satara and killed and wounded sixty men, and took thirty horses and six prisoners. On the 12th General Smith was near Phaltan and was moving south-east towards Shingnapur where he intended to cross the Man near Marde opposite Mhasvad. Thus he and General Pritzler pursued the Peshva in hopes of intercepting him if he again turned north. General Smith was just outside the eastern boundary of the district while General Pritzler went by the usual route to Tasganv. On the 17th of January about ten thousand horse of Gokhale's army in two divisions attempted a reconnaissance of General Pritzler's camp. The cavalry under Major Doveton charged them three times and put them to flight, their loss being forty killed and wounded. The day after, part of Prizler's army was placed under General Smith while Pritzler still moved down the right bank of the Krshna. About the same time the Peshva turned north passing Pritzler to the west reached Karad on the 23rd. On 23rd General Smith also turned northwards after the Peshva reached Kavthe two miles south of Tasganv. About half-way on the march his rear guard was closely pressed by the whole of the Maratha light division not less than fifteen thousand strong and commanded by Appa Desai, Trimbakji Dengle, Vinchurkar, several of the Patvardhans, and Gokhale himself. The ground being confined and intersected by water-courses General Smith took ground and moved out to drive off the Marathas. The latter kept their ground firmly for some time behaving with much more spirit than usual. Five six-pounders and a howitzer were kept firing on them for some time and their losses were considerable. Meanwhile the Peshva had succeeded in passing General Pritzler and his force in the west and on the 23rd was at Karad. By the 27th General Smith's division had reached Pusesavali while the Peshva was six miles from Mahuli. The Marathas under Gokhale five thousand strong contended themselves with harassing the troops on the march. General Smith was only six miles from Mahuli by sunset the next day. The Peshva had arrived at noon. He left at once in the morning of the 29th and did not stop till he reached Hanbad six miles from the Nira bridge. Here his advance guard fell in with a force under Captain Boles. He instantly moved on and at 8 p.m. reached Phaltan leaving many tired men and camels at Hanbad. He only stayed two hours at Phaltan and marched again in the direction of Pusesavali. He halted about sixteen miles further on. He had marched about eighty miles in forty hours and in consequence had got separated from his baggage. He afterwards turned south-east and on the 30th reached Nateputa. Smith started in pursuit of the Peshva on the 29th.

Bajirav Peshva II 1796-1818.

The light division of Gokhale's force attempted to pass him by the short route by Koreganv in order to join the Peshva but he managed to intercept them and they had to take a more circuitous route further west, as General Smith neared the Salpa pass. Part of them made another push at a point where the valley is some five or six miles wide, probably not far from Deur. General Smith had just pitched his camp. Gokhale's division was advancing along the opposite side of the valley. The 2nd Cavalry and the Horse Artillery supported by the Grenadiers of the 65th Regiment and part of the Light Infantry were immediately ordered under arms and proceeded with the intention of cutting off this body as they passed between them and the hills. Seeing this the Marathas kept close under the hills and upon the advance of the cavalry and horse artillery at a gallop fled in the greatest consternation to avoid the charge. Their rear was driven back by the road by which they were advancing, while the main body pushed on at speed for some miles. A few with part of the baggage which had preceded the horse took refuge in the hills and numbers crawled up to the top by a path which from below appeared almost perpendicular. The grenadiers and part of the Light Battalion went up and took part of what remained, killing such of the armed men as offered resistance. The rest under Gokhale moved by the Khambatkl pass and were joined next day by a body of troops from the eastward below the pass. After waiting at Khandala Gokhale again retired above the Khambatkl pass. On the 30th General Smith joined Colonel Boles with his reserve at Lonand. He had marched five hundred and seventy miles in forty days with only three halts. General Pritzler returned by the same route after having been driven as far as Galgala in Bijapur, and had marched three hundred miles in eighteen days and altogether twenty-three days without a halt.

Satara Surrendered to the British,10th February, 1818.

The scattered English forces were determined to effect a meeting. With this object General Smith again moved south on the 4th of the February and reached Rahimatpur on the 6th. Here General Pritzler joined him from the south and on the 8th, the united force went to Satara, and the fort surrendered on the 10th. General Smith then turned towards Pandharpur. At Ashta Bapu Gokhale was overtaken by him and was killed in a stiff action on 19th February 1818. With the death of his faithful commander, the Peshva lost all hope of recovering his position. He did not wait to witness the result of the action but fled away hurriedly with his wife and three ladies riding with him in a male attire. The Raja of Satara and his party left helpless on the camping ground with all Bajirav's treasure valued at about one crore fell into his (General Smith) hand. General Smith wrote the following hurried note to Elphinstone, " I send you a private account of our good luck as the Raja's family is with me and the poor Gokhale is to be roasted this evening with all ceremony. For he really fought like a soldier. I entreat you to relieve me of the Raja's family as I cannot keep up any useful pursuit with them." Elphinstone met General Smith at Belsar on 4th March and took charge of the Raja, who was not a little happy at his deliverance [Sardesai: New History of the Marathas, Vol. III, p. 493.]. For long since the murder of Gangadhar Shastri Patvardhan and the state of panic following the murder, Pratapsinh and his mother had made secret approaches to the Resident, requesting his help against Bajirav's plans.

Mr. Elphinstone's Manifesto.

In order to hasten the destruction of the Peshva by inducing his subordinates to quit his service, Elphinstone under orders from the Governor General issued the following proclamation dated 11th February 1818 stating the British case against Bajirav.

"In 1796, from the time when Bajirav ascended the throne, his country had been a prey to faction and rebellion and there was no efficient government to protect the people. That in 1802 when Bajirav was driven from Poona he took refuge at Bassein, and entering into an alliance with the British Government, early in 1805 was restored to his full authority and the supremacy of the British in the Deccan ensured peace. In 1803 when Bajirav was restored the country was wasted by war and famine, the people were reduced to misery, and the government drew scarcely any revenue from its lands. From that time, through British protection, in spite of the farming system and the exactions of Bajirav's officers, the country had completely recovered, and Bajirav had accumulated those treasures which he was now employing against his benefactors. The British Government not only kept peace within the Peshva's possessions but maintained his rights against his enemies abroad. It could not, without injury to the rights of others, restore his authority over the Maratha chiefs, which had expired long before its alliance with him, but it paid the greatest attention to satisfy his admissible demands and in spite of many difficulties succeeded in adjusting some and putting others in a train of settlement. Among these were Bajirav's claims on the Gaikvad. The British Government had prevailed on the Gaikvad to send his prime minister to settle Bajirav's demands, and they were on the eve of adjustment with great profit to the Peshva, when Gangadhar Shastri, the Gaikvad's agent was murdered by Trimbakji Dengle, the Peshva's minister, while in actual attendance on his court and during the solemn pilgrimage of Pandharpur. Strong suspicions rested on Bajirav, who was accused by the voice of the whole country, but the British Government unwilling to credit such a charge against a prince and an ally contended itself with demanding the punishment of Trimbakji. This was refused until the British Government had marched an army to support its demands. Yet it made no claim on the Peshva for its expenses and inflicted no punishment for his protection of a murderer; it simply required the surrender of the criminal, and on Bajirav's compliance it restored him to the undiminished enjoyment of all the benefits of the alliance. Notwithstanding this generosity Bajirav immediately began a new system of intrigues and used every exertion to turn all the power of India against the British Government. At length he gave the signal for disturbances by fomenting an insurrection in his own dominions, and prepared to support the insurgents by open force. The British Government had no remedy but to arm in turn. Its troops entered Bajirav's territories at all points and surrounded him in his capital before any of those with whom he had intrigued had time to stir. Bajirav's life was in the hands of the British Government, but that Government, moved by Bajirav's professions of gratitude for past favours and of entire dependence on its moderation, once more resolved to continue him on his throne, after imposing such terms on him as might secure it from his future perfidy. The principal of these terms was a commutation of the contingent which the Peshva was bound to furnish for money equal to the pay of a similar body of troops. When this was agreed to, the British Government restored Bajirav to its friendship and proceeded to settle the Pendharis who had so long been the pest of the peaceable inhabitants of India and of none more than of the Peshva's subjects. Bajirav affected to enter with zeal into an enterprise so worthy of a great government. He assembled a large army on pretence of cordially aiding in the contest, but, in the midst of his professions, he spared neither pains nor money, to engage the powers of Hindustan to combine against the British. No sooner had the British troops marched, towards the haunts of the Pendharis, than he seized the opportunity to begin war without a declaration and without even an alleged ground of complaint. He attacked and burnt the house of the British Resident, contrary to the laws of nations and the practice of India, plundered and seized peaceable travellers, and put two British officers to an ignominious death in the vicinity of Taleganv. Bajirav himself found the last transaction too barbarous to avow; but, as the perpetrators were still unpunished and kept their command in his army, the guilt remained with him. After the beginning of the war, Bajirav threw off the mask regarding the murder of Gangadhar Shastri and avowed his participation in the crime by uniting his cause with that of the murderer. By these acts of perfidy and violence, Bajirav had compelled the British Government to drive him from power and to conquer his dominions. For this purpose a force had gone in pursuit of Bajirav which would allow him no rest, a second was employed in taking his forts, a third had arrived by way of Ahmadnagar, and the greatest force of all was entering Khandesh under the personal command of His Excellency Sir Thomas Hislop. A force under General Munro was reducing the Karnatak and a force from Bombay was taking the forts in the Konkan and occupying that country. In a short time no trace of Bajirav would remain. The Raja of Satara, who had always been a prisoner in Bajirav's hands, would be released and placed at the head of an independent state of such an extent as might maintain the Raja and his family in comfort and dignity. With this view the fort of Satara had been taken, the Raja's flag had been set up in it, and his former ministers had been called into employment [Elphinstone's motive in not annexing the Maratha power completely can be guaged from his own words. Says he, summarising the British situation at the time, "We never before attempted the complete conquest of a country. Even Mysore was saved by the creation of a Raja. If we fail, (in following such a policy), Sindia will go to war, Holkar rebel, Sikhs and the Gurkhas join in, Haidarabad burst out. The flame expands to other provinces, some fundamental point is touched and our whole Empire tumbles down like a pack of cards. It certainly is a bad' plan to swallow more than we can digest. By destroying and diminishing so many states, we have increased the sources of discord, which it was our object to remove." (Colebrooke's Life of Elphinstone, Vol. II pp. 40-44).]. Whatever country was assigned to the Raja would be administered by him and he would be bound to establish justice and order. The rest of the country would be held by the Honourable Company. The revenue would be collected for the Government but all real and personal property would be secured. All vatan and inam or hereditary lands, varshasans or yearly stipends, and all religious and charitable establishments would be protected, and all religious sects tolerated and their customs maintained as far as was just and reasonable. The revenue-farming system would be abolished. Officers should be forthwith appointed to collect a regular and moderate revenue on the part of the British Government, to administer justice, and to encourage the cultivators of the soil. They would be authorized to allow remissions in consideration of the circumstances of the times. All persons were forbidden paying revenue to Bajirav or his adherents or aiding them in any way. No reduction would be made from the revenue on account of such payments. Vatandars and other holders of land were required to quit his standard and return to their villages within two months. The Jamindars would report the names of those who remained and all who failed to appear in that time would forfeit their lands and would be pursued without remission until they were crushed. All whether belonging to the enemy or otherwise, who might attempt to lay waste the country or to plunder the roads would be put to death whenever they were found."

Pratapsinh Restored, March 1818.

This proclamation sealed Bajirav's fate. The British installed Chhatrapati Pratapsinh [Blacker's Maratha War, 256.] in his seat at Satara and Captain Grant Duff [He was originally Captain Grant. He later added ' Duff' to his original name and hence is known as Grant Duff.] the author of the History of the Marathas, was placed with him to aid his councils and direct his conduct. This singular act of diplomacy for a time created an impression that the British looked upon Bajirav as their enemy and that they had no designs against the Chhatrapati whose family had been raised from hereditary confinement to power. Besides Pratapsinh who was in the prime of life, it included two brothers Chitursingh and Shahaji and their mother. Pratapsinh was described by Elphinstone as a young man of about twenty, [Pratapsinh was born on 18th January 1793.] good humoured and frank and not destitute of intelligence. His mother, who was more ambitious, made large claims stating that she expected that the family would be re-established on the footing it enjoyed in its time of greater fortune [On the 29th of March 1818, Mr. Elphinstone rode with the Raja through the lower part of the valley of Satara. Groves of mango trees, chimps of cocoa-palms so uncommon above the Sahvadris, here and there fine tamarind or pimpal trees throwing their deep shade over a temple by the Krishna, and the picturesque hills that surrounded the whole made this the finest part ot the Peshwa's country, if not of India. The Raja went into Satara with the pomp of a prince and the delight of a schoolboy. Colebrooke's Elphinstone, II. 30.].

On the 29th of March 1818 after a two days' halt, part of the reserve marched from Satara and on the 30th camped at some distance on the high road towards Vasota [Blacker's Maratha War, 295-98. The force assembled for this service included two corps of Europeans, the flank battalion of the Bombay European Regiment, half a battalion of European Rifles, four battalions of Native Infantry of the line, that is the 2nd battalion of the 12th Madras, the 2nd battalion of the 7th, and the 2nd battalion of the 9th Bombay, and an auxiliary battalion from Poona. To this force was attached 700 Poona Auxiliary Horse and four companies of Pioneers. The ordnance included twenty-nine pieces, of which four were iron eighteen-pounders and two were iron twelve-pounders. There were one ten-inch and four eight-inch mortars, two heavy five and a half inch howitzers, and two brass twelve-pounders. The rest were field guns and light howitzers. Colonel Dalrymple of the Madras establishment commanded the artillery of which there were 270 Europeans and 317 Natives of both Presidencies. Captain Nutt of the Bombay establishment was Chief Engineer.] which had been Pratapsinh's prison and where some of his family were still confined. Vasota stands on one of the Sahyadri hills about 3,000 feet high on the Konkan side and about 2,000 feet above the Deccan plain. Like most Maratha hill-forts it was commanded from neighbouring hills. Its greatest strength lay in its height and in the difficulty of approach. In almost every direction it was surrounded by inaccessible mountains, except a few passes so narrow and rugged as to be easily defended, and extremely difficult though in no way strengthened by art [From the camp near Sudoli, twelve miles from Vasota, Mr. Elphinstone wrote (3rd April): The pass is now a good open road to the top. The scenery was less romantic and the fort less alarming than before. The descent was worse than the ascent. Along the bank of the Koyna, where there was a good road, there were occasionally fine views of the water bordered with trees and surrounded by woody hills. The scenery was romantic. Dr. Coats compared it to Malabar and General Pritzler to St. Domingo. The road to Vasota lay along a valley between high mountains and was quite secluded, as if no one were within a hundred miles. The hill sides had a variety of summits and ravines. In some places were craggy rocks intermingled with trees; in others appeared smooth summits covered with the richest and greenest foliage: in some the forest was on fire, and gusts of smoke drawn through the leafless trees; in others the fire was spent and there remained only the blackened ground and scorched trunks. Towards the west of the valley the bottom and sides of the hills were covered with brushwood or with tall pine-like trees, but all the upper part of the mountain was bare rock or withered grass. The whole was closed by Vasota. Colebrooke's Elphinstone, II. 31-32.]. On the 31st, under Colonel Hewett's command, a detachment of six companies of the European flank battalion, two companies of Rifles, and flank companies of the 2nd battalion of the 12th and 7th Bombay Native Infantry, was sent forward to Vasota about twenty miles west of Satara. In the afternoon Colonel Hewett's detachment reached Induli a small village within two miles and a half of Vasota, and drove in an outpost of the garrison. Two companies of the Seventh were left in possession of the fort, and the rest of the force returned to Tambia, five miles from Vasota as there was no nearer place fit for encampment. The investment was put off till the first of April, when three outposts were established, one at old Vasota at a distance of 700 yards and commanding the place, the second at the same distance and commanding the road to the gateway, and the third to the right of it at a distance of no more than 400 yards from the walls. A summons was sent to the commandant, but it was refused admittance. On the first and second all the Pioneers and litter-bearers were engaged in making a road. On the 3rd, the head-quarters of the division were moved forward to Tambia, and with the help of elephants the mortars and howitzers were brought across the hills to the same place. Next day a strong working party was employed on the pathway to old Vasota to complete the work begun on the first, and some light guns and ammunition were got up. The Raja Pratapsinh, some of whose family were prisoners in the fort, arrived in the camp, and a detachment of rifles and auxiliary horse was sent into the forests to search for eighteen elephants which their keepers had carried off from Pandavgad immediately before that place was reduced. On the fifth the battery from old Vasota opened with good effect and one of the largest buildings in the fort was fired by the bombardment. The garrison returned a few shots from their large guns, but kept up an unremitting fire from their wall-pieces and small arms and were all day busily employed in improving their defences. The bombardment continued on the 6th. As it was found that the arrangements were insufficient to intimidate the commandant, the Pioneers were directed to complete the road from the camp for the advance of the battering guns. This proved unnecessary. On the following morning the garrison surrendered unconditionally and a company of Bombay Native Infantry took possession of the fort. The loss of the enemy amounted to seventeen killed and wounded and that of the British force to only four. Among the prisoners set free were two officers Cornets Morison and Hunter, who were restored to freedom after an almost hopeless confinement. They were the first to meet the party advancing to receive possession of the place, among whom were some intimate friends, but so greatly had their past hardships changed them that they were scarcely recognised. The members of Pratapsinh's family were also set free and accompanied the chief to Satara. Much importance was attached to the fall of Vasota which was one of the Peshva's treasure-houses and one of his strongest forts. The 7th was spent in the removal of the mortars and guns from the batteries back to the park and in preparing to re-cross the mountains. The passage was effected during the two following days and on the 10th the force returned to Satara having reduced the fortress of Parali by detaching a party of infantry under a native officer to whom it surrendered. The detachment of rifles and auxiliary horse, which had been sent off a few days before rejoined with the elephants they had gone in search of, after a long and most fatiguing march among the hills. With the usual ceremonies, which the general and the leading officers attended, the Commissioner formally seated Pratapsinh on the masnad or pillow of state. On the 11th of May a halt was called during which visits of ceremony were exchanged with the Raja, and on the 12th the force began its return southward by the valley of the upper Krshna to reduce more forts during its progress to join Brigadier-General Munro from Satara. On the 13th of May the encampment was at Masur, which, as well as the hill fortress of Vasantgad, surrendered in the course of the day. On arriving at Karad on the 14th the garrison of Kole and Sadashivgad abandoned those places. At Kopargahv, on the following day, the submissions of Machhindragad, Battis Shirala, Islampur, Vahghi, and Valva, were received. Garrisons were established in all these as well as in other places. From Valva the force marched without halt by Islampur, Ashta, and Siredvar, to Nagar Manoli, General Munro's headquarters which were reached on the 22nd. Dategad, Makrandgad, Pratapgad, Bhairavgad, and Jangli Jaygad, also surrendered. The rapid fall of so many places bore out the truth of the well-known saying that forts quickly fall when there is no army to keep the field. The garrisons seemed to want only a pretence for surrendering.

Strong military forces were stationed at Satara and Karad. Shortly after a conspiracy was discovered for the release of Chitursingh, the murder of all Europeans at Satara and Poona, the surprise of some of the principal forts, and the possession of the Raja's person. The plot was suppressed and several of the conspirators executed. On the 25th of September 1819 a treaty was concluded under which Pratapsinh agreed to hold his territory in subordinate co-operation with the British Government. He was neither to increase nor to diminish his military force without its sanction, and as a fundamental condition he was positively forbidden to hold any intercourse with persons not his subjects except through the Resident at Satara. The British Government charged itself with the defence of his territory which was to be managed by a British Agent till the Raja had acquainted himself with the business of Government [ Grant Duffs Marathas, Vol. II, p. 525.]. Their lands were restored to the great Jagirdars and in most cases at their own request they were placed under the Raja of Satara. By the treaty of 1819 Raja Pratapsinh was formally installed as ruler of a territory which included the whole of the present district of Satara except the sub-division of Tasganv which then formed part of the Patvardhan estates. The Satara chief held in addition what are now the sub-divisions of Sangola, Malsiras, and Pandharpur in Sholapur, and part of the Bijapur district in the neighbourhood of and including the city of Bipapur. [The Ramoshis who served in the inferior ranks of Police in the Marathi administration in Satara played an important part under the leadership of Chitursingh, An official letter from Bombay (23rd February 1822) refers to the errors of assessment. The turbulence of the people along with the factors, inherent in the transfer of power led to the ruling of the Ramoshis. They proved to be so turbulent that the Government was forced to condone many of the crimes and even placated them by land grants and recruiting them as hill police (S. B. Chaudhuri—Civil Disturbances pp. 155-56). In 1845 Koli outrage spread into Purandhar and Satara whose headquarters were in the hilly country to the northwest of Poona. (S. B. Ghaudlmri— Civil Disturbances p. 168).]

These arrangements did not meet with ready approval from the Maratha public of those days, as the Chhatrapati, was now reduced to a position of a petty chieftain. Captain Grant who had been appointed as his Resident and guardian was himself assisted by Balajipant Natu who had been for many years a confidential agent and an informer of Elphinstone. From the very beginning Raja Pratapsinh took a dislike to Natu who was known to be selfish and intriguing.

Captain Grant Duff found Pratapsinh naturally intelligent and well disposed, but surrounded by profligate men bred among intrigues and ignorant of every thing except court etiquette [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. II, p. 519.]. All went well so long as Captain Duff remained in sole charge. In 1822 Pratapsinh was freed from tutelage, and a fresh treaty was concluded in which special stress was laid on the articles regarding foreign intercourse. For a time things went well. In 1829 Sir John Malcolm admired the condition of the country, the chief's devotion to business, and his promotion of useful works. Besides building of a road to Mahabaleshvar and part of that to Poona by the Salpa pass, he also provided funds for the dam and lake at Mahabajeshvar, and at Satara he made the water works by which the town is supplied from springs in the neighbouring hills of Yavteshvar. He built some large public offices and a fine palace and pleasure gardens and arranged that his territory should be surveyed by Captain Adams. In 1825 Bishop Tleber wrote that the chief was a well disposed young man of good understanding. His country was peaceable, orderly, and as prosperous as could be expected after the famine. He was so ardent a professed lover of peace as almost to bring his sincerity in question [Journal, II. 212.]. In November 1826 Mr. Elphinstone wrote: He is the most civilised Maratha I ever met, has his country in excellent order, and everything to his roads and aqueducts in a style that would credit a European. 1 was more struck with his private sitting room than anything I saw at Satara. It contains a single table covered with green velvet at which the descendant of Shivaji sits in a chair and writes letters as well as a journal of his transactions with his own hand [ Colebrooke's Elphinstone, II. 187-188.].

How Raja Pratapsinh gradually developed an anti-British prejudice is an interesting question which has given an undeserved notoriety to his career. A prisoner of the Peshva during his boyhood, he contracted no vice and grew up to be a plain soldier, generous and outspoken in his manners and punctilious in the observance of the rules of his caste and religion. He was never afraid of giving out whatever was uppermost in his mind, a trial which perhaps ill-accorded with his position as a vassal of the British power. One notices this conflict in his inner thoughts in the entries he has made in his diary, which Captain Grant advised him to write every day regularly and which is now preserved in volumes in the Peshva's Daftar at Poona. He has herein occasionally reproduced his conversation with the Governors and British officials of note. The diary discloses his kindness to his younger brother and his fondness for hunting. He opened schools in his territory and thus made the first beginning of popular education in Satara, Captain Giant retired in 1822 but Pratapsinh long continued his contact with him by regular correspondence. He often ordered from England rare articles and curios of foreign manufacture making regular remittances for their cost. He was made a member of the Royal Asiatic Society of England. Thus he received quite a healthy start in life with a distinct promise of increasing advancement in the future. His senapati Balasaheb was a spirited youth devoted to his master and acted as his executive officer [Sardesai: New History of Marathas, Vol. III. p. 511-512.].

At the instance of Colonel Briggs, the next Resident, Pratapsinh built as has been said above a strong permanent road to the plateau of Mahabaleshvar which formed a part of his dominion and in which was established a suitable summer resort for European and Indian visitors. The road was later extended to Mahad and the sea coast on the west. This hill resort of Mahabaleshvar was handed over to the British Government by a special agreement executed in 1829. A bazar was opened on the hill and given the name of Malcolm Path. In return, the fort of Pratapgad, with the shrine of Bhavani founded there by Shivaji, was handed over to the Raja's possession. The Governors of Bombay paid visits to Pratapsinh at Satara and complimented him on the healthy progressive line of his newly established rule. The home authorities in England appreciated his services by sending him a jewelled sword with a laudatory certificate in 1835. By the time these tokens reached India, the relations of the Raja with the Government of Bombay had become strained and the tokens were withheld. This development deserves to be explained.

The condition in the treaty of 1819 restraining Pratapsinh from communication with the outside world was found irksome and prevented the Raja, from undertaking even marriage negotiations and ceremonial exchanges outside his own jurisdiction. The regimes of the first four Residents, Grant, Briggs, Robertson and Lodwiek ran fairly smooth but when Col. Ovants took charge in 1837 the habitual cordiality between the two began to wane. In fact even before these Raja Pratapsinh had been rather cold shouldered by sir Robert Grant, the then Governor of Bombay. It. appears that he was instrumental in withholding from the Raja some of the decisions of the Court of Directors which had been in Raja's favour and also managed to postpone forwarding to the court of Directors, some of the representations made by the Raja through him, taking care all the while to conceal his real intentions behind a facade of ceremonious and courtly behaviour. The Raja thereupon resolved to make the representation direct to the Court of Directors in England through his own acredited agent. This upset Sir Robert Grant very much and he argued that the Raja's action in sending his agent direct to the Directors without Resident's knowledge was contrary to the treaty of 1822. Whether through the encouragement of his masters or through sheer vicious ambition Balajipant Natu was engaged in concocting evidence of Raja's complicity in this or that subversive action and the Raja became a suspect in the eyes of his masters.

In November 1835 Balajipant Natu informed Colonel Lodwick that Pratapsinh was in the habit of talking of the probable fall of the British Government and making other treasonable remarks. Balaji had also heard rumours of a plot among the chiefs which he thought that Pratapsinh might be induced to join. Colonel Lodwick regarded these accusations as the result of intrigue and did not report them to Government. Colonel Lodwick no doubt had some idea of the discontent brewing in the Raja's mind. Pratapsinh wrote in his diary of 4th April, 1837 stating that the Resident asked him to omit the words, ' This is pressure of the English, would like to commit suicide. Pratapsinh, however refused to accede to his suggestion' [ Vide selections from Peshva Dafter Vol. 42 p. 100.]. According to General Lodwick the Raja's feelings were embittered by delay in settling the question of his rights to the lapsed estates of the great Jagirdars, and that he was further annoyed by the Governor's refusal to pay a return visit to him at Satara. Again it was further reported that he communicated direct with various Europeans and natives in Bombay and that his disloyalty and bad faith went further. His minister Govindrav was employed to interview Shaikh Gulamsingh and Guljar Missar, two Subhedars of the 23rd Regiment then at Satara and tempt them from their allegiance. On the 21st of July, 1836 one Antajipant took the Subhedars to the minister's house, and they were shown to Pratapsinh who secretly recognised them. Ten days later Antaji told them that the Raja called them to private interview. During August, matters went no further. On the 8th of September, the Subhedars were summoned in disguise to the Raja who told them that the signal for rising was to be disturbances in Bombay and Belganv, the arrival at Satara of an army from Hyderabad, and at the Narmada of an army from Hindustan. On the 18th of September Antaji met the Subhedars for the last time and had a long and treasonable conversation with them. Next day Antaji was enticed into the lines and arrested, and when Pratapsinh was told of the accusations against him the minister was given up. On the 10th of October 1836 a commission consisting of Colonel Ovans, Mr. Willoughby, and the Resident Colonel Lodwick met to inquire into the extent of the conspiracy and of Raja's connection with it. The procedure of the inquiry was defective in many respects. For although the Raja asked times without number for copies of the evidence of the witnesses who appeared before the Commission to make the statements implicating him in the crime, they were never supplied to him on the ground that the Commission was a secret one and hence no part of its proceedings could be made public. The Commission fully believed the Subhedars statements. They were satisfied that Pratapsinh secretly recognised the Subhedars and afterwards held private and treasonable conversations with them. That Pratapsinh was party to a conspiracy was for the Commission, proved beyond doubt. As to the extent of the conspiracy, it appeared that during the interview hints were thrown out, of aid from Shinde and of a Moghal emissary. Some attempt also was made to show that Pratapsinh had been in communication with Mudhoji Bhonsle, the ex-Raja of Nagpur, and that he even thought of corresponding with Russia. The commission rejected the evidence of so widespread a plot as untrustworthy, and held that, though there could be no doubt of the Raja's hostile feelings to the British Government, he had no defined or intelligible plan of action. Much of this disloyal conduct was due to exaggerated notions of his consequence and to the designs of evil men by whom he was surrounded. Of the minister Govindrav's and Antaji's guilt there could be no doubt. Both were imprisoned, the minister at Ahmadnagar.

More Charges Against Pratapsinh.

Colonel Ovans further brought forth an evidence of a bundle of letters seeking to prove that contrary to the belief of the Commission, Pratapsinh had communicated both with the Viceroy of of Goa and with Appa Saheb, the ex-Raja of Nagpur. The Goa intrigues, it was alleged, had began as far back as 1826-27 when a certain Nago Devrav was sent to Goa to conduct communications with the Portuguese Viceroy Dom Manoel. In that year a draft treaty was prepared at Satara. Negotiations were continued till 1828-29, and an agent named Erculana Dettora was sent to Satara to ascertain whether Pratapsinh acknowledged Nago Devrav as his agent. He returned with presents and satisfactory assurances from Pratapsinh. The object of the intrigues with Goa was to enter into an offensive and defensive alliance with Portugal against the British Government. The principal conditions of the alliance proposed by Pratapsinh were: That Portugal was to furnish an army for the recovery of the territories which formely belonged to the Marathas; that Pratapsinh was to bear the cost of the army, and that when the conquest was completed the Portuguese were to be rewarded in money and territory and a portion of their army was to be subsidised at Satara. The evidence sought to prove that Pratapsinh hoped to gain possession of the whole territories which had been under the last Peshva Bajirav and additional conquests in Southern India. The evidence further suggested that the participants in the plot also entertained an idea uniting, France, Russia, and Austria in the alliance against the English. It should, however be remembered that none of the documents presented bore either the signature of Pratapsinh or Dom Manoel. Seven of the letters alleged to have been written by the Raja and three of them said to have been written by the Portuguese Governor to be in the same handwriting, which almost convincingly proved their forged character. The seals on the letters going from Pratapsinh were found to have been faked ones. It is further worthy of note that the British government never once registered any complaint to the Government of Portugal for the serious subversive activities in which the Portuguese Governor at Goa was alleged to have been involved. In spite of all this, the Commission no doubt was convinced that the evidence was conclusive enough. Pratapsinh and probably the agents on his side, were said to have believed that their scheme was feasible, and that the Portuguese Viceroy and his agents, besides their feeling of hostility to the English, encouraged and continued the plot for the sake of Pratapsinh's large disbursements. The last act of this alleged conspiracy was a mission of Madhavrav Shirke on the departure of Dom Manoel in 1835-36. The whole was said to have been disclosed by voluntary information after the seizure of the minister Govindrav in the Subhedars' case. The third intrigue attributed to Pratapsinh was with Appa Saheb, the ex-Raja of Nagpiir. Though he was destitute and under restraint in Jodhpur, the alleged plan was that Appa Saheb should raise Rs. 20 lakhs to enable the Portuguese to replace him in power. At Satara the intention to link this with the Goa conspiracy was evident, but no direct communications between Goa and Jodhpur were proved. Once Appa Saheb Mahadik of Tarle took a sword of the Bhonsles to Appa Saheb at Jodhpur and brought back a mare and letters. The exchange of letters lasted over about eight years, and the correspondence ceased only with the seizure of the minister Govindrav at which time a messenger of Appa Saheb was found hid at a village near Satara. In addition genuine letters were said to have been discovered from Pratapsinh to the native soldiery urging them to rise. As the Bombay Government was thus feverishly busy in collecting evidence against Pratapsinh he saw no prospect and hope of his obtaining any justice at the hand of the Authorities of Bombay. He therefore tried to represent his case to the Governor-General at Calcutta and the Directors of the East India Company in England. In Bombay there were many Englishmen of unimpeachable character who were quite convinced of the innocence of the Raja. Amongst them were Dr. Milne, Captain Cogan and Mr. Mac-donald, the editor of the Bombay Gazette. Dr. Milne wrote several letters to the Governments of Bombay and India but no attention was paid to them. The only accredited agents of the Raja sent to England to represent his case were four in numbers viz. Syed Mir Afizil Ali, Yeshvantrav Raje Shirke, Bhagvahtrav Vitthal and Rango Bapuji. Of these four, the first did nut present his ease although his departure to England proved to he a cause of a great annoyance to the Authorities in India. Great obstacles were placed in the way of the other three and much delay was caused; but they overcame all difficulties and reached England only to find that the Directors of the East India Company would not recognise them and bade them return whence they came unheard [Of the four agents that went to England to plead the case of Satara, Rango Bapuji deserves a place of honour. He reached there in 1839 and spent fourteen years of his life in England, unceasingly advocating the cause first of the Pratapsinh, so long as he lived and then of his adopted son Shahu. Even after the death of Shahaji alias Appasaheb, and the subsequent annexation of Satara, Rango Bapuji persisted in his efforts writing with sincerity and vigour that made the persons in power restive in their position. In one of his letters addressed to Right Hon. J. C. Hemes he says " suppose yourself an English gentleman, dwelling at Peking for the same time as I have dwelt in London and advocating among the Chinese as I have humbly done here...............the stainless innocence of your Queen who had been secretly accused and deposed by a Chinese Emperor ". (Basu: Story of Satara, p. 338). He knocked at the doors of both the Houses of Parliament and at last became literally penniless losing his own money in the cause; but alas with no effect ! It must however be said to the credit of a few Englishmen of note, that they admired his unfaltering devotion to his master and presented him with a silver casket on which the names of the subscribers have been inscribed. The disappointed Rango Bapuji reached India in 1854, the British Government having paid him Rs. 25,000 and his passage money, perhaps to make themselves free from the activities of one who may be described as the first great foreign ambassador of India.]. As a result of the inquiry carried on by the Commission in its own way both the Government of India and the Court of Directors held that the evidence of Pratapsinh's guilt was complete.

Pratapsinh Depoded. September 1839.

Pratapsinh was therefore called for a final explanation of his conduct. In the course of his reply, Pratapsinh made no real attempt to meet the charges because he had not been allowed to sec and examine the original copies of the evidence brought against him. Sir James Carnac, Governor of Bombay (1839-1841) more than once asked him to bind himself strictly and in good faith to act up to the articles of 1819. Pratapsinh refused to promise this, because he felt that any binding of that character indirectly meant an acceptance of the charges levelled against him. To agree, he said, would lower him to the position of Mamlatdar. British Government felt that the Raja had shown such ingratitude and ill-feeling towards the British Government, and that he was so lull of absurd ambitions and pretensions that it would be misplaced clemency to overlook his treason and his want of contrition. On the 5th of September 1839 Pratapsinh was deposed. He was thereafter deported to Kashi, his jailors inflicting heart rending hardships upon him and his suite, during the long overland journey. Balasaheb, the chief commandant of the Raja could not bear the strain of the journey and died on the way, his pregnant wife giving birth to a posthumous child on a road side at Sahgvi in Khandesh district. A request for a halt on the way for the purpose was refused and the party marched on. On the deposition of Pratapsinh, Lord Auckland, the Governor-General, proposed that the Company should resume the state. But the Court of Directors decided to give it into the hands of the Raja's younger brother Shahaji as the other brother, the gallant Chitursingh, had died in 1821.

Pratapsinh dragged a wearisome existence at Kashi till his death on the 14th October 1847. On 2nd December 1844 he addressed a strong remonstrance to the Governor-General Lord Hardinge, in which he forcefully described the unjust treatment meted out to him. The document is a rare specimen of language and argument, having been drafted by Pratapsinh's agent George Thompson.

The deposition and persecution of Chhatrapati Pratapsinh released a wave of discontent and revolt all over the country. The region round about Satara was naturally much affected and a chain of disturbances followed the deposition. They were inspired and organised by Dharrav Pavar of Karad. The most noteworthy of these revolts was planned and executed by Narsappa Dattatraya Petkar, alias Nimbaji or Narsingrav of Islampur. He had an interview with the Chhatrapati at Nimb when the latter was on his way to Kashi. Later he contacted an Arab jamadar, Koberan, another Arab, Talib bin Ali and with their help collected over a thousand men at Raichur, led an attack against the fort of Badami in 1841. captured it and hoisted the flag of Satara Raja on it. Thereupon Company's divisions from Dharvar and Belganv suddenly rushed to the place and recaptured the fort. Narsihgrav was sentenced to transportation for life and he died in 1862 in Ahmadabad jaii. In the course of another similar attempt under the leadership of one Jagmohan and Benarban (Brindaban?) Colonel Ovans, the Satara Resident was waylaid and put into confinement for about two weeks. The rising was suppressed in 1844. It is however difficult to say what part Chhatrapati Pratapsinh played in these attempts. [History of Freedom Movement in India: Bombay Government Publication, pp. 55-56.]

Shahaji 1839-48.

Although Government were convinced of the clearness and com pleteness of the evidence against Pratapsinh there were not a few who made every effort to discredit the discoveries of the Resident Colonel Ovans. The principal informants, even Colonel Ovans him self, were accused before the Court of Directors of taking bribes to trump up a case against Pratapsinh, and the chief papers were said to be forgeries. Shahaji the successor to the ehiefship hated his. brother Pratapsinh, and Pratapsinh's advocates declared that many of the accusations brought against their client were due to Shahajis malice and ambition; Pratapsinh's case was taken up as has been said above by Dr. Milne, ex-president of the Medical Board of Bombay, and a pensioner of the Bombay Government, as also by several proprietors of East India Stock, and General Lodwick the former Resident of Satara. The cry reached Parliament. But the explanations of Colonel Ovans and his colleagues in the Commission of 1836 were considered entirely satisfactory. Nothing came of the agitation except three years delay between Pratapsinh's conviction and his punishment.

Till the end Pratapsinh's management of the state was excellent. His strength and practical sense as a governor only highlights his desire to be given a fair trial. His schemes, however, unlikely to succeed, were viewed by Government as neither the blind follies of an ignorant tool nor the empty aspirations of a visionary.

After his succession to power Shahaji's submissive attitude in resigning all his claims over the Jagirdars as also his loyalty to the British Government strongly contrasted with Pratapsinh's insistence on asserting his claims and his unceasing efforts to seek a fair trial.

Under a treaty dated the 4th of September 1839 all the provisions of the treaty of 1819 not expressly repealed were confirmed. The chief change was that the great estate-holders or Jagirdars were placed under the direct control of the British Government instead of under the chief of Satara. Shahajl built and supported a civil hospital and schools and was liberal in expenditure on roads, bridges, and other public works which were executed out of the balance found in Pratapsinh's treasury and by savings in the military establishment. He abolished transit duties and introduced the Company's rupee. The rite of sati or widow-burning had become very common under Pratapsinh's administration, and in spite of the Resident's remonstrances, British subjects had been allowed to come to Satara to perform the rite. On his accession Shahajl of his own accord abolished sati by proclamation and at a later period interferred to prevent a woman burning herself. During the first Afghan war (1841-42) Shahajl offered his troops, and during the 1845 insurrection in Kolhapur and Savantvadi he kept his territories in order, sent a detachment of his troops to act against the rebels, and did valuable service by forwarding supplies and keeping open communications. His expenditure on public works including those above named amounted to nearly Rs. 11 lakhs. Of this, nearly Rs. 2 lakhs were for improving the Satara water works and another Rs. 2 lakhs for two fine bridges across the livers Vena and Krshna on the Poona road by the Salpi pass. He also finished the magnificent court room and buildings known as the New Palace and now used as the Satara court of justice. In March 1848, in the midst of his plans of usefulness, Shahajl was attacked with serious illness. He for some time had taken under his protection a boy of obscure birth on whom he had conferred the name of Balvantrav Bhonsle and the title of Rajadnya. On the 1st of April as his sickness increased Shahajl sent for the Resident Mr., the late Sir Bartle Frere, and more than once engaged in long conversation with him regarding the succession. He expressed the wish to make so extravagant a provision for Rajadnya that Mr. Frere formed the idea that he was anxious to adopt him as his son. Mr. Frere remarked that so low born a child was unsuitable to succeed him, and Shahaji stated that he intended to choose from any branch of the Bhonsle family except those of Kolhapur, as they had married into the less pure family of the Shindes and of Vavi. Bocause his brother Pratapsinh had adopted a boy from their family, he expressed a strong unwillingness to recognise Pratapsinh's adopted son. He hinted that if he was suddenly overtaken by death he would adopt and trust to the generosity of Government to recognise adoption.

Shahaji's Death. 5th April 1848.

On the 5th of April the Resident left for Mahabaleshvar. He was brought back by a note telling him that the Raja despaired of life and had declared his purpose of adopting a son. The adoption took place in the presence of Dr. Murray, the Civil Surgeon of Satara. The lad who was named Venkaji, was of the house of Shedganv which traces its origin to Sharifji the uncle of the great Shivaji. The Raja made Dr. Murray write in English, as he spoke in Marathi, a memorandum of his adoption of Venkaji whom he named Venkaji Raja after Shivaji's younger brother. There can be no doubt that all through these proceedings Shahaji was anxious to defer to the British Government in every possible way, and that nothing but the near approach of death led him to make an adoption without their sanction.

Mr. Frere arrived at Satara at ten in the evening. He went straight to the palace and explained to the Ranis and assembled chieftains that the decision of the Supreme Government must be awaited as to the course of succession; that till then he could not recognise the adoption; and that the government of the Satara territory would be conducted by the same agency as before under the Resident's control. All expressed their confidence in and willingness to defer to the wishes of the Supreme Government. On the 12th of April 1848 the Resident wrote to Government, ' No act is so trifling but' it has been interpreted in various ways, favourable or unfavourable to the continuance of the state, according to the hopes or fears of the party. Government will not be surprised at this when it is considered that the bread of almost every one in the city depends more or less on this decision. Besides the holders of land and other grants who may feel more or less secure according to the tenure on which they hold, at least 10,000 persons are supported directly by salaries from the court, and most of these have probably many dependents. Few of the people of Satara, even of those whom the change would not directly affect, would be indifferent to the passing away of Shivaji's dynasty.'

Intrigue was at once opened with Pratapsinh's family at Panares. Reports were circulated and letters written stating that the late Raja had asked the Resident to send for Pratapsinh's adopted son, that, though this was not the ease, Pratapsinh's choice was nearer by blood to the Raja's line than Shahaji's choice, that Babajipant forced Shahaji to adopt Venkaji, and that Shahaji was insensible when the adoption took place. The presence of Dr. Murray and the precautions taken by the Raja and the Resident in specifying the Raja's intentions gave the lie to these reports. The British Government had to decide what was to be done with Satara, Their decision turned on three leading points: (1) Was Shahaji's adoption valid without recognition by the British Government?, (2) If it was not valid was the Bombay Government bound in justice or expediency to recognise it? and (3) What were the claims of Pratapsinh's adopted son and the members of the house of Shahaji? The opinion was generally accepted that as regards private estates the adoption was valid without the recognition of Government. Whether the adoption was valid as regards the political powers conferred by the treaty of 1819 was a point on which opinions differed. All members of the Government both of Bombay and India held that the sanction of the paramount power was required to render an adoption to a principality valid. But Sir George Clerke, Governor of Bombay (1847-1848) held that in the case of Satara the right of sanction could not without injustice be exercised to the extent of forbidding adoption. The other members of the Bombay Government and all the members of the Government of India were of opinion that to confer or to withhold the sanction was at the option of the British Government as the paramount power, and that the only question was one of expediency. On financial, military, and political grounds it was decided that it was regarded as expedient to withhold the sanction of Government to the adoption [ Some light is thrown on the so-called grounds of expediency through a letter dated 24th December 1847 written by Sir John Hobhouse, the President of the Board of Control to Lord Dalhousie the Governor-General. Says the President "The death of the ex-Raja of Satara certainly comes at a very opportune moment. The reigning Raja is, I hear, in very bad health and it is not at all impossible we may soon have to decide upon the fate of his territory. I have a very strong opinion that on the death of the present prince without a son no adoption should be permitted, this pretty principality should be merged in the British Empire; and if the question is decided in my day I shall leave no stone unturned, to bring about that result.]. It was thought that the country would benefit by the annexation of Satara, and that the condition of the Deccan no longer made it necessary to maintain native states like Satara as a safety valve for characters who would be discontended under direct British rule.

It was held that no other members of the family of Shivaji had any claim to the succession. The treaty of 1819 was with Pratapsinh and his heirs and successors. All his ancestry were passed by, no right was confirmed to them. The other branches of the family could have no pretension to the territorial rights which were created in favour of Pratapsinh. The arrangement of 1839 especially admitted Pratapsinh's brother Shahaji to that settlement, and the adopted son of the last recognised possessor of the throne must have a better right than the adopted son of the deposed chief or of any other claimant. When the discussion was shifted to England certain advocates argued that political powers conferred on the Satara state differed from the tenure of all those persons to whom the right of adoption to territorial possessions had been refused, and that, as regards Satara, the title of Paramount Power as applied to the British Government was misplaced. That therefore if the adoption were legal according to the usages of the state it was valid independent of British sanction. It was further argued that if British sanction was required it was contrary to the treaty to refuse if; that even if the adoption was invalid for want of sanction or for any other cause, the collaterals had claims under the treaty, the terms of which did not necessarily restrict the succession to lineal heirs and that at any rate the claims of collaterals should not be barred without giving them a chance of stating them. The able management of the state by both Rajas, and the loyalty of the second Raja, were urged as reasons for showing consideration to Shahajis wishes. A well governed state, it was argued, was a source of strength to the British empire. Only five members of the Court of Directors dissented from the annexation of Satara.

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