HISTORY

MUSLIM RULE

 Delhi Governors.

THE FIRST MUSALMAN INVASION OF THE DECCAN TOOK PLACE IN 1296 [Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan Vol. VI, pp. 15-16. It was not Ram Dev but his son Sangama who gave shelter to the refugee king of Gujarat and Ram Dev denounced his son and asked Ala-ud-din to take steps to restore his authority. This happened after the unsuccessful expedition of Alauddin against Warangal in 1303-04 (K.A.N. Sastri-History of South India, p. 219).] but the power of the Devagiri Yadavas was not extinguished till 1318 [Briggs' Ferishta, I. 304. In 1296 (Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan: Vol. VI, p. 31) Ramdev the ruling king of Devagiri or Devgad was surprised in his capital by Ala-ud-din Khilji, the nephew of the Delhi emperor Jalal-ud-din Khilji, and forced to pay tribute. In 1297, Ramdev gave shelter to Rai Karan the refugee king of Gujarat, and neglected to pay tribute for three years (Ditto, I. 365). In 1306-07 Malik Kafur, Ala-ud-din's general reduced the greater part of Maharashtra, distributed it among his officers, and confirmed Ramdev in his allegiance (Ditto, I. 369). In March 1307 (Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Vol. VI, p. 31), Malik Kafur, on his way to Telingan was received with great hospitality at Devgad by Ramdev (Ditto, I. 371). In 1311 (Ramdev died in 1311, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Vol. VI, p. 38) as Ramdev was succeeded by his son Shankardev (the name of Ramdev Rao's son is Sirighanadev and not Shankardev-Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Vol. VI, p. 48) who was not well affected to the Musalmans, Malik Kafur on his wav to the Karnatak left a force at the town of Paithan on the left bank of the Godavari to overawe the Yadavas (Ditto, I. 373). In 1313 Malik Kafur marched a fourth time into the Deccan, seized and put Shankardev to death, wasted Maharashtra, and fixed his residence at Devgad (Ditto, I. 379), where he remained till Ala-ud-din in his last illness ordered him to Delhi. During Malik Kafur's absence at Delhi, Harpaldev the son-in-law of Ramdev stirred the Deccan to arms, drove out many Musalman garrisons, and with the aid of the other Deccan chiefs recovered Maharashtra. In 1318 Mubarik Khilji, Ala-ud-din's son and successor, marched to the Deccan to chastise Harpaldev who fled at the approach of the Musalmans, and was pursued, seized, and flayed alive. Mubarik appointed Malik yak Laki, one of his father's slaves, to command in the Deccan, and returned to Delhi (Ditto, I. 389). ]. From 1318 Maharashtra began to be ruled by governors appointed from Delhi and stationed at Devagiri. The Delhi emperor Muhammad Tughlag (1325-51) made Devagiri his capital and changed its name to Daulatabad or the Abode of Wealth. In 1341 Musalmar. exactions caused a general revolt in the Deccan, which, according to Ferishta, was so successful that in 1344 Muhammad had no part of his Deccan territories left him except Daulatabad. In 1345 there was widespread disorder, and the Delhi officers plundered and wasted the country [ Briggs' Ferishta. I. 432-33.]'.

MUSLIM RULES Bahmanis 1317-1489.

These cruelties led to the revolt of the Deccan nobles in 1347 under the able leadership of an Afghan soldier named Hasan Garigu bearing the title Zafar Khan. The Nobles were successful, and freed the Deccan from dependence on Northern India [Briggs' Ferishta, II. 285-91. Hassan Gangu, the first Bahamani kiwi, was an Afghan of the lowest rank and a native of Delhi. He farmed a small plot of land belonging to a Brahman astrologer named Gangu who was in favour with the king of Delhi. Having accidentally found a treasure in his field, Hasan had the honesty to give notice of it to his landlord. The astrologer was so struck with his integrity that he exerted his influence at court to advance Hasan's fortunes. Hasan thus roye to a great station in the Deccan, where his merit marked him out among his equals as their leader in their revolt. He assumed the name of Gangu in gratitude to his benefactor, and from a similar motive added that of Bahamani or Brahmani by which his dynasty was afterwards distinguished. About the origin and 'early history of Hasan there is much dispute and Wolsley Haig traces his descent to an ancient Persian hero, (see CHI, II 372) but Dr. P. M. Joshi is right when he says " On the whole it is much safer to leave the question open as to the origin and early history of Hasan ". Karlier he remarks " Firishta therefore cannot be dismissed off hand as absurd'". (See Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan Vol. VI p. 249) Elphinstoue's History of India, 666'. The Bahamani dynasty consisted of the following eighteen kings, who were supreme for nearly 150 years (1347-1490) and continued in power for about thirty years more:

].

Hasan founded a dynasty, which in honour of his patron, a Brahman he called Bahamani, and which held the command of the Deccan for nearly ISO years. The Bahamani capital was first fixed at Gulbarga about 180 miles east or Satara and in 1426 was removed to Bedar or Ahmadabad-Bedar about 100 miles further east. By 1351 Ala-ud-din Hasan Gangu Bahamani, by treating the local chiefs and authorities in a liberal and friendly spirit, had brought under his power every part of the Deccan which had previously been subject to the throne of Delhi [Briggs' Ferishta, II. 291-292; Grant Duff's Marathas Vol 1 p. 45.] . In 1357. Ala-ud-din divided his kingdom into four provinces or tarfs, over each of which he set a provincial governor or tarfdar. Satara formed part of the provinces of Gulbarga which extended from Gulbarga as far west as Dabhoi and south as far as Raichur and Muclgal in the Nizam's territory. Ala-ud-din apparently had control over the whole of Satara, except the hilly west which with the Koukan was not reduced till a century later. In the latter part of the fourteenth century, under the rule of Muhammad Shah Bahamani (1358-1375). the banditti which for ages had harassed the trade of the Deccan were broken and scattered, and the people enjoyed peace and good government [Briggs' Ferishta, II. 325-326.]. This period of prosperity, when the fort of Satara [Satara fort is said to have been built in 1190 A. D. by Silahar Bhoj II of Kolhapur (History of Kolhapur in Marathi Vol. 1 Part I, p. 170 by B. P. Modak) Satara may have been repaired later] and may other forts were probably built, was followed by the awful calamity of the Durga Devi famine, when the country is said to have been reduced to a desert by twelve rainless years (1396-1407). In the first years of the famine Mahmud Shah Bahamani (1378-1397), is said to have kept ten thousand bullocks to bring grain from Gujarat to the Deccan, and to have founded seven orphan schools in the leading towns in his dominions [ Briggs' Ferishta, II. 349-350. These seven towns were Cheul, Dabhol, Elichpur, Daulatabad, Bedar, Gulbarga and Kandhar.]. No efforts of any rulers could preserve order of life, through so long a series of fatal years. Whole districts were left without people, and the strong places fell from the Musalmans into the hands of local chiefs [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I p. 50.]'. Before the country could recover, it was again wasted by two rainless years in 1421 and 1422. Multitudes of cattle died and the people broke into revolt [Briggs' Ferishta, II. 405-06.]. In 1429 Malik-ut-Tujjar the governor of Daulatabad, with the hereditary officers or deshmukhs, went through the country restoring order. Their first operations were against some Ramoshis in Khatav Desh and a body of banditti that infested the Mahadev hills. The army next marched to Wai and reduced several forts. So entirely had the country fallen waste that the old villages had disappeared and fresh villages had to be formed, which generally included the lands of two or three old villages. Lands were given to all who would till them, free of rent for the first year and for a horse-bag of grain for the second year. This settlement was entrusted to Dadu Narsu Kale, an experienced Brahman, and to a Turkish eunuch of the Court [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I p. 51.]. In 1453, Malik-ut-Tujjar, who was ordered to reduce the sea coast, of Konkan forts, fixed his head-quarters at Chakan, a small fort eighteen miles north of Poona, and, after reducing several chiefs, laid siege to a fort whose chief was named Shirke who he speedily obliged to surrende, and to deliver himself and family into his hands. Malik-ut-Tujjar insisted that Shirke should embrace the Muhammedan faith or be put to death. Shirke on this, assuming an air of great humility, represented that there existed between him and Sharikar Ray of Khelna or Vishalgad in Kolhapur a family jealousy, and that should he become a Muhammedan, his rival, on Malik-ut-Tujjar's retreat, would taunt him with ignominy and excite his own family and subjects to revolt. He further promised to accept the Muhammedan faith if Malik-ut-Tujjar would reduce his rival, and agreed to guide him and his forces through the woody and very difficult country to Shahkar's dominions. Malik-ut-Tujjar marched against the chief of Khelna but was treacherously surrounded and killed in the woods by Shirke[Briggs' Ferislita, III. pp. 438-39.]. About this time (1453-1480) no references have been traced to Satara places except to War and Man which are mentioned as military posts, whose troops in 1464 were ordered to join Mahmud Gavan in his Konkan expedition [Briggs' Ferislita, II. 483.]. In 1460, and twelve years later in 1472 and 1473, failure of rain so wasted the country that in 1474 when rain fell, scarcely any one was left to till the land [Briggs' Ferislita, II. 483, 493, 494.]. The power and turbulence of their provincial governors was a source of weakness and danger to Bahamani rule. To remove this evil Mahmud Gavan, the very learned and able minister of Muhammad Shah Bahamani II (1463-1482), framed a scheme under which the Bahamani territories were divided into eight instead of into four provinces. Satara was included under Bijapur, one of the two divisions into which Gulbarga was divided, and was placed under Khwaja Gavan himself. In each province only one fort was held in the governor's hands; all other forts were entrusted to captains and garrisons appointed and paid from headquarters; the pay of the captains was greatly increased and they were strictly compelled to keep their garrisons at their full strength [Briggs' Ferislita, II. 503, 504.]. This scheme for reducing their power brought on the minister the haired of the leading nobles. They brought false charges of disloyalty against Mahmud Gavan. The king was weak enough to believe them and foolish enough to order the minister's execution, a loss which Bahamani power never recovered [Of the Bahamani kings Muhammad II was a scholar of Arable and Persian. He attracted Arab and Persian people to the Deccan in order to make the country the seat of learning and culture. He appointed teachers in various centres of the kingdom and large cities and towns. This immigration of Arabs and Persians had a great effect upon the culture and future history of the Deccan. With this influence which was definitely foreign in character, we find the native Hindu art influencing the cultural structure of the Bahamanis. We find that in the reign of Firoz the relations between Hindus and Muslims were excellent and the influence of Hindu culture was creeping even though slowly, in the sacred buildings of the Bahamanis. In a word the twenty-two years in interregnum between the death of Muhammad I and the accession of Firoz are really a period of struggle between the cultures immerging into an atmoshpere of an attempted synthesis of purely Hindu forms, the foreign influence represented by the Afaqis and the northern tradition represented by the Bahamanis.].

Adil Shahi 1489-1686.

In 1481, on the death of Mahmud Gavan, his estate of Bijapur including Saturn was conferred on Yusuf Adil Khan the future founder of the Adil Shahi dynasty of Bijapur [Yusuf Adil Shah of Bijapur was a Turk, a son of Amurath Sultan (1421-1451) of Constantinople. He founded the family of the Adil Shahi ruler of Bijapur consisting of nine sovereigns whose rule lasted nearly 200 years. At the same time the Nizam Shahi dynasty under Ahmad Nizam was established at Ahmadnagar (1490-1636), the Kutb Shahi dynasty under Sultan Kutb-ul-mulk at Golkonda (1512-1609), and the Barid Shahi under Kasim Barid at Bedar (1492-1609). Though kings, nominally supreme, continued to rule as late as 1526, the supremacy of the Bahamanis may be said to have ceased when the Bijapur (1489) and Ahmadnagar (1490) governors threw off their allegiance and established themselves as independent rulers. According to Colonel Meadows Taylor, except Humayun Shah (1457-1461), the Bahamani kings protected their people and governed them justly and well. Among the Deccan Hindus all elements of social union and local government were preserved and strengthened by the Musalmans, who, without interfering with or remodelling local institutions and hereditary offices, turned them to their own use. Persian and Arabic education was extended by village schools attached to mosques and endowed with lands. This tended to the spread of the literature and faith of the rulers, and the effects of the education can still be traced through the Bahamani dominions. A large foreign commerce centred in Bedar, the capital of the Deccan, which was visited by merchants and travellers from all countries. The Bahamani kings made few public works. There were no water works, no roads or bridges, and no public inns or posts. Their chief works were huge castles which after 500 years are as perfect as when they were built. These forts have glacis and counterscarps, covered ways, traverses, flanking bastions with curtains and intermediate towers, broad wet and dry ditches, and in all plain fortresses a faussebraye or rampart-mound with bastions and towers in addition to main rampart. No forcible conversion of masses of. Hindus seems to have taken place. A constant stream of foreigners poured in from Persia, Arabia, Tartary, Afghanistan, and Abyssinia. These foreigners, who served chiefly as soldiers, married Hindus and created the new Muhammedan population of the Deccan. The names and elates of the Ahmadnagar and Bijapur kings are:-

Ahmadnagar and Bijapur Kings, 1489-1686 (Cambridge History of India, Vol. III, p. 704)

], who was appointed tarafdar or provincial governor, while Daria Khan Fakr-ul-mulk, Mallu Khan and most of the Mughal Officers attached to him obtained estates in the province. In 1489 Yusuf Adil Khan asserted his independence and proclaimed himself king. He wrested many forts from the governors of Mahmud Shall Bahamani If (1482-1518), and subdued all the country from the river Bhima to Bijapur [Briggs' Ferishta, III, 9.]. In 1551 Saif Ain-ul-Mulk, late commander-in-chief of the Ahmadnagar army who had taken refuge in Berar and who at the request of the Bijapur king had come to Bijapur was given considerable estates in Satara. In the battle of Sholapur against Ahmadnagar in the same year Ibrahim Adil Shah suspected Saif Ain-ul-Mulk of treachery, and he, in consequence, retired to Man in east Satara, collected the revenue, and divided them among his troops. Ibrahim Adil Shah sent one of his officers with 5,000 horse to expel Ain-ul-Mulk, but the Bijapur troops were defeated. Saif Ain-ul-Mulk, growing bolder by success, gathered the revenues of man)' districts including Valva in Sangli. Ibrahim next sent against him 10,000 horse and foot under Niaz Kuli Beg and Dilavar Khan Habshi. These troops were also defeated and so many elephants and horses and so great a store of valuable baggage fell into the hands of Ain-ul-Mulk that he levied fresh troops and determined to establish himself as an independent chief. Ibrahim Adil Shah took the field in person at the head of 5,000 chosen horse, 3,000 foot, and a train of artillery. Ain-ul-Mulk encamped on the river Man, and the king arrived and halted some days on the opposite bank without attacking him. Saif Ain-ul-Mulk resolved not to quit the country without fighting. For three days he advanced towards the king's camp as if to engage hut as often retired, the royal army remaining under arms on each occasion from dawn till sunset expecting the attack. On the fourth clay Ain-ul-Mulk put his troops again in motion; but the king, supposing that his design was only to parade as on the preceding days, neglected to make-preparations for his reception, the common guards of the camp only getting under arms. At length, when the enemy's standard appeared in sight, Ibrahim Adil Shah marshalled his troops in great haste and moved out of the camp to give battle. Ain-ul-Mulk averse from engaging the king in person consulted with his friends, observing that it was treason to fight against the royal standard. To this all agreed except Murtaza. Khan Anju who remarked that the standards did not light, and there was no danger of shedding royal blood. Ain-ul-Mulk satisfied with his casuistry and finding it too late to hesitate, charged the royalists, and attacking the centre where Ibrahim Adil Shah was posted, pressed on it so fiercely that it was thrown into disorder and the king fled. On this his whole line broke and victory declared in favour of Ain-ul-Mulk, who seized the royal canopy, elephants, and artillery, besides all the tents and baggage. Ain-ul-Mulk pursued the king towards Bijapur, but was afterwards obliged to fly by the route of Mail Desh to the Ahmadnaga dominions where he was assassinated [Ibid, 105.]. In 1579, the Bijapur minister Kishvar Khan falsely accused Chand Bibi, the dowager queen, of instigating her brother, Murtaza Nizam Shah, king of Ahmadnagar, to invade Bijapur, and sent her a prisoner to Satara after subjecting her to many indignities [Briggs' Ferishta, III.]. On Kishvar Khan's fall in the same year Chand Bibi was released from prison and conducted to Bijapur [Briggs' Ferishta, III, 150.]. In 1592 Dilavar Khan, the Bijapur regent, was sent a prisoner to Satara where he died [Briggs' Ferishta, III, 172-I73.] shortly after.

Their Institutions

Under the Bijapur kings, though perhaps less regularly than afterwards under the Moghals, the country was divided into districts or sarkars. The district was distributed among sub-divisions which were generally known by the Persian names pargana, karyat, Minimal, mahal, and taluka, and sometimes by the Hindu names of prant and desh. The hilly west, which was generally managed by Hindu officers, continued to be arranged by valleys with their Hindu names of khora, mura, and maval. The collection of the revenue was generally entrusted to farmers, the farms sometimes including only one village. Where the revenue was not farmed, its collection was generally entrusted to Hindu officers. Over the revenue-farmers was a government agent or amil, who, besides collecting the revenue, managed the police and settled civil suits. Civil suits relating to land were generally referred to juries or panchayats. In money suits the amils or government agents probably passed decisions. One of the amildars, who superintended a considerable division and to whom all other amildars, were subordinate, was termed mokasadar, and it is conjectured that he had some percentage on the revenue. The mokasadar's office though sometimes continued from father to son was not hereditary. Frequently but not always over the mokasadar was a subha who, although he took no share in the revenue management and did not live in the district, executed deeds and formal writings of importance. Though the chief power in the country was Muhammedan, Hindus were largely employed in the service of the State. The garrisons of hill forts seem generally to have been Hindus, Marathas, Kolis, Ramoshis, and Dhangars, a few places of special strength being reserved for Musalrnan commandants or killedars. Besides the hill forts, some parts of the open country were left under loyal Maratha and Brahman officers with the titles of estate-holder or jagirdar and of district head or deshmukh. Estates were generally granted on military tenure, the value of the grant being in proportion to the number of troops which the grant-holder maintained. Phaltan from which in the time of the Peshvas 350 horse were required, furnished only fifty to the Bijapur government at a very late period of the dynasty, but the Maratha chiefs could procure horsemen at short notice and they were entertained or discharged at pleasure. Family feuds or personal hate, and, in the case of those whose lands lay near the borders of other kingdoms, an intelligent regard for the chances of war-, often divided Maratha families and led members of one family to take service under rival Musalman states. Numbers of Hindus were employed in the Bijapur armies and those of distinguished service were rewarded with the Hindu title of Raja, naik, and rav [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I pp. 64-65].

Maratha Chiefs

The principal Maratha Chiefs in Satara under the Bijapur government were Chandrarav More of Javli, about thirty-five miles northwest of Satara, Rav Naik Nimbalkar of Phaltan about thirty-five miles north-east of Satara. Junjharrav Ghatge of Malavadi about twenty-seven miles east of Satara, Daphle of Jath about ninety miles south-east of Satara, Mane of Mhasvad about sixty miles east of Satara, and the Ghorpade of Kapshi on the Varna about thirty miles south of Karad. A person named More, originally a Karnatak chief was appointed in the reign of Yusuf Adil Shah (1490-1510) to the command of a body of 12,000 Hindu infantry sent to reduce the strong tract between the Nira and the Varna. More was successful. He dispossessed the Shirkes and completely suppressed the depredations of their abettors, the chiefs of whom were Gujar, Mamulkar, Mohite, and Mahadik. More was dignified with the title of Chandrarav and his son Yeshvantrav, having distinguished himself in a battle fought with the troops of Burhan Nizam Shah (1508-1553), in which he captured a green flag, was confirmed in succession to his father as Raja of Javli and had permission to use the banner he had won. Their descendants ruled in the same tract of country for seven generations and under their mild and just management that barren tract became populous. All the successors of the first More assumed the title of Chandrarav. The unswerving loyalty of this family induced the Bijapur government to exact little more than a nominal tribute from districts producing so little, and which had always been in disorder under Muhammedan governors. Rav Naik Nimbalkar or Phaltanrav was the Naik of Phaltan. His original surname was Pavar; he had taken the name of Nimbalkar from Nimbalik or Nimlak where the first Nimbalkar lived. The family is considered one of the most ancient in Maharashtra as the Nimbalkar was made sardeshmukh of Phaltan before the middle of the seventeenth century by one of the Bijapur kings. The deshmukh of Phaltan is said to have become a polygar or independent chief and to have repeatedly withheld the revenues of the district. Vangoji or Jagpalrav Naik Nimbalkar who lived in the early part of the seventeenth century was notorious for his restless and predatory habits. Dipabai the sister of Jagpalrav was married to Maloji Bhonsle, Shivajis grandfather who was one of the principal chiefs under the Ahmadnagar kingdom. Jagpalrav Naik seems to have been a man of great influence. It is said that it was through his exertions that the marriage of Maloji's son Shahaji and Jijabai, Lukhdev Jadhavrav's daughter, was brought about against the wishes of the girl's parents. One of the Phaltan Naiks was killed in 1620 in a battle between Malik Ambar and the Moghals. Nimbalkar never exchanged his ancient title of naik for that of Raja. Junjharrav Ghatge, the deshmukh of Malavadi was the head of a powerful family whose founder Kam Raje Ghatge had a small command under the Bahamani kings. His native country Khatav was separated from that of the Nimbalkar by the Mahadev Hills. The Ghatges were deshmukhs and sardeshmukhs of the pargana of Man. In 1626 Nagoji Ghatge was given the title of sardeshmukh as an unconditional favour by Ibrahim Adil Shah II, together with the title of Jhunjarray. The head of the Mane family was deshmukh of Mhasvad, adjoining the district of the Ghatges. The Manes were distinguished shiledars or self-horsed cavaliers under Bijapur, but were nearly as notorious for their revengeful character as the Shirkes. The Ghorpades, who were originally Bhonsles, according to then-family legend acquired their present surname during the Bahamani times from having been the first to scale a fort [Khelna or Vishalgad in 1471. See Sherwani II. K., Bahamanis of Deccan, p. 298.] in the Konkan which was deemed impregnable by fastening a cord round the body of a ghorpad or iguana. They were deshmukhs under the Bijapur government and were divided into two distinct families, one of Kapshi near the Varna river and the other of Mudhol near the Ghatprabha in the Karnatak. Under Bijapur the Kapshikar Ghorpades were known as the navkas or nine-touch Ghorpades and the Mudholkars as the satkas or seven-touch Ghorpades, a distinction which the two families maintain. The head of the Mudholkar Ghorpades was the patil of a village near Satara. The Ghorpades seem to have signalized themselves at a very early period. The high Musalman titles of Amir-ul-umra or Chief of the Nobles was conferred on one of the members of the Kapshi family by the Bijapur kings. The first Ghorpade that joined Shivaji was one of the Kapshikars while the Mudholkars were his bitter enemies. The Daphles were deshmukhs of the pargana of Jath. Their original name was Chavhan and they took the surname of Daphle from their village of Daphlapur of which they were hereditary patils. They held a command from the Bijapur kings [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, pp. 69-71.].

Shivaji 1627-1680.

In 1636 the Nizam Shahi dynasty came to an end. In 1637 Shahaji Bhonsle, the son of Muloji Bhonsle, who had taken a considerable part in Nizam Shahi affairs during the last years of the dynasty, was allowed to retire into the service of Mahmud Adil. Shah of Bijapur (1636-1656). In 1637, besides giving Shahaji his jagir districts in Poona, Mahmud Adil Shah conferred on Shahaji a royal grant for the deshmukhi of twenty-two villages including Masur [Patrasar Sangraha No. 885.] in the district of Karad, the right to which had by some means devolved on government [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, p. 96.]. Before the middle of the 17th century, Shahaji's son Shivaji, [Some recent sources assert that he was born on 19th February, 1630.] the founder of the Maratha empire, had begun to establish himself in the hilly parts of Poona in the north where he had been put in possession of his father's estate of Poona and Supa. By 1648 he obtained control over the strong forts of Torna [According to jadunalli Sarkar the tort of Torna was captured in 1646 and Kajgad was a new fort built by Shivaji in the same year (Jadnnath Sarkar -Shivaji, p. 34).

The date of acquisition of Koudana is not known. Shivapur Deshpande Bhai gives the year 1647. This year is indicated by Mohammednania (Jadunath Sarkar-Shivaji, p. 35).] in Bhor about thirty-five miles and Kondana or Sinhgad about twelve miles south-west of Poona, of Purandhar about twenty miles south of Poona, and of Kajgad in Bhor about five miles east of Torna. At this time the south of the Nira, as far east as Shirval and as far south as the range of hills north of the Krshna, was farmed by the hereditary deshmukh of Hirdas Maval, a Maratha named Bandal, and the fort of Rohida was committed, to his care, fie early entertained a jealousy of Shivaji and kept a strong garrison and carefully watched the country round Purandhar. The deshpdnde of the place was a Prabhu. Wai was the station of a Bijapur Mukasadar or manager who had charge of Pandugad, Kamalgad and several other forts in the neighbourhood. Chaudrarav More, Raja of Javli, was in possession of the Ghatmatha from the Krsna to the Varna [Grant Duffs Marathas, Vol. I, p. 109.]. The Bijapur government being impressed with the idea that it was incited by Shahaji, caused him to be imprisoned, and at the same time sent an army under Fateh Khan to attack Shivaji; but Shivaji proved more than a match for him and killed him in the battle of Belsar near Purandhar. Shahaji was subsequently released in the same year, and an effort was made to bring about reconciliation between him and Baji Ghorpade, the Mudhol Chief who had been instrumental in his capture. To induce both parties to forget what had passed, Mahmud Adil Shah made them exchange their hereditary rights and inams as deshmukhs. Baji Ghorpade thus obtained from Shahaji the deshmuki rights of twenty-two villages in Karad which Shahaji had acquired in 1637 from Bijapur [Grant Duffs Marathas, Vol. I, p. 115.]. This agreement however was not acted upon. In the meanwhile another attempt was made to seize Shivaji and this time Baji Shamraj was sent for the purpose. Shivaji frequently lived at the town of Mahad in Kolaba and the party of Shamraj, passing through the territory of Chaudrarav More, lurked about the Par pass until an opportunity should offer. Shivaji anticipated the surprise, attacked the party near the bottom of the pass and drove them in great panic to the forests. Disturbances in the Karnatak prevented the Bijapur government any further from taking active steps against Shivaji, who finding that his father had been sent far away from the capital on a military campaign in Karnatak, began to devise new schemes for possessing himself of the whole Ghatmatha or hilly west Deccan. With this object in view Shivaji turned his attention to the Mores of Javli who were very powerful in that region. The ruling prince [Shiv Bharat Canto 13 shloka 43.] Yeshvantrav was however none too friendly towards Shivaji and would not fall in a line with the designs of Shivaji. In fact he had reasons to be grateful to Shivaji because it was he who was instrumental [Ruling princes of Javli enjoyed a hereditary title " Chandrarny ".] in enabling Yeshvantrav to succeed to the jahagir of Javli after the death of Daulatrav in 1648, who died childless and whose widow had sought the help of Shivaji in adopting young Yeshvantrav and carrying on the administration in his name dining Yeshvantrav's minority with the assistance of one Hanmantrav More, a distant relation of the family. In course of time Yeshvantrav grew jealous of his independent position and impatient of Shivaji's interference. Shivaji spent years in negotiation for a peaceful way to gain his object. There was also some understandable reason for Shivajis patience. Afzalkhan the subhedar of Wai who had acted as the representative of the sovereign power of Bijapur since 1649 was anxious to prevent both Yeshvantrav and Shivaji from growing very powerful in that region. He had sent letters to Kanhoji Jedhe and other sardars to join his standard for the purpose. There thus arose a triangular contest between the Mores, Shivaji and Afzalkhan. About the year 1654, Afzalkhan came to be transferred to Kanakgiri [Sardesai: New History of the Marathas p. 112.] and Shivaji seized this opportunity of Afzalkhan's absence; to deal resolutely with the affair. He took into his confidence some of the Maval Deshmukhs, particularly Kanhoji Jedhe and Haibatrav Silimkar as also other neighbours of the Mores and sent a proposal to Javli stating terms which the Mores refused to accept. Then he dispatched a contingent of these Deshmukhs along-with his commander Sambhajf Kavji and a small force threatening their residence. This first attempt proved ineffectual, and Shivaji sent another force under Raghunath Ballal Korde. A battle was fought near Javli in which Hanmantrav More was killed and Yeshvantrav fled for his life and took shelter in the fort of Rairi. Prataprav More another scion of the family escaped to Bijapur to seek the help of Adil Shall to oust Shivaji from Javli (26-1-1656). Shivaji himself at once proceeded to Javli, stayed there for two months, and strengthened his hold upon the principality. In the meantime Yeshvantrav started serious trouble afresh from the hill top of Rairi, a large and lofty plateau near Mahad which belonged to the Mores. Shivaji sent troops and his agent Haibatrav Silimkar to Yeshvantrav demanding submission. After a long negotiation, a meeting was arranged at the foot of Rairi in May. When the Mores came down to meet Shivaji, he killed the principal offender Yeshvantrav and carried his two sons Krshnaji and Baji as captives to Poona. The capture of the strong fort of Vasota, which had also belonged to Mores, about fifteen miles west of Satara, subsequentlv called Vajragad by Shivaji and the conquest of Shivthar valley completed the conquest of Javli. Later on the two sons of Yeshvantrav were detected conducting secret intrigues with Bijapur and were therefore put to death [Sardesai; New History of the Marathas Vol. I, p. 112-113.]. The result of Shivaji's swift and decisive action towards Mores was on the whole helpful to his pursuits, because the turbulent chiefs in the surrounding area came to know what to expect from him if an open opposition were offered to his plans and desires. Shivaji followed up his conquest of javli by surprising Rohida which he scaled at night at the head of the Mavlis. Bandal, the deshmukh who was in the fort at the time stood to his arms on the first moment of alarm; and although greatly outnumbered his men did not submit until he was killed. At the head of them was Bajl Prabhu Deshpande; Shivaji treated him with generosity, received him with great kindness, and confirmed him in all his hereditary possessions. He had relations with Shivaji, and afterwards agreed to follow the fortunes of his conqueror; the command of a considerable body of infantry was conferred upon him and he maintained his character for bravery and fidelity to the last.

Pratapgad built by Shivaji, 1656.

In 1656, to secure access to his possessions on the banks of the Nira and the Koyna and to strengthen the defences of the Par Pass Shivaji pitched upon a high rock near the source of the Krshna on which he resolved to build another fort commanding an extensive view of Konkan to the west. The execution of the design was entrusted to Moro Trimal Pingle, who shortly before had been appointed to command the fort of Purandhar in Poona. This man, when very young, had accompanied his father, then in the service of Shahaji to the Karnatak and returned to the Maratha country about the year 1653 and shortly alter joined Shivaji. The able manner in which he executed every thing entrusted to him soon gained him the confidence of his master and the erection of Pratapgad, the name given to' the new fort, confirmed the favourable opinion entertained of him [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, 119.]. A new image of the goddess Bhavani, the prototype of his family deity, Bhavani of Tuljapur, was later installed in the fort and Shivaji made it a practice to visit the place on devotional grounds, whereby he effectively served his political object of keeping a watchful eye on the region around. In the same year (1656) the Moghals invaded the Bijapur territories and Sarjerav Ghatge, Nimbalkar, and other Maratha estate-holders promptly joined Khan Muhammad, the Bijapur prime minister with their troops [Grant Duffs Marathas, Vol. I, 123.].

Battle of  Pratapgad.

About the year 1658 Bijapur was distracted by factions among its nobles and the youth of its sovereign Ali Adil Shah II. At last they became sensible of the necessity of making an active effort to subdue Shivaji. For this purpose an army was assembled consisting of 500 horse and 7000 choice infantry, a good train of artillery or what was considered as such, besides a large supply of rockets, a number  of swivels mounted on camels, and abundance of stores.

Afzal- Khan killed, 1659.

 Afzal Khan, an officer of high rank, volunteered to command the expedition, and in his public leave-taking, in the vaunting manner particularly common to Deccan Muhammedans of those days, pompously declared that he should bring back the insignificant rebel and cast him in chain under the footstool of the throne. To avoid impediments which presented themselves on the straight route from Bijapur and the heavy rains which seldom subsided in the neighbourhood of the hills till the end of October, the army proceeded in September 1659 from Bijapur to Pandharpur and thence marched towards Wai. Shivaji, on its approach, took up his residence in Pratapgad and sent the most humble messages to Afzal Khan. He pretended to have no thought of opposing so great a personage, and seemed only anxious to make his peace with the Bijapur government through the Khan's mediation; he affected the utmost sorrow for his conduct, which he could hardly persuade himself would be forgiven by the king, even if the Khan should receive him under the shadow of his protection; and he would surrender the whole of his country to the Khan were it possible to assure himself of his favour. Afzal Khan, who had all the vanity of a Muhammedan noble, had also a thorough contempt for his enemy. At the same time as he had formerly been in charge of the Wai district he was aware of the exceeding difficulty of an advance through the wild country which he must penetrate. With such considerations and mollified by Shivaji's submission, Afzal Khan in answer to repeated applications despatched a Brahman in his own service named Gopinathpant with suitable attendants to Pratapgad. On his arrival at Par, a village below the fort, Shivaji came down to meet him. The Brahman stated that the Khan, his master, and Shahaji were intimate friends, that the Khan bore no enmity towards his son, but on the contrary would prove his desire to aid him by interceding for his pardon, and even endeavouring to get him confirmed as jagirdar in part of the territory he had usurped. Shivaji acknowledged his obligation although his reply at the public meeting was not couched in the same humble strain he had used in his message. He said that if he could obtain a part of the country in jagir it would be all he could expect, that he was the king's servant and that he had been of considerable use to his government in reducing several chiefs whose territory would now come under the royal authority. This was the substance of what passed at their first interview. Shivaji provided accommodation for the envoy and his suite, but assigned a place for the Brahman at some distance from the rest. In the middle of the night Shivaji secretly introduced himself to Gopinathpant. He addressed him as a Brahman, his superior. He represented that all he had done was for the sake of Hindus and the Hindu faith, that he was called on by the goddess Bhavani herself to protect Brahmans and cows, to punish the violators of their temples and their gods, and to resist the enemies of their religion, that it became Gopinathpaht as a Brahman to aid a course which Bhavani had sanctioned, and that if he did, he should ever after live among his caste and countrymen in comfort and wealth. Shivaji seconded his arguments with presents, and the solemn promise to bestow the village of Hivra on him and his posterity for ever. The Brahman envoy could not resist such an appeal seconded by such an inducement and swore fidelity to Shivaji, declared he was his for ever, and called on the goddess to punish him if he severed from any task Shivaji might impose. They consulted on the fittest means for averting the present danger. The Brahman, fully acquainted with Afzal Khan's character, suggested tempting him to a conference and Shivaji at once approved of the scheme. He sent for Krshnaji Bhaskar, a confidential Brahman, informed him of what had passed, and of the resolution which he had adopted. After fully consulting on the subject they separated as secretly as they had met. After holding some interviews and discussion for the purpose of masking their design, Krshnaji Bhaskar as Shivaji's agent was despatched with Gopinathpant to the camp of Afzal Khan. Gopinathpant represented Shivaji as in great alarm; but if his fears could be overcome by the personal assurance of the Khan, he was convinced that he might easily be prevailed on to give himself up. With a blind confidence Afzal Khan trusted himself to Gopinathpant's guidance. An interview was agreed on, and the Bijapur troops with great labour moved to Javli Shivaji prepared a place for the meeting below the fort of Pratapgad; he cut down the jungle, and cleared a road for the Khan's approach but every other avenue to the place was carefully closed. He ordered Moropant and Netaji Palkar from the Konkan with many thousands of the Mavli infantry. He communicated his whole plan to these two and to Tanaji Malusare. Netaji was stationed in the thickets a little to the east of the fort, where it was expected that part of the Khan's retinue would advance, and Moro Trimal with a body of old and tried men was sent to hide himself in the neighbourhood of the main body of the Bijapur troops which as had been agreed remained near Javli. The preconcerted signal for Netaji was the blast of a horn, and the distant attack by Moro Trimal was to begin on hearing the fire of five guns from Pratapgad which were also to announce Shivaji's safety. Fifteen hundred of Afzal Khan's troops accompanied him to within a few hundred yards of Pratapgad, where, at Gopinathpant's suggestion they were desired to halt to dispel any doubt and fear that Shivaji had professed about Khan's preparations. Afzal Khan, dressed in a thin muslin garment, armed apparently only with his sword, and attended, as per mutual agreement only by two armed soldiers, Bada Sayyad and another, advanced in his palanquin to' a well-decorated reception tent set up for the occasion, about half way up the ascent of the fort. Shivaji while preparing himself to meet the Khan for peaceful negotiations, had taken complete precautions to meet any contingency. It was Thursday, 10th of November 1659. On that day after a morning bath and usual worship and prayers, Shivaji took his meals and bid a hasty but affectionate farewell to his friends, committing his son Sambhaji to their care. He rose, put on a steel chain cap under his turban and chain armour under his cotton gown, held Bhavani sword in his right hand, concealed a crooked dagger or bichva in his left sleeve, and put on a shield to cover his back. Thus armed he slowly descended from the fort. The Khan had arrived at the place of meeting before him, and expressed his jealous indignation at the lavish grandeur of decoration of the mandap which surpassed something that could be observed at Bijapur and which the son of a sardar of Bijapur should be in a position to display. By that time Shivaji was seen advancing, attended by two of his companions Jiva Mahala and Sambhaji Kavji.

Shivaji viewing Afzal Khan at a distance expressed fear for the presence of Bada Sayyad and requested Khan, through Pantaji Gopinath that Bada Sayyad be kept a few paces away, to which Afzal Khan readily agreed and as if to dispel fear, even handed over his sword to Krshnaji Bhaskar who was standing nearby. Khan however, was not left completely unarmed; for he had a dagger fixed by his right side near the waist. With characteristic over-confidence Afzal Khan took no objection to Shivajis companions although they had possessed their usual arms with them, a circumstance which might have passed unnoticed, being common amongst Marathas. He advanced two or three paces to meet Shivaji; they were introduced to each other by Pantaji Gopinath and further in the midst of the customary embrace, the tall and mighty Khan was able to hold the neck of comparatively short statured Shivaji under his left arm. As the Khan tried to press it, he took out his dagger from his waist on the right side and tried to hit the left side of Shivaji. As Shivaji was clad in armour, the steel weapon only made a sharp rubbing sound against his side but did not hurt him. Thereupon Shivaji, ever on his guard hit the bichva in his left hand on the right side of the Khan. Unfortunately the Khan wore no armour and therefore the hit proved singularly effective and ripped open his bowels [The story told by Sabhasad and reproduced by Grant Duff, that Shivaji fixed Vaghnakhs or steel tiger's claw on his fingers and used the weapon for killing Afzal Khan, is not supported by Shiva Bharat, which is a contemporary and a comparatively more reliable evidence. That Vaghnakhi were found in the collection possessed by the later Chhatrapatis of Satara is however true. In 1827 Raja Pratapsinh then Chief of Satara (1810-1839) gave the Vaghnakhs to Mr. Elphinstone. They were most formidable steel hooks and attached to two rings fitting the fingers and lay concealed in the inside of the hand. Colbrooke's Elphinstone. II 188. See also Scott Waring's Marathas, 69,]. Khan uttered the words 'treachery' 'treachery' and shouted for help. Khan's hold on Shivajis neck by this time was naturally slackened and Shivaji having made himself free quickly thrust his sword right through Afzal Khan's stomach and in a moment Afzal Khan lay dead on the ground. Krshnaji Bhaskar who possessed Afzal Khan's sword tried to rescue him but was held at bay by Shivaji who with another stroke of his sword separated the head of the Khan from the trunk of his body. At this moment Bada Sayyad rushed forth and tried to attack Shivaji but Jiva Mahala finished him. The palanquin bearers of Khan tried to take away the body putting it in the palanquin but Sambhaji Kavji hit at their legs, seized the head of the Khan and marched towards the gate of the fort. The sharp shrill sound of the bugle-like horn was a signal to Netaji Palkar and the Mavlis lying in concealment, who fell upon Khan's army, that was resting at the foot of the hill. Moro Trimal also, began his operations on hearing the sound of five guns fired from Pratapgad on Shivaji coming out safe. Few of the Bijapur soldiers had time to mount their horses or stand to their arms. Netaji Palkar gave no quarter; but orders were sent to Moropant to' spare all who submitted. Shivajis humanity to his prisoners was conspicuous on this as on most occasions. Many of those that had attempted to escape were brought in several days afterwards in a state of great wretchedness. Their reception and treatment induced many of the Maratha prisoners to enter Shivaji's service. The most distinguished Maratha taken was Jhunjharrav Ghatge whose father had been the intimate friend of Sbahaji, but Shivaji could not induce him to depart from his allegiance to Bijapur. At his own request he was allowed to return, and was honourably dismissed with valuable presents. The son and family of Afzal Khan were taken by Khanduji Khopde one of Shivaji's officers, but on being offered a large bribe he agreed to guide them to a place of safety, and led them by unfrequented paths across the mountains and along the banks of the Koyna, until he safely lodged them in Karad. When this treachery came to Shivaji's knowledge Khopde was condemned to death and at once executed [Afzal Khan incident was for a long time regarded as one of the controversial topics in the life of Shivaji. The fact that Afzal Khan who had gone to meet Shivaji should have met with sudden death at Shivaji's hands led the common observer to believe that Shivaji meant treachery. Muslim chroniclers and those that closely followed them naturally presented the story in that light. Subsequent research has however revealed that Afzal Khan intended to seize Shivaji dead or alive, and' that he was making preparations to that effect (see Patra Sar Sangraha No. 774 and 792). Afzal's over-confidence and unguarded behaviour brought the tragic end upon him. Eager to meet Shivaji, Afzal rashly consented to meet the lion in his den as it were. If Shivaji had meant treachery, he would have certainly asked his people lying concealed in the thickets at the foot of the hill, to fall upon Afzal Khan then found well within his trap; and he would have avoided the risk of an interview with the Khan. In this controversy enough weight has not been given to Shivaji's readiness to meet the Khan who was known for his earlier treacherous behaviour and whose intentions to seize Shivaji had been widely publicised. (See Shiva Charitra Nibandhavali : R. P. Patwardhans essay on "Afzal Khan's Expedition", pp. 178-179).].

This success greatly raised the reputation of Shivaji. The immediate fruits were four thousand horses, several elephants, a number of camels, a considerable treasure, and the who'e train of equipment which had been sent against him. Such of his troops as were wounded, Shivaji on this occasion distinguished by presents of bracelets, necklaces, chains of gold and silver, and clothes. These were presented with much ceremony, and served to stimulate future exertion among his soldiers as well as to give greater fame to his exploit. The sword of Afzal Khan and Shivaji's favourite sword Bhavani passed to the Moghals on the capture of Sambhaji in 1689. They were restored by Aurahgzeb to Shahu in 1707 and till 1827 remained a valued trophy in the armoury of Shivaji's descendants. Gopinathpaht received the promised grant of Hivra in reward for his help to Shivajl, and was afterwards promoted to considerable rank in the service [Grant Duff's Marathas, 137.].

In 1659, Shivaji surprised the fort of Vasantgad about seven miles north-west of Karad, levied contributions along the Krshna, and left a thana or garrison with a revenue collector in the gadhi or mud fort of Battis Shirala. In January 1661, Ali Adil Shah II disappointed in his hopes of crushing Shivaji, took the field in person and marched to Karad. All the district authorities, some of whom had submitted to Shivaji, attended the royal camp to tender their allegiance. Ali Adil Shah recovered Panhala and Rangna in Kolhapur which had fallen to Shivaji in the previous year [Grant Duff's Marathas, 143.].

In 1661, as Shivaji was unable to visit the famous temple of Bhavani at Tuljapur during the rains, he with great solemnity dedicated as has been mentioned above, a temple to her in the fort of Pratapgad. His religious observances from this time became exceedingly rigid; he chose the celebrated Ramdas Svami as his mahapurush or spiritual guide and aspired to a high character for sanctity [Grant Duff's Marathas, 144. For a further elucidation as regards Ramdas- Shivaji relations see p. 39.]. In 1662 when Shivaji thought of making Raygad in Kolaba his capital he held the Kohkan Ghatmatha that is the hilly west Deccan from the Bhima to the Varna [Grant Duff's Marathas, 147.]. In 1665, in accordance with the terms of the treaty of Purandhar by which Shivaji ceded to the Moghals the forts which he had taken from them and twenty others taken or built by him in the old Nizam Shahi territory and obtained the right of levying the chauth and sardeshmukhi over the Bijapur dominions and to co-operate with the Moghals to subdue Bijapur, Shivaji with a body of 2,000 horse and 8,000 infantry joined Jaysingh and the combined army marched about November. Their first operations were against Bajaji Naik Nimbalkar a relation of Shivaji and jagirdar of Bijapur. Phaltan was reduced and the fort of Tathvad scaled by Shivaji's Mavlis. All the fortified places in their route were taken. Ali Adil Shah had prepared his troops, but endeavoured to prevent the invasion by promises of settling the demands of the Moghals. But Jaysingh continued his advance and met with little opposition until near Mahgalvedha in Sholapur [Grant Duff's Marathas, 165.] In 1668 Shivaji obtained a yearly payment of money from the Bijapur Government in lieu of a levy of the chauth and sardeshmukhi over the Bijapur dominions and in spite of the narrowing of his territory by the Purandhar treaty he still retained the western Satara hills.

Shivaji's institutions

The years 1668 and 1669 were of greatest leisure in Shivaji's life. Some of his contemporaries, speculating on the future, supposed from his apparent inactivity that he would sink into insignificance, but he employed this interval in revising and completing the internal management of his government, which with his various institutions are the key to the forms of government afterwards adopted by every Maratha state. Shivaji's regulations were gradually formed and enlarged, but after a certain period underwent no change by the extension of his territory until he assumed the ensign of royalty. Even then the alterations were rather in matters of form than in rules. The plans of Maratha expansion which were afterwards pursued so successfully by his nation may be traced from a very early period and nothing is more remarkable in regard to Shivaji than the foresight with which some of his schemes were laid and the fitness of his arrangements for the genius of his countrymen.

The foundation of his power was his infantry; his occupation of the forts gave him a hold on the country and a place of deposit for his plunder. His cavalry had not yet spread the terror of the Maratha name; but the rules of formation and discipline for his troops, the interior economy of his infantry and cavalry, the regulations for his forts, his revenue and judicial arrangements, and the chief offices through which his government was administered were fully developed. Shivaji's infantry was raised in the West Deccan and Konkan; the men of the West Deccan tract were called Malis or westerners, those of the Konkan, Hetkaris or southerners. These men brought their own arms and required nothing but ammunition. Their dress, though not uniform, was generally a pair of short drawers coming half-way down the thigh, a strong narrow band of considerable length tightly girt about the loins, a turban, and sometimes a cotton frock. Most of them wore a cloth round the waist, which likewise answered the purposes of a shawl. Their common arms consisted of a sword, shield and matchlock. Some of the Hetkaris, especially the infantry of Savantvadi used a species of firelock, the invention of the lock for the flint having been early received from the Portuguese. Every tenth man, instead of firearms, carried a bow and arrows which were useful in night attacks and surprises when firearms were kept in reserve or forbidden. The Hetkaris excelled as marksmen but they could seldom be brought to the desperate sword-in-hand attacks for which the Mavails were famous. Both of them had unusual skill in climbing, and could mount a precipice or scale a rock with ease, where men of other countries must have run great risk of being dashed to pieces. Every ten men had an officer called a Naik and every fifty a havildar. The officer over a hundred was termed jumladar and the commander of a thousand was styled ek-hazari. There were also officers of five thousand, between whom and the sarnobat or chief commander there was no intermediate step. The cavalry was of two kinds. bargirs, literally bridlemen or riders who were supplied with horses and shiledars who were self-horsed; Shivaji's bargirs were generally mounted on horses, the property of the state. A body of this description was termed pagah or household troops, and Shivaji always placed more dependence, on them than on the shiledars or any horse furnished on contract by individuals; with both he had a proportion of his pagah mixed, to overawe the disobedient and to perfect his system of intelligence which abroad and at home penetrated into a knowledge of the most private circumstances, prevented embezzlement, and frustrated treachery. The Maratha horsemen were commonly dressed in a pair of tight breeches covering the knee, a turban which many of them fastened by passing a fold of it under the chin, a frock of quilted cotton, and a cloth round the waist, with which they generally girded on their swords in preference to securing them with their belts. The horseman was armed with a sword and shield; a proportion in each body carried matchlocks, but the great national weapon was the spear, in the use of which and in the management of (heir horses they showed both grace and skill. The spearmen had generally sword and sometimes a shield; but the shield was unwieldy, and was carried only in case the spear should be broken. Over every twenty-five horsemen Shivaji had a havildar. To one hundred and twenty-five there was a jumladar, and to every five jumlas or six hundred and twenty-five was a subhedar. Every subha had an accountant and auditor of accounts appointed by Shivaji, who were liable to be changed and were invariably Brahmans or Frabhus. To the command of every ten subhas or six thousand, two hundred and fifty horse, which were rated at only five thousand, there was a commander styled panch-hazari with whom were also stationed a muzumdar or Brahman auditor of accounts and a Prabhu registrar and accountant who' was called amin. These were government agents. Besides these, every officer, from the jumladar upwards, had one or more karkuns or writers paid by himself as well as others in the pay of government. Except the sarnobat or chief, no officer was superior to the commander of five thousand There was one sarnobat for the cavalry and one for the infantry. Every jutnla, subha, and panch-hazari had an establishment of news-writers and spies besides secret intelligencers. Shivajis head spy was a Maratha named Bahirji Naik. The Marathas are peculiarly roused from indolence and apathy when charged with responsibility. Shivaji at the beginning of his career personally inspected every man who offered himself, and obtained security from some persons already in his service for the fidelity and good conduct of those with whom lie was not acquainted. This system of security must soon have made almost every man answerable for some of his comrades; and although it could have been in most instances but a form, owing to the ease with which the responsibility could be evaded, the demand of security was always a part of Shivajis instructions to his officers. The Mavlis sometimes enlisted, merely on condition of getting a subsistence in grain; but the regular pay of the infantry was 1 to 3 pagodas [A pagoda was equal to from Rs. 3 to Rs. 4.] a month; that of the bargis or riders, was 2 to 5 pagodas and that of the shiledars or self-horsed cavaliers 6 to 12 pagodas a month. All plunder as well as prizes was the property of government. It was brought at stated times to Shivajis darbar or place of public audience and individuals formally displayed and delivered their captures. They always received some small proportionate compensation; they were praised, distinguished, and promoted according to their success. In fact to collect plunder from the enemy's ranks was usually regarded by the Marathas to express a victory, of which in their estimation it could be the only tangible proof. The horses, especially at an advanced period of Shivaji's history, were subsisted during the fair season in the enemy's country; during the rains they were generally allowed to rest, and were cantoned in different places near kurans or pasture lands, under the protection of some fort, where the grass of the preceding season was stacked and grain prepared by the time they returned. For this purpose persons were appointed to whom rentfree lands were hereditarily assigned. The system was preserved when many of Shivaji's institutions were neglected, and it proved a great aid to the success of his countrymen.

Shivaji kept the Hindu festival of the Dasara with great pomp. It falls in October at the end of the south-west rains, and was particularly convenient for a general muster and review of his troops previous to their taking the field. At this time each horse was examined and an inventory and valuation of each soldier's effects were taken to be compared with what he brought back or eventually to be made good. If a horseman's effects were unavoidably lost, his horse killed, maimed, or destroyed in government service they were on due proof replaced. On the other hand all plunder or articles discovered, of which no satisfactory account could be given, were carried to the credit of government, either by confiscating the article or deducting the amount from the soldier's arrears. It was at the option of the captors to keep almost any articles if fairly brought forward, valued, and paid for. The, accounts were closed every year, and balances due by government were paid either in ready money or by bills on the collectors of revenue in favour of the officers, but never by separate orders on villages. The only exceptions to plunder made by Shivaji were in favour of cows, cultivators, and women; these were never to be molested-nor were any but rich Muhammedans or Hindus in their service who could pay a ransom to be made prisoners. No soldier in the service of Shivaji was permitted to carry any female followers with him to the field on pain of death. His system of intelligence was the greatest check on every abuse, and his punishments were rigorous. Officers and men who had distinguished themselves, who were wounded, or who had suffered in any way, were always gratified by promotion, honour or compensation. Shivaji did not approve of the jagir or estate system; he confirmed many, but, with the exception of the establishment for his forts, he seldom bestowed new military estates and gave away very few as personal assignments, lnam lands were granted by him as well in reward of merit as in conformity with the tenets of his faith; a gift of land, especially to Brahmans, being of all charities the most acceptable to the divinity. Shivaji's discipline, which required prompt obedience to superiors in every situation, was particularly strict in his forts. The chief person or killedar in the command of a fortress was termed havildar and under him there was one or more sarnobats. In large forts there was a sarnobat to each face. Every fort has a head clerk and a commissary of grain and stores; the head clerk, a Brahman was termed sabnis; the commissary was commonly of the Prabhu caste and was called karkhannis. The orders regarding ingress and egress, rounds, watches, and patrols, care of water, grain, stores, and ammunition were most minute, and the head of each department was furnished with distinct rules for his guidance from which no deviation was allowed. A rigid economy characterised all Shivaji's instructions regarding expenditure. The garrison was sometimes partly composed of the common infantry. Independent of them, each fort had a separate and complete establishment. It consisted of Brahmans, Marathas, Ramoshis, Mahars, and Mangs; the whole were termed gadkaris or fort-men. They were maintained by permanent assignments of rent-free lands in the neighbourhood of each fort, which with the care of the fort passed from father to son. The Ramoshis and Mahars were employed on outpost duty. They brought intelligence, watched all the paths, misled inquiries, or cut off hostile stragglers. This establishment while new and vigorous was admirably suited to Shivaji's purpose as well as to the genius of the people. The gadkaris described the fort as the mother that fed them, and among other advantages, no plan could better provide for old or deserving soldiers.

Shivaji's revenue arrangements were founded on those of Dadaji Kondadev, Shahaji's Brahman manager, to whom Shivaji's education in Poona was entrusted (1641) [D.V. Kale: Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj p. 27.]. The assessments were made on the actual state of the crop, the proportionate division of which is stated to have been three-fifths to the husbandmen and two fifths to government. As soon as Shivaji got permanent possession of any territory, every species of military contribution was stopped, all farming of revenue ceased, and the collections were made by agents appointed by himself. Every two or three villages were superintended by karkun under the tarafdar or talukdar who had charged of a small district, and was either a Brahman or a Prabhu. A Maratha havildar was stationed with each of them. Over a considerable tract there was a subhedar or mamlatdar who had charge of one or more forts in which his collections both of grain and money were secured. Shivaji never permitted the deshmukhs and deshpandes to interfere in the management of the country; nor did he allow them to collect their dues until their amount had been ascertained, when an order was annually given for the amount. The patil's, khots and kulkarnis were strictly superintended, and Shivaji's government though popular with the common cultivators, would have been unpopular with village and district officers, of whom Shivaji was always jealous, had it not been for the recourse which all had of entering his military service.

The method which the Brahman ministers of the Maratha government afterwards adopted, of paying the military and civil servants by permanent assignments on portions of the revenue of villages, is said to have been early proposed to Shivaji. He objected to it, not only from fear of immediate oppression to the husbandmen, but from apprehending that it would in the end cause such a division of power as must weaken his government and encourage the village and district authorities to resist it as they frequently did that of Bijapur. With the same view he destroyed all village walls and allowed no fortification in his territory which was not occupied by his troops. Religious establishments were, carefully preserved, and temples for which no provision existed had some adequate assignments granted to them, but the Brahinans in charge were obliged to account for the expenditure. Shivaji never sequestrated any allowance fixed by the Muhammedan government for the support of tombs, mosques, or saints' shrines. The revenue regulations of Shivaji were simple and judged by the standards of those times undoubtedly judicious.

People were encouraged to clear the jungles, raise crops and revive the village panchayats. They were further assured that the authorities would not take anything more than whatever be due according to law. This persistent effort to foster the rule of law and create an atmosphere of security endeared him to his people, it is just possible, however, that his judicious measures may not have been attended with immediate improvements and prosperity to the people as is sometimes alleged; for his districts were frequently exposed to great ravages, and he never had sufficient leisure: to complete his arrangements by that persevering superintendence which alone can perfect such institutions. The Muhammedan writers, and Fryer, a contemporary English traveller describe his country as in the worst possible state, and the former only mention him as a depredator and destroyer. Still those districts taken by him from Bijapur which had been under the management of farmers or direct agents of government undoubtedly experienced great benefit by the change. The judicial system of Shivaji in civil cases was that of panchayat or council which had invariably obtained in the country. Disputes among his soldiers were settled by their officers. He drew his criminal law from the Hindu sacred works or Shastras; but as the former rulers were Musalmans they had naturally introduced changes which custom had sanctioned and perpetuated. This accounts for the difference that long afterwards persisted between Hindu law and Maratha usage.

To aid in the conduct of his government, Shivaji established eight offices; 1st the Peshva or head manager whose office was held by Moro Pant or Moreshvar Trimbak Pingle; second the Muzumdar or general superintendent of finance and auditor general of accounts, whose office was held by Abaji Sondev, subhedar of the province of Kalyan; third the Sumis or general record-keeper, superintendent of correspondence, examiner of letters; the office was held by Annaji Datto; fourth the Vanknis or private record-keeper and superintendent of the household troops and establishment; the office was field by Dattajipant; fifth the Sarnobat or chief captain of whom there were two, Prataprav Gujar over the cavalry and Yesaji Kank over the infantry; sixth the Dabir or minister for foreign affairs, an office held by Somnathpant; seventh the Nyayadhish or superintendent of justice, an office managed by Niraji Ravji and Gomaji Naik; and eighth the Nyaya Shastri or expounder of Hindu law, an office held first by Shambhu Upadhya and afterwards by Raghunathpant.

The officers at the head of these civil situations, except the Nyayadhish and Nyaya Shastri, held military commands and frequently had not leisure to superintend their duties. All therefore were aided by deputies called karbharis. who often had power to fix the seal or mark of their principals on public documents. When so empowered they were styled mutaliks. Each department and every district establishment had eight subordinate officers under whom were an adequate staff of assistants. These officers were. 1st the Karbhari, Mutalik or Divan; 2nd the Muzumdar or auditor and accountant; 3rd the Fadnis or Fadruvis deputy auditor and accountant; 4th the Sabnis or clerk sometimes styled daftardar: 5th the Karkhannis or commissary; 6th the Chitnis or correspondence clerk; 7th the Jamdar or treasurer in charge of all valuables except cash; and 8th the Potnis or cashkeeper. Attached to himself, Shivaji had a treasurer, a correspondence clerk, and an accountant besides a Farisnis or Persian secretary. His clerk was a Prabhu named Balaji Avji, whose astuteness and intelligence were remarked by the English at Bombay on an occasion when he was sent there on business. Balkrshnapant Hanmante, a near relation of Shahajis head manager was Shivajis accountant. On Shivaji's enthronement at Raygad in 1674 the names of such offices as were formerly expressed in Persian were changed to Sanskrt and some were marked by higher sounding titles. There was only one commander-in-chief for the infantry and cavalry and one Nyayadhish or judge [Grant Duffs Marathas, 206'-:207. The following statement gives the names and the old and new titles of Shivaji's ministers in 1674:].

Shivaji's Ministers, 1674.

Shivaji's takes satara.

In May 1673 a detachment of Shivaji's Mavlis surprised Parali about four miles south-west of Satara. Its capture put the Musalman garrisons on the alert, and Satara, a fort that had always been kept in good order by the Bijapur government, which was next invested, sustained a siege of several months and did not surrender till the beginning of September. It is remarkable that this fort which had long, perhaps before the Adil Shahi Dynasty, been used as a slate prison, often became the prison of Shivaji's descendants in later years. The forts of Chandan, Vandan, Pandavgad, Nandgiri, and Tathvad all fell into Shivaji's hands before the fair season [Grant Duffs Marathas, 202. Satara was captured on 27th of July and after the capture of Satara Shivaji installedhis Guru in the neighbouring hill for of Parali or Sajjangad, and guides still point out the tourists the seat on the top of the Satara hill from which Shivaji used to hold conversation with the saint across 4 miles of the space (Sarkar-Shivaji p. 193 and p. 363).]. In 1075 Shivaji again possessed himself of all the forts between Panhala in Kolhapur and Tathvad. As soon as he was occupied in Konkan and had carried down all the infantry that could be spared, Nimbalkar and Ghatge, the deshmukhs of Phaltan and Malavdi, attacked Shivaji's garrisons, drove out the posts and recovered most of the open country for Bijapur [Grant Duff's Marathas, 208. Satara was captured on 27th of July and after the capture of Satara Shivaji installedhis Guru in the neighbouring hill for of Parali or Sajjangad, and guides still point out the tourists the seat on the top of the Satara hill from which Shivaji used to hold conversation with the saint across 4 miles of the space (Sarkar-Shivaji p. 193 and p. 363).]. In 1676 Shivaji for the third time took possession of the open country between Tathvad and Panhala. To prevent future inroads by neighbouring proprietors Shivaji gave orders to connect the two places by a chain of torts, which he named Vardhangad, Bhushangad, Sadashivgad, and Machhindragad. Although of no great strength they were well chosen to support his intermediate posts and to protect the highly productive tract within the frontier which they embraced. While engaged in this arrangement Shivaji was overtaken by a severe illness which confined him at Satara for several months. During this period he became extravagently rigid in the observance of religious forms, but he was at the same time planning the most important expedition of his life, the invasion of the Madras Karnatak [Grant Duff's Marathas, 209.]. The discussion of his legal claim to share in half his father's Karnatak possessions and the possibility of making this a cloak for more extensive acquisitions in the south was a constant subject of consultation [Grant Duff's Marathas, 213.]. While Shivaji was in the Karnatak a body of horse belonging to Ghatge and Nimbalkar laid waste Panhala in the south and retired plundering towards Karad. A detachment from Shivaji's army under Nilaji Katkar overtook them at Kurli, attacked and dispersed them, recovering much valuable property, which, as it belonged to his own subjects, Shivaji scrupulously restored [Grant Duff's Marathas, 221].

In 1679, Shivaji's son Sambhaji joined "the Moghals [According to Sardesai, Sambhaji joined the Moghals in 1678 but the fort was captured in 1679 (Sardesai-New History of Marathas Vol. 1 p. 251 and Sarkar-Shivaji p. 317).]. Diler Khan the Moghal general, intent on making Sambhaji the head of a party in opposition to his father, sent a detachment of his army from before Bijapiir which they had invested, accompanied by Sambhaji as Raja of the Marathas, and took Bhupalgad in the Khanapur sub-division Shivaji's easternmost outpost [ Grant Duffs Marathas, 225.]. At the time of his death in 1680, Shivaji, who during the last two years of his life had become an ally of Bijapur against the Moghals, possessed that part of Satara of which the line of forts built from Tathvad to Panhala distinctly marked the eastern boundary. Shinganapur in the Man sub-division in the east with the temple of Mahadev was his hereditary inam village given by one of the Ghatges to his father Shahaji [Grant Duffs Marathas, 231.]. Ramdas Svami, Shivaji's guru or spiritual guide, whose life and conduct seem to have deserved the universal praise of his countrymen, a few days before his death in 1682 January wrote to Sambhaji his elder son from Parali an excellent and judicious letter, advising him for the future rather than upbraiding him for the past, and pointing out the example of his father yet carefully abstaining from personal comparison [Grant Duffs Marathas, 238.].

The name of Ramdas Svami is closely associated with many places in Satara region. On the completion of his all India pilgrimage he settled at Masur north of Karad near the river Krshna, in about 1644. After staying there for about three or four years he shifted to Chaphal where he continued his practice of celebrating the annual Ramnavmi festival for which Shivaji, is reported to have made an annual grant of 200 hons or about Rs. 700. There is some controversy as to the nature of relationship between Ramdas and Shivaji as also about the exact year in which they met each other, one side advocating that Ramdas met Shivaji as early as in 1649 and initiated him into his favour, while the other advocating that the two could not have met each other earlier than in 1672 [G. S. Sardesai: New History of Marathas, Vol. I, p. 266.]. Even accepting the later year i.e. 1672 as the one of their actual meeting it should be taken into account that their spheres of activity in which they worked for over thirty years, overlapped each other. Under the circumstances it is highly improbable that they might not have heard of each other. In fact there is ample indirect evidence to believe that the two held each other in high respect [G. S. Sardesai: New History of the Marathas Vol. I, p. 265,]. There is however no first hand evidence to prove that Shivaji ever took his inspiration from Ramdas for his political mission. Similarly there is also no first hand evidence to show that Ramdas's teaching which had been first purely religious, developed a secular and political character later because he was influenced by Shivajl's activities. It must be remembered that Ramdas started collating his famous Dasbodh in 1654, the piece-meal composition of which must have been done much earlier[Patra-Sar-Sangraha-1039.]. In 1676 Ramdas at the request of Shivaji came to stay at Parali which soon came to be known as Sajjangad [Patra-Sar-Sangraha, 1864.]. On Shivaji's return from the Karnatak campaign in 1678 Shivaji was apprised of the misconduct of his son Sambhaji whereupon Shivaji asked him to go to Ramdas at Sajjangad and stay with him for some time, hoping of course that the association of the saint would bring about the required change in his son's conduct. Unfortunately the hope was not realised, for Sambhaji soon chose a moment to escape from Sajjangad with the object of joining Diler Khan.

Sambhaji 1680-1689

After Shvaiji's death. Rajaram his younger son was placed on the throne at Raygad by his mother Soyarabai, who was supported by Shivaji's confidential secretary Balaji Avji. He wrote letters in his own hand to the Killedar of Panhala, calling upon him to keep a strict watch upon Sambhaji. The news of Shivajis death could not however be long concealed from Sambhaji. who killed the Killedar, took possession of Panhala and prepared for a march on Raygad. Senapati Hambirrav Mobile who was near Karad, and who probably had no intimation of the plans at Raygad went over to Sambhaji. In the meantime two of Shivajis prominent ministers Moropant Pingle and Annaji Datto who had supported the accession of Rajaram were moving towards Panhala, apparently to prevent Sambhaji from doing any mischief. Sambhaji however managed to capture and confine them both at Panhala under a rigorous watch. Determined to put down Soyarabai and her supporters, Sambhaji inarched on Raygad and got possession of the capital on 18th June 1680, putting Rajaram and Soyarabai in close confinement. In gratitude for this easy success he immediately made a formal grant to his family goddess Bhavani of ten thousand gold hons a year. Matters thus appeared to move smoothly. Moropant Pingle died in October 1680 and Sambhaji appointed his son Nilopaut to Peshvaship. Annaji Datto was released and restored to his office. The formal coronation ceremony was performed on 10th January 1681 (Magh Shuddh 7, Shiva Charitra Pradip p. 31). The disturbed atmosphere of Maharashtra appeared for a time to assume its normal tenor [ Sardesai: New History of the Matharas.].

At this time Akbar the son of Aurahgzeb rose up in rebellion against his father and fled to Rajputana. Aurangzeb fought a battle with him at Ajmer and defeated him. Akbar who had been supported by the Rathods of Rajputana under Durgadas fled with him to the south and came to the Deccan to seek the support of Sambhaji who extended his hospitality and accommodated him at Pali in Konkan. The discomfited group of Shivajis statesmen again revived their efforts and probably sought the support of Akbar in their designs against Sambhaji, who straightway communicated the whole plot to Sambhaji. His anger now knew no bounds with the result that he instantly put the conspirators, like Annaji Datto, Balaji Avji and Hiroji Farjand to death. (August-September 1681). Soyarabai, the mother of Kajaram who died soon after, was said to have been poisoned under instructions from Sambhaji. Members of the Shirke family to which Soyarabai belonged also incurred the displeasure of Sambhaji who put many of them to death [Marathi word ' Shirkan' meaning ' massacre' has been derived from this incident of the massacre of Shirkes.]. The massacre of Shivajis best men had a psychological reflex upon Sambhaji who felt himself somewhat lonely with almost none on whom he could depend. At this stage he developed closer relationship with one Kavi Kalash, a kanoji Brahman coming from Pravag, who soon became his trusted and intimate friend, ft appears that Sambhaji had known him long since the time of his return journey from Agra during the life time of Shivaji. The term Kavi Kalash came to be mutilated at the hands of his detractors into Qalusha which in Marathi meant a calumniator.

On his accession to the throne, Sambhaji found that his task was simply stupendous. On the Konkan side he had to face the Side and the Portuguese who constantly harassed his possessions in that region, while on the Deccan plateau he had to watch the movements of the Moghals under Azam, another son of Aurangzeb who had reached Aurangabad by that time. In the following year Moghal contingents were further strengthened by the arrival of prince Muazzam and Shahabuddin and they planned a three pronged attack on Sambhaji in Konkan, Shahabuddin penetrating from the north near Kalyan, Muazzam marching from Belganv across Ramsej ghat and joining hands with the Portuguese at Goa and thus blockading him from the south, and the Sidis co-operating with both cutting off the supplies and preventing them from reaching the Maratha forces which were to be trapped both from the north and the south. Simultaneously Azam was expected to distract the attention of Sambhaji by carrying on a foraging campaign into Baglan. For about three years Sambhaji was incessantly facing the difficult situation and it must be said to his credit, that he proved himself to be a worthy son of his father and foiled with great skill and adventure all the attempts of the Moghals, the Sidis and the Portuguese. There is a reference that Durgadas helped him on the Surat side in this effort. Akbar, the rebel prince, wanted Sambhaji to join him in his north India campaign for the conquest of Delhi; but it is not surprising that Sambhaji refused to move far away from his base of operations, particularly when he had always reason to suspect some plot formation against him at home. Disappointed. Akbar thereafter proceeded to Iran in February 1687.

Fall of Bijapur 1686.

To turn to the Moghals: Aurangzeb was so enraged at the discomfiture of his forces that he is reported to have taken the cap off his head and thrown it on the ground taking a vow never to wear it until Sambhaji was overcome. He however decided to proceed against Adil Shahi and Kutb Shahi powers first with the object of destroying them before he could turn his attention to Sambhaji. Accordingly he ordered his army to proceed to Bijapur. Thereupon Sambhaji resolved to harass Aurangzeb from the rear and with that object in view concentrated his forces under Kavi Kalash at Panhala and also asked Hambirrav to be watchful in that region. Sambhaji's efforts to distract the attention of Aurahgzeb in this manner, however, did not prove effective probably because Sambhaji gave himself up to pleasure and slackened in his grip over the situation. Aurahgzeb was able to capture Bijapur towards the end of 1686 and Golkonda next year and was now free to concentrate all his might against Sambhaji. For this purpose he encamped at Akluj [G. S. Sarderai: New History of the Marathas, Vol. I, p. 313.] on the banks of Bhima near Pandharpur. One of the old Bijapur generals Sharza Khan, a clever and watchful man, conversant with the terrain of the Maratha country who had now joined the Moghals, invaded the Satara district. Sambhaji's senapati  Hambirrav Mohite came to oppose him.

Moghals 1686-1720 Sambhaji 1680-1689.

An action was fought between them near Wai towards the end of 1687 in which Hambirrav lost his life on the battle field. A kind of encircling movement was now started against Sambhaji in all directions. He was surrounded by swarms of Moghal parties occupying the difficult passes and stopping communication between Panhala and Raygad where Sambhaji was known to be moving.

The hilly region below the Sahyadri range between Kolhapur and Satara were long held by the Shirkes who had become Sambhaji's mortal enemies. They now played their game, watched Sambhaji's movements and communicated them to the Moghal officers. For about a year after Hambirrav's death Sambhaji and Kavi Kalash struggled as best as they could. In November 1688 Sambhaji having learned that Shirkes had attacked Kavi Kalash and forced him to run away to Vishalgad for protection, rushed against them, forced them to take to their heels and joined Kavi Kalash at Vishalgad. Although Shirke was thus defeated, he came to know the movement of Sambhaji and lost no time in communicating them to the Moghals. On the 1st of February 1689 Sambhaji and Kavi Kalash started from Vishalgad and on their way to Raygad halted at Sangameshvar. No sooner was this known Shaikh Nizam of the Moghals lost no time in rushing thither from Kolhapur and seized them both alive:, while many others ran away to Raygad [Shiv Charitra Pradeep, pp. 34-35.]. Shaikh Nizam seated Sambhaji on his own elephant and the other captives were accommodated on horses and camels, all moving towards the Emperor's camp via Amba Ghat. Aurahgzeb moved from Akluj to Bahadurgad [Ditto 314.] where the captives were presented before him. They were subjected to disgrace and severe ill-treatment at that place and then Sambhaji was offered survival on very humiliating terms. Sambhaji who was roused to self-respect, spurned the offer and preferred a martyr's death to a disgraceful existence. Aurahgzeb now ordered him to be put to death by cruel torture and this was effected at Koreganv on 11th March 1689, the Amavastya day of Falguna, Saka 1610.

Social effects of Moghal-Maratha Conflict.

Before turning to subsequent events it is necessary to understand the social effects of the constant warfare and consequent uncertainty prevailing in Maharashtra during this period. The system of administration which Shivaji had introduced gradually fell into decay, which first appeared in the army where Shivaji's discipline and strict orders came to be neglected. When the horse took the field, stragglers were allowed to join, plunder was secreted, women followers who had been forbidden on pain of death were not only allowed but women were brought off from the enemy's country as an established article of plunder and either kept as concubines or sold as slaves. The booty brought back by the commanders of the horse was too small for the pay of the troops. They took the field in arrears and leave to keep part of the plunder was a natural compensation for the regular pay allowed by Shivaji. As Sambhaji had to incur heavy expenses, his favourite minister Kavi Kalash, raised the land-rent by the addition of various cesses. When he came to collect the revenue he found the receipts much less than they had been in the time of Shivaji though the assessments were nominally greater. The managers of districts were in consequence removed for what seemed to him evident peculation. The revenue was farmed, many of the husbandmen fled from their villages, and the approach of a vast army of the Moghals under Aurangzeb helped to complete the prospect of ruin to the Maratha territory [Grant Duff's Marathas, 246.]. In 1685 during his campaign Sultan Muazzam lay at Valva, and in the emperor's name took possession of such parts of the country as he could overrun. Deeds still remain in which Muazzam confirmed in his own name grants of lands originally given by Bijapur generals. In October a pestilence broke out in his camp, swept off many of his men, greatly diminished his force. Still on receiving the emperor's orders to reduce the south-west districts above the Sahyadris, formerly taken by Shivaji from Bijapur, he advanced without hesitation for that purpose [Grant Duffs Marathas, 250.]. In October 1686 Bijapur completely fell to Aurangzeb, the Bijapur government came to an end, and its territories passed to the Moghals [Grant Duffs Marathas, 206. In taking possession of a district the Moghals appointed two officers the fauzdar, a military and the khalsa divan, a civil officer. The fauzdar, who was in command of a body of troops was charged with the care of the police and the protection of his division. He held, or, according to circumstances assumed, a greater or less degree of power. The regular amount allowed him for the maintenance of the district establishment was about 25 per cent, of the government collections. The duties of the divan were entirely civil and he was entrusted with the collection of the revenue whether for the exchequer or on account of a jagirdar. The Moghal commander who received land grants, or jagirs from the newly acquired territories seldom had lands permanently made over to them similar to the tenure by which the Maratha mansabdars held their possessions. The usual practice was to grant assignments for a term of years on specified districts for the support of their troops. Thus, the fauzdars were on the footing of feudatories than the jagirdars. The fauzdars in conjunction with the divans farmed out the districts to the deshmukhs or desais and the divans realized the amount from them. Ditto, 267.]. The Maratha mansabdars on men of title who had been in the service of Bijapur, sent professions of duty to the emperor, but showed no readiness to join his standard.

Effect of Bijapur and Golkonda conquest.

The advantage which the Marathas had gained by the extinction of Bijapur Government was not neglected; several detachments pushed forward and occupied a great part of the open country towards Bijapur [Grant Duff's Marathas. 267- ]. This indiscriminate rush for the occupation of the extensive territory resulted in further weakening of the discipline in the Maratha army. Though ruinous to Sambhaji's resources as head of an organized state, this increased looseness had a wonderful effect in spreading predatory power. Every lawless man and every disbanded soldier, Mohammedan or Maratha, who could command a horse and a spear, joined the Maratha parties, and such adventurers were often enriched by the plunder of a day. it must also be realised that the Moghal invasion of the Deccan was a challenge to the Marathas whose spirit of independence was roused and stimulated by the prospects of a worthy prize to their spirit of adventure. The multitude of horsemen nurtured by former wars was already too heavy for the. resources of the Maratha state. The proportion of the best troops which was kept in the Imperial service would probably have soon enabled Aurangzeb to suppress the forces of disorder had not the spirit of independence as also the love of war been kindled among the Marathas. A pride in the conquests of Shivaji, their confidence in the strength of the forts, the skill and bravery of many of the Maratha leaders, the ability and influence of many of the Brahmans, and the anger raised among Hindus by the odious poll-tax, excited a ferment which developed a nationalistic character for they felt that they were fighting for the ashes of their fathers and temples of their gods. It required a man of broader vision than Aurangzob to deal with the new forces released bv the spirit of the times.

Aurangzeb had great military and financial strength: he had considerable local knowledge, and in the first: instance the same power of confirming or withholding hereditary right as his predecessors in conquest. Titles, Mansabs, and jagirs were bestowed and still more frequently promised with a liberality greater than that of any former conqueror. Still, presumption, jealousy, and bigotry deprived him of many of those advantages. He was not fully aware of the strength of the people fired with the spirit of independence and determined for once to put an end to the spirit of religious intolerance of which he himself was an example incarnate. Instead of crushing it by the aid of the established governments Aurangzeb pulled down the two leading stales of Golkonda and Bijapur and raised nothing in their place. He involved himself with enemies on every side; he disc-barged the soldiery, whom, in addition to his own troops, he could not maintain, and thus sent armies into the field against himself. He supposed that he was not only acquainted with the details of the arrangements necessary in a newly conquered territory, but capable of superintending them. He placed little confidence in his agents, while at the same time he employed Muhammedans in situations for which policy and humanity alike advised the choice of Hindus. The confusion and disorder which followed could not be quieted by the emperor's fancied wisdom or by the flattery and praises of his court and countrymen. Marathas far from being dazzled by the pomp of the Moghal camp soon found the weak points in the magnificence of the emperor. The powerful Satara chiefs Daphle, Ghatge, Mane, and Nimbalkar, during the siege of Bijapur hovered round the imperial camp until the fall of the capital. They then withdrew to their estates, sending their agents with humble professions of duty, and in some eases attending themselves. Still from this time they became unsettled and joined the adventurous parties of their countrymen or submitted to the Moghals as circumstances invited or forced them. Few of those adventurers were independent of Sambhaji's parties or of some of the local chiefs because the Moghal fauzdar's troops were always too strong for an isolated adventurer. While their envoys were in the imperial camp professing obedience to Aurangzeb, the chiefs often sent parties to plunder the Moghal districts. In case of discovery their Brahman agent, who by bribery had secured the patronage of some great man at the Moghal court was ready to answer for or to excuse the irregular conduct of his master's followers. The Moghal fauzdars were told to please the Maratha chiefs on conditions that they agreed to serve the Moghals. The chiefs were negotiating with the jauzdar; their agents were intriguing at court; their own villages were secure; and their followers, hid under the vague name of Marathas, were making the Moghal rule unsettled in the country. The Moghal officers who had land assignments in the Deccan soon found that they could raise little revenue. Their corruption was increased by poverty, and the offenders who in the first instance had plundered their districts by purchasing the connivance of the fauzdars, bribed the jagirdars at court with a part of the village. The hereditary rights and the family feuds which had before usefully served as an instrument of Government, in the general confusion of the period became a cause of increasing disorder. The intricate nature of some of the hereditary claims in dispute and the ingenuity of Brahmans who with their ability to read and write and manage the daftar were usually the managers, made every case so plausible that the officers of Government found little difficulty in excusing or at least in palliating many acts of gross injustice to which they scandalously lent themselves. The rightful owners had often reason for complaint; they absented themselves with their troops, joined the adventurers, and when induced or compelled to come in, they boldly justified their behaviour by the injustice they had suffered.

When an hereditary office was forfeited or became vacant in any way the Moghal government selected a candidate on whom it was conferred; but the established premium of the exchequer was upwards of six and a half years' purchase or precisely 651 per cent, on one year's emoluments, one-fourth of which was made payable at the time of delivering the deed and the remainder by instalments. Besides this tax the clerks exacted an infinite number of fees or perquisites all of which lent encouragement to confiscations and new appointments. The emperor, weighed down by years, was soon overwhelmed with pressing cares; his ministers and their underlings were alike negligent and corrupt; even after deeds and papers were prepared years passed before the orders they contained were carried out [Grant Duff's Marathas,270-273.]. Aurangzeb spent some time for the settlement and restoration at Bijapur. During this time his arms were everywhere successful. In Sambhaji's Deccan districts nothing but the strong forts remained unsubdued (1689). The Moghal troops had possessed themselves of Tathvad and the range of forts built by Shivaji between that place and Panhala, and Aurangzeb was now preparing to enter on a regular plan for reducing the whole of the forts, as, in his opinion, this was all that remained to complete the conquest he had so long meditated. His plans were thwarted by the terrible outbreak of plague which forced him to leave Bijapur and pass north to Akluj in Sholapur.

Rajaram 1689-1700.

[The Marathas gained their first signal victory over the Moghals on 4th June, 1690, when they captured Sharza Khan near Satara with his family, 4,000 horses and the, entire camp and baggage of his army, after slaying 1,500 of his men. Then they recovered several forts namely Prabalgad, Rohida, Rajgad and Torna In 1692 there was a renewal of Maratha activity and their success was conspicuous in many quarters such as the recovery of Panhala. The disaster of Sharza Khan in 1690 compelled the emperor to occupy the Satara district in force, which led to frequent but indecisive conflicts with Santaji Ghorpade, who had made the Mahadev hill the base, and used to raid far to the south and the east (Sarkar in Cambridge History Vol. IV pp. 293-94). ] As has been said before, Sambhaji was surprised at Sangameshvar in 1689 and was carried in triumph to Aurangzeb's camp and subsequently met a heroic death. At Raygad, on the news of his death, his younger brother Rajaram was declared regent during the minority of Sambhaji's son Shivaji afterwards known as Shahu. In 1689 Raygad the Maratha capital fell to the Moghals and young Shivaji and his mother Yesubai were made prisoners and taken to the Moghal camp. Shivaji's sword Bhavani and the sword of Afzal Khan were taken by the Moghals. Yesubai and her son found a friend in Begam Saheb the daughter of Aurangzeb, and the emperor himself became partial to the boy whom he named Shahu. Undaunted by the calamities the Marathas resolved to fight with the Moghals by dividing their own forces and thus widely extending the field of military operations. Rajaram moved from place to place and afterwards made Jinji about eighty miles south-west of Madras his head-quarters. In a fresh arrangement of state offices made at this time Santaji Ghorpade the oldest representative of the Kapshi family was made senapati and was to act as a roving general between Kolhapur and Jinji. He was dignified with the title of Hindu Rav Mamlakat Madar. He was also entrusted with a new standard called the jaripatka or Golden Streamer, and in imitation of the imperial officers of the highest rank he was authorised to beat the naubat or large drum and assume various other signs of rank. Rajaram at this time created a new office called pratinidhi or the King's representative and conferred it on Pralhad Niraji who at this time was the soul of the Maratha cause.

Satara taken by Aurangzeb 1700.

While Rajaram was at Jinji, Ramechandrapant Bavdekar who held the post of Amatva was given the title of Hukmat Panha and was placed in charge of all the forts. He was given all powers of government, and under him was placed Parshuram Trimbak who from the humble situation of hereditary Kulkarni of Kinhai had brought himself into notice and had given proofs of intelligence and spirit. These officers used great exertions in restoring forts and giving spirit and zeal to the garrisons. Ramechandrapant moved from place to place, but fixed his principal residence at Satara, where, by the aid of his head writer Shankaraji Narayan Gandekar. he not only attended to every military disposition, but regulated the revenue and established order. He had raised troops of his own and had cut off several straggling parties of Moghals before Santaji and Dhanaji returned from Jinji. When they joined him Ramechandrapant proposed a plan for surprising the fauzdar at Wai to which, Santaji greatly pleased immediately agreed, took the fauzdar with all his troops prisoners, and in their stead established a Maratha post. The presence of Santaji and Dhanaji inspirited Ramechandrapant's men and he stirred his captains to follow their example. He sent them to make their established collections, the chauth and sardeshmukhi, as they were termed, from the Moghal territory, and under the encouragement of success, his officers added a third contribution for themselves under the head of ghasdana or forage money. In this manner a new army was raised whose leaders were Pavar, Thorat, and Atole. Rajaram gave them honorary presents and rewards; the title of Vishvasrav was conferred on Pavar, of Dinkarrav on Thorat, and of Shamsher Bahadur on Atole. Ramchandrapant was particularly partial to the Dhangars or shepherds, a great number of whom served among his troops; and many of the ancestors of those who afterwards became great chiefs in the empire began their career under Ramechandrapant. Shankaraji Narayan, known as an able officer, received charge of Wai [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, 286. ]. Jinji in which Rajaram was besieged fell to the Moghals in January 1698. But a few days before the fall, Rajaram was allowed to escape and came in safety to Vishalgad in Kolhapur [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, 293.]. In 1699 Rajaram remained for a short time at Satara which at the recommendation of Ramechandrapant he made the seat of government and then passed north with his army plundering [Grant Duffs Marathas, Vol. I, 296. ]. On hearing of Rajaram's return, Aurangzeb inarched west from Brahmapuri in Sholapur and encamped under the fort of Vasantgad about seven miles north-west of Karad. Batteries were prepared and in three days the garrison surrendered. The emperor named the fort Kalied-i-fateh or the Key of Victory and was much pleased with his success. Aurangzeb marched for Satara, a movement wholly unexpected by the Marathas, who, filled with the idea that Panhala in Kolhapur was about to be besieged, had directed all their preparations towards its defence. The provisions in Satara fort were not enough to stand more than a two month's siege. Tin's neglect roused the suspicion that Ramechandrapant had purposely left it unprovided. Of this suspicion Aurangzeb took advantage, and when during the  siege in consequence of Rajaram' s illness, Ramechandrapant was called to Sinhgad in Poona, Aurangzeb wrote a letter which fell into the hands of Parashuram Trimbak and widened the breach which had for some time existed between him and Ramechandrapant. On arriving before Satara Aurangzeb pitched his tents to the north of the fort on the site of the present village of Karanja. Azam Shah was stationed at a village on the west side which has since borne the name of Shahapur. Sharza Khan invested the south side and Tarbiyat Khan occupied the eastern quarter; and chains of posts between the different camps effectually secured the blockade. The fort which occupies the summit of a very steep hill of moderate height, and whose defences consist of a sheer scarp of over forty feet topped by a stone wall, was defended by Prayagji Prabhu Havildar, who had been reared in the service of Shivaji. He vigorously opposed the Moghals, and disputed every foot of ground as they pushed forward their advanced posts. As soon as they began to gain any part of the hill he withdrew his troops into the fort and rolled huge stones from the rock above, which did great execution, and, until they threw up cover, were as destructive as artillery. In spite of Prayagji's efforts the blockade was completed. All communication with the country round was cut off; and as the small stock of grain was soon exhausted, the besieged must have been forced to surrender had not Parashuram Trimbak, who had thrown himself into the fort or Parali, bought the connivance of Azam Shah and brought provisions to the besieged. The divisions on the west and south faces raised batteries, but the grand attack was directed against the north-east angle, one of the strongest points with a total height of sixty-seven feet of which forty-two were rock and twenty-five were masonry.

Tarabai's Regency 1700-1707.

Tarbiyat Khan undertook to mine this angle, and at the end of four months and a half (1700) completed two mines. So confident of success were the Moghals, that the storming party was readily formed, but concealed as much as possible under the brow of the hill from the view of the garrison. Aurangzeb was invited to view the spectacle, and to draw the garrison towards the bastion emperor moved off from that side so that when the match was ready, hundreds of the Marathas, drawn by his splendid retinue crowded to the rampart. The first mine was fired. It must several fissures in the rock, and caused so violent a shock that a great part of the masonry was thrown inwards and crushed many of the garrison in its ruins. The storming party in their eagerness advanced nearer; the match was applied to the train of the second and larger mine, but it was wrongly laid and burst out with a dreadful explosion, destroying, it is said, upwards of 2,000 Moghals on the spot. Prayagji the Maratha commandant was buried in the ruins caused by the first explosion close to a temple dedicated to the goddess Bhavani, but was afterwards dug out alive. His escape was considered a lucky omen, and under other circumstances might have done much to inspirit the garrison to prolong the defence. But as Azam Shah could no longer be persuaded to allow grain to pass into the fort, proposals of surrender were made through him, and the honour of the capture which he so ill-deserved was not only assigned to him, but the place received his name and was called by the emperor Azam Tara. Satara surrendered on 21st April 1700. Immediately on the fall of Satara, Parali was invested. The siege lasted till the beginning of June, when, after a good defence, the garrison left the fort. The fort was called by the emperor Nauras Tara. As the south-west monsoon burst with great violence, the Moghal army, which was unprepared, suffered much distress and hardship before the camp could be moved from the hills. After much loss both of baggage and of life, the army reached Khavaspur on the banks of the Man in Satara, where the rains are comparatively light [Grant Duff's Marathas, 299-300.].

A raid of Rajaram's against Jalna about fifty miles east of Aurangabad was met so vigorously by Zulfikar Khan, the only Moghal general of whom the Marathas then stood in fear, that Rajaram was forced to fly. So hot was the pursuit that though he managed to escape he died of exhaustion at Sinhgad near Poona on 3rd March 1700, more than a month before the fall of Satara [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, 300. ]. The news of Rajaram's death was received in the emperor's camp at Satara with great rejoicing. Tarabai, Rajaram's' elder widow, who, with the aid of Ramechandrapant Amatya had immediately assumed the government for her son Shivaji a boy of ten, raised Parashuram Trimbak to the rank of Pratinidhi, and placed him in general charge of all the forts. Tarabai had no fixed residence [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, 301.]. The mankaris began to profess obedience to the descendant of Shivaji and sometimes joined his standard, but they always plundered on their own account when opportunity offered [Grant Duff's Marathas, 302.].

Aurangzeb, whose reign was prolonged beyond all expectation, persevered to the last in his fruitless endeavours to stifle Maratha independence. In 1701 besides several other forts in Poona and Kolhapur, Chandan, Vandan and Pandugad surrendered to his officers [Grant Duffs Marathas, 303; Elliot and Dowson, V. 370.]. But these apparently vigorous efforts were unsubstantial; there was motion and bustle without zeal or efficiency. The empire was unwieldy, its system relaxed, and its officers corrupt beyond all example. It was inwardly decayed, and ready to fall to pieces as much by its inherent weakness as by the corroding power of the Marathas whom the Muhammedan wars had trained to arms. Though the weakness of the government tempted them to plunder, the Marathas had not yet the feeling of conquerors. There was a common sympathy but no common effort; their military spirit was excited by plunder, more than by patriotism. Many enjoyed greater advantages under the weak Moghals than they were likely to enjoy under a strong Maratha government and these were eager that war should not cease. Many Moghal officers in charge of districts were in the pay of both parties, and they also had no wish that the confusion should end. Parties of Marathas in the service of the Moghals met, rioted, and feasted with their countrymen, and at parting or when passing within hearing of each other used to mock the Muhammedans by uttering an alhamdalilah-praise be to Alla, and praying for long life to the glorious Alamgir whose mode of warfare made their life so easy.

Some of the Moghal officers were anxious to negotiate a peace and Kam Bakhsha, the favourite son of the emperor, whose early plans were directed to the establishment of an independent kingdom at Bijapur, contrived to obtain the emperor's consent to open a negotiation with Dhanaji Jadhav. Overtures were begun by proposals for releasing Shahu, the son of Sambhaji. The negotiations proceeded and for a few days Aurangzeb had been brought to agree to pay ten per cent, of the whole revenue: of the six subhas of the Deccan as sardeshmukhi for which the Marathas were to engage to maintain order with a body of horse. On the news of the concession, the Marathas, who, notwithstanding their predatory practices were exceedingly eager to have any right formally recognised, flocked to Dhanaji's camp. With their increasing numbers their expectations and their insolence rose. Their tone changed from prayer to demand, they crowded near the camp, and when they required honorary dresses for seventy officers, Aurangzeb suspected treachery, broke off the negotiations, and recalled his ambassador. Soon after he left the Maratha camp the Moghal ambassador was attacked, and as this confirmed the emperor's suspicion of treachery he withdrew to the cast. [Grant Duffs Marathas, 306.]

In 1705 Tarabai went to live at Panhala in Kolhapur and admitted Ramechandrapant to a very large share of power. In the following year Vasahtgad and Satara were taken by the Pratinidhi, Parashuram Trimbak. Satara was surprised by the artifice of a Brahman named Annajipant. This man had escaped from prison at Jinji and assumed the character of a mendicant devotee. He fell in with a party of Moghal infantry marching to relieve the Satara garrison, amused them with stories and songs, obtained alms from them, and so ingratiated himself with all that they brought him with them, admitted him into the fort and in reward for his wit allowed him to live there. Annajipant, who had been a writer attached to a body of Mavli Infantry, saw that with the aid of a few of his old friends the place might be surprised. He watched his chance, told Parashuram Trimbak of his design, and having introduced a body of Mavlis into the fort the enterprising man seized the opportunity to put every man of the garrison to the sword. [Grant Duff's Marathas, 308.]

TOP